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Learning English vocabulary at the university level: some considerations for objectives, strategies and outcomes

Brendan Rodda

この論文は、日本の大学における英語学習者むけ語彙学習プログラムを紹介する。外国語学習者の語彙習得の分野の研究を総説する。プログラムの目的、習得方法、アセスメントは研究の主要な結果に基づいている。

This paper outlines a program of vocabulary study for students of English language at Japanese universities. The literature on vocabulary acquisition among second language learners is reviewed. Salient findings in the literature form the basis of the objectives, learning strategies and assessment methods that comprise the program.

Learning thousands of words in a foreign language is a long and difficult process, one of the most demanding of all the tasks facing language learners. While incoming students in English programs at universities in Japan might already know basic vocabulary, they need to learn thousands more words in order to reach an advanced level of proficiency in the language. A task of that magnitude takes years of effort. It cannot be achieved in a one-semester course nor will it happen simply by sitting in English classes for four years, without conscious attention to the task from teachers or students. The need for planning of vocabulary study and coordination among courses is a corollary of those points.

Yet vocabulary learning is often approached in haphazard ways in university English programs. Typically, there is subjective selection of words by teachers and students (Waring, 2002), lack of instruction in learning strategies (ibid) and over-reliance on incidental learning (Meara, 1995). Furthermore, coordination of vocabulary learning across courses is almost completely absent. As Sanaoui states (1995, p.25), there is a need "to increase awareness that [vocabulary learning] is an important pedagogical focus to be incorporated into the curriculum."

Rather than leave it up to the student, the individual teacher, or the vagaries of the classroom environment, a vocabulary program based on comprehensive planning of study is necessary for students to optimise their learning in this area. Ideally, such an approach to vocabulary learning would specify which words would be learnt, how and when they would be learnt and how the learning would be assessed. The program would require considerable coordination across the curriculum. However, it would not require specialised vocabulary classes or even much more time given to vocabulary study in existing classes. The program proposed here recommends instruction in vocabulary learning strategies for students—which would take a small amount of class time—and suggests some minor changes to class materials but most of the study would be done by students outside of class.

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Vocabulary Objectives

Before deciding on a suitable number of words for university students to learn, it is useful to consider some other vocabulary levels: the level of students when they enter university and the level of native speakers' vocabulary—that is, where the students are coming from and where they are heading towards. Educated native speakers know about 20,000 words, according to one conservative estimate (Goulden et al, 1990, cited in Nation, 2001). Incoming students of English at Japanese universities have only a small fraction of that knowledge. Research done at Kanda University of International Studies (KUIS) in Chiba showed that incoming students on average had good results on Nation's (2001) test of receptive knowledge of the 2000-word level but poor results on the test of the 3000-word level, which suggested that the average number of English words known by incoming students was between 2000 and 3000 (Van Moere, personal communication). KUIS is a reasonably high-level university; at other universities, the average vocabulary level of incoming students might be a little lower, perhaps between 1500 and 2000 words.

Of course, it is almost impossible for a student to go from the average incoming level of vocabulary knowledge to anywhere near the level of a native speaker in four years of study at university. Even the 10,000-word level would not be a useful objective for most students because of the low likelihood of achieving it. What, then, would be a suitable level? Although students spend fewer years in university than in secondary school, there is much greater emphasis on English and more exposure to it in university English programs. As such, it is reasonable to expect that students will more than double their vocabulary knowledge during their time at university, especially if they make use of vocabulary learning strategies (see below), rather than relying on the most common means of learning—rote memorisation and incidental learning.

This suggests that knowledge of about 5000 English words is an attainable objective for university students. It is probably greater than the current average vocabulary level of graduates in most English programs at Japanese universities. Such an advance on current levels of acquisition is not without its challenges—for students and teachers—but it would not be overly demanding. The 5000-word level results in considerably better comprehension of authentic communication than the 2000-word level. Corpus studies show that, for learners with a knowledge of the most frequent 5000 words, the number of unknown words in authentic written and spoken texts is close to half the number of unknown words for learners with a vocabulary of only 2000 words (Nation, 2001). That might not seem like a substantial difference, but the decrease in unknown words corresponds to much better comprehension because the relationship between unknown words and lack of comprehension of a text is more exponential than linear. Not only does the 5000-word level bring better comprehension of authentic texts but it also makes it more likely that learners will be able to guess from context the meaning of unknown words.

It is not enough, however, simply to settle on a certain number of words without consideration of which words should be learnt. Careful attention needs to be paid to the selection of words. The main criterion should be frequency of use in authentic texts. This ensures that students are likely to hear or read the words in their communication in English, thereby understanding more of the communication and at the same time reinforcing their knowledge of the words. However, students cannot consistently identify frequent words by themselves. Even teachers' impressions of word frequency are not always accurate. It is safer—and easier—to use a list from a large-scale corpus study, such as the University of Birmingham's

Bank of English. This corpus is based on many tens of thousands of authentic written and spoken texts from Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia and contains 450 million running words (University of Birmingham, 2005).

As well as word frequency, students' need and interests should be a factor in selection. In the case of Japanese university students, their needs might include academic vocabulary and vocabulary that often appears on the TOEIC test. Academic vocabulary can be taken from the Academic Word List—a list of 570 words that often appear in academic texts (Coxhead, 1998, cited in Nation, 2001). As for students' interests, multiplicity makes it impossible to cover these in one general list. However, if students were required to add a certain number of words to a list by themselves, they would be able to include, as part of their formal vocabulary study, words related to their interests. Allowing for student input based on personal interest in this way introduces more autonomy and active learning into the process and is likely to raise students' motivation for vocabulary study (Dornyei, 2001).

One other factor that should be taken into account in the selection of words is ease of acquisition. If certain words are easier for students to learn, then giving those words more priority, somewhat independent of their frequency, makes sense because students are able to acquire more vocabulary from the same amount of study. Not only would that raise their English level, but the quick progress could also increase motivation (Dornyei, 2001) and would boost confidence. Some words that might be easier to learn include—among others—cognates of gairaigo (loanwords in Japanese) from English. The benefits of gairaigo seem to have been largely ignored by English teachers in Japan. In fact, gairaigo have probably attracted more attention for the potential problems that they pose. Nicholls (2003) points out that many gairaigo have phonological differences and some have semantic differences from their English cognates. She claims that it is a challenge for Japanese learners of English to override the interference from their L1 and learn the English cognates. That is a fairly common assertion among language teachers and researchers in Japan. However, Daulton (1998) found that Japanese high school and university students performed better on receptive and productive tests of English cognates of gairaigo than they did on tests of non-cognates. Ringbom (2007) points out that language acquisition is usually better when the L2 is related to the L1 and one reason for this is the large number of similar words. He states that "learners should be guided to make use of the built-in lexicon, gairaigo, which provides a powerful tool for more effective learning" (p.4-5). Of course, gairaigo do present some possible pitfalls—slight pronunciation and semantic differences—for learners but overcoming them is probably much easier than learning a new word the usual way—that is, by establishing a connection between a new combination of phonemes and a meaning, a process that fails more often than it succeeds (Waring, 2002).

Strategies

Over the past two decades, researchers in second language acquisition have investigated the effectiveness of various learning strategies for vocabulary acquisition. These strategies include rote rehearsal, the context method, semantic mapping, the keyword method and visual aids. Despite some inconsistencies among the results of the studies, it is clear that some of the strategies are more effective than rote memorisation. Unfortunately, teachers and learners rarely use these strategies and tend to rely on rote memorisation or incidental learning through exposure to new words in communication.

With the advent of communicative language teaching in the 1970s and '80s, incidental learning gained cachet among language teachers because it derived from the use of language to communicate, without a focus on form. However, there are several disadvantages to relying on incidental learning of English vocabulary at the university level. Incidental learning requires certain conditions which rarely occur spontaneously in university classrooms or materials. Firstly, multiple exposures—about 5 to 15—to a new word are usually required for acquisition (Crothers & Suppes, 1967; Tinkham, 1993, cited in Nation, 2001). Furthermore, exposure needs to occur in texts where learners know at least 95% of the words (Liu & Nation, 1985, cited in Nation, 2001), though 98% seems to be optimal for learning (Coady & Nation, 1988, cited in Nation, 2001). For students to learn 3000 words in this way, teachers would have to prepare materials of about 600,000 words in length (3000 new words x 10 exposures each x 20 known words for each new word). That is over 1600 A4 pages of very carefully written text! As well as the vocabulary issues, grammatical constraints would probably also need to be considered in preparing the materials, making the preparation even more difficult. Clearly, such an approach is beyond the capability (not to mention willingness) of most universities' English language faculties. It might be claimed that graded readers could easily perform the same function but any series of graded readers would only contain a small fraction of the target words of a university program and those words that do appear would rarely be repeated a sufficient number of times for acquisition to take place. From the students' point of view, incidental learning takes a lot of time and effort and might not be a very reliable means of increasing vocabulary, all of which has negative effects on motivation. However, despite the drawbacks, incidental learning should—and inevitably does—play a role in vocabulary learning. Although it should not be the mainstay of a vocabulary program, it can complement other learning strategies. Students should be encouraged to do extensive reading and listening, especially with texts that are close to their level. They will acquire some new words this way and reinforce and develop their knowledge of previously learnt words, as well as improve other English skills.

The context method has some similarities to incidental learning. The method involves learners reading a new word and its definition or translation and then reading three or so simple sentences in which the word appears. It differs from incidental learning in that there is a focus on form—i.e., learners are encouraged to notice the word, think about it and remember it—and the exposures are more concentrated in time than is usual with incidental learning. From the perspective of students and material writers, the method is much more convenient than incidental learning while offering many of the benefits. Crow and Quigley (1985, cited in Brown & Perry, 1991) tested similar semantic-based strategies and found them to be more effective than rote memorisation. Brown and Perry (1991) and Wang and Thomas (1995) found that context method groups outperformed keyword method groups, though in Brown and Perry's study the difference was not significant. In contrast to those positive findings, Lawson and Hogben (1996) found that the use of strategies similar to the context method correlated poorly with recall of words on a post-test. Overall, though, the context method's good results in other studies suggest that it has some part to play in facilitating vocabulary acquisition. It might be that it is better suited to later stages of a word's acquisition. Used then, it can add durability to the acquisition and provide deeper understanding of meaning and usage.

The keyword method is a mnemonic technique that has consistently achieved good results in vocabulary acquisition studies. It involves matching a target word in

the L2 with a similar sounding word—known as the keyword—from the L1. The meanings of the two words are then combined in one mental image or sentence, called the keyword image. For example, a Japanese speaker trying to learn the English word "mud" could use "mado"—meaning "window"—as the keyword and then imagine a window covered with mud. The method aims to assist acquisition of vocabulary by creating associations for the form and meaning of the target word with existing semantic and phonological knowledge. Gruneberg (1998) claimed that about 50 studies have found that it facilitates vocabulary acquisition, with only about five studies failing to find an advantage. McDaniel and Pressley (1989) found it to be more effective than the context method. In a study involving Japanese university students, Rodda (forthcoming) also found that the keyword method was significantly more effective than the context method for immediate acquisition and long-term retention. In the study, the main advantage of the keyword method was at the stage of initial acquisition where vocabulary learning using other strategies often fails—as Waring (2002) puts it, "Initial word knowledge is very fragile." (p.11) The keyword method seems to overcome this problem by making semantic and phonological connections from the new word to existing knowledge in the L1. Furthermore, although there have been concerns that the keyword method is not suitable for abstract words, Rodda found that the keyword method resulted in significantly more acquisition of abstract words than the context method did. It is clear from the combined evidence of many studies, that the keyword method is a powerful strategy for learning vocabulary. As a bonus, it might also be more interesting for students than other forms of vocabulary study (Avila & Sadoski, 1996). Its widespread use would probably boost acquisition considerably among university students.

Another feature of Rodda's study with Japanese university students was a comparison of the effectiveness of Japanese translations and simple English explanations of new words. Students were far more likely to remember words that were presented with a Japanese translation than those with an English explanation. This suggests that English-only policies for language classes might not be the best approach at universities. Although an explanation in English of a new word gives students slightly more English exposure, it seems to do so at the expense of vocabulary acquisition. This view is supported to a degree by Yoshii's (2006) study of vocabulary acquisition among Japanese university students reading English texts. He found some benefits for the use of Japanese glosses for unknown English words in comparison with the use of English glosses. In particular, the Japanese glosses resulted in significantly less forgetting of learned words. Although more research needs to be done, the above two studies indicate that the use of Japanese translations might be important when introducing new vocabulary to students.

Review is an important part of all vocabulary learning, whether it is incidental or intentional learning. Waring (2002) points out that, "It is easier to forget a word than remember it"(p.11). Griffin (1992, cited in Nation, 2001) found that this forgetting begins soon after the first learning session. In order to counter the 'forgetting curve,' many researchers (e.g. Baddeley, 1990; Pimsleur, 1967) recommend spaced repetition, which involves reviewing each new word at gradually longer intervals. For example, a word could be reviewed one day after the first learning session, then again three days later, followed by a third review session a week after the second one and so on. Spaced repetition is one of the best-supported recommendations in vocabulary research, yet in practice it is rarely followed. Although teachers often recycle new vocabulary in lessons, it is difficult for them to achieve multiple reviews at gradually longer intervals for a large

number of words. As for students, few of them, even if they are motivated, have the high level of organisational skills needed to keep track of review times for hundreds of words. Fortunately computers can facilitate spaced repetition quite well. There are several software programs (e.g. SuperMemo and Mnemosyne) that present study materials to users for easy and fast review at appropriate times based on the principle of spaced repetition. Although anecdotal, there are reports of high school and university students achieving very good results with vocabulary acquisition using spaced repetition software (e.g. Szynalski, n.d.). Such reports are not surprising given the solid findings in second language acquisition—and psychology research, in general—for the benefits of spaced repetition.

Rote rehearsal is another strategy that deserves consideration in any vocabulary program. It is a simple and fast strategy that involves repeatedly saying the target word out loud for about 10 seconds. Several studies have found benefits for the strategy. Ellis and Beaton (1993) found that rote rehearsal was more effective than the keyword method for productive knowledge of vocabulary. Ellis and Sinclair (1996) found that use of rote rehearsal resulted in better scores on tests of receptive and productive knowledge of words than the use of silent rote memorisation. They attribute the success of the method to its maintenance of the new word in the phonological short-term memory for longer than is normally the case, thus promoting long-term retention. Learners seem to use rote rehearsal often of their own accord. Lawson and Dogben's (1996) study of strategies used spontaneously by learners in vocabulary study found that rehearsal of the word was a frequent strategy and that it correlated significantly with success on a post-test of vocabulary. Although, in general, rote rehearsal does not seem to be as effective as the keyword method, the above studies show that it is a valuable strategy. Given its ease and speed of use, it should be included in vocabulary learning programs. It is probably most valuable at the initial stage of acquisition—the first learning session for a word—when the transition to long-term memory is most prone to failure. It might also be worth using at a later stage in the acquisition of each word, when it can promote the advance from receptive to productive knowledge.

Many researchers who have investigated vocabulary learning strategies have concluded that the most effective approach involves using several strategies to learn each word. Wang and Thomas (1999, p285), who studied acquisition from the perspective of cognitive psychology, stated that "the most optimal training program may include a variety of strategies." Brown and Perry (1991), found that a combination of the context and keyword methods was more effective than either one alone. Lawson and Hogben (1996), observing students learning L2 words, found that:

> …there was a strong tendency for those students employing many strategies for word learning to recall more word definitions than those students employing fewer strategies. (p.121)

The robust agreement on this point should not be ignored. Clearly, a good vocabulary program makes use of a variety of learning strategies.

Outcomes

In an ideal world, after receiving a list of words to learn and instruction in learning strategies, university students would diligently and carefully go about learning the words. Reality, though, is rarely so rosy. Robb (2002), in discussing self-directed learning among students at Japanese universities, claims that it is not very

effective without assessment because most students are not autonomous learners. Without assessment of the acquisition of words on the vocabulary list of this program, only a very small percentage of students will make an effort to learn all of the words. Some students might learn a few of the words and give up. Others would forget about the list as soon as they received it. Of course, they would learn some of the words anyway, through incidental learning in class or rote memorisation of words for tests in individual classes. But the whole purpose of the vocabulary program proposed here is to advance from such haphazard approaches and modest results. So, assessment with consequences—positive and negative—is necessary in order to ensure students make the efforts that the program requires.

In Japanese universities, vocabulary acquisition is typically assessed in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most common way is the vocabulary quiz, written by a class's teacher and based on words that have appeared in earlier lessons. There is sampling of the content so not all new words are tested. Furthermore, students do not need to answer each question correctly; often, answering only half of the questions correctly is considered an acceptable result. Vocabulary might also be assessed as one component of presentations or essays. In such cases, there are no clear objectives for students and assessment tends to be based on the impressions of raters. What all the above methods of assessment fail to do is determine what words students know. This is only partially determined by in-class quizzes because many new words are not included on the quizzes. Even that partial information of students' vocabulary knowledge is soon lost as it is converted into a test score and then mixed with other assessment scores for a course grade at the end of the semester. With such assessment procedures, it would not be possible to determine whether students have achieved the objectives of the vocabulary program.

Rather than the usual forms of assessment, outcomes-based methods of assessment seem preferable. Based on performance and with the purpose of determining what learners can actually do in the language, these approaches developed out of the broader communicative language testing movement, which emerged in the 1970s. On a practical level, the trend towards this kind of assessment has also been advanced by demands for clear vocational standards. Rather than giving marks or grades, outcomes-based assessment typically gives either a pass or fail—i.e., either the student can do this or cannot do it (Brindley, 1994). Furthermore, there is no sampling of objectives; all objectives are assessed (ibid).

Docking (1994) outlines many benefits of outcomes-based approaches. He claims that certification decisions are more easily justified because they are based on real standards rather than a normative basis. Outcomes-based approaches result not only in better assessment but the clear specification of expected outcomes enhances teaching and learning. Although some view outcomes-based approaches as too prescriptive and likely to diminish student autonomy, Docking claims that they encourage learners to take more responsibility for their learning, leading to self-directed and active learning. There is some support for this in Dornyei's (2001) claim that clear and specific objectives increase student motivation. Dornyei goes on to claim that if objectives are challenging but realistic, they increase students' motivation, which should lead to better achievement, according with Docking's claim that outcomes-based approaches can raise standards. One other benefit of this kind of assessment is that students get clear information about their areas of weakness (Brindley, 1998) and can therefore take steps to improve them.

Although the standard use of communication tasks in outcomes-based assessment would not be practical for vocabulary assessment, the principle of requiring proof of proficiency with all objectives in outcomes-based assessment is

consistent with the aims of the program. What that translates to in the context of the program is a requirement for students to show they understand each word in the program by the end of their time at university. Given the need to test knowledge of all the words on the list, assessment would be somewhat time-consuming for both students and teachers. Ideally, students would be able to take the tests when they like and be able to retake tests of failed objectives multiple times until they pass.

Conclusion

Judging from average acquisition in secondary school, students in English programs at Japanese universities should be able to extend their vocabulary knowledge to 4000 words simply using the same methods of rote memorisation and incidental learning. If they make use of more effective strategies—such as the keyword method, rote rehearsal, spaced repetition and the context method—they could quite easily reach the 5000-word level.

The words that they learn should be primarily the most frequent English words. Perhaps 3500 words on the vocabulary list would be chosen on the basis of frequency—that is, the 3500 most frequent words in a corpus, such as the Bank of English. As students probably learn most of the first 2000 words in secondary school, they would learn the next 1500 most frequent words at university. A further 500 words would come from the Academic Word List and 500 from gairaigo or other words that are easy to learn. The remaining 500 words could be chosen by each student based on personal interests and needs.

In order to ensure optimal learning, students would be instructed in the use of effective strategies for vocabulary learning. They would receive materials that facilitate the use of the strategies—e.g. vocabulary lists with keywords and keyword images. The context method and rote rehearsal would also be encouraged. Students would also have access to software programs that provide review with spaced repetition. Some target words could be added to class materials so that incidental learning would complement other strategies. Although instruction in how to use the strategies would take place in class, most of the learning would be done outside of class. Because the above strategies lead to faster learning, the program would not place great demands on students' time—about 90 minutes a week would be enough. Using the strategies, students would make considerably greater gains in vocabulary acquisition, leading to better English proficiency, more confidence in their learning ability and possibly more motivation to learn (Covington, 1998, cited in Dornyei, 2001).

Outcomes-based assessment is most congruent with the approach of the program—that is, specification of clear objectives that could and should be attained by all students. In assessment, it is worth making a distinction between receptive and productive knowledge of words. Because productive knowledge is more difficult, tests of production should come at a later stage. The overall objective of the 5000-word level could be broken down by year level to enhance student motivation (Dornyei, 2001) as well as management of the program. For example, first-year students would need to show receptive knowledge of the 3000-word level, second-year students the 4000-word level, third-year students the 5000-word level and fourth-year students would need to show productive knowledge of the 5000-word level.

The vocabulary program proposed here is based on strong findings in research and the views of several leading researchers. It is not a very difficult program for teachers to implement or for students to follow yet it would result in

considerably greater acquisition of vocabulary. In turn, we could reasonably expect that it would lead to higher English proficiency, better achievement in English content courses and better TOEIC results. Other benefits could include more motivation and self-directed learning among students. While we should not expect too much from the program, the research suggests that a little effort along these lines would lead to impressive rewards.

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Teacher trainees learning through action research

Anne McLellan Howard and Russell Fauss with Chie Kuroda, Ryuichi Nakahara, Aya Arimura and Naoko Tagami

本研究論文は、日本において英語のみで授業を行う教師のための研修プログラムで用いられる実地研究プロジェクトについて述べている。研修生となる学生は、１回の教育実習を基に各自の研究テーマを選んだ。その後小規模の研究を計画し、テーマに関する調査を行った上で２回目の授業を行った。指導者はプロジェクトに組織的な問題があることに気付いたが、学生は役に立つし有意義だと感じた。ここでは学生が行ったプロジェクトの４例を紹介する。

This paper describes an action research project that was used in an English-medium teacher-training program in Japan. Trainees chose their own subjects of research, based on one teaching event. They planned a small piece of research, investigated the subject, and then taught a second class. The instructors found that, although there were logistical problems with the project, the students found it helpful and rewarding. Four examples of student projects are included.

> "Action research is a very effective way of helping teachers to reflect on their teaching and to come up with their own alternatives to improve their practice." (Tsui, 1993, p.173)

Many people would say that reflection is an integral part of teacher training, yet teaching trainees to reflect is not easy. The task becomes even more difficult when the trainees are Japanese L1 speakers being trained in English, with very little experience in the classroom. This project was conceived to help trainees through these difficulties, while encouraging autonomy. Through simple projects based on the principles of action research, trainees can practice a systematic, data-based way of examining their own teaching. They can also learn ways of improving their own teaching, resources for information on teaching, and skills that may last for their professional lifetime.

Background

This project was done at Miyazaki International College, in which all the classes are taught in English. As part of the Teacher Certification (TC) Program, students take a course in English Teaching Methodologies. This course consists of two classroom hours per week and one teaching practice per semester at a local high school, Miyazaki Gakuen (also referred to as "Miyagaku" in this paper). The teaching practice is done in a group, with each student responsible for a short section and other students assisting, for two forty-five minute sessions of a class called General English.

Trainees prepare for the class in their groups, with some input from the instructor. They then teach the class, with the MIC instructor, the high school instructor, and one other group of MIC students observing and giving feedback. The students are expected to reflect on their lesson by talking to observers, collecting feedback and, in the second semester, watching a videotape of their teaching.

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First year of the project

Last year, I [Howard] taught the second semester of the course for the first time. Some problems had arisen in the first semester of the course. First, in their reflections students sometimes seemed to be simply repeating the advice they had been given by their observers. Second, it was not clear whether the observers were able to give advice on matters of concern to the trainees. The main problem that trainees had was discipline, which other trainees do not have the experience to give advice on. Finally, we wondered whether we had shown the trainees how to critcally reflect on their own teaching without reports from observers.

The trainees prepared by doing an exercise where they read various steps of the action research process: identifying a problem, looking at data for more information, hypothesizing a solution to the problem, and testing the hypothesis. Trainees read each step in groups, and then brainstormed what the next step would be. After this, they had a brainstorming session to identify areas of concern in their own teaching (they had taught one class at this point). At the brainstorming session, students came up with many interesting ideas and ambitious ways of investigating them. However, as the semester went one, we were able to give less and less class time to the project, and enthusiasm fell off.

Second year

In the second year, we decided to make it a full-year project. Trainees were introduced to the idea of action research in the first semester after having done their first teaching. They then wrote their ideas for their own action research as part of the first reflection paper. In the second semester, they turned in a step-by-step plan for their research with their lesson plan, and wrote their results in the final paper. It is important to point out that this project does not fit the rigor of an actual action research project. With only two teaching events, it was not possible for the trainees to collect enough data to have confidence in the results of their research. However, the trainees were able to discover some solutions to problems they were experiencing.

Here are four examples of student projects. Some corrections have been made for grammar and length, but the language is largely the students' own.

Seating arrangements—Chie Kuroda

> When I was teaching at Miyagaku for the first time, I noticed that students behaved or reacted differently when they sat individually from when they sat in a group. I assumed that there would be some connection between students' behaviors and seating arrangements. That is why I chose how seating arrangement affects students as my Action Research topic.
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> First, I found three types of seating arrangements: "lockstep," "pair work" and "group work" (Harmer, 1989). Lockstep is the seating style where every student faces front, and this is the traditional teaching arrangement. In this seating style it can be easy for teachers to control the class, and students to concentrate. However, students have little chance to practice or talk. In the pair work arrangement each student has a partner, and they can take part in the class or use the target language more than lockstep. Students also have more chance to practice than lockstep, and they can solve problems together. At the same time all of the students can use the target language freely so it will be difficult for teachers to correct all students' errors in the class, and students will speak loudly so there can be noise and lack of discipline. Group work can be used for oral work, reading and writing tasks, cooperative writing, and so on. It has the same advantages and disadvantages as pair

work. In addition to those, teachers also will have difficulty in selection of group members.

After the research, I thought that lockstep, the individual seating style, can be for giving information to all the students at once, encouraging individual ideas, and solving questions by students without any help; such as for tests. I assumed that pair work is for letting students compare and exchange their ideas, and to work together. Group work can be for cooperative tasks.

At Miyagaku I did two activities using group work, one individual task and one pair work activity. In the first group work students compared what they answered for their homework. Next, the teachers asked questions to students one by one for the individual work. After that, we did the second group work playing "Whisper Game." In this game students could help each other. Finally, students had a writing task for pair work.

From the teaching, I found that students were well motivated and enjoyed the lesson in both group work activities. Sometimes they were so active that it was hard for us to control the class. On the other hand, students were very quiet in lockstep and pair work. There were only a few students who could tell their ideas voluntarily when we asked students to tell their ideas to the class. I think that the differences might have been caused by the seating arrangements. Students may not have confidence about their answers or ideas. If they are in a group, they can discuss them and check whether they are right or wrong before saying them in front of other classmates. I think pair work is kind of middle point between lockstep and group work. In pair work students can feel more confident than in lockstep, but they might feel less confident than in a group.

In addition to the above points, chatting among students happened all the time, and students spoke Japanese most of the time, even though teachers taught in English. I think that may be caused by teaching skill. The seating arrangement may be one of the causes, because chatting was more often seen in the group work and less in the pair work and lockstep, but I have already learned how to react to these students' behaviors and I was supposed to be able to solve them. However, I could not. I think it was lack of experience. I realized that teaching is not simple.

Teachers' comments

The fact that group work encourages talking and individual work makes students quieter will come as no surprise to an experienced teacher. It is interesting that, although Chie has had ample experience of group, pair, and individual work as a student in her MIC classes, this project made her look at these as a teacher, perhaps for the first time. Probably the value of this research lies more in the fact that Chie discovered for herself one solution to the problem of students who will not voluntarily speak in class. Although she does end with the idea that her own lack of teaching experience is the cause of discipline problems in her class, she may have gained more of a feeling of control over one aspect of classroom management.

Students' Motivation—Ryuichi Nishihara

The definition of the "motivation" in English class is the students' willingness to study and try to use English. The students who are motivated have a big interest in learning English. This willingness brings a positive attitude from the students. For example, they will concentrate on class and do homework. In addition, the teacher can control students easier and the class will have a good atmosphere.

According to Lightbown and Spada (1999), motivation comes from communicative needs. If students need to speak English in the English speaking community or they have some opportunities to speak English with native speakers, they are motivated to learn or acquire the language. When they say their opinions or ideas in a communicative situation, their identities are recognized, and this makes them motivated.

Moreover, Lightbown and Spada (1999) mention some techniques to make students motivated. If students have the same pattern in class, they may be bored. The first step is to break the class routine. The teacher can use different types of activities, materials and tasks. Changing the pace and rhythm can also change the class routine. It means that teacher speaks faster or more slowly depending on the class atmosphere, and pays attention to the timing when moving to a new activity. The second technique is to use co-operative and competitive goals effectively. When students have group activity, each student is responsible for completing the project. Without all members' working together, the project cannot be completed. If students have a race or competition, they will be motivated because almost all students want to win in the competitions.

Based on those ideas, my group made our lesson plan and tried some techniques and original activities in our Miyagaku teaching. Our activities were a listening activity and translating activity. In the listening activity, we used American, Japanese and Indian English. Students answered questions and guessed where the speakers come from. In this activity, students were able to experience real English directly. In Japanese English education, only American English (sometimes British English) is taught, so students have never heard other kinds of English. However, in real English community, we meet many varieties of English, so this challenge makes the classroom more communicative. Actually, this activity was little bit difficult for them, but they seemed to enjoy it and to be interested in learning English.

In the translating activity, students translated one part of the lyrics of the song "You're Beautiful," into Miyazaki dialect. When I asked students whether they like translating, no one said they liked it. However, they concentrated on this activity, enjoyed it and translated very well. The advantage of this activity is that students' individual identities are recognized through their dialects. This activity focused on the contents of the song, not to the meaning, and their language that they use in their daily life. There are many different answers and no correct answers in this activity, so they were able to have confidence to translate.

To motivate students, there are many techniques and ideas. The best way is to care about student's feelings, decrease the pressure to study and make actual goals.

Teachers' comments

Motivating students is, along with discipline, one of the issues of most concern to the trainees. Although Ryuichi has learned many techniques for motivating students in his time in the TC program, through this research he was able to approach it from the standpoint of the students' identity. Since Ryuichi is also a speaker of a Japanese dialect, he was also able to put something of himself into the research.

Directing students' attention–Aya Arimura

How do teachers direct students' attention? When I went to Miyagaku in the last semester, which was my first time to teach in a real situation, I struck a snag in directing student's attention, which I had never considered before teaching. To make students interested in teaching or

teachers at the beginning of the class, to make students listen to us, and to move on to next activity smoothly, we need to pay attention to this issue. I believe it is the secret of successful teaching.

In the Miyagaku teaching I identified five techniques to get students attention: using a loud voice, clapping hands twice or three times, telling students that I will call one of them to the front after the explanation, tapping a student's shoulder, and standing behind a student silently. These are good for both the whole class and for individuals. All of these techniques came from my observation of teachers.

First of all, I used a loud voice to get students attention and to show my authority in the beginning of class. I wanted students to think I am a teacher, not a college student. It was a very good start. Observers also said it and some students whispered that I seemed a real teacher. Through the teaching I kept using a loud voice to whole class. When another teacher was trying to get the attention from the whole class, I used two techniques, which were using a loud voice and clapping hands. I thought just using the loud voice might become 'shouting.' Therefore to lessen the loud voice, I used the second technique. When I did it, students looked at me, and tried to listen to the teacher. I thought it was easy to hear the sound of clapping hands for the students.

Secondly in my plan, I told them that some students from each group would have to come up to the front and present stories that they got when they started working on their task. Through observing the last class, I noticed that the students show attention or are more interested in their classmates than in teachers. It seemed to work well; however, some students practiced speaking while others were presenting their stories. For this kind of students I used other techniques, which were tapping student's shoulder and standing behind a student silently. I also told to the whole class that they would have a quiz in the second class. As a result, when I used these techniques they realized they have to listen to others for the quiz.

As a consequence of the research in Miyagaku, I found things I did not predict. I thought about the techniques which could be used for both for prevention and after a problem happens to get students' attention directly. Of course it is the best thing to get attention before a problem happens. I predicted the most effective technique for this is to tell students that I will call someone up to the platform. As I mentioned earlier, I found that students were usually quiet and paid attention to their classmates when some of them were in front of the class. Unexpectedly, 'using a big voice' was the most effective way to get direct students' attention to teachers and their task. Of course, two techniques of clapping hands and standing silently worked for individuals. When I used these two techniques students tended to try to understand teacher's instruction.

However, after teaching, I felt very tired. I think it is the next issue for me: to manage/change a volume of my voice. It is also important to consider in what situation I should use a loud voice. I believe it is still effective to use a loud voice, because it also has the effect of showing authority. I think it is good to use it in the first two weeks of teaching. However, I predict students would become afraid of me and of learning English if I continue using the loud voice in every class. Therefore, after the first two weeks past, the teacher can reduce using the loud voice in the class.

Teachers' comments

Although we might question whether the use of a loud voice is an effective technique for teachers in the long run, we recognized its value in helping this student teacher get the attention and respect from her students that she desired. We

encourage Aya to continue to experiment and discover effective ways of managing the class.

Making students more active—Naoko Tagami

The topic of my action research project was that both teachers and students can create a positive and active learning class together. That is, I wanted most of the students to participate in the class actively and willingly. I realized that some students seemed to have little interest and participation in the class during our previous Miyagaku teaching. This time, I wanted to analyze what we can do to solve those issues through actualizing my ideas in teaching at Miyagaku.

Students should express and share their ideas and opinions freely. This was my main goal because today's students seem afraid of giving "wrong" answers; this can make students too passive about speaking. So, we briefly recommended useful expressions as "What does __ mean?" or "How do you spell __?" However, this plan was not so helpful. Only a few students used the expressions in English, or students mostly said, "I can't understand." or "Is it correct?" in Japanese. So, we also should have used other concrete plans as displaying the expressions or giving points when students used them in English.

Meanwhile, we kept a warm mood while using points or praise. This plan was helpful because several students volunteered in order to get points, and even students who made mistakes raised their hands again. Some students actually started competing to give answers after we started praising. I hope students could get confidence and start to feel pleasure in expressing themselves through this plan.

Students get more input from interesting materials or ones that are connected to their lives. After listening to Martin Luther King Jr. 's dream speech, students worked on free writing. At that time, they created their own sentences about their dreams, using the pattern "I have a dream that . . . ." This plan was most helpful. Most students seemed to work enjoyably and hard. Even a boy who often slept in class wrote his sentences. We also spent time interacting with students and got many questions. According to an observer, this was the most student participation in a free writing activity through the semester. This may be because the positive topic about dreams matched with students' curiosity and they easily could express themselves.

Various types of learning materials that suit the learners' levels can increase students' understanding and participation. Each student must have individual learning styles such as audio, visual and tactile. In this time, I focused on the visual one and used many visuals for introducing the Civil Rights theme of this class.

We focused on the African Americans' efforts that students could easily relate to, rather than the difficult topic of racism. So, we showed the American flag and pictures of today's successful African Americans such as Beyonce and asked their names. Later, we introduced Martin Luther King's picture and connected his effort to the above people's success. We chose this way because students might get stuck in encountering a complex issue at the beginning. These plans were helpful because many students seemed to be interested or involved in the class and answered names soon and willingly.

From doing this project, I realized I did not know what the definitions of what "active, positive and autonomous students" are. Before teaching, we defined these concepts as students having fun or talking a lot. However, we now believe that we can define them as even students concentrating on the work or trying to do so. This is because many students worked on some exercises quietly and could answer voluntarily or correctly, while other enjoyably chatted with their task untouched.

> It is hard to see the students' understanding. When we said, "Do you understand?" students seldom responded or started chatting. And, the same students always spoke out. This suggests that many students may still be shy, may not understand the content or may not feel autonomous. So, we really should do similar exercises or quizzes several times, and prepare activities so that students can be exposed more to English and to get more responses from them.
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> To increase students' autonomy, teachers should participate in the class not by indulging students but by sharing with them and guiding them to create a better learning environment. When we gave students tasks to find answers by themselves with their groups' help, and responsibility for their ideas, we facilitated as helpers. Students should learn from activities as well as enjoy them. Again, students' silent work can also imply active learning. Improving the balance between the fun and seriousness can be my next project to work on.

Teachers' comments

Although Naoko had trouble limiting her research topic, she obviously learned a great deal from her attempt. She found that she can increase students' participation by first relating content to students' interests and knowledge, and by making tasks that are easily manageable for students, especially in the beginning of a unit or lesson. She was also able to reach a more mature understanding of how "active" class work and students can be defined. These realizations will be very helpful for her in the future.

Analysis of the project

We believe that the proceeding student reports represent the success of the project overall. However, behind this were many day-to-day challenges, even though we changed the format of the project this year. In this section we will describe what we feel were some weaknesses of the project.

As I [Fauss] guided the students in the fall semester through their research projects, I found that it was hard for many students to understand the requirements and process of the overall project. Part of the difficulty was undoubtedly due to their level of development as trainees. However, certainly some responsibly must lie with the way I presented the project and gave instructions, examples, advice and feedback.

As mentioned in the background section, one way we attempted to improve the project was to allow more time for it by starting students thinking about research topics in the spring semester. All students proposed general topics in their spring end-of-semester reflections paper; they therefore had a head start. Unfortunately, we found that students did not take advantage of the extra time. Most students started to plan their specific research too late, usually about a week before their actual second lesson. There was not enough time to give them feedback and help them choose appropriate sub-topics or narrow their topics before they went to teach. This may have been due to poor scheduling of deadlines on my part.

Students also had difficulty identifying topics that were appropriate (measurable) and focused enough (manageable). As Hadley (1997) states, one of the main "barriers to starting an AR project" and concluding it successfully is "vague research ideas"(p.88). The research plans that students submitted along with their fall lesson plans bore this out. Many of them had trouble coming up with ideas that were more detailed than those that they identified in the spring. Topics tended to be very general ones, such as "how to motivate students" or "how to keep students'

attention in the class." Many students also did not do proper research on their topic before teaching, likely due to a lack of time, not knowing where to look, and not being focused enough. We assume that this is natural at first due to our students' lack of knowledge and experience. However, because of the lack of time mentioned before, we were sometimes not able to rectify the problems before students had to go and teach.

Finally, students seemed to have trouble focusing on their (second-ever) lesson plans and the research project at the same time. We recognized this fact when first considering doing this project, but felt that it was worth trying regardless. There is little we can do about this inherent difficulty, but we can do much in terms of presentation and management to ease it.

Nevertheless, despite these problems, through much teacher-trainee consultation prior to the teaching practice, we were able to guide most of the students to a reasonably clear understanding of their task and its aims, and to topics that the students could manage. We could clearly see from reading their reflections, such as the previous examples, that all the students had gained a heightened awareness of the specific pedagogical issues they investigated; they also gained the beginnings towards finding the solutions they sought and the tools they needed to find answers.

Feedback from students

At the end of the fall semester, we gave the students an evaluation questionnaire to get their feedback on various aspects of the course, including the Action Research project. They were asked to rate three aspects of the project: the teacher's instructions, examples and advice; their own making and implementing of their research plans; and their post-teaching reflections papers and class presentations. Students gave the entire project a ranking of 4 out of 5, and included many comments, mostly positive, as follows.

The teacher's instructions and advice received the lowest score, a 3.9, which confirmed our earlier concerns about our effectiveness in presenting the project. Comments were mostly positive, but included the following:

- "Sometimes I didn't understand what I'm supposed to do . . . . need clearer instructions."

The score and comments suggested that our presentation was effective overall, but that there is room for improvement.

Students gave the planning and implementation of their action research plan a score of 4.2. This score reflects the value students gave to having the activity as part of their class, not a self-evaluation of how well they did it. Comments included the following:

- "To have another goal [in addition to teaching] was good."
- "It can make us realize or think deeply about teaching methods."
- "We have to find solutions by ourselves and we can see the results."
- "It was hard to focus on both teaching and our research topic at the same time."

These comments were quite positive, and they affirmed the value of the experiential approach we used. Still, the last remark confirmed the challenge of the task we gave students.

Students also gave high marks, and average of 4.2, to the assignments of the individual reflective essay and group presentation for the class of their research projects. Feedback included the following:

- "Reflection makes us think again and learn more."

- "Observers gave us strong and weak points—it was helpful."
- "Sharing gives us other opinions and standpoints. I can borrow some ideas."

The value of sharing experiences and learning from each other was the most common comment regarding the class presentations.

Conclusion

Although we did not originally conceive of the project in this way, it could be viewed as an action research project within another one: the group and individual projects of our students, and surrounding that the research project of we the teachers, judging the overall effectiveness of the project we conceived, assigned and directed. The key questions that we needed to ask ourselves at the end of the year were the following: Was the project generally successful? Should we include it again in our plans for the course? If so, how should we go about it next time? What should we change?

Based on students' reflective essays and presentations, and on their feedback on the value of the project itself, we can positively conclude that it was worthwhile for them. However, there are a number of things we could do better. For example, we can make the project easier for students to understand with easier instructions in a step-by-step fashion, more concrete examples (especially of appropriate and specific topics), and class discussion (perhaps using a case studies approach). We also need to show them how to do the kinds of research they will need to do to get informed support for their ideas. Starting the project in the spring was definitely helpful, but in the fall we allowed students to waste this advantage by not having them start focusing on more specific topics until shortly before they were to teach. We must have them submit specific topic ideas and research plans as early as possible, early enough to give them proper feedback and time to revise their plans before they go to teach. Plans may need to go through several drafts, or we may need to advise some students individually to put them on the right track.

With these revisions, the action research project will no doubt continue to be a challenge for our teacher trainees, but at the same time a positive and valuable experience, and a resource that they can take with them and use throughout their future teaching careers.

> "Can a teacher with no previous experience undertake action research? The answer is an emphatic 'yes.'" (Hadley, 1997, p.90)

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Collaborative Interdisciplinary Team Teaching (CITT): An Exploratory Focus Group Study

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本研究は宮崎国際大学で行われている、大学一、二年生向けの異分野教員によるチームティーチングに参加している英語教員グループと教科教員グループへのインタビューを用いたパイロットテストである。本研究は過去の研究の発見と本研究の結果を比較した後に、これから行い得る研究へのスタート地点となりうるものでもある。上記二グループの教員の答えの分析からチームティーチングの成功と失敗を分ける重要な十一の要因が発見された。それらの要因の大部分は教員のもつ性質と他の教員への接し方とに分類できる。本研究の結果の多くは過去の研究の発見と重なったが、新しい要因も発見された。これから先の研究ではこれら十一の要因の中の幾つかの要因の重要度の違いを調査することが課題となるであろう。

This paper describes an exploratory focus group study of MIC's team teaching approach for lower-division classes, Collaborative Interdisciplinary Team Teaching (CITT). The study was designed to test previous findings from the professional team teaching literature and provide a baseline dataset for a program of further studies into CITT. Content analysis of the data revealed eleven major categories of response emerging independently across the focus groups, primarily concerned with team teacher attributes and secondarily with team teacher interactions. Most categories are well represented in the team teaching literature, although some less common responses also emerged. A number of potential tensions between team teachers' professional responsibilities with respect to the major categories are identified in the analysis, and these have been used to guide the development of further CITT research.

One of the most notable features of Miyazaki International College (MIC) is the unusual mode of instruction implemented across the curriculum for nearly all of its first- and second-year classes. Dubbed 'Collaborative Interdisciplinary Team Teaching' (CITT) by Stewart, Sagliano & Sagliano (2000), this is a collaborative teaching approach derived from adjunct models of team teaching and grounded in Brinton, Snow and Wesche's (1989) 'sheltered instruction model' of Content-Based Language Instruction (CBLI) for second language learners, which the authors describe as "the concurrent study of language and subject matter, with the form and sequence of language presentation dictated by content material" (p.vii). In the CITT approach, two teachers form a partnership comprised of a content teacher (CT), who is a specialist in the content or subject discipline of the class (e.g. psychology, history, economics); and an English language teacher (LT), who is a specialist in TESOL. The two partners team teach both ESOL and the subject discipline together in the same course, engaging the principles of CBLI for meeting parallel learning goals in both disciplines. They are expected to team teach each course jointly as equal partners, being present in the classroom at all lesson times and sharing responsibility for classroom management, lesson planning, materials development, student assessment and course evaluation.

Research into team-teaching is not uncommon in the TESOL literature, particularly with reference to the JET programme (Miyazato, 2006). However, it is less common to find studies of interdisciplinary collaborative approaches. Much of

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this area is comparatively new ground for research, and MIC is unique in being the first tertiary education institution in Japan to implement interdisciplinary team teaching across its entire curriculum (Stewart, 1996). As a field ripe for study, CITT has attracted the research interest of several MIC faculty members in previous years, most notably Tim Stewart, who published findings in Comparative Culture (Stewart, 1996), as well as other professional TESOL journals in Asia and Canada (J. Sagliano, Sagliano, & Stewart, 1998; M. Sagliano, Stewart, & Sagliano, 1998; Stewart, 1999, 2001; Stewart et al., 2000). Stewart explored the theoretical bases for team teaching at MIC, and, with Bill Perry, conducted videotaped interviews of team teachers to describe their perceptions of various aspects of CITT (Perry & Stewart, 2005). Since much of the previously published literature concerning CITT tended to be self-anecdotal in character, Perry and Stewart's (2005) use of more objective research methods provided useful data to help substantiate existing knowledge in this field.

In the first stage of their project in 2001, Perry and Stewart interviewed four separate pairs of team teaching partners at MIC, using questions to elicit the respondents' beliefs and opinions about CITT (described to respondents as "content-based team teaching" (Perry & Stewart, 2005, p.567)). In the second stage of their project in 2002, the researchers interviewed six different team teaching partners using similar questions, but separated each respondent from his/her partner by conducting interview sessions individually. Data collected from both sets of interviews were collated and content-analysed "in an effort to uncover common categories" (Perry & Stewart, 2005, p.566), and the results were used to describe the various aspects of an effective CITT partnership.

By comparison, the research project that forms the focus of this article has been designed as an exploratory, small-scale study to build on the strengths of the Perry and Stewart (2005) project by exploring the beliefs and opinions of CITT practitioners several years later, using interview-based research to allow the practitioners to identify and define features of CITT that are of importance to them. Most of the respondents in the current study were not participants in Perry and Stewart's (2005) interview project, and half of them had yet to be employed as MIC faculty in 2001-2002. Thus, the current study was expected to act as a useful point of comparison with Perry and Stewart's (2005) interviews and perhaps offer some support for their original findings. In addition, the current study was designed to test some of the major categories and concepts arising in the professional team teaching literature, and to provide baseline data for future studies that would allow larger and more representative numbers of team teachers at MIC to participate.

Methodology

Since the current study was designed as the first step in a planned programme of interrelated research projects investigating CITT, focus group research methodology was selected as an appropriate tool for generating initial data (Dushku, 2000; Frey & Fontana, 1993). As Ho (2006) observes, focus group methodology is an increasingly common method of collecting qualitative data in the social sciences because of its effectiveness in eliciting a wide range of relevant ideas and observations with respect to a given research topic. Participants are interviewed in groups, rather than as individuals, on the principle that group interaction stimulates more responses. In other words, "the synergistic effect of the focus group can help to produce data or ideas less forthcoming from a one-on-one interview" (Ho, 2006, p.05.2). Thus, as an exploratory project, a goal of the current study was to use focus group methodology to identify and define a wide variety of pertinent data

concerning CITT directly from its practitioners, and provide directions for follow-up studies within the research programme.

In July 2006, eight faculty members at Miyazaki International College agreed to participate in focus group discussions, drawn from a total population of approximately 30 active CITT practitioners. The participants were divided into two separate groups, with each group comprised of four participants from one of the two primary teacher designations at MIC, i.e. content or language teachers. Although focus groups are typically comprised of 5-12 participants (Fowler, 1995; Krueger & Casey, 2000), they are feasible with as few as four participants, and Krueger and Casey (2000) note that there are distinct advantages in preferring "mini-focus groups" (p.10) to larger gatherings for ease of accommodation and affording "more opportunity to share ideas" (p.10).

The decision was made to assemble a separate focus group for each teacher designation because the distinction between content and language teachers is institutionally mandated (indeed, each group elects its own 'facilitator' from within its ranks to represent its members' interests within the college), and MIC encourages content teachers and language teachers to take responsibility for different aspects of CBLI in their shared classrooms, as relevant to their own particular fields of academic specialization (MIC Faculty Council, 2006b). As Krueger & Casey (2000) explain, a focus group is best composed of participants with homogeneous characteristics within the commonality of the group from which they are drawn, and this principle was therefore applied to the group designations that determine the two different professional types of CITT practitioner.

A further selection consideration was that still-current team teaching partners should not both be included in a single focus group, on the grounds that it can be difficult for a team teacher to publicly voice honest opinions about team teaching issues while in the presence of a partner with whom he or she is expected to continue maintaining a working relationship (Dudley-Evans, 2001; Perry & Stewart, 2005). By keeping partners separate, it was hoped that the potential for awkwardness among participants would be lessened. Also, although focus group designs are more effective in achieving their desired aims when the participants do not know each other well, if at all (Anderson, 1990; Krueger & Casey, 2000), it was clearly impossible to meet this requirement for such a small population, and thus it was hoped that the participants' familiarity with each other would be offset by the grouping of participants with no direct experience of each other as team teaching partners, despite the likelihood of their having collegial relationships outside the classroom. In addition, at the beginning of each discussion, participants were asked to respect the confidentiality of other faculty by not identifying specific individuals if mention of actual situations was deemed necessary. In this way, it was hoped that participants would not be tempted to pursue any discussion of what Frazee (2007) describes as the "private animosities [that] distort professional judgement" which can emerge in faculty relations, and which could have been a source of distraction from the interview questions.

Although Perry and Stewart (2005) sought to obtain a representative sampling of the CITT population for their research project, it should be noted that representativeness was not a goal in assembling participants for the current study. As Fowler (1995) explains, the primary goal of focus group research design is "to get a sense of the diversity of experience and perception, rather than to get a representative sample" (p.107). Therefore, no attempt was made to randomise the selection of eligible participants, and some of the selection decisions were made on

the basis of participant availability and researcher convenience, subject to the aforementioned selection criteria.

One of the limitations of the Perry and Stewart (2005) study was that their interview questions tended to confine respondents to the specific aspects of CITT which the researchers deemed to be of value, instead of allowing the respondents to determine which aspects of team teaching were of importance to them. For example, Perry and Stewart's (2005) interviewees were asked how they distinguished between language and content in their team-taught classes, which assumed that they did so and that the distinction could reveal insights into effective partnerships. By comparison, an important feature of focus group methodology is that, while the researcher dictates the parameters of the discussion by creating "carefully predetermined" (Krueger & Casey, 2000, p.12) interview questions in a logical sequence to collect data of relevance to the research topic, he/she designs the questions to be as open-ended as possible to ensure that the participants' perspectives are allowed to emerge with a minimum of researcher imposition, while staying within the parameters of the topic itself (Anderson, 1990; Fowler, 1995; Ho, 2006; Krueger & Casey, 2000). To this end, the 'moderator' (i.e. group interviewer) "does not offer any viewpoints during the talk-in process session" (Ho, 2006, p.05.3), but simply allows respondents to address the predetermined questions in their own way. In Grotjahn's (1987) terms, such interview questions serve an 'exploratory-interpretative' function in creating the conditions for data to emerge which the researcher can then analyse to develop theoretical propositions, as is commonly associated with Glaser & Strauss's (1967) qualitative research tradition of 'grounded theorising'. Krueger & Casey (2000) note that, in focus group methodology, such a sequence of open-ended questions is typically described as a 'questioning route'. For the current study, the researcher assumed the role of moderator and designed a single questioning route for both focus group discussions, to allow participants to discuss what team teaching is to them and how it works (or doesn't work), as distinct from other ways of teaching (see appendix).

A meeting room at MIC was used as the venue for the two focus group discussions. All discussions were audio-taped for transcription and data analysis. Although the suggested time limit was 90 minutes, participants in both focus groups ended the discussions shortly after one hour had elapsed by indicating that they had had sufficient time to fully address all relevant points.

Results

Data emerging from the focus group discussions were content-analysed to categorise the types of responses which were of common importance to the respondents. Since the focus group discussions yielded data concerned with a wide variety of team teaching issues, responses of lesser prominence were filtered out of the final results table, but all major categories of response that emerged from the data were identified and tabulated, without exception. The criteria for defining a category of response as a major category were that it must have emerged independently in the responses of each of the two focus group discussions and be identifiable in quotes from at least two different respondents. In fact, all but one of the categories (category 'K') in the final results table exceeded the minimum terms of these criteria by emerging several times in the responses from different participants or at different points within the discussions. Table 1 provides definitions and descriptions of each major category of response, together with example quotes from the respondents to demonstrate how each category was

manifested in the data. The categories have also been collocated into general types for purposes of comparison and ease of reference.

In the course of data analysis for this study, a researcher with no past or present association with MIC agreed to perform an inter-rater reliability check on the results by categorising 39 selected respondent quotes from a randomly compiled list, according to an earlier version of table 1. An inter-rater agreement of 89.7% resulted. Where the raters' judgments diverged, marginal adjustments were made to the table to improve the mutual exclusivity of its category definitions and clarify its descriptions.

The final question in the moderator's question route asked respondents to identify what was to them the single most important point about effective team teaching from everything that had arisen in the preceding discussion. The initial three categories of table 1 emerged as the three most common types of response to this question. 'Respect (for one's team teaching partner)' was considered important by four respondents (CT1; CT2; CT4; LT2), while 'openness' and 'flexibility' were each considered important by three respondents (CT4, LT1, LT4 and CT4, LT1, LT2, respectively) [1].

Analysis

(I) Category types

The major common categories from the data were collocated into category types which represent various aspects of team teaching, such as common attributes of effective team teachers, or administrative requirements for the institution where team teaching occurs. From these categorisations, table 1 shows that the three most important common categories of response were concerned with team teacher attributes and four of the remaining eight categories were concerned with team teaching partner interactions. It is perhaps unsurprising that these aspects figure so largely in the responses of CITT practitioners when a team teacher is likely to perceive his/her partner, and the attributes and behaviours demonstrated by that person in relation to the perceiver, as the closest and most readily apparent manifestation of team teaching in action. Also, although the pedagogical outcomes of CITT, as with any form of teaching, are expected to be of most direct benefit to the students to whom it is targetted, team teaching is an educational initiative centred on teachers themselves and their collaborative relationships with each other. Therefore, its effects on students, administrators and the wider institution might well be conceptualised as secondary aspects of the team teaching phenomenon, while the relationship between the two team teaching partners constitutes the heart of the phenomenon itself.

(II) Respect for one's partner

When the respondents were asked to identify the single most important point about effective team teaching from all issues discussed, it is notable that most of them did not provide a single point in response to this question as directed, but tended to offer several points of equal importance. Their lack of compliance is suggestive that the respondents may tend to perceive team teaching variables as highly interdependent and consider the isolation of any single specific feature as an

[1] Individual respondents are identified by code number within each designation: CT for content teacher or LT for language teacher

Table 1. Major categories of response from focus group data, with descriptions and examples
(Individual respondents ar identified by code number within each designation: CT for content teacher and LT for language teacher).

Category type	Category of response	Description	Example quote/s
Team teacher attributes	A. Respect for partner	Team teaching partners show respect for each other as teachers and colleagues, and for what each contributes to their shared course	"In the case where it [my team teaching relationship] didn't work, I think I didn't get the respect, and that's why everything I had planned became undermined or ignored" (LT2)
	B. Openness	Team teaching partners show willingness to communicate openly with each other about their shared course	"When these small conflicts do come up, the willingness to - the feeling that you can talk about it with your, with your partner" (LT1)
	C. Flexibility	Team teaching partners show professional flexibility, adapting well to sudden changes and new ways of doing things	"I think coming planned is good but being flexible is as important" (CT4) "Yeah, being flexible in the classroom is good, too - having plan B or C or D or whatever is good" (CT1)
Team teaching partner interactions	D. Equal power sharing	Team teaching partners share authority equally within their team taught course without arrogating individual power over each other or the course itself	"The thing is, I think, not to assume ownership of the class" (CT3)
	E. Role agreement	Team teaching partners jointly determine their roles within their team teaching relationship to both partners' satisfaction, even if they share power unequally	"If you have a partnership that's worked out where you've just agreed, okay, I'm going to take an assistant role, regardless of what I'm supposed to do because you've taught this forever and it's useless - letting me take an equal role. I mean that can be okay" (LT4)

	F. Advance joint planning	Team teaching partners meet outside the classroom to jointly plan their lessons in advance of implementation	"Giving a plan of what I'm going to teach or what I'm going to talk about and trying to discuss: What about you? Would you do this part? Or, do we include the quiz here or do we - an exercise? And what would you do here? And so, things like this, so in a way we plan the choreography before, and - plan the show" (CT2)
	G. Coordinated student instruction	Team teaching partners are coordinated in their instruction to students, giving them non-conflicting information	"For students, maybe confusion sometimes. If it happens that you have a, as we talked about, you may …" (CT2) "Get two versions of the same … [instructions]" (CT1) "Yeah" (CT2) "Two non-complementary versions … [inaudible] … he said, she said" (CT1)
Team teaching benefits	H. Awareness of multiple perspectives	By modelling acceptance of each other's divergent opinions and viewpoints, team teachers promote student awareness of multiple perspectives	"The strength [of team teaching] is that the students will begin to very quickly realize that the teacher is not always right, because there's another expert opinion" (LT3)
	I. Professional development opportunities	Team teaching offers partners opportunities for professional development by learning from each other	"You can also learn about different teaching techniques that maybe you hadn't been exposed to" (CT4)
Administrative requirements	J. Preparation time	Team teaching requires more preparation time to implement than single-teacher instruction	"[Team teaching is] time-consuming. Takes time to meet up, talk, talk through the things when you could just simply write it up, write up your, your curriculum, your course, on your own, on your time. So yeah, it takes time to meet up with someone…" (LT3)
Student influences	K. Student needs take priority	A successful partnership is one that meets student needs, regardless of the relationship between the team teaching partners	"The students are the consumers and you're there to deliver a product and whatever it takes to make that work, that's good team teaching" (CT3)

arbitrary distinction. Nevertheless, from all responses offered, respect for one's team teaching partner (category 'A') emerged as the most common response, with four of the eight respondents emphasizing its importance.

The belief that respect between partners is of fundamental importance to the effective team teaching relationship is evident in much of the data, where it commonly emerges in responses to a range of questions about different aspects of team teaching, e.g.:

> "Mutual respect, I think, is an important thing. You and the other person have different abilities, different interests, different approaches, different experiences, all that kind of stuff, but you can respect each other and bring it together in the same classroom" (CT1)

Indeed, one respondent defined respect as a first principle underlying other necessary attributes for effective team teaching, as follows:

> "Of the things we have discussed so far, what would you say is the single most important point about effective team teaching?" (Moderator) …
>
> "I would say it's the respect. I mean, from the respect you get the flexibility and the tolerance" (LT2)

However, the respondents also identify a number of difficulties in showing respect for one's partner behaviourally within the constraints of other responsibilities faced by CITT practitioners, as explained below.

(III) Coordinated student instruction

Although the need to show respect is one example of the responsibilities team teachers have towards their partners, they also bear the responsibilities that any teacher has toward his/her students, such as the responsibility to provide students with accurate and comprehensible information. Category 'G' notes that respondents recognise the importance of team teaching partners coordinating their instruction to avoid giving their students conflicting information, as expressed in the following quote:

> "For students, maybe confusion sometimes. If it happens that you have a, as we talked about, you may …" (CT2)
>
> "Get two versions of the same [instructions]" (CT1)
>
> "Yeah" (CT2)
>
> "Two non-complementary versions … he said, she said" (CT1)

The data from this study reveal how these different responsibilities can create tensions when the need for partners to show respect for each other, and coordinate their classroom instruction, conflicts with their responsibility to provide their students with accurate information. These tensions are manifested in the classroom when a team teacher is faced with the dilemma of his/her partner giving students information that the observing teacher believes to be in error, but cannot correct for the students' benefit without publicly undermining the partner's authority and thereby showing disrespect for him/her. The following respondent expresses the dilemma thus:

> "You don't want to stop them [your team teaching partner], you know, midstream and then, and say, no, that's wrong. On the other hand, you don't want the students to be misled on something that needs to be, you know, made clear to them" (CT3)

Similarly, in the following exchange, a respondent appears to demonstrate some degree of embarrassment at the hypothetical suggestion that he/she would point out his/her partner's mistakes in front of students in a team taught class, and laughs, perhaps nervously, at the idea. As a group, the participants proceed to discuss the issue, and seem to reach an informal consensus that pointing out a partner's errors in front of students is not necessarily damaging to an effective team teaching relationship, but requires some degree of goodwill between the two teachers:

> "In my experience, I don't know whether you've ever experienced that, but the other teacher will make some mistake – factual errors, but I wouldn't point it out in front of the students" (LT3)
>
> "Oh no, not in front of students, no" (LT1)
>
> [Some dialogue omitted]
>
> "No, I'll keep quiet, of course [laughs]" (LT3)
>
> [Some dialogue omitted]
>
> "It depends a great deal on the partnership …" (LT4)
>
> "And neither person minds" (LT1)
>
> "Right" (LT4)

Since the participants identify mutual respect as very important to an effective team teaching partnership, this exchange suggests that partners with little respect for each other run the risk of damaging their (already poor) relationship still further by pointing out each other's errors in front of students; yet they might be giving students inaccurate or misleading information if they did not. It therefore seems likely that the way team teachers reconcile these potentially conflicting responsibilities is one of the most problematic features of the CITT partnership.

(IV) Awareness of multiple perspectives

The prominence of category 'H' in the data, namely the potential for CITT to raise student awareness of multiple perspectives, introduces further complications to the tensions between the teachers' various responsibilities. While respondents stress the importance of team teaching partners giving their students non-conflicting information in category 'G', they also paradoxically identify disagreement between team teachers as a potential benefit for students in category 'H', as exemplified in the following quote:

> "If a good spirit is maintained, then I think it [disagreement between team teaching partners] contributes to this business of different, differing expert opinions and potentially helping critical thinking" (LT4)

Here, teacher disagreement is identified as a means of raising student awareness of multiple perspectives, and fostering critical thinking skills. Interestingly, while several of the categories of response emerging from the current study are well represented in the team teaching literature, category 'H' is far less prominent, although, in their CITT research, Perry and Stewart (2005) do note that students benefit from exposure to "multiple perspectives on key issues and concepts in their courses" (p.568). One possible explanation for the relative lack of prominence of this

category beyond the CITT context is that much team teaching research is focussed on unidisciplinary models of collaboration, such as the JET programme. These models are likely to require greater unity of instruction from their practitioners than interdisciplinary collaborations, which rely on experts from separate disciplines to pursue more distinctly different (albeit coordinated) educational goals. Additionally, since critical thinking is emphasized as a key feature in the MIC college mission (MIC Faculty Council, 2006a), and students are routinely expected to seek out and critically evaluate multiple viewpoints to synthesize their own coherent arguments in English across the curriculum, it seems unsurprising that the potential for using CITT to advance critical thinking skills has emerged as a prominent issue in this context.

Nevertheless, the balance struck between categories 'G' and 'H' in the data indicates that there is a need for CITT practitioners to make a distinction between the kinds of instruction for which classroom disagreement between the teaching partners may or may not be beneficial. The following quote helps to clarify this distinction:

> "Discussing certain issues, having two different opinions is fine, but when it comes to an assignment, there should be one vision for the assignment, which I've had a problem with. It was an assignment I created, it was an assignment I planned out, it was an assignment I delivered to all the students but my partner had a completely different idea of the assignment. So when the students consulted him, you know, with any kind of questions that they had, he gave them a complete - different answer from what I wanted." (LT2)

In this example, one might argue that the respondent is expressing frustration at the lack of coordination between team teaching partners when issuing instructions to their students about what they are supposed to know or do to meet the assessable requirements of their course, in contrast with theoretical or philosophical differences of opinion which are likely to model accepted differences between authorities in the wider academic or general community. In short, receiving conflicting information from multiple authorities can be of benefit to the development of students' critical thinking skills, but will be of no benefit when the information they require constitutes directions for what their teachers expect them to do. Thus, team teaching partners must make on-the-spot decisions as to when they should present their students with a 'united front' in the classroom and when it is acceptable for them to diverge in opinion, but such a decision is dependent on how the teachers interpret the purpose of the classroom event in which they are engaged at any given time. If this purpose is interpreted differently by the individual team teachers, it might be expected to provoke frustration based on the perception that one's partner is not behaving appropriately, and lead to deterioration in the relationship between the two team teachers.

(V) Equal power sharing and role agreement

Another potential conflict between categories that can be identified from the results of this study is that of equal power sharing (category 'D') and mutually determined role agreements (category 'E'). While it is possible for team teachers to share power equally and jointly determine their roles within the team teaching relationship to both partners' satisfaction, thus satisfying the requirements of both criteria, it is also possible for team teachers to jointly determine their roles in such a way that one teacher exercises a disproportionate degree of authority over his/her partner, thus violating the terms of category 'D', as is indicated in the description for category 'E' in table 1. The respondents identify different versions of team teaching

that are defined by the way team teaching partners distribute power between themselves, as expressed in the following quote:

> "It just depends on who I'm working with, what team teaching means. For one class, I feel like it's more of a team where we decide on what will be taught in the classroom and then we decide who is stronger in that aspect and then that person will take the lead and the other person will provide the support. And in another class, it was more of a senior teacher situation and the other partner would just be there to kind of fill in the gaps whenever something comes up. So I guess it depends on who you ask, or which partner I work with – it becomes a different type of team teaching situation" (LT2)

This finding is consistent with the team teaching literature, in which it is a common observation that partners in an effective team teaching relationship must negotiate a shared understanding of their roles and responsibilities in relation to each other in order to avoid the unwanted imposition of one partner's authority into the other's professional 'territory' (Bailey, Dale, & Squire, 1992; Brumby & Wada, 1990; Miyazato, 2006).

In their research into CITT, Perry and Stewart (2005) observe that power sharing problems can arise through disagreements between partners about the territorial boundaries of their roles, particularly with reference to the language/content distinction, and claim that a 'leader/subordinate' relationship can emerge which undermines the ideal of the equal CITT partnership. It is important to note here that a team teaching partnership at MIC in which power is shared unequally between partners contravenes the mandate of the institution, since CITT, by definition, is collaboration between equals (Stewart et al., 2000). Yet CITT practitioners themselves recognise circumstances where equality between partners is unrealistic and the teachers assume 'leader/subordinate' roles instead. It is notable how, in the following quote, the respondent twice qualifies his/her comments about equal power sharing at MIC with the word 'supposed', to suggest the divergence of reality from the institutional description of CITT:

> "There's a lot of cases where one person is the main teacher or the senior teacher and then the other teacher or teachers are basically assistants. I think that's found in many situations elsewhere, though supposedly not here. And then, of course, this, the case that is supposed to be here at MIC, where we have equal partners" (LT1)

The usefulness of team teaching as a means of matching new teachers with senior mentors for on-the-job teacher training purposes does not go unnoticed by CITT practitioners, and one respondent even advocates a one-semester 'training' period of subordination for new team teachers before they assume equal authority with their partners in their team teaching relationships:

> "This is my personal opinion, I think a first semester teacher at MIC, regardless of their credentials, if they don't have a background in this kind of situation, and almost nobody does, I think it helps that person to allow the partner to take a leading role for a while and to take a supporting role. But then, after a semester, I think that's enough. It's just my personal view on it" (LT1)
>
> "And then what should happen?" (Moderator)
>
> "Then I think they can be, easily be equal partners from then on" (LT1)

Problems of inequality in power sharing also emerge in the historical context of the college itself. Since the prerequisite qualifications for content teachers hired by MIC have always been Ph.D.-level or equivalent, while those for language teachers have always been Masters degree-level or equivalent, the respondents recount how,

in past years, conflict was created by some team teachers' expectations that the more academically qualified partner had the right to assume seniority over the less qualified partner, in violation of the institutional mandate for equal authority between the two teachers. For example:

> "Earlier on, there was a sense that the content faculty owned the class and the language faculty assisted the – you know, there was a sentiment, and that was really very, very damaging and - it was the wrong view and the wrong attitude, and it led to bad feelings very quickly" (CT3)

Unsurprisingly, the arrogation of power by some team teachers has tended to breed resentment and contributed to the deterioration of relationships between partners. But the respondents make a clear distinction between this unwilling imposition of unequal power between partners and the mutually agreed acceptance of unequal roles by both partners (category 'E'), and stress that it is possible for an effective team teaching relationship to be maintained in the latter case. As long as both partners voluntarily agree to their roles, the distribution of power between them can become negotiable without necessarily endangering the relationship. For example,

> "It may be that, if 'Vanna White' likes to be 'Vanna White', then that works[2]. There was one teacher here who actually liked to be 'Vanna White' because there was no preparation involved. You just have to stand there and look vaguely glamorous - [inaudible] - so, in terms of complementarity, it worked because they understood, both understood what their roles were in the class and there wasn't any conflict in those roles. I don't think it's a very good model of how team teaching should work, but - it worked" (CT1)

As suggested here, while the respondent affirms that a team teaching partnership based on a relationship of unequal power between partners is viable, it tends to be perceived by respondents as a 'weaker', less preferable version of team teaching than the institutionally mandated version, and is recommended only when, for various reasons, it is unrealistic to expect partners to share their power equally. The key point of these observations is that if both team teachers negotiate a relationship to their mutual satisfaction, they can create a partnership with some degree of effectiveness, even if their relationship falls short of the ideal CITT partnership in other respects. However, if one partner attempts to exercise power arbitrarily over the other, the relationship is under a more fundamental threat, perhaps because it is likely to be interpreted by a team teacher as a lack of respect from the offending partner. Such an interpretation might be inferred from the following quote if it is supposed that one partner repeatedly telling the other that he/she is wrong is an inappropriate assumption of superior authority:

> "[After discussing his/her relationship with a partner that worked well] The other partner, on the other hand, didn't give me the same kind of respect and – anything I said was wrong!" (LT2)

Perry and Stewart (2005) conflate power inequality issues under the category of teacher 'experience', noting that they impact mostly on new team teachers and claiming that such issues "tend to dissipate" (p.569) as the practitioner gains in CITT experience. However, despite some advocacy of leader/subordinate roles for the training of new team teachers, there is little indication of concurrence with Perry and Stewart's (2005) claim by respondents in the current study.

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2 'Vanna White': A television game show hostess and actress mocked "for her limited acting ability and her position on *Wheel [of Fortune]* as a non-speaking clotheshorse" (A & E Televsion Networks, 2007)

(VI) Openness and flexibility

Beyond the primary category of respect for one's partner, two other attribute-related categories have emerged from this data, namely 'openness' and 'flexibility'. The recurrence of these specific terms in the response data, and the identification of these attributes by respondents as the single most important points about effective team teaching from their discussions after 'respect', necessitated their inclusion as major categories of response in table 1, yet there seems to be a vagueness of interpretation in the way that the respondents themselves define these terms with reference to team teaching, as demonstrated by the following quotes:

"Openness is seeing the positive side of the person" (LT4)

"What are the requirements of team teaching?" (Moderator)

"I was thinking as far as, you know, psychological requirements or sociological requirements, more tolerance on the part of both partners. More, more sensitivity, umm…. " (LT1)

"Openness" (LT3)

"Um-hmm. Willing – willingness to accept other ways of doing things. Willingness to compromise, yeah?" (LT1)

"And sometimes learn from other ways …" (LT4)

"Um-hmm. Willingness to learn new ways of doing things" (LT1)

"And could be more flexible" (LT2)

"Flexibility, yeah, yeah" (LT1)

In the course of data analysis, it became clear that these two categories were closely related to each other in the perceptions of participants, with several instances of respondents merging the two key terms in the same response. For example,

"Basically, it's similar to what [LT4] said, the openness and the flexibility, the willingness to change and learn new things" (LT1)

With reference to openness generally, the general context of the discussion suggests that this might be interpreted most precisely as an openness of attitude, with a corresponding willingness to communicate openly with one's partner on team teaching matters. Though not using the word 'openness' specifically, one respondent offers an insight into how it might be articulated in this response, which follows on closely from the previous quote:

"When these small conflicts do come up, the willingness to - the feeling that you can talk about it with your, with your partner and if you do have some sort of conflict you have the confidence that you can work it out and reach some kind of a compromise with them" (LT1)

In contrast, flexibility might be defined from this data as a willingness to adapt one's behaviour to meet sudden or unexpected situations, as best expressed in the following exchange:

"I think coming planned is good but being flexible is as important" (CT4)

"Yeah, being flexible in the classroom is good, too - having plan B or C or D or whatever is good" (CT1)

This distinction between the two terms suggests that, while both categories are concerned with closely-related attributes of the effective team teacher, 'openness' might best be considered a willingness to communicate for cooperative purposes, while 'flexibility' might best be considered a willingness to adapt one's behaviour for cooperative purposes.

The need for teacher flexibility emerges commonly in the team teaching literature, predominantly in terms of the partners' potential differences in how they teach. According to Perry and Stewart's (2005) respondents, one of the main obstacles to effective team teaching is "incompatible teaching styles" (p.565). Consequently, a teacher who has the flexibility to adapt well to his/her partner's differences in ways of teaching is likely to team teach more effectively than one who adapts less well, as has been observed by a number of researchers (Dudley-Evans & St. John, 1998; Miyazato, 2006; M. Sagliano & Greenfield, 1998; Stewart, 2001).

(VII) Advance joint planning and preparation time

While the respondents' comments in the previous quote highlight the importance of teacher flexibility, there is also a recognition that a team teacher's ability to make sudden changes and adaptations in the classroom must be balanced against the importance of team teachers jointly planning and structuring various aspects of their shared curriculum outside the classroom. The need for team teachers to engage in advance preparation is well highlighted by CITT practitioners as a whole. Category 'F' indicates that team teaching partners need to jointly engage in the administrative requirements of their course because CITT requires joint commitment from both partners both inside and outside the shared classroom. Partners cannot simply meet in their shared classroom during lesson times to team teach, or they end up wasting lesson time on the planning that should have occurred beforehand, as noted by the following respondent:

> "I have a partner who's not very good about planning ahead of time, and sometimes we do the planning on the spot. When the class starts, we just do our discussion on what we're going to do for that day, and that could eat up 10, 15, 20 minutes of their period. And the students have – don't know what to do, because the teachers also don't know what to do because we hadn't planned anything out for the day" (LT2)

While this quote identifies the need for team teachers to engage in advance joint planning, it also suggests an implicit need for teachers to be given extra time in their schedules for class preparation, which is a common concern for CITT practitioners, as expressed in category 'J'. The data from this study reveals that there is a close relationship between categories 'F' ('advance joint planning') and 'J' ('preparation time') in the perceptions of several of the respondents. Indeed, most of the inter-rater disagreement of the earlier version of table 1 resulted from the confusion of response items across these two categorisations. Yet despite their similarities, data analysis allowed a distinction to be made between these categories on the basis of the emphasis placed by respondents on specific aspects of the team teachers' interactions. Category 'F', advance joint planning, implies a focus on the importance of team teachers not simply meeting in the classroom at class time and expecting the lesson to unfold without preparation, but to meet outside the classroom beforehand to jointly determine how the lesson is to proceed. The following quote emphasises this aspect of team teaching:

> "Which is what I think, what [CT4]'s talking about, planning outside of the classroom so that the – the other person knows where you're going to and why you're going there and

> roughly how long it's going to take you to get there, so that they can plan that, or you can plan it" (CT1)

Category 'J', by comparison, is focussed specifically on the amount of time that team teachers require to jointly coordinate the different aspects of their team taught courses overall. This category reflects a common concern arising in the professional literature on team teaching, particularly CITT. Perry and Stewart (2005) quote a respondent's claim that team teaching takes "twice as long" (p.571) to implement as single teacher instruction, and conclude that many respondents "emphasized the time-consuming nature of these extensive relationships" (p.572). Stewart, Sagliano et al. (2000), Sagliano, Sagliano et al. (1998), and Sagliano and Greenfield (1998) also note the need for extra time to implement CITT, and Nunan (1992) stresses the need for sufficient implementation time for team teaching in general to be successful. While it is true that much of this extra time is needed for the advance joint planning of category 'F', it also encompasses other aspects of collaborative teaching that may need to be negotiated and coordinated by both partners, such as summative student assessment or course evaluation. Such aspects are likely to be dealt with more quickly by a single teacher for a comparable non-team taught course, who has little need to take time to coordinate his/her actions with colleagues. The emphasis on the coordination time required by team teaching partners, rather than the specific activities they use to occupy that time, is evident in the following quote:

> "[Team teaching is] time-consuming. Takes time to meet up, talk, talk through the things when you could just simply write it up, write up your, your curriculum, your course, on your own, on your time. So yeah, it takes time to meet up with someone…" (LT3)

It is notable that there is little in the major categories of response that might be interpreted as a drawback of CITT as an educational approach (as distinct from what teachers must have or do in order to implement it effectively), while perceived beneficial outcomes of CITT for both teachers and students emerged from the data as aspects of importance (categories 'H' and 'I'). Evidently, CITT practitioners tend to support the widespread belief that the benefits of team teaching outweigh its disadvantages (Bailey et al., 1992; Edmundson & Fitzpatrick, 1997; Gottlieb, 1994; Nunan, 1992). 'Extra preparation time' emerging as a major category (category 'J') is thus conspicuous in this context, yet it might be considered unsurprising if it is remembered that such a requirement impacts directly on teachers' scheduled workloads but is potentially invisible to administrators and other key institutional stakeholders, particularly if they have had little prior experience with team teaching in other institutional contexts. Inevitably, team teachers' meeting times outside the classroom tend not to appear on administrators' schedules, while lesson times do. Thus, teachers may feel a need to protect their interests by ensuring that the need for extra preparation time for team teachers remains a high-profile concern in the face of potential financial constraints and budget cuts that could result in the encroachment of expanding class contact hours into their team teacher coordination time. Such an encroachment would not only place extra workloads on teachers but, as far as CITT practitioners are concerned, would also hinder their ability to team teach effectively.

(VIII) Professional development opportunities

One of the most recurrent observations in the team teaching literature that is supported in data from the current study is conceptualised here as category 'I', that

team teaching offers opportunities for improvements in the partners' professional development by learning from each other, e.g.:

> "What are the strengths and benefits of team teaching?" (Moderator)
>
> "You could learn from another teacher" (LT2)
>
> "Mmm" (LT1)

Many researchers have claimed that team teaching can act as a useful tool for professional development by raising teachers' awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses and allowing critical reflection on their experiences and assumptions (Edmondson & Fitzpatrick, 1997; Kaufman & Brooks, 1996; J. Sagliano et al., 1998; Sandholtz, 2000; Stewart, 1999), hence its common use in teacher training scenarios, where new teachers are partnered with experienced mentors (Bailey et al., 1992; Kachi & Choon-hwa, 2001; Sandholtz, 2000). Perry and Stewart (2005), specifically, note that most of their respondents make mention of the benefits of having a teaching partner for professional self-reflection. As an example of this process, a respondent notes that having a partner to "bounce ideas off" (Perry & Stewart, 2005, p.568) can improve teacher creativity. Perry and Stewart (2005) infer from their findings that team teachers "grow as teachers through effective partnership" and that effective team teaching "can lead to increased reflection and professional growth" (p.568).

(IX) Priority of student needs

Like category 'H', category 'K' in the current study is largely unrepresentative of common findings from the professional team teaching literature. The claim of category 'K' responses is that student needs take priority over the state of the relationship between the two team teaching partners in terms of how its effectiveness should be evaluated, e.g.:

> "I want my students to learn, even if it's a horrible [teaching] relationship, or partnership, but students learn something, I'm very happy with that because that's what matters." (LT3)

Although, as has been mentioned, this category met only the minimum requirements for inclusion in table 1 by emerging explicitly from the responses of only one respondent in each focus group, it is notable that, in each case, the teacher was responding specifically to the final prompt of the interview, when asked to identify what they believed to be the single most important point about effective team teaching from the preceding discussion. It might be suggested that category 'K' was offered by respondents as a kind of caveat to earlier discussions, which were largely focussed on the attributes and interactions of the team teachers themselves, as has already been noted. But the importance of category 'K', even if not widely reflected across the beliefs of most CITT practitioners, should not be overlooked. Although it is largely unrepresentative of findings from the team teaching literature, it might be argued that category 'K' is consistent with a recent trend among team teaching researchers to take into consideration the interactions between all participants in the team taught classroom (Dudley-Evans, 2001; Miyazato, 2001; Tajino & Tajino, 2000), in contrast with typical older team teaching studies, which tended to focus primarily on the interpersonal dynamic between the two team teaching partners to the exclusion of their students. It is possible, then, that category 'K' is indicative of a changing zeitgeist in the field of teacher collaboration amongst researchers and teachers alike.

Conclusion

Eleven major categories of importance to participants were identified in the data analysis of this study. Three team teacher attributes were identified as the most important, with four of the remaining eight categories concerned with team teaching partner interactions. Although the responses suggest that there is a high level of interdependence between the various features of team teaching, 'respect for one's partner' was identified as fundamentally important to an effective partnership, and was observed to underlie other aspects of an effective team teacher's behaviour. 'Openness' and 'flexibility' were also considered of key importance, though some inferences needed to be made as to how the respondents defined these terms.

Despite an acknowledgement of the time-consuming nature of team teaching, the respondents tended to emphasize the beneficial outcomes of CITT as an educational approach. Most of the prominent categories emerging from the current study are commonly represented in the findings of previous research into team teaching literature in general and CITT in particular, especially 'professional development opportunities'; 'equal power sharing'; 'role agreement'; 'need for extra preparation time'; and the importance of teacher 'flexibility'. However, two less common categories have emerged from the current study, namely, 'awareness of multiple perspectives' and 'priority of student needs'.

With regard to the effective implementation of CITT, a number of potential tensions were identified between a team teacher's various responsibilities, including: the need to show respect for one's partner and the need for both team teachers to provide students with non-conflicting instruction; the need to provide students with non-conflicting instruction and the potential for team teachers to develop their students' critical thinking skills by representing divergent perspectives; the importance of teacher flexibility and the need for partners to conform to jointly planned classroom behaviour; and the need for team teachers to negotiate their roles and distribute power within the partnership to the satisfaction of both parties.

The findings of the current study have provided a number of possible directions for further research in this area, particularly with reference to the potential tensions arising between specific categories of response. These tensions suggest a need for further research to provide ordinal data indicating how CITT practitioners rank in importance their various responsibilities in relation to each other, since such data might enhance our understanding of team teacher behaviour that seems paradoxical at face value, when team teachers feel they must fail one of their professional responsibilities to meet another responsibility deemed to be of greater importance. At the time of writing, a questionnaire-based research project is being conducted at MIC which will address these issues in more depth and gather data from a broader sampling of CITT practitioners in order to further our knowledge in this field.

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Appendix

The following "questioning route" (Krueger & Casey, 2000, p.47) was used by the moderator to guide the focus group discussions:

1. What does the term 'team teaching' mean to you?
2. What are the requirements of team teaching that are different from the requirements of traditional teaching?
3. What are the strengths and benefits of team teaching for participating teachers?
4. What are the strengths and benefits of team teaching for participating students?
5. What makes a team teaching partnership work effectively?
6. What are the weaknesses and limitations of team teaching for participating teachers?
7. What are the weaknesses and limitations of team teaching for participating students?
8. What prevents a team teaching partnership from working effectively?
9. Of the things we have discussed so far, what would you say is the single most important point about effective team teaching?

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Exploring the Relationship between Magical Thought, Scientific Thought, and Religiosity: A Pilot Test

Futoshi Kobayashi

本研究の目的は各人の魔法的思考(非科学的思考)、科学的思考、そして信仰の度合いの相関関係を調査することである。本研究では、米国中西部在住の 132 名のアメリカ人大学生被験者の年齢、性別、信仰の度合い、そして三種の日常的な状況と三種の生死を賭けた究極の状況下で彼らがどのような行動をとるかに関する意見がデータとして採取された。結果として魔法的思考(非科学的思考)は科学的思考よりも生死を賭けた究極の状況下で現れやすい反面、科学的思考は魔法的思考(非科学的思考)よりも日常的な状況下で現れやすい事実が確認された。また、信仰の度合いは魔法的思考(非科学的思考)と正に相関したが、科学的思考との関連性は発見されなかった。さらに本研究の限界と未来に行い得る次なる研究の方向性も検討された。

The purpose of this pilot study was to explore the relationship between magical thought, scientific thought, and one's degree of religiosity. Participants were 132 American undergraduate college students in the Midwest, who provided information pertaining to their age, gender, religiosity, and their open-ended responses to three ultimate situations and three normal situations. The results indicated that magical thoughts were more likely to appear in the ultimate situations than scientific thoughts, whereas scientific thoughts were more likely to appear in the normal situations than magical thoughts. Also, religiosity was positively correlated to one's magical thought but not correlated to scientific thought. The limitations of this study and possible future research directions were discussed.

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) published the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems in order to compare the heliocentric system of Copernicus and the geocentric system of Aristotle and Ptolemy. Because of this publication, he was condemned by the Pope and spent the rest of his life under house arrest. Although Galileo lost politically, he still believed that the heliocentric system of Copernicus was the correct model to explain the movements of heavenly bodies (James, 2004). The case of Galileo is used in scientific literature as the ultimate example of the tyranny of religion over science (Edelman, 1992; Moy, 2003; Shermer, 2003).

Since the time of Galileo, the general public often assumes that science and religion are antagonistic rivals when it comes to explaining the nature of the universe. However, many early scientists tried to understand the universe as God's creation; this motivation facilitated scientific inquiry (Myers, 2005). Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) thought that God's created universe was always working towards perfect harmony and order, thus leading him to his precise calculations (James, 2004). Although religion encourages magical thought (e.g., prayer), religion has not always discouraged scientists from conducting scientific and logical inquiries through history.

Today, several prominent scientists use an evolutionary perspective in order to explain religion (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Click, 1992; Dawkins,

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1989, 1998; Kirkpatrick, 1999, Pinker, 1997; Shermer, 1997, 2003). Although their approaches are different from each other, these scientists agree that evolution created the basic framework of the human mind, which then allowed for the conception of supernatural worlds and agents. Each culture then determined the specifics of different religions. In other words, human religions were created by both evolution and culture.

Dawkins (1998) assumed that in order to increase their survival rate, children acquired, through evolution, the ability to believe what they hear. For example: If a child did not believe when a parent told him or her "This mushroom is poisonous" and ate it, the child may not have survived. Humans also evolved to find patterns in their surroundings to increase their survival rate. If a person found a relationship between a certain substance and sickness, the person avoided that particular substance in the future. Dawkins (1998) used B.F. Skinner's experiment in order to explain how religion might have emerged in human life. Skinner (1948) created superstitious behavior in pigeons by using a specific reinforcement schedule. In his experiment, Skinner gave pigeons food according to a fixed interval of reinforcement schedule so the pigeons' actions had no relationship with the food delivery. But, he found that each pigeon started to exhibit a unique behavior (e.g., shook its head to the left suddenly) just before the delivery of the food. Skinner guessed the unique behavior was superstitious behavior because the pigeons seemed to assume that the behavior would cause the food delivery. Indeed, later research also found that similar fixed interval reinforcement schedules could produce superstitious behavior in seven out of twelve preschool children (Wagner & Morris, 1987) and in three out of twenty undergraduate college students (Ono, 1987). In a similar vein, gambling addicts also exhibit their own unique behaviors before gambling. Some gamblers talk to the slot machines, others fondle or hit the machines (Dawkins, 1998). A farmer offering a sacrifice to a god in return for rain is using the same kind of thinking (Dawkins, 1998).

Whenever we encounter a coincidence in two things or events, we tend to infer a causal relationship between the two. In modern times, we are faced with a tremendous amount of information (Dawkins, 1998). Because we hear about and experience numerous cases of coincidence in our own and other people's lives, we tend to think there is some supernatural explanation for each coincidence (i.e., magical thought). Like Dawkins, Shermer (1997, 2003) also assumed that humans evolved to seek patterns in their surroundings in order to increase their survival rates. The same thought process that finds patterns in the surroundings may have also created magical thought. Humans have a strong urge to find patterns anywhere and not all two incidents have a causal relationship (Shermer, 1997, 2003). Magical thought is defined in this study as cognition that assumes a causal relationship between two incidents, even though there is no such relationship. Magical thought might have emerged as a by-product of evolution.

In addition, cognitive psychologists recently proposed the possible existence of two independent cognitive systems (Evans & Over, 1999; Sloman, 1996). Sloman (1996) proposed that humans have two forms of reasoning: the automatic associative system that is based on personal experience; and the rule-based system that is based on clear logic. Evans and Over (1999) also proposed two systems in thinking: System 1 that is unconscious, automatic, early evolved, pragmatic, and implicit thinking; and System 2 that is conscious, later evolved, logical, and explicit thinking.

In a classic anthropological study, Malinowski (1925/1954) studied people in northeast Melanesia and found that their superstitious behavior appeared whenever

the Melanesians faced uncertainty and danger. Superstitious behavior was not observed whenever Melanesians handled situations that were safe and could be understood by rules. In this study, scientific thought is defined as cognition that follows a rational logic based on known rules and data.

Layng (2003) claimed that both magical and scientific thought are still used in contemporary American life, for example the use of prayer and modern surgery for critical illness. Pinker (1997) also claimed that:

> "Religion is a desperate measure that people resort to when the stakes are high and they have exhausted usual techniques for the causation of success – medicines, strategies, courtship, and in the case of weather, nothing" (p.556).

In summary, magical thought is more likely to appear in cognition than scientific thought in order to solve the problems that cannot be solved by known rules and data. However, scientific thought is more likely to appear in cognition than magical thought in order to solve the problems that can be solved by known rules and data. The present study tested such claims using three vignettes each presenting an ultimate situation question (i.e., a problem that cannot be solved by known rules and data) and another three vignettes each presenting a normal situation question (i.e., a problem that can be solved by known rules and data). In addition, the relationship between religiosity and these two kinds of thought was also investigated by using a valid religiosity measure by Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975). The present study had several different hypotheses listed below:

1. The sum of the magical thought score from three ultimate situation questions would be higher than the sum of the scientific thought score from three ultimate situation questions.
2. The sum of the scientific thought score from three normal situation questions would be higher than the sum of the magical thought score from three normal situation questions.
3. The sum of the scientific thought score from three normal situation questions would be higher than that from three ultimate situation questions.
4. The sum of the magical thought score from three ultimate situation questions would be higher than that from three normal situation questions.
5. There would be a positive correlation between one's religiosity score and the sum of magical thought score.
6. There would be no correlation between one's religiosity score and the sum of scientific thought score.

Method

Participants

The participants were 132 American undergraduate college students (88 females and 44 males) from a small University in the Midwest. The average age of these students was 20.9 (SD = 4.21) years, ranging from 17 to 45.

Materials

The Magical and Scientific Thoughts Measure. The author first wrote up four normal situations and four ultimate situations in order to elicit scientific thought and magical thought respectively. These situations were used to make a survey. A native English speaker revised these eight situation vignettes into more conventional American scenes. Then, two adults answered the survey and indicated

the expected results. After submission to the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the IRB recommended the removal of two questions among these eight situation vignettes because these two were too realistic and might have been psychologically harmful to some participants. The author followed the recommendation and deleted the two questions. The final version asked the participant's age and gender and what the participant would do in facing the six different real-life situation vignettes. In the final version, there were three vignettes presenting an ultimate situation question and another three vignettes presenting a normal situation question. Each vignette question was scored with both a scientific thought score and a magical thought score. Whenever scientific thought appeared, it was encoded as 1 in the scientific thought score. If it did not appear, it was encoded as 0 in the scientific thought score. The same method was applied to the magical thought score calculation.

The Religiosity Measure. Rohrbach and Jessor (1975) created the eight items to measure four different dimensions of religiosity (ritual, consequential, ideological, and experiential) and each item was scored from 0 (least religious) to 4 (most religious). The sum of each item indicates one's religiosity that ranges from 0 to 32. The higher the score becomes, the more religious a person is. This scale has well established reliability and validity (Hill & Wood, 1999).

Procedure

After receiving approval from the IRB, the author asked his Psychology 101 class and classes that were taught by other instructors for volunteers to participate in the present study. Extra credit was given to the research participants as an incentive. After reading and signing the informed consent, each participant answered the two measurements.

Manipulation Check

According to the intention of the author, three vignettes presenting an ultimate situation question (i.e., a problem that cannot be solved by known rules and data) were supposed to elicit magical thought more frequently than scientific thought and another three vignettes presenting a normal situation question (i.e., a problem that can be solved by known rules and data) were supposed to elicit scientific thought more frequently than magical thought.

As seen in the appendix, Question 3, 5, and 7 were designed to be ultimate situation questions and Questions 4, 6, and 8 were designed to be normal situation questions. Regarding Question 3, frequency of magical thought ($M = .54$) was significantly higher than that of scientific thought ($M = .09$, $t(128) = 8.149$, $p < .0001$). Regarding Question 5, frequency of magical thought ($M = .54$) was significantly higher than that of scientific thought ($M = .19$, $t(130) = 5.647$, $p < .0001$). Regarding Question 7, frequency of magical thought ($M = .62$) was significantly higher than scientific thought ($M = .33$, $t(129) = 4.391$, $p < .0001$). Thus, the expected results were found in all three ultimate situation questions. The expected results were also found in all normal situation questions. Regarding Question 4, frequency of scientific thought ($M = .97$) was significantly higher than that of magical thought ($M = .02$, $t(131) = 42.392$, $p < .0001$). Regarding Question 6, frequency of scientific thought ($M = .92$) was significantly higher than that of magical thought ($M = .15$, $t(130) = 18.375$, $p < .0001$). Regarding Question 8, frequency of scientific thought ($M = .88$) was significantly higher than that of magical thought ($M = .04$, $t(129) = 23.955$, $p < .0001$). Therefore, all six questions indicated the expected results.

Results

Regarding hypothesis 1, the sum of the magical thought scores from the three ultimate situation questions (M = 1.70) was found to be higher than the sum of scientific thought score from three ultimate situation questions (M = .61, t (126) = 8.427, p<.0001). This indicates that magical thoughts were more likely to appear than scientific thoughts in these three ultimate situations.

Regarding hypothesis 2, the sum of the scientific thought scores from three normal situation questions (M = 2.78) was found to be higher than the sum of magical thought scores from three normal situation questions (M = .21, t (129) = 32.645, p<.0001). This indicates that scientific thoughts were more likely to appear than magical thoughts in these three normal situations.

Regarding hypothesis 3, the sum of the scientific thought scores from three normal situation questions (M = 2.78) was found to be higher than that from three ultimate situation questions (M = .61, t (126) = 28.632, p<.0001). This indicates that scientific thoughts were more likely to appear in these three normal situations than those in these three ultimate situations.

Regarding hypothesis 4, the sum of the magical thought scores from three ultimate situation questions (M = 1.69) was found to be higher than that from three normal situation questions (M = .20, t (126) = 16.243, p<.0001). This indicates that magical thoughts were more likely to appear in these three ultimate situations than those in these three normal situations.

Regarding hypothesis 5, a positive correlation was found between the religiosity score and the magical thought score (r = .394, p<.01).

Regarding hypothesis 6, no correlation was found between the religiosity score and the scientific thought score (r = -.055, p = .539).

Discussion

Based on the clearly supported first four hypotheses, American college students tend to think scientifically in normal situations but also tend to think magically in ultimate situations. It means that contemporary American college students produce both scientific and magical thoughts based on the nature of the problem. The participants in this pilot study were more likely to think scientifically than magically in normal situations, but when they faced ultimate situations, they produced more magical thoughts than scientific thoughts. In addition, religiosity and magical thought were positively correlated but scientific thought was not correlated to religiosity. From these results, it is possible to hypothesize that the same person can have either magical or scientific thoughts depending on the nature of the problem. Although highly religious people tend to have more magical thoughts, highly religious people can also have highly scientific thoughts. Future researchers can investigate both scientific and magical thoughts as independent thought processes, using a more neuroscientific approach. For example, it may be possible to conduct fMRI scans on subjects who are conducting scientific or magical thoughts in the future to see which parts of the brains are activated for either magical or scientific thought. Theoretically, the evolutionary perspective of religion assumes that culture plays an important role in shaping human religious thoughts. The United States is known as a very religious country compared to other countries. For future research, similar studies could be conducted in different countries which are considered less religious.

There are several limitations in this pilot study. First, this study investigated only three normal and three ultimate situations. In the future, a larger variety of

normal and ultimate situations should be used. Second, this study used a convenience sample and contained many more female subjects (66.7%) than male subjects (33.3%). In the future, a random sample that contains a similar number of female and male subjects should be used. Third, the sample size (n = 132) was small, thus it is assumed to be a pilot study. A larger study should be conducted in the future. Fourth, the current magical and scientific thoughts measure can be revised from the responses of this study in order to have better outcomes. Fifth, the author coded the answers to either scientific or magical in this study. Multiple evaluators, who are unaware of the hypotheses, should score each vignette in future research.

Although this pilot study clearly has limitations, it has suggested that both magical and scientific thoughts are part of normal human cognition because they appeared differently depending on the nature of the problem. Thus, these thoughts might occur independently of each other.

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Appendix

The Magical and Scientific Thoughts Measure

Please print clearly when you answer the questions below.
There are 8 different questions.

Question 1. Please circle your gender.

1. Woman
2. Man

Question 2. Please write down your current age.

( ) years-old

Question 3.

Your finances seem hopeless right now. The Power Ball jackpot is up to 15 million dollars. You decide to spend one of your very last dollars on a ticket. What do you do to increase your chances of winning?

Question 4.

You decided to attend your 20 year high school reunion. In order to look a bit more like you did 20 years ago, you decide to lose a few pounds. What do you do?

Question 5.

While on vacation with several of your friends, you all decide to go hiking. The weather suddenly turns ugly and you become separated. Back at the trail head, you are at first relieved to see that your friends have made it back safely, but quickly

realize that one of them is still missing. She is an experienced hiker, so you fear that she hasn't made it back because she has been injured. The temperature is dropping and your friend is only wearing shorts and a T-shirt. As the rescue team prepares for a search, the rain changes to snow. If your friend is not found soon she will freeze to death. As the temperature continues to drop, and snow continues to fall, you must wait at the rescue station for news of your friend. What do you do?

Question 6.

Your three year old son hates to go shopping, but you took him to the mall anyway. He has, of course, wandered off again. You don't see him nearby, and he doesn't answer when you call. What do you do?

Question 7.

Your plane is malfunctioning. There is no engine noise anymore, the oxygen masks are down, and it is falling rapidly. All around you people are screaming and crying. You look at the emergency exit door, but you don't know if opening it will help or make the situation worse and anyway, by the time you open it the plane will have hit the ground. What do you do?

Question 8.

You want to fly to visit your family in New York for Thanksgiving. You need to get the lowest round trip air fair possible as your funds are a little tight right now, but you also know that this is the busiest travel time of the year. What do you do?

~ That's all. Thank you very much for your cooperation. ~

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The High Price of Peace: The Catholic Church and Japanese Nationalism 1926-1945

Míchéal Thompson

MEP (société des missions etrangères de Paris)はフランスのカトリック教徒の伝道の社会でした。1850 年代に MEP は近代日本のカトリック教会を設立しました。当初は、多くの問題がありましたが、日本のカトリック教会は 20 世紀の初めまでに大いに成長しました。昭和の最初の 20 年は日本にとっては、過激な国家主義と戦争の時代でした。MEP のカトリック教会と宣教師はこれらの諸問題に対処しなければなりませんでした。国家神道と日本人のカトリック教徒の司教への対応は特に重要な問題でした。日本のカトリック教会は、バチカン市国の方針と、日本人の聖職者と、MEP の間で分割されました。この論文はこの時代に日本のカトリック教会と MEP によって採用された異なった戦略を検証します。カトリック教会がこの敵対的環境で平和に生き残るのは、ひじょうに困難なものでした。

The MEP (*société des missions-etrangères de Paris*), a French Catholic missionary society, had founded the Catholic Church in modern Japan in the 1850s. Despite many challenges the Catholic Church in Japan had grown significantly by the beginning of the twentieth century. The first twenty years of the Showa period, however, were a time of extreme nationalism and war for Japan. The Catholic Church and particularly the missionaries of the MEP had to deal with these pressures and especially with the issues of State Shinto and the indigenization of the Japanese Catholic hierarchy. The MEP were caught between the policies of Vatican diplomacy, the aspirations of the indigenous Japanese Clergy, and their own (often divided) assessment of the situation. This article looks at the different strategies adopted by the Catholic Church in Japan and the MEP in this period, and at the high price they both had to pay to secure the peaceful survival of the Catholic Church in this often-hostile environment.

> "On the occasion of the Fourth Assembly of the FABC, we, Catholic Bishops of Japan, as Japanese and as members of the Catholic Church, sincerely ask forgiveness from God and from our brothers and sisters of Asia and the Pacific for the tragedy brought by Japan during World War II. As parties involved in the war we share in the responsibility for more than 20 million victims in Asia and the Pacific. Furthermore we deeply regret having damaged the lives and cultures of the people of these regions. The trauma is not healed yet".
> - Homily delivered by Archbishop Seiichi Shirayanagi, President of the Bishops' Conference of Japan at the Eucharist celebrated on Sept. 21,1986 at the Cathedral of Tokyo.

More than forty years after the end of hostilities in East Asia, the head of the Catholic Church in Japan apologized for the support given by the Catholic Church in Japan to the nationalist governments of the Japanese Empire during the wartime period. Important though this long-delayed apology undoubtedly was, it could not explore in any great depth the nature, extent, and reasoning behind this complicity. Despite this apology, it was to be a further 13 years until, in a study released without fanfare (to say the least) that the Bishops' Conference of Japan commented further on the background of this apology[1]. The

1 歴史から何を学ぶか： (Nagoya:Shinseido, 1999).

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current article will attempt to clarify the questions as to exactly what the attitude of the Catholic Church in Japan was to Japanese nationalism in this period, how it arrived at this position, and how it fitted with the more general attitude of the Catholic Church throughout this very difficult period for the Church and the world. Its primary point of reference is the role of the MEP (*société des missions-etrangères de Paris*) as the principal Catholic missionary group active in Japan during this period.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first three of the nineteenth century were times of great difficulty for the Catholic Church and its institutions. From the French Revolution through to the Kulturkampf, the attacks against the Church seemed to come in endless waves. Each attack left the Church somewhat more weakened and diminished in influence than it had been before. From the perspective of Europe, this culminated in the final years of the pontificate of Pius IX who died in 1878 a self-proclaimed 'prisoner of the Vatican' marooned in his papal palace adrift on a hostile sea of republicanism, modernism, nationalism, and anti-Catholicism. Without questioning much of the validity of this, the state of the Catholic Church in the world as a whole was not quite so bleak and subsequent popes were intent to capitalize on this. Above all, the successors to Pius IX concentrated on two things: establishing the best possible basis for church-state relations in Europe (despite the challenges) and fostering the work of the Church outside of Europe. The former consisted in the creation of a long series of concordats with European states which guaranteed the Catholic Church a privileged place in the lives of these states, especially in such vital areas as education and family life; the latter meant fostering the mission work of the Church and attempting to separate the lives of these missions from the potentially hostile vagaries of European politics. This in turn meant encouraging the growth of indigenous clergy and hierarchies which, though strictly loyal to Rome, would be less and less dependent on European missionaries. When the time was considered right, this could also lead to the establishment of diplomatic and concordat relationships between the Holy See and the governments of those mission countries that could be considered viable. In most cases, of course, these mission countries were European colonies and, as such, beyond the reach of individual concordats nevertheless preparations were being made for the future.

Such papal policies carried with them several implicit and explicit consequences. Firstly, if a government or regime were willing to accept a specific or even a privileged role for the Church, the Popes in turn would be willing to work with it. As such the specific variant of nationalism, imperialism, conservatism, etc espoused by a government was of no significance. The statement of Jesus: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21) was frequently invoked. In that respect, the Popes saw themselves as being neutral or above the fray. This, however, did not and could not extend to regimes (above all Communist or Communist inspired ones) that rejected any role for the Church at all. While prompted in part by bitter personal experience (such as that of Achille Rato [the future Pius XI] in Warsaw and that of Eugenio Pacelli [the future Pius XII] in Munich) the experiences of the Church in the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Spain weighted the attitude of the Church heavily against dealing with Communists and the Left more generally. Given the climate of the times, the 'neutrality' of the Church was of its nature less than perfectly neutral. This was perhaps augmented by the fact that leading 'democratic' countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States were hostile to the concept of concordats, while the concordat of 1801 with France had been brutally severed by the French

government. It is in this context that the relations of the Catholic Church with the increasingly nationalist governments of Japan should be set.

The Catholic Church in Japan in 1926

On Christmas Day, 1926, the Showa Era began with the accession to the throne of the Emperor Hirohito whose father (the Emperor Taisho) had reigned since 1912. The Catholic Church had been reestablished by French missionaries of the MEP in 1859 and had been able to build on the hitherto forgotten survivals of the sixteenth and seventeenth Portuguese and Spanish missionaries. The situation of the Church in Japan had been regularized into two Vicariates (northern and Southern Japan) in 1876 and then still further into four Arch/Dioceses in 1889. The numbers of faithful were now in excess of 90,000 though 60% of the total were to be found in the Archdiocese of Nagasaki in Kyushu where the legacy of the Iberian missionaries was concentrated. The MEP, largely because of their own inability to adequately staff the Church in Japan, had begun to progressively cede some of its territories to other religious orders, beginning with the cession of Shikoku to the Spanish Dominicans. This was finalized in 1904. The process of cession continued with further areas in Hokkaido, Honshu, and Kyushu being reassigned to German and Italian Catholic missionary societies. In 1926, however, the MEP still retained their control of the Catholic Church in Japan with the two Archdioceses (Nagasaki and Tokyo) and the two Dioceses of Osaka and Hakodate in their hands. The other religious orders had to be content with Prefectures Apostolic (Shikoku, Niigata, Nagoya, and Sapporo).

The control of the MEP had been, however, much contested at least since the anti-clerical legislation of the French Third Republic and, furthermore, the cataclysm of the First World War in Europe had undermined much of the claim to authority of the society. The former had coincided with a massive drop in clerical recruitment to the MEP and in a corresponding loss in financial contributions to the *Oeuvre de la propagation de la foi*, which since the 1830's had provided most of the funding for French Catholic missionary ventures. These had affected the missions of the MEP (and other French missionary societies) around the world. Specifically in Japan, the role taken by France with respect to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, and especially the alliance of the French Third Republic with Czarist Russia prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, had placed France, and with it the MEP and (perhaps) Catholicism in general, in a negative light. Briefly, the MEP in Japan had even been in a virtual state of siege in many areas due to threats of violence against the property and persons of the missionaries. While this overt hostility quickly abated, Catholicism and especially the MEP remained to some degree suspect. The First World War, on the other hand, had seen France and Japan as allies. The response of the MEP and of the French Catholic Church in general had been a massive outpouring of devotion and service to the *patrie* with missionaries serving in the military not only as chaplains but also as regular soldiers. Undoubtedly this had helped to heal some of the wounds of the early anti-clerical period in France itself and had vindicated the loyalty of the Catholic Church to the state, but in Japan this had served to underline both the ready acceptance of the MEP of the call to patriotism, and the fact that this was to France and not to Japan. How patriotic was the MEP and the Catholic Church in Japan to the Japanese nation and state?

If France had suffered major devastation and loss as a result of the First World War (1.3 million dead, 740,000 maimed, 289,000 houses destroyed, and three

million acres of agricultural land made unfit for cultivation)[2], Japan had only benefits from the war. At no cost in Japanese lives, Japan had acquired both new territories and even greater influence in Asia and the Pacific. Apart from the Pacific Islands mandates, Japan's primary gains had been in China. In 1915, the Japanese government under Prime Minster Shigenobu Okuma had succeeded in gaining substantial concessions from a weakened Chinese government, even though the United States had made it give up on some of its more extreme demands. In 1918, Japanese Prime Minister Masatake Terauchi had negotiated a joint-defense treaty with China in the light of the proposed threat from the nascent Soviet regime in Russia. Using this treaty, and combining it with sending a substantial army (eventually totaling 70,000) to Siberia as part of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Japanese troops could be found in large areas of China[3]. A primary goal of post-war Japanese governments was how to hold on to these gains (and exploit them) against the probable opposition of the Western nations, especially the United States. France wanted security and reparations for its losses; Japan wanted security and protection for its gains. Neither was to be happy with what they got.

The Great Depression hit Japan, like France, hard though the onset was not as delayed in Japan as it was in France[4]. In some respects, though, the Great Depression in itself was of less significance because it was the last (or nearly the last) in a series of economic crises that reached back to the immediate post-war period. In fact, the 1920s is often referred to as a period of recurring panics of greater or lesser magnitude. Financial crises, bank closures, bankruptcies, and job losses were recurrent themes. Small companies were pushed to extinction, though the big *zaibatsu* companies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) had the reserves and government connections to weather these storms and retain or even gain economic power. The composite of all these economic woes was a depression, which was the worst in Japanese history. Much publicized were the roles of 'dollar speculators' and Britain's withdrawal from the Gold Standard, which added to Japan's woes. It seemed that these might be linked to foreign displeasure with Japan's foreign policies. This strengthened the claims of the nationalists and the army as to who the enemies actually were and of the necessity (and rightness) of adopting a policy of aggression in China and other parts of Asia. Nationalism (and the army) appeared to have the right formula to restore Japan's economy, and therefore its self-respect, while protecting Japan from exploitative foreigners who wanted to restrict the country's role in Asia.

Of course, there was much more to Japanese attitudes as the Japanese moved through the 1920s into the 1930s than economics. Other nations, like France, explored a variety of different responses to economic depression and social uncertainty. As discussed earlier, successive Japanese governments from the middle of the Meiji period had been concerned as to what the best social policies were that would both minimize social conflict, and maximize a sense of common purpose (and obedience) in their citizens. They were determined to minimize the influence of socialism and other radical ideas. The Great Treason Trial (1911) was the final death knell for the desperately small Anarchist movement in Japan, and the start of the Soviet Revolution in Russia (with the Japanese sending an Expeditionary Army to Siberia to combat it) ensured that Communism would have no foothold in Japan.

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2 J.P.T. Bury, *France 1814-1940* (London, 1985) 244.

3 Ikuhiko Hata 'Continental Expansion 1905-1941' in *The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 6: The Twentieth Century* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Peter Duus (ed.).

4 Takafusa Nakamura 'Depression, recovery, and war, 1920-1945' in Duus (ed.) (1988).

But it was obvious that there was a need, not just to repress unwelcome social tendencies, but also to establish (and enforce) positive ones, particularly nationalism. An increasingly important aspect of this was religion. While Buddhism could be relied upon to support the nationalist agenda and, since the 1890s and especially since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, had regularly done so, more was needed. The hostility towards Buddhism in some areas and its virtual absence in others (for example Amami-Oshima) made it a useful adjunct, but not a perfect instrument. That instrument could only be found in State Shinto and, since that same war, Japanese governments had increasingly honed it and put it to this use.

State Shinto and the Catholic Church in Japan: The First Stage

This was a major problem for some, especially Catholics, who viewed Shinto as not just a demonstration of non-religious patriotism, but as an alternative religion to their own. This potential for conflict had nearly come to a head during the First World War. In 1915 the Governor of Nagasaki had initiated a formal conversation with Bishop Combaz[5] about this issue. Despite the contentions of the Governor that the State Shinto shrines and rites were solely civil and not religious, Bishop Combaz reiterated the ban on Catholic participation in a pastoral letter of 1916. The Vatican's Office of *Propaganda Fide* dispatched Monsignor Petrelli[6] to Tokyo to smooth things over bearing an official letter of felicitations to the Emperor. However, Bishop Combaz was unconvinced, declaring in 1918: 'We regret exceedingly that as Catholics we cannot accept the interpretation of shrine worship given by the government nor can we visit the shrines and engage in the services for the dead nor can we ever pay respect to the so-called gods'[7]. There the matter rested, the government adamant that shrine observance should be mandatory of all loyal Japanese though protesting that it was non-religious, the MEP adamant that it was religious and therefore not possible for Catholics though protesting the loyalty of the Catholic Church in Japan to the state.

The visit of Monsignor Petrelli, however, was a sign of things to come with the establishment of direct relations between the Vatican and Japan and the residence of Monsignor Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi[8] as Apostolic Delegate from 1919 to 1921. This Apostolic Delegation was also to include the Japanese Imperial territories of Korea and Taiwan, thus pragmatically accepting the realities of Japanese Imperialism. From his elevation to Cardinal in 1933 to his death in 1960, Fumasoni-Biondi was the Prefect of the Congregation *Propaganda Fide* and so a key influence on Japanese-Vatican relations throughout this period. The inauguration of direct diplomatic links meant, though the MEP in Japan only slowly incorporated this fact, that issues to do with State Shinto were now to be handled through the Apostolic Delegate (and thus the Vatican) rather than through the diocesan bishops (and thus the MEP). It was, in part at least, a realistic recognition of the centrality of the Vatican to Catholicism and equally a recognition of the loss of French claims to

5 Jean Combaz was born in the Archdiocese of ChambŽry in December 1856. He died in Nagasaki in 1926.

6 Joseph Petrelli was born in the Marche in 1873. He was a curial official from 1915 until his death in 1962.

7 George Minamiki, *The Chinese Rites Controversy from its Beginning to Modern Times* (Chicago, 1985) 130.

8 Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi was born in Rome in 1872. He was elevated to Cardinal and became Prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in 1933. He died in office in 1960.

represent the Catholic Church in Asia. Though a barely noticed change, it was to prove an important one.

The first move of Bishop Fumasoni-Biondi's successor as Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Mario Giardini[9]), which impacted on this issue, was the calling of the second provincial synod in 1924 (the first had been held in 1895). It was not to offer much in the way of a solution to the impasse concerning State Shinto in which the Catholic Church in Japan now found itself. Clearly the desires of the Apostolic Delegate and the Japanese clergy were not entirely commensurate with those of the MEP. A compromise between these two positions was sought and the resulting documents reflect this[10]. Basically, certain acts of 'passive' or solely 'material' participation in certain shrine rites could be tolerated (*tolerari potest* in accordance with Canon 1258) especially for soldiers or government workers but 'signs of reverence' could not. The acts of reverence for the war dead were prohibited (despite some disagreement) because of their continuing religious nature. Catholic students in state schools were not allowed 'material' participation in any form. While hope was held out for the future when all State Shinto rites would lose their religious or quasi-religious character, the synod could not reach agreement and they could not see their way to deciding upon a common guideline (*Communis autem regula nulla ratione statui posse videtur*)[11]. Even this limited compromise, inadequate from both the Japanese and the Apostolic Delegate's perspective, was not well received in certain quarters. The section of the synod documents dealing with State Shinto, because they involved questions of faith, were separated from the other documents and forwarded to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office for consideration.

While *Propaganda Fide* wanted a quick, realistic decision to help the Japanese church in an increasingly nationalistic and militaristic environment, the Holy Office had no such concerns but wanted to preserve the integrity of its decisions of the eighteenth century concerning the Chinese Rites. So, nothing happened and the Japanese Catholic Church remained divided and highly suspect in the eyes of the authorities. In 1931, a new Apostolic Delegate (Bishop Edward Mooney[12]) took office and, instead of waiting for some kind of response from the Holy Office, decided to call a new synod. In doing so, he did not just express his own and Propaganda Fide's sense of urgency about the situation, but also the fact that a new synod would reflect the changes in the Japanese Catholic Church since the last synod. Propaganda Fide had taken action in Japan that changed the balance of power in the synod; the process of indigenization of the hierarchy had begun. Any documents coming out of this new synod would reflect these changes.

The Indigenization of the Hierarchy: The First Stage

The MEP (and *Propaganda Fide*) had always been clear that one of the goals of the mission was to lay the foundations for what would become self-governing

9 Mario Giardini was born in Milan in December 1877. He became Archbishop of Ancona in 1931. He resigned in 1940 and died in 1947.

10 The documents of this synod were never published, this account of the documents relies on the summary found in George Minamiki The Chinese Rites Controversy Chicago: Loyola University, 1985 and on Josef Metzler, *Die Synoden in China, Japan und Korea: 1570-1931* (Paderborn, 1980) 268-292.

11 Metzler (1980) 283-284.

12 Edward Mooney was born in Maryland in 1882 and was ordained in 1909. He became Archbishop of Detroit in 1937 and was made a Cardinal in 1946. He died in 1958.

dioceses under indigenous Bishops. The question was how to judge when the time was right for this transition to take place. How self-sufficient did a prospective diocese have to be? How could you know when the indigenous clergy were ready to take control? In normal circumstances these decisions would be difficult ones to make, but Japan in the 1920s could not be considered 'normal'. However, it was this very lack of normality that pushed *Propaganda Fide* who in turn pushed the MEP into urgent consideration of action. The obvious first choice for such an action was the Diocese of Nagasaki, the jewel in the MEP's crown and, for that reason if for no other, likely to be a contentious choice. The MEP had in fact initiated a Japanese administered area in the diocese (the Goto Islands) during the war but some in the MEP (including Fr. Fernand Thiry[13]) were convinced that it had had negative effects both in terms of administration and religion[14]. Despite this skepticism, the MEP was in no position to block the decision that had been clearly made by *Propaganda Fide* (and thus by Pope Pius XI).

Initially, Bishop Combaz at least appeared to think that the MEP was about to cede Hakodate to another religious society (as had been done with Sapporo in 1915) and pleaded with the Superior General of the MEP (Bishop Guébriant)[15] to keep the rest of the MEP's territories 'together and not separate them one by one to another congregation, especially of a different nationality'[16]. The visit of the Apostolic Delegate (Fumasoni-Biondi) to Nagasaki made him begin to accept that the plans of the Vatican might be otherwise. Bishop Combaz was acutely aware of the fact that Fumasoni-Biondi had only been in Japan a short while and did understand in depth the 'numerous obstacles opposing the conversion of the Japanese or the government's attitude to the Catholic religion'. He implies that the Apostolic Delegate was caught up 'in the middle of Japanese obsequiousness'. He also noted the visit of the Prince Imperial (soon to be Emperor Hirohito) to the Vatican at the same time as Fumasoni-Biondi was on tour in Japan[17]. He soon made the connection however and realized that Vatican backed change was on the way in Japan whatever he might have preferred to. But what change and how much were still unanswered questions at the end of 1920, that was not to remain the case for long.

By the following year, Bishop Combaz realized that two alternative, though inter-related plans were under discussion. One was the further sub-division of the diocese with parts of it going to other mission societies. The other was the erection of a diocese under a Japanese Bishop. Yet it was still not clear to Bishop Combaz and the other MEP in Japan as to how these two were related, what exactly was meant, and what the timetable would be. During the course of 1921, it became apparent that *Propaganda Fide* had approved the transference of part of the diocese to the Canadian Franciscans[18]. The Salesians of Don Bosco were also encouraged by the Apostolic Delegate to take on a mission independent from the MEP in part of the

13 Fr. Fernand Thiry was born in September 1884. He was Vicar General to Bishop Combaz. Nominated Bishop of Fukuoka in 1927, he died in 1930.

14 Letter of Fr. Thiry to MEP 06/07/1926 he is writing on behalf of Bishop Combaz who was too sick to write himself. MC [*Missionary Correspondence*] 571a (1926).

15 Jean-Baptiste Budes de Guébriant was born in December 1860 to a distinguished Breton family. In 1921 he was chosen as Superior General of the MEP in which capacity he served until his death in 1935.

16 Letter of Bishop Combaz 02/22/1920 in MC 571a (1920).

17 MC 571a (1920).

18 *Comptes Rendus* (1921).

diocese[19]. Initially, in 1921, the Canadian Franciscans were sent to Kagoshima, which was expected to be their new mission territory. But Kagoshima on its own was relatively unpromising territory for them, so they worked towards extending the territorial base of their proposed independent mission. Their primary goal, once they realized the lie of the land, was to take possession of the flourishing mission of Amami-Oshima[20]. Finally, it was 'agreed' that the Franciscans would have Kagoshima (including Amami-Oshima), Miyazaki, Oita, and Kumamoto prefectures[21]. Though the MEP missionaries in Nagasaki Diocese were not happy about the loss of Amami-Oshima, they would have been happier if this loss had been counter-balanced by the loss of less fertile mission territory as well (such as Kagoshima, Miyazaki, and Oita). They didn't want to have another missionary society 'take the jam and leave them with the dry bread'[22]. There was also some division about whether ceding Kumamoto was appropriate in geographical and transportation terms. If the four prefectures were to be ceded to the Franciscans, what was to be ceded to the Salesians and who was responsible for making the final decision?

The provisional head of the Canadian Franciscan mission in Japan (Fr. Maurice Bertin), though willing to keep Kagoshima Prefecture in its entirety, wished to shift the center of the new mission to Amami-Oshima. He was also content that the Salesians should have Oita and one other Prefecture, and therefore recommended that Miyazaki as well should be added to the Salesian mission[23]. This would leave Kumamoto Prefecture as territory to be decided. But the Superior General of the Canadian Franciscans disagreed with Fr. Bertin and wanted to keep Miyazaki Prefecture for his order. This would mean a Franciscan mission of two prefectures (Kagoshima and Miyazaki) and a Salesian mission of two prefectures (Oita and Kumamoto). There was understandable opposition to this on the part of the MEP in Japan[24]. One part of this opposition centered on how the decision on this division would be made, Article 19 of the MEP rules stipulated that the society itself should make these decisions while Article 39 noted that it should be the Holy See[25]. Concerns ran so high that Fr. François Bertrand[26] (claiming to represent six other MEP missionaries) went over Bishop Combaz' head to write directly to the MEP in Paris about the proposed division[27]. These concerns were communicated to Bishop Combaz very shortly thereafter following a meeting of the Missionary Council. The missionaries made it clear that they wished to 'keep something at least equal to other societies'[28]. In the end, the MEP intervened with Propaganda Fide to insure that the MEP would retain Kumamoto Prefecture (along with Saga and Fukuoka Prefectures), so which of the two articles applied was never truly clarified. The only thing that the MEP in Japan was definitely sure about is that they must maintain

19 Letter of Bishop Combaz to MEP 23/09/1923 MC 571a (1923).

20 *Comptes Rendus* (1921).

21 *Comptes Rendus* (1923).

22 MC 571a (1921).

23 MC 571a (1924).

24 Correspondence of 28/07/1924 and 16/08/1924 (Fr. Lemarie) in MC 571a (1924).

25 Correspondence of 28/06/1923 in MC 571a (1923).

26 Fr. François Bertrand was born in August 1866. Following a long illness, he died in February 1940 at Yatsuhiro.

27 Fr. Bertrand to MEP 07/12/1923 in MC 571a (1923).

28 23/09/1923 MC 571a (1923).

Fukuoka, as it was the only larger settlement in the three prefectures at the time. In the smaller towns in the countryside 'everyone is enrolled in Shinto-Buddhist associations' and it was 'difficult if not impossible' for the missionaries to get results. One the other hand, 'towns of 15,000 to 20,000 and above have more liberty, more independence, and are more open to Christian ideas' so that 'there at least we advance slowly but surely'[29]. One thing that made the discussion even sharper was the realization that Fumasoni-Biondi had promised that there would be a Japanese Diocesan Bishop during his visit in 1921 and that *Propaganda Fide* were intent on delivering on that promise. The Diocese of Nagasaki was to be taken out of the hands of the MEP and given to the Japanese clergy.

In 1926, the die was cast and it was made clear that the Apostolic Delegate (Bishop Mario Giardini) with the authority of *Propaganda Fide* was intent on implementing the transition to a Japanese controlled diocese in Nagasaki as soon as possible. Bishop Combaz seems to have been largely accepting of the project, though he was too sick to take part in the practical discussions leading to implementation. In fact, the scheme was of necessity postulated on his no longer being the Bishop of Nagasaki. In fact, because of ill health, he died in August 1926, and there was no need to discuss his demission. That did not mean, however, that it would be plain sailing to transfer the diocese into Japanese hands. Fr. Thiry (as Vicar General) led the charge against the intentions of *Propaganda Fide*. While he would have been a natural successor to Bishop Combaz (and did become the first Bishop of Fukuoka) there is no real reason to think that his attempts to counter the transition were motivated by personal factors; rather his concerns were with the continued smooth functioning of the diocese and with the timing and appropriateness of the change.

His primary contention was that *Propaganda Fide* was attempting to move too fast without adequately considering the situation in the diocese. While ultimately there was no doubt that the diocese should have a Japanese bishop, now was not the time and, not only that, there was in fact no pressure (he believed) from the Japanese clergy to make this change at this time. He wrote that 'the healthy (*saine*) majority of the Japanese clergy of Nagasaki are completely opposed to any precipitate action in this matter'. He went on to note that *Propaganda Fide* and the MEP in Paris should be aware that the Japanese clerical administration of the Goto Islands had been 'a setback in religious and administrative terms' irrespective of what had been officially reported in the Comptes rendus. The correct solution was a new MEP Bishop of Nagasaki Diocese to be followed by the division of the diocese at a later time[30]. Implicit here was the idea that Bishop Combaz had 'gilded the lily' somewhat in his official reports on the Goto Islands and that this had moved *Propaganda Fide* to adopt a more favorable stance towards indigenization of the diocesan administration. He further noted the opposition of the missionaries based on the lack of adequate numbers of priests, there being no suitable candidate for Bishop among the Japanese clergy, and the problems of administrative competence (or the lack of it) noted in the Gotos[31]. He also raised the more 'personal' problems of the missionaries many of whom were 'more or less aged' and, though they had years of experience, found that the current disruptions had diminished 'the fire of enthusiasm of their youth'. They were, after all, 'still men' which meant that the

29 07/12/1923 MC 571a (1923).

30 06/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).

31 22/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).

current situation was very bad for the morale of the MEP missionaries in Nagasaki Diocese[32].

The main problem, however, for Fr. Thiry and the other MEP missionaries that he represented, was more to do with the inadequacies of the Japanese clergy than the reluctance of the French clergy. Of the 29 Japanese clergy of the diocese, seven were over 60 and three of them were over 70. A further three were assigned to the seminary and thus not engaged in parochial work while another two could 'only be employed very discretely' because of 'very delicate reasons'. Stretching logic perhaps a little too far (given the practice of the Catholic Church in general not least in France) 'nearly all of them were from the prefecture which meant keeping them in the same prefecture could be a source of grave moral difficulties'[33]. Based on this, he suggested a European Bishop for the diocese as a whole with a Japanese Auxiliary Bishop with special charge of the Gotos, Hirado, Kuroshima, and Sasebo[34].

Despite this spirited, and perhaps reasonable, opposition, Fr. Thiry was soon made aware of its irrelevance. In December 1926 he received a letter from Bishop Giardini 'in the name of the Pope' (sub sigillo pontificio) that the decision had been made and that a Japanese Bishop for the whole Diocese of Nagasaki would be appointed. All that was required of the MEP missionaries were nominations for the episcopate[35]. Despite two previous votes against the proposal, the opposition of the MEP missionaries was of no avail. The somewhat desperate appeal of Fr. Thiry to have a 'temporary double administration' with the MEP retaining the seminary was clearly beside the point by this time[36]. Other than nominations, the only things left for the MEP were to plan their exit from Nagasaki (and its timing) and to set about creating a viable new diocese in Fukuoka.

The MEP in Japan nominated Fr. Moriyama and Fr. Urakawa, both of whom were rejected in favor of the choice of *Propaganda Fide* (Fr. Kyunosuke Hayasaka). However, Fr. Michael Urakawa did become Bishop of Sendai in 1941[37]. At least Fr. Hayasaka was not a native of Nagasaki but of Sendai, so one of Fr. Thiry's concerns at least had been addressed. The suggestion was made by the MEP in Paris that the missionaries might wish to stay on in the Diocese of Nagasaki at least for a period of transition, but that was rejected because 'though the Europeans have enough humility to stay in their posts, the Japanese don't have enough to let them'[38]. Fr. Thiry acted as one would expect him to act and accepted the decision of *Propaganda Fide* as final and thus beyond discussion, reiterating the old maxim that 'Rome has spoken, discussion is closed' (*Roma locuta, causa finita*). Despite some continuing resistance and rearguard action ('intrigues and deceptions') the rest of the MEP complied as well[39]. The Sisters of the Infant Jesus of Chauffailles notified Fr. Thiry of their unwillingness to leave their novitiate under Japanese direction, but that was

32 23/07/1926 MC 571a (1926).

33 07/10/1926 MC 571a (1926).

34 15/12/1926 MC 571a (1926).

35 23/12/1926 MC 571a (1926).

36 10/05/1927 MC 571a (1927).

37 Bishop Michael Urakawa was born in April 1876. He served in Nagasaki for 35 years until he became Bishop of Sendai in 1941. He retired in 1954 and died in the following year.

38 10/05/1927 MC 571a (1927).

39 24/11/1927 MC 571a (1927).

the end of the trouble[40]. Fr. Thiry asked for and received additional financial aid from Paris for purchasing land and building new churches as the 'work of evangelization and other existing works had slowed down because of a lack of resources'[41]. He was ordained Bishop of Fukuoka in December 1927, though his was not to be a long tenure of office. In July 1927, Fr. Hayasaki Kyunosuke[42] became the first Japanese Bishop of Nagasaki.

The reasons for over-riding the objections of the MEP in Japan and for swiftly executing the policy of indigenizing the 'flagship' Diocese of Nagasaki are not difficult to discern. Pope Pius XI was acutely aware of the dangers of modern nationalism to the Catholic Church in Europe and throughout the world. He was seconded in this by his Secretaries of State (Cardinal Pietro Gasparri [1922-1930][43] and Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli [1930-1939])[44]. The Vatican believed that the best way to secure the best position for the Church was through direct negotiations with national governments with the aim of achieving detailed written agreements (preferably Concordats) with them, which would provide guarantees for the Catholic Church at the national level. From 1916, and especially from 1919, the Vatican had been working towards this end in Japan with increasing urgency, as nationalism appeared to increase in strength. To achieve this goal, in Japan as elsewhere, would mean some concessions to 'give a mark of respect and show confidence in the government'[45]. It was even felt that not to do so might lead to a schism or the creation of a 'National' Catholic Church in Japan[46]. How viable a threat this was must remain an open question, but it was not a question that the Vatican wished to leave open. Schismatic breakaways from the Catholic Church that rejected the authority of the Papacy had been a feature of Catholic life in Europe since the time of the Jansenists[47]. They were especially prominent at the time of the First Vatican Council in 1870 in the Netherlands and parts of German speaking Europe. Such schisms were not, however, restricted to Europe as the Polish National Catholic Church (in the United States) and the Aglipayan Church (in the Philippines) demonstrated. However, although it may have been an empty threat, it was not one that could be dismissed summarily by the Pope or by *Propaganda Fide*. It was also a question that was to recur over the next few years as the position of the Catholic Church in Japan became even more precarious in the face of the rising tide of extreme nationalism.

State Shinto and the Indigenization of the Hierarchy: Stage Two

Since the end of the First World War, the MEP in Japan had been in a very difficult financial position due to inflation and a collapsing exchange rate, which

40 15/07/1927 MC 571a (1927).

41 12/10/1927 MC 571a (1927).

42 Bishop Hayasaka was born in Sendai in 1883. He was appointed Bishop of Nagasaki in 1927 at the age of 43. He resigned in 1937 and died in 1959.

43 Cardinal Pietro Gasparri was born in May1852. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1907 and became Secretary of State in 1914. He retired in 1930 and died in 1934.

44 Cardinal Pacelli was born in March in March 1876. He became Secretary of State in 1930 and was elected as Pope Pius XII in 1939. He died in 1956.

45 *Comptes Rendus* (1927).

46 23/06/1926 MC 571a (1926).

47 John Neale, *History of the So-Called Jansenist Church of Holland* (New York, 1958).

made things very difficult everywhere perhaps especially in Tokyo[48]. The comparatively low level of missionary departures (averaging 20 a year or less in both the 1920s and 1930s) meant that there was a growing shortage of MEP missionaries and Japan had no special claim above that of other missions. Further territorial concessions were made to other missionary societies; in 1922 the Diocese of Nagoya was carved out of the Tokyo Archdiocese and given to the German based Divine Word Missionaries. In 1923, the Diocese of Hiroshima was created out of the western part of the Diocese of Osaka and assigned to German Jesuits. By 1930, the number of MEP priests had fallen by nearly 20% compared with prewar levels and they represented exactly half of the number of foreign Catholic missionaries. They had experience on their side but increasingly little else and even that was starting to ebb away. In Kyushu in the same year in the final deal agreed to by *Propaganda Fide*, Kagoshima was entrusted to the Canadian Franciscans (including the fertile mission field of Amami Oshima), and the Italian Salesians of Don Bosco took over the decidedly less promising territory of Miyazaki. The granting of Nagasaki to the indigenous clergy was clearly in response to the nationalist mood of the times and was a demonstration of 'confidence in the (Japanese) government'[49]. As a concession it was a major one but, in the increasingly radicalized environment of the 1930s in Japan, it was not enough. It became clear that what was expected was the handing over of all of the Catholic dioceses to Japanese control. If foreign missionaries were to be tolerated at all, they could certainly not be tolerated when they were in charge of Japanese. It seemed to some (especially the Apostolic Delegates) that the future of the Catholic Church in Japan was at stake, while to at least some of the missionaries the mere survival of the institution was perhaps a high price to pay for giving up the principles upon which the MEP had built up the mission at such great cost. At the time, however, there was little scope for an in depth discussion to take place.

The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was the active beginning of the Greater East Asia War. The army (and the navy) increasingly influenced all of the decisions of the government. With the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in May 1932, civilian government virtually ended in Japan. The Japanese nation was put on a permanent war footing and all sectors of the economy were directed at the war effort. To mobilize a nation and to keep it mobilized is not an easy task since an accessible set of beliefs and practices, which are inclusive of all the people of the nation need to be put into place and maintained. In Japan, this set of beliefs and practices was to be found in State Shinto. The military-based governments were intent on imposing State Shinto throughout Japan and, in fact, throughout the Japanese Empire, and so the Catholic Church had to deal with this. It was a matter of urgency and it would no longer be possible to let the decision disappear into the files of the Holy Office. The transfer of Nagasaki Diocese had proved the willingness on the part of the Pope to make reasonable compromises for a greater good, now was the time to consider State Shinto.

Matters came to a head in May 1932, just before the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai. A group of sixty Sophia University students had been led on a march as part of the compulsory military training program. When they reached Yasukuni Shrine they were required to present arms as a show of homage to the war dead, but two or three Catholic students refused to do so[50]. In response, the Army

48 *Rapport annual des évêques* (Tokyo, 1921).

49 *Comptes Rendus* 1927.

50 This account is based on Minamiki (1985) who in turn used an unpublished account of the affair written Fr. von Küenburg the Rector of Sophia University.

Ministry threatened to cancel the position of military training officer at the school, which would have effectively meant its closure. Bishop Ross, the new German Jesuit Bishop of Hiroshima, intervened with a more liberal interpretation of the rules (Canon 1258) governing these matters[51]. Archbishop Chambon[52] of Tokyo agreed to go along with this and permission was granted 'by word of mouth and for this instance' (*mündlich und pro casu*) for Sophia students to perform homage at shrines pending a decision of all of the ordinaries. As the next synod was not scheduled until 1934, Archbishop Chambon wrote directly to the Ministry of Education requesting clarification of the purpose and meaning to be attached to shrine visits. They replied that the 'bow that is required of the group of students of the higher schools and the students of the middle and primary schools has no other purpose than that of manifesting the sentiments of patriotism and loyalty'[53]. This was sufficient for the Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Edward Mooney) to issue his approval, which the synod of 1934 then approved in its turn. In 1935, the then Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Paolo Marella[54]) requested revisions of the previous guidelines governing shrine visits from *Propaganda Fide*. The reply, in the form of an instruction (*Pluries instanterque*), was issued by the Prefect of *Propaganda Fide* (Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi, a previous Apostolic Delegate to Japan). It was declared lawful for Catholics to attend and participate in shrine ceremonies since they were solely of a 'civil nature'. Catholics could also take part in other private rites (funerals, weddings, etc), which had also lost their religious nature. The norms given in these instructions were not just recommendations; Bishops were required (*debere*) to observe them. The final seal was placed on this in February 1937 when Monsignor Marella and the new Archbishop Designate of Tokyo (Archbishop Takeo Doi[55]) visited the Yasukuni Shrine along with a number of Catholic clergy and laity. Perhaps an even more tangible symbol of the acquiescence of the indigenous led Catholic Church in Japan was the campaign, launched by the first Japanese Bishop of Nagasaki (Bishop Hayasaka) to purchase a military plane to be donated to the government to demonstrate "Catholic patriotism". Under considerable pressure undoubtedly, the policy strictly adhered to by the MEP since its arrival in Japan and ably defended just a few years before, had been overturned. The nature of Shinto rites, the separation of Religion and the State, and the relationship of the Catholic Church to them remains a debate to the present day[56].

At the Yasukuni visit in 1937, Archbishop Doi led the Catholic clergy at the shrine visit, and the MEP had been pushed into further concessions. Very shortly more were to come. As the nationalist and militarist hold on the country deepened, the Japanese government was getting impatient with the slow rate of change towards Japanese control of the Catholic Church in Japan. The first move designed to hasten the process came in 1936 when the Canadian Franciscans withdrew under

51 *Codex iuris canonici* (Rome, 1909).

52 Jean-Baptiste Chambon was born in March 1875. He became Archbishop of Tokyo in 1927. On the division of the diocese in 1937 he became Bishop of Yokohama. He surrendered his diocese in 1940 and retired. He died in Japan and in 1948.

53 Minamiki (1985) 145.

54 Paolo Marella was born in Rome in 1895. He was appointed to the Roman Curia and elevated to be a Cardinal in 1959. He retired in 1983 and died in the following year.

55 Archbishop Peter Doi was born in 1892 and ordained in 1921. In 1937 he was appointed Archbishop of Tokyo. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1960 and died in 1970.

56 Matsumoto Saburo 'The Roman Catholic Church in Japan' in Kumazawa Yoshinobu and David Swain [eds] *Christianity in Japan, 1971-1990* (Tokyo, 1990).

considerable pressure and a Japanese Administrator Apostolic (Fr. Paul Yamaguchi)[57] was appointed. The center of the Kagoshima mission was the island of Amami-Oshima, which the MEP had been reluctant to concede to another missionary society because the rate of conversions had been so high. Amami-Oshima was declared a militarily sensitive zone and all foreigners were excluded which spelt the end of the mission. Where the charge of being ruled by foreigners was most galling was in the capital city of Tokyo. Archbishop Chambon was only sixty in 1935 and in good health so there was a problem with waiting for time to take its course. In 1937, the Archdiocese was divided with the MEP (under Bishop Chambon) keeping the new Diocese of Yokohama[58] while the Japanese clergy took control of Tokyo itself. The final blow would come in 1940 when all the foreign ordinaries were required to give up their sees to Japanese clergy, a process that was complete by 1941. As Japan entered the latest and, as it turned out, final stage of the war, the Catholic Church in Japan was solely led by Japanese and more fully integrated into the 'national project' than ever before.

The Final Stage: The Catholic Church in Japan 1940-1945

It was against this background of war and nationalism that the final decision was made to indigenize all the Japanese dioceses and to do it immediately. It is worth reiterating that the MEP, along with *Propaganda Fide*, had made clear all along their commitment to eventual indigenization. The problems lay with the word 'eventual'. Was the Catholic Church in Japan truly ready to 'stand on its own feet'? Did it have enough motivation? Was the decision to indigenize a reflection of the readiness and maturity of the Catholic Church in Japan or was the decision based on *real politik*, which in turn might indicate a fundamental unreadiness? Clearly, the decision no longer rested with the MEP, even in an advisory capacity, and *Propaganda Fide* had reached a decision. Whatever doubts could legitimately be entertained over this decision, it was not without its supporters. Both important elements of the Japanese clergy and some of the non-MEP heads of mission were strongly in its favor since they were convinced of both its timeliness and its appropriateness. However, some among the MEP, most notably Bishop Castanier of Osaka, remained unconvinced and instituted some delaying action that gave some color and tension to the final stages of the process.

Archbishop Doi of Tokyo was responsible for orchestrating the final demission of the non-Japanese Bishops and heads of missions. Initially it seemed that the plan was for a piecemeal series of demissions beginning with the dioceses of Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Osaka and then proceeding to the others and circumstances permitted. This was the plan communicated to Bishop Castanier by the Apostolic Delegate (Monsignor Marella) in September 1940. He noted the agreement of Bishop Chambon to this but shared his unhappiness over the decision: 'You understand well that it's neither Rome nor me who requires this, but our shared resolution to agree to all the sacrifices (necessary) to save whatever can be saved in this Church'[59]. Bishop Castanier replied noting his own wish to remain as Bishop, but acknowledging the government's clear intention of replacing foreigners with Japanese Bishops especially in the major towns. He believed that the decision

[57] Paul Yamaguchi was born in 1894 and ordained in 1923. He was appointed Bishop of Nagasaki in 1937. He became the first Archbishop of Nagasaki in 1959. He retired in 1971 and died in 1976.

[58] The Diocese of Yokohama was to be divided again very shortly afterwards (in 1937-1939) when the Prefecture Apostolic of Urawa (now the Diocese of Sendai) was created and given to the Canadian Franciscans.

should rest with Rome, and clearly believed that it would still be the graduated series of demissions envisaged by Monsignor Marella, which would start immediately[60]. To clarify this point, Bishop Castanier wrote directly to Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi at *Propaganda Fide*.

The reason for his confusion was that at an earlier meeting of the Bishops (on the 11th of September) the gradual solution was discussed, as was the idea, championed by Bishop Doi, that all of the Bishops and Heads of Missions should submit their resignations at the same time and immediately. They requested the advice of *Propaganda Fide* or at least confirmation that across the board resignations were what Rome required of them. The response of *Propaganda Fide*, delivered by telegram on the 23rd of September, was the message communicated by Monsignor Marella to Bishop Castanier on the same date: demission should be 'little by little (and) by stages'[61]. Despite the fact that, as Bishop Castanier acknowledged 'leading Catholics believe total demission is a *sine qua non'* for the Catholic Church in Japan, it would appear that Rome did not entirely agree. The source of this lack of agreement probably lay in the reasons used in favor of general demission: '1) Japan is a power of the first order (and) shouldn't have foreigners in charge of anything – Catholics are obstinate; 2) If they demit, maybe the missionaries can stay [to foster good relations with other countries]; 3) The Bishops have agreed (!) so they should keep their word; 4) Not to demit would raise the possibility of schism'[62]. In particular the last reason, because it seemed like a threat on the part of the Japanese government and maybe on the part of elements in the Catholic Church in Japan itself, no doubt disposed *Propaganda Fide* to a slightly less conciliatory line.

However, the decision had been effectively removed from the hands of *Propaganda Fide* as well. After the meeting of the 11th of September, and without waiting for confirmation from Rome, Bishop Doi had informed the Japanese government (and announced in a Japanese Catholic newspaper) that it would be a general demission[63]. Bishop Castanier agreed to submit his demission (which would have been required under either plan) in order to save Bishop Doi's embarrassment, though clearly suspicious of the way in which Bishop Doi had conducted himself during the whole affair. The first demissions (Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Urawa [Saitama]) were received immediately, but even that was not a smooth process. After having resigned, Monsignor Ambrose Leblanc (of Urawa) then had second thoughts when he began to suspect that it was Bishop Doi rather than the Japanese government who was behind the general demissions strategy. This, along with the telegram from *Propaganda Fide*, made him call the whole general demissions plan 'an invention' and even led to him questioning the validity of demissions made under these circumstances[64]. Bishop Castanier was under increasing pressure to resign, Bishop Chambon visited him to urge him to do so in October, noting that this was

59 Letter of Monsignor Marella to Bishop Castanier 23/09/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

60 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Monsignor Marella 28/09/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

61 Telegram of 23/09/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

62 Memorandum of Bishop Castanier to Bishops Doi and Chambon n/d but probably October 1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

63 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi 25/10/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

64 Letter of Monsignor Leblanc to Bishop Castanier 25/11/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

what both Bishop Doi and Monsignor Marella wanted, the latter largely because of Bishop Doi's pre-emptive contact with the government and the press. By November, Bishop Doi was becoming increasingly desperate and wrote to Bishop Castanier that only he and Bishop Lemieux (The Canadian Dominican who was Bishop of Sendai) had not submitted their resignations[65]. The latter had indicated his willingness to do so but was out of the country. Bishop Castanier, in a gesture which indicated his feelings, replied and soothed Bishop Doi with the news that he had indeed submitted his resignation, but directly to *Propaganda Fide* and not to Monsignor Marella[66]. This resignation was accepted in December, after a telling lag of a month, and Fr. Paul Taguchi was appointed as his successor. He was ordained to the episcopate on December 14th 1941 a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Osaka was the last of the Japanese dioceses to accept an indigenous bishop and it was the last of the MEP dioceses in Japan. An era was over and clearly a period of great challenge for the Catholic Church and the MEP in Japan lay ahead.

France surrendered to the German Armed Forces on June 22 1940 and Marshal Pétain became Chief of State of the French government, which was allowed to control the southern half of France from the city of Vichy. On September 27 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy forming the 'Axis Alliance'. In September 1940, the Japanese Army with consent of the Vichy government entered French Indochina where they remained in effective occupation until 1945. In October 1940, the Thai Air Force attacked Vichy French forces in Southeast Asia, which was followed by a ground assault in January 1941. The Vichy French forces retaliated and gained territory but, in the resulting peace treaty of May 9 1941 signed in Tokyo and brokered by the Japanese, these territories were all returned. Vichy was a collaborationist state with the Axis in Europe and this was also the case in Southeast Asia. It was not an equal partner, but a tolerated assistant whose skills could be valuable but whose weakness was manifestly clear. This would clearly impact on the status of the MEP in Japan.

At the opening of hostilities in Europe in September 1939 there was a total of 67 MEP priests actually living in Japan. An additional seven were out of the country on furlough (six in France and one in the United States). With the signing of the Axis Alliance a year later they became officially citizens of a 'friendly' nation, as did the German and Italian Catholic missionaries. The Salesian Prefect Apostolic for Miyazaki, Vicenzo Cimatti, even went so far as to compose the first ever Western style opera in Japanese 'Grazia Hasegawa' to celebrate the signing of the Axis Treaty. It was first performed in Tokyo that year[67]. This 'friendly nation' status for these missionaries continued after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia. Catholic and Protestant missionaries from America and Britain (as well as Belgium and Ireland) were subject to internment but this did not apply to the MEP[68]. Some missionaries from 'enemy' nations were interned and then deported[69]. In August 1942, and again in September 1943, some of these missionaries were exchanged at sea for captured or interned Japanese civilians, while others remained interned for the duration of the

65 Letter of Bishop Doi to Bishop Castanier 03/11/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

66 Letter of Bishop Castanier to Bishop Doi 06/11/1940 in papers of Bishop Castanier.

67 Vicenzo Cimatti was born in 1879. He came to Japan in 1925. During the war he was under virtual house arrest in Tokyo. He stayed on in Japan for a further 20 years after the war dying there in 1965.

68 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).

69 Sister Aimee Julie, *With Dedicated Hearts* (Ipswich [MA], 1963) 202-232.

war. Although being from a 'friendly' country prevented deportation or internment, the MEP were subject to considerable harassment and difficulty. Two were arrested in December 1941 (Bishop Breton and Fr. Marcel Houtin)[70] and imprisoned for four months. At the same time, Fr. François-Xavier Brenguier was arrested in Saga and imprisoned for three months[71]. Two missionaries had been conscripted in 1939 (Fr. Clément Fonteneau in Vietnam and Fr. Alfred Mercier at the French Embassy in Japan)[72]. All of the other missionaries were subject to various restrictions ranging from house arrest to intensive surveillance. Frs. Frédéric Bois, Anatole Heuzet, and Henri Léoutre were put under house arrest at the Cathedral of Fukuoka sharing their place of residence with some Japanese police who reported their words and actions[73]. Fr. Bonnet was arrested and imprisoned for 19 days, on the denunciation of his catechist with whom he was not on good terms. The nature and extent of the harassment varied at the whim of government officials and policemen around the country 'some (missionaries) were not allowed to leave their posts while others had to leave and take refuge in the mountains'[74]. Father Bonnet noted that the police in his parish of Izuka were always 'correct' in their treatment of him[75], though the same could not apply to the police dealing with Fr. Breton who, it seems, was particularly disliked by them and was even physically beaten in prison. However, even this story had a happier side as he was released on the instructions of a senior government official, was given gifts of beer, fruit, and candies and returned to the Cathedral of Fukuoka with a policeman to carry his bags[76]. The MEP continued to function, however, and remained in groups organized by diocese.

Two things were of particular help to the MEP during the war. One was the continued interest on the part of the Japanese government in maintaining

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70 Fr. Marcel Houtin was born in 1890 and ordained to the priesthood in 1920. He served in various positions in the Archdiocese of Tokyo where he died in 1951.

71 Fr. François-Xavier Brenguier was born in 1871. He served in various posts in Kyushu until his death in 1946.

72 Fr. Clément Fonteneau was born in 1913 and ordained to the priesthood in 1937. After a brief stay at Fujieda he served in the French Army until 1945. After his return from Vietnam he served in various positions in the Diocese of Yokohama until his death in 2001. Fr. Alfred Mercier was born in 1905. He was mobilized in 1940, though he was demobilized after three months. In May 1945 he was arrested and tortured by the police. After his release in August 1945 he served in various parishes until his death in 1977.

73 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945. Fr. Maxime Bonnet was born in 1878. He served in various positions in the Dioceses of Nagasaki and then Fukuoka. He retired in 1952 and died at Shindenbaru in 1959. Fr. Frédéric Bois was born in 1887. He was mobilized into the French Army from 1914 to 1919. On his return to Japan he served in Kumamoto and then Fukuoka. After the end of World War Two, he served in Yahata from 1948 to his retirement in 1975. He died in Shindenbaru in 1977. Fr. Anatole Heuzet was born in 1870. He served at Kianousa for 18 years before he was mobilized into the French Army in 1915. He was demobilized in 1917 and returned to Japan where he served in a variety of positions. He died in Fukuoka in 1944. Fr. Henri LŽoutre was born in 1907. He served in various positions before his health problems became severe. He died in 1944.

74 Note (no date) in papers of Bishop Combaz.

75 In fact, Fr. Bonnet attempts to portray his life as a largely pleasant one with a big garden, chickens, rabbits, goats, and bees. Despite his tendency to 'look on the bright side' it would seem that life, though always uncertain, was not always unpleasant for all of the MEP missionaries. Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.

76 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.

diplomatic links with the Vatican. Bishop Breton believed that his release from prison was connected to the appointment of Harada Ken (Councilor of the Japanese Embassy in France) as the first Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican[77]. The other was the continued support of the French Government that, under Marshal Pétain, was favorable towards the Catholic Church. In fact, through the assistance of M. Gallois at the French Consulate in Yokohama, the MEP received regular monthly cash subventions[78]. While not treated by the Japanese government as favorably as the German Jesuit missionaries (as Fr. Henri Unterwald noted)[79], the help of the Vichy government was important for the physical survival of the MEP missionaries during these difficult times. In return, they were supportive of the requests of Vichy for interpreters in Indochina and of saying a mass for the war dead at the special request of Marshal Pétain[80].

As opposed to this, there were two things that were particularly irksome to the MEP during the war. The first was the attitude of the Catholic Church in Japan towards Japanese nationalism and the wartime government. In the words of Bishop Breton: 'Hierarchy and clergy cooperated heartily with the militaristic and racist elements of the country, not a single one daring to say "no" to a government official. Lack of character, lack of principles, a real game of opportunism all through, I should say rather of servilism (sic)'[81]. Following the orders of the government, the Catholic Church had restructured itself in May 1941 as the 'Japanese Catholic Religious Body' (*Nippon Tenshu Kokyo Kyodan*) with Archbishop Doi as its first president. In every way, from participation in 'pacification delegations' to the South Pacific and Indonesia, to making all Church buildings available for the use of the military from offering prayers for victory at mass to official visits to State Shinto shrines for the same purpose, the Catholic hierarchy seemed to be wholeheartedly supportive of the war. Its numerous publications, especially those of Bishop Taguchi of Osaka[82], during this period reflect this. Bishop Taguchi was a particularly zealous supporter of the militarist government and its actions, especially in Southeast Asia. Archbishop Doi, though not a participant in the actual 'pacification missions', made his support for the government's actions clear in print.

The second issue was the way in which the Japanese clergy had treated the missionaries during the war. In the words of Bishop Breton concerning his imprisonment 'On the part of the native Bishop and of his clergy, there was complete indifference, not even the least request to the competent authorities to obtain my release or that of my fellows'[83]. This was reflected throughout the country: whether out of fear, cowardice, or nationalist commitment, the Japanese clergy did nothing to help the missionaries and distanced themselves as far as possible from them. The support of the Japanese clergy for the 'pacification delegations' requested by the Japanese government in 1941 and 1943 for the Pacific

77 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).

78 Letter of Bishop Chambon 23/08/1944 in papers of Bishop Chambon.

79 Fr. Henri Unterwald was born in 1908 and ordained to the priesthood in 1933. He served in various parishes in the Diocese of Osaka. He retired in 1971 and returned to Alsace. He died there in 1998.

80 Letter of Bishop Chambon 03/09/1941 in papers of Bishop Chambon.

81 Letter of Bishop Breton to Bishop O'Hara and Bishop Heady 20/07/1946 in MC 571b (1946).

82 Bishop Taguchi was born in 1902. He became Bishop of Osaka in 1941 and then Archbishop in 1969. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1973 and died in 1978.

83 Letter of Bishop Breton to MEP Superior General 20/09/1945 in MC 571b (1945).

and Indonesian territories captured by the Japanese army was not appreciated by the MEP. This was particularly the case for Bishop Taguchi and Bishop Yamaguchi of Nagasaki both of whom left on one such mission in August 1943, and who were still actively involved with it in September 1945[84]. It would take some of the missionaries a while to adjust to this after the war was over, Bishop Breton, for example, strongly believed that non-Japanese bishops should be brought back to serve as moral examples to the Japanese hierarchy and Church[85]. Fr. Bonnet also believed that General MacArthur would institute this course of action because of the moral weakness shown by the Japanese[86]. It was not however, a piece of advice that he intended to follow.

With the end of the war, the MEP and the Catholic Church entered a new and very different era in Japan. A total of 16 MEP priests had died in Japan during the war and all of the others had suffered varying degrees of hardship. Their treatment had worsened during the last few months of the war after the defeat of Nazi Germany and the disappearance of Vichy France. All of the missionaries had been interned in special camps in July 1945 from which they were released after Japan's surrender. Now decisions had to be made about the future and the need to find a new vision for their mission and for the Catholic Church in Japan. Whatever these were to be, and whatever their relationship with the indigenous hierarchy was to be, the MEP was unwilling to sever its links with Japan; links that had been forged over nearly a century and whose quality had been severely tested.

84 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.

85 Letter of Bishop Breton to Bishop O'Hara and Bishop Heady 20/07/1946 in MC 571b (1946).

86 Letter of Fr. Maxime Bonnet to MEP Superior General 19/09/1945.

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Japanese Revisionists and the 'Comfort Women' Issue: a Comparison of Two Texts

Micheal Cooper

愛国の誇りと国民の士気を再生するため、「美しい国、日本」を政権構想に掲げた安部元総理大臣は、2007 年 3 月、第二次世界大戦中の日本軍が、女性を強制的に性労働者として従事させた証拠はないという公式声明を発表した。これを受けて世界のマスメディアと各国政府は激しい憤りを示し、生存する「慰安婦」に対して公式に謝罪するよう強く求めている。本記事では、リベラル系英国新聞「The Independent」と日本の保守系新聞「読売新聞」の記事を批判的談話分析を用いて比較し、筆者のイデオロギーが、事件や問題を描写する言葉において、そして記事が作り出す読者との関係においてどのように明確であるかを明らかにする。

When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the architect of the "Beautiful Japan" campaign to renew Japanese national pride and morale, made a public statement in March 2007 that there was no evidence the Japanese military coerced women into serving as sex workers during World War II, the international media and many governments replied with outrage and demands for a formal apology to the surviving "comfort women". This article uses Critical Discourse Analysis to compare a story from the liberal British newspaper The Independent and an article from the conservative Japanese newspaper The Yomiuri Shimbun to reveal how the ideology of a text's producer is evident in the language used to represent events and subjects and in the relationship the text forms with the reader.

This analysis uses Norman Fairclough's procedure for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to compare two articles about the current Japanese administration's public statements concerning WWII sex workers: "Japanese Prime Minister angers victims of wartime sex slavery," from the UK newspaper The Independent (Appendix 1, hereafter Text-I), and "Background of 'Comfort Women' Issue / Comfort station originated in govt-regulated 'civilian prostitution," from the Daily Yomiuri, an English newspaper in Japan (Appendix 2, hereafter Text-Y). This analysis examines some of the ideological issues underlying the controversy by comparing the representation of events and subjects and the relationships each text establishes with the reader.

PM Abe's comments and the "comfort women" issue

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his supporters in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have undertaken a campaign called 'Beautiful Japan,' the goal of which is to renew Japanese national pride, confidence, and morale. Abe and his supporters promote, among other policies, a revision of history textbooks to omit references to Japan's war crimes and a 're-thinking' of the 1993 admission by Yohei Kono of the Imperial Army's coercion of women and girls into sexual service as 'comfort women' during World War II. In March 2007, Abe stated that no evidence was found that women were coerced into sexual service, a claim made frequently by Japanese revisionists like the Society for Dissemination of Historical Fact (Ogata, 2007), the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (2007), and the Association for Advancement of Unbiased View of History (2007), who will hereafter be referred

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to as Japanese revisionists. The passage on 26 June 2007 of U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 121 (Honda, 2007), which calls on the Japanese government to admit guilt and apologize, has further angered these groups.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Jaworski and Coupland (2006) and Fairclough (1995) introduce CDA by distinguishing it from other linguistic fields. CDA attempts to show "how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social structures" (Fairclough, 1995, p.27, cited in Jaworski & Coupland, 2006, p.28-9). Fairclough is ultimately concerned with the relationship between language and power in society, and this distinguishes CDA from other forms of discourse analysis.

Each member of a society interprets her world through socially-determined "knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds..., values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on" (Fairclough, 1989, p.24) which Fairclough calls Member's Resources (MR). Because MR has the status of "a given," it is unexamined and accepted without question, thus acting as the medium by which discourse and society shape one another: "social structures shape MR, which in turn shape discourses; and discourses sustain or change MR, which in turn sustain or change structures" (Fairclough, 1989, p.163). MR is the link between language and power.

For Fairclough, CDA is not an exercise in scholarship or an abstract investigation; it is a socio-politically transformative act of defiance to the status quo in modern capitalist society: "Discourse analysis offers a means of exposing or deconstructing the social practices that constitute 'social structure' and what we might call the conventional meaning structures of social life" (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006, p.5), and by doing so, the CDA practitioner hopes to emancipate those members of society who do not have power: "Critical discourse analysts need to see themselves as politically engaged, working alongside disenfranchised social groups" (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006, p.30). The CDA practitioner does this by revealing how control of power is maintained through control of discourse.

Fairclough's CDA framework

I have chosen to base my analysis on the three-stage framework that Fairclough lays out in Language and Power (Fairclough, 1989). Table 1 summarizes the aspects relevant to this discussion.

Fairclough offers his three-stage CDA framework as a tool to enable the practitioner to reveal how formal features of a text influence and are influenced by social power structures, with the ultimate goal of revealing how the details of language use can actually affect who holds power in a society. This analysis will focus on how the texts compared reveal their discourses and ideologies and how these discourses relate to the institutional and societal context.

The Texts

The two newspaper articles analyzed here – one from the UK and one from Japan – are used to demonstrate how CDA reveals the relationship between language, discourse, ideology, and power. Text-I appeared in The Independent, a UK newspaper with a mostly liberal readership. Text-Y appeared in The Daily Yomiuri, an English-language Japanese newspaper published by the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun; however, the Japanese version was also published in the Yomiuri

Table 1. Summary of Fairclough's discourse analysis framework

Description of the formal features of the text At the core of CDA is the assertion that the formal features of a text – lexis, grammar, textual structure - ultimately influence and are influenced by larger social structures. The Description dimension of this analysis describes how the formal features of the two texts, when compared on common points of dispute, reveal the ideologies of their creators.	
Vocabulary	What experiential, expressive, and relational values do words have, particularly in reference to subjects? Are there words which are ideologically contested, like euphemistic expressions? Are there instances of the metaphorical transfer of a word or expression from one domain of use to another?
Grammar	What experiential, expressive, and relational values do grammatical features have? Is agency unclear? Are sentences active or passive? What modes (declarative, grammatical question, imperative) are used? How are (simple) sentences linked together?
Textual Structures	What larger-scale structures does the text have?
Interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction Fairclough's Interpretation dimension deals with the relationship between text production and the MR of the text consumer. The writer's assumptions about the reader's knowledge and beliefs define the ideal reader, and the actual reader must negotiate a relationship with this ideal reader in the interpretation of the text. As the Interpretation section of this analysis will show, the relationship between actual and ideal readers affects a text's persuasiveness.	
Context	What interpretations are participants giving to the situational and intertextual contexts, including the relationship between the actual reader and the ideal reader?
Explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context Fairclough's Explanation dimension of CDA reveals the connection between discourse and social structures, including how discourse determines, maintains, and reproduces these structures (Fairclough, 1989, p.163). This paper will briefly address the relationship between the discourses revealed in the two texts and the institutional and societal power struggles of their social contexts.	
Social determinants	What power relations at institutional and societal levels help shape this discourse?
Effects	How is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the institutional and societal levels? Is the discourse normative with respect to MR or creative; does it contribute to sustaining or transforming existing power relations?

Shimbun, so the audience includes both Japanese nationals and Japan-resident foreign nationals.

Description of the text: Vocabulary, Grammar, and Textual Structure

Introduction

The two texts under consideration address a sensitive issue in international politics, and since a large part of political struggle occurs "in language and over language" (Fairclough, 1989, p.23), this section will describe how lexis, grammar, and textual structure differ between the two texts in the representation of events and subjects and how these choices are ideologically motivated.

Lexical choice plays a prominent role in this section, because both texts exercise "the power to constrain content...to favor certain interpretations and 'wordings' of events, while excluding others" (Fairclough, 1989, p.51-2). Choice of vocabulary can place a text in an ideology by, among other things, choosing words associated with an ideology, collocating words, and using metaphorical transfer of a word or expression from one domain of use to another (Fairclough, 1989, p.113-4). Fairclough notes that "choice entails exclusion as well as inclusion", and by comparing these two ideologically-opposed texts, we will show that absences also reveal the underlying ideology of a discourse (Fairclough 1989, p.210). Both texts attempt to redefine agents and events to support their respective positions on the issue.

Table 2 compares the number of times ideologically-contested terms are used in the two texts.

Rather than following the questions in the order Fairclough lists them in his framework, this analysis is organized around common themes that arise in the two texts, as Table 3 summarizes.

The "comfort women": sex slaves or prostitutes?

Both texts assert that "comfort women" is an inaccurate euphemism in need of clarification: Text-Y claims they were actually prostitutes; Text-I, sex slaves.

Table 2 illustrates that Text-I uses comfort station or comfort wom[ae]n in 'scare quotes'. Fairclough explains how quotation marks can dissociate the writer from the quoted phrase (Fairclough, 1989, p.90) by putting a term in quotation marks when the text is not directly quoting another speaker or writer: the quotation marks signify that the author does not endorse the term but is just borrowing it to make a point. When referring to the women directly, Text-I avoids the term "comfort women" in favor of "slaves" or "victims." When Text-I uses 'scare quotes' in the passage about the "comfort station" where Gil Won-ok was raped, it highlights the irony of a "comfort" station where there was so much pain. These lexical choices are used in the present tense to signify continuing victimization, in line with Text-I's use of "victim", a term absent from Text-Y.

In contrast, Text-Y uses the terms "comfort wom[ae]n" and "comfort station" many times but includes no stories or quotations from individual comfort women; the exclusive use of these references reduces the women to an abstract collective. Only the ideologically-disputed term "comfort women" is used to refer to them, which at first seems to indicate an endorsement of the current usage. However, Text-Y uses the phrase "so-called" to question the terms' suitability, such as when it refers to "so-called comfort women" who "received remuneration in return for sexual services at so-called comfort stations." Text-Y implies that, if the women received

remuneration, these comfort stations were no more than brothels. The terms "comfort wom[ae]n" and "comfort station" are used without qualification when referring to the dispute itself ("the comfort women issue") and when collocating with lexis that redefines the term as prostitution: "The reasons cited for the need for comfort women and wartime brothels." Other collocations include "remuneration", "recruited", "brothel", and "prostitution".

Table 2. Comparison of frequency of use of ideologically-contested terms.

Term or Reference	Text-I	Text-Y
"comfort wom[ae]n"	3	13
"slave"	3	2
"prostitute" / "prostitution"	1	6
"comfort station"	4	2
"brothel"	1	8
"so-called"	0	2
use of quotation marks around a term to indicate that the author is distancing herself from it	5	0
"sexual service"	0	3
"rape"	6	1
"Imperial"	0	3
"recruit"	0	3
"victim"	2	0
"denial" / "denier" / "deny"	4	0

The bias of the text producer is easily detected in the choice of lexis used to define subjects in the text, but bias can be also be introduced more subtly when judgments and opinions are implicit grammatically as part of subordinate clauses and rhetorically as given information. In its list of reasons for establishing wartime brothels, Text-Y cites the advantages of medically-verified comfort women over "local prostitutes". By foregrounding the distinction between local and military-approved prostitutes, the text backgrounds the implicit assumption that these women were indeed prostitutes. The same thing happens when Text-Y states that "During the war, comfort women were not called 'jugun ianfu' (prostitutes for troops)," that the use of the word "jugun" started after the war ended. By foregrounding the dispute over the term "jugun" ("under military management"), Text-Y backgrounds the equation of "ianfu" with "prostitute," concluding that the comfort stations were "the battleground version of civilian prostitution." This relegation of disputed points to the status of given information is consistent with Text-Y's assertion that the details of the comfort women issue have been resolved and that Text-Y itself is simply a listing of facts.

Table 3. Outline of the differences in the way the two texts define the comfort women and their activities

Description	Text-I	Text-Y
References to the women	Uses quotation marks to distance author from term comfort women; prefers slaves or victims	Uses so-called to distance author from the term; doesn't use victims
References to their work	Prefers slavery	Prefers prostitution or sexual service, which is conducted in brothels
References to relationship between the women and the Japanese military	Uses language from economic and commercial domain	Uses language related to conquest and slavery
References to the Japanese revisionists	Prefers forms of the verb deny	Frames the revision of history as an attempt to correct mistakes and misrepresentations
References to the Japanese military and government	Makes no distinction between past and present Japanese governments	Specifies "Imperial" army and distances WWII-era Japan from the current administration
References to hidden agents	Personified power of memories of the past and suffering continue to pursue the women	Political machinations of foreign governments and liberal domestic newspapers manufacture controversy for their own ends
Textual structures	Dramatic narrative, 3-part matching pattern structure	List-like, telegraphic, like internal memo style with no appeals to sentiment or morality

The work of the comfort women: enslavement or commercial prostitution?

The word "slavery" is used in the title of Text-I, while "prostitution" is used in the title of Text-Y, more or less summarizing the differences in underlying ideology between the two texts. Text-I repeatedly uses slave/slavery in reference to Japan, while Text-Y only uses the word when quoting the US House of Representatives resolution and in reference to German sex camps.

However, lexical choice, especially in the title, is easily noticed and questioned by readers, but the metaphorical transfer of language from one domain of use to another (Fairclough, 1989, p.113-4) is a more subtle way to place discourse in an ideology. Text-Y's use of business terminology to frame the relationship between the comfort women and the military in economic terms is an example of such transfer: Text-Y refers to the "recruited" comfort women as "women who provided sexual services to officers and soldiers." The terms "provided services," like the phrase "brothels catering to soldiers" uses the language of commerce to define the comfort women as prostitutes doing a job. The term "recruit" further

implies that the women entered the comfort stations willingly, as one would apply for a job. In contrast, Text-I refers to women being "forced" into the comfort stations as slaves, and commerce-related terminology is not used.

Text-Y only uses "rape" once, in reference to what comfort stations were trying to prevent, while Text-I repeatedly uses "rape" with the Japanese as the agent. The corresponding term in Text-Y would be "sexual service," which further reinforces the mercantile relationship it claims existed between the comfort women and the Japanese military.

The Japanese revisionists: denial versus correction

While Text-I refers to the revisionists as deniers, a term that the reader will associate with holocaust denial groups, Text-Y, which claims to be setting the record straight by correcting mistaken perceptions, does not use the word "denial" at all: Text-Y begins by asking "Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed?" and then goes on to frame the its argument as a correction that requires first understanding "the social background of the time when prostitution was authorized and regulated by the government in Japan." Understandably, the revisionists don't refer to themselves as deniers because they assert there is nothing to deny.

The Japanese government: which Japan are we talking about?

Text-Y distances the current Japanese government from the WWII-era Japanese government with the term "Imperial," as in "countries invaded by the Imperial Japanese Army." Text-I on the other hand makes no distinction between current and past Japan, referring to the war as "Japan's rampage across Asia in the 1930s and 40s." The lack of a qualifier equates the Abe administration with WWII Japan. Text-Y, however, never directly refers to Japan's role in WWII; the only reference to the war itself is when Germany's WWII sex camps are mentioned.

Invisible forces at work

Text-Y uses passive constructions to imply that unseen forces are at work. In "Controversy over the so-called comfort women has been inflamed again," Text-Y implies an agent, and then follows this sentence with a reference to US House of Representatives Resolution 121. Though only implied initially, this accusation is made explicit in the third story (Appendix 4) in this series of articles (Appendices 2-4), of which Text-Y is the first. The Yomiuri suggests that Mike Honda, the representative pushing the legislation, is attempting to bolster non-Japanese Asian support in his district by appeasing China and Korea, thereby portraying the issue as being not about truth but about politics in an attempt to discredit the legislation.

Text-I also depicts unseen forces, but it does so in active sentences in which the subject is the personification of something intangible. All the former comfort women are consistently portrayed as victims, manipulated against their will, as when "[A]nger and the call of the past drags Gil Won-ok from her bed in a suburb of Seoul to the Japanese embassy in the South Korean capital." She is not an agent but a victim of these past wrongs that drive her on, even in her campaign against the wrong-doers, thus reinforcing her victim status. The present tense "drags" also emphasizes that the comfort women issue has not been, as PM Abe asserts, concluded.

In "Thousands died in painful silence after a lifetime of torment until a group of Korean victims began to speak out in the early 1990s", Text-I implies a tormentor,

an agent imposing a life of torment. Again, the experience of having been comfort women is represented as a hidden agent that continues to "torment" these women.

In both texts, the protagonist is victimized by an unseen agent: in Text-I, the former comfort women are pursued by the memories of their ordeals; in Text-Y, the Japanese government's problems are created by a US politician trying to secure votes at home.

Time and age

The two texts treat time and age very differently, and these differences follow from the ideology behind each text.

To emphasize the decades these women have waited for recognition, Text-I contrasts the age of these survivors with the age of their abduction. Text-I specifies that some comfort women were "as young as 12," that Guo Xi-cui was "just 15," and that Gil Won-ok was "a teenage girl" when she was "raped daily" by "Japanese soldiers." Text-I refers to the women now as a "frail 78-year-old," a "Seoul pensioner," and an "Adelaide grandmother". The present perfect tense Text-I uses in describing how "For 15 years, the Korean 'comfort women' have stood outside this embassy" leaves the reader with an image of these aging women waiting for retribution, only to receive "another official denial."

In contrast, Text-Y rarely refers to a personal experience of time or age. The women petitioning for apologies from the Japanese are consistently referred to with the age-neutral term "women", and time is only referred to in descriptions of statements made by Japanese officials in passages such as "According to an investigation report publicized by the government on Aug. 4, 1993...."

Text-Y measures time in institutional, political terms, and its assumes that official statements define the truth. In contrast, Text-I measures time in human, personal terms and directly quotes the former comfort women as witnesses of history. This contrast demonstrates the underlying assumptions of both texts: in Text-Y, only official decisions matter and personal testimony is irrelevant; in Text-I, personal experience and memory trump the political mechanizations of governments. The assumptions which underlie both texts are themselves assertions about truth and evidence.

Textual structures: dramatic narrative versus internal memo

Both I and Y are newspaper articles, so their genre, in terms of function and intended audience, is journalism. As such, the authors are following what they consider "professional practices" (Fairclough, 1989, p.54) in journalism by reporting what they see as the truth. However, they have different conceptions of truth and the role of the journalist in society: Text-I is a moving narrative written by the compassionate journalist trying to better the world; Text-Y, a list of clarifications written by a newspaper bringing objective, official truth to light on complex, over-politicized issues.

The first half of Text-I contains a vivid portrayal of three former comfort women told in their own words. The stories are told in a three-part matching relation; Coulthard (1992) examines the use of this pattern in jokes and children's stories to demonstrate how such a matching relationship highlights the contrast of the third element. Coulthard explains how children learn that repetition often accompanies matching and that "the significance of the matching is to be found in the replacement" (Coulthard, 1992, p.35). Text-I presents the women in the following order: Korean, Chinese, and Dutch-Australian. It begins far away from

the reader in Asia, with old women who speak other languages and have different cultures and customs. Of course, one can expect the reader to have sympathy with these Asian women, but putting the "Adelaide grandmother" who was "planning to become a nun" in the contrasting third position brings the issue into the reader's ethnic and cultural group, assuming that the readership of the Independent is predominantly British, and the majority of readers will be English-speaking, Caucasian, and Christian. It should be noted that this trio of women does not parallel the ethnic composition ratio of the comfort women, since very few were Dutch. The ordering and the use of matching relations with the Australian in the third position brings the comfort women issue closer to the British reader.

The first half of Text-I exhibits lexical choice more suitable for editorial or creative narrative genre than for journalism: sympathetic lexical descriptors like "frail 78-year-old," "elderly women," "an Adelaide grandmother", and "the Seoul pensioner" refer to the former comfort women in terms that evoke sympathy for and humanize them.

After this fable-like dramatization of these women, the tone of Text-I shifts noticeably when it starts reporting in impersonal political terms the mechanizations of the Japanese government and its supporters, as demonstrated by the lexical choices in the transition sentence, "But the issue has galvanised the Japanese right, who deny government involvement." The contrast between sympathetic, humanizing lexis for the women and the impersonal lexis used for the Japanese government makes the Japanese position seem even colder and less compassionate.

Text-I also uses juxtaposition and sequence to emphasize the brutality of what happened, such as when Jan Ruff-O'Herne is described as "aged 21 and planning to become a nun" when she was "raped by an officer." The fact that she was planning to become a nun not only emphasizes that these women were not professional prostitutes but also increases the sense of violation. Also, notice that the perpetrator was specifically "an officer" and not the hypernym "soldier," implying that this practice was an official part of the Japanese army's conduct and not random sexual violence and further emphasizing the power difference.

The quotations included in Text-I seem to have been chosen to create a strong emotional reaction. The panic of the rape victim is dramatically conveyed when Text-I quotes Guo Xi-cui as saying that "two or three men" held her legs. The reader understands it was so terrible and traumatic that she is unsure of exactly how many men there were.

Text-I's foregrounding of personal testimony and emotional consequences contrasts with Text-Y's impersonal tone, which seems to be more objective and less biased than Text-I because of the absence of metaphor, vivid descriptions, and appeals to reader sentiment. However, the appearance of neutrality is a sign of a naturalized discourse type (Fairclough, 1989, p.92). The surface objectivity of Text-Y is an attempt to portray the perspective expressed therein as the objective truth.

Text-Y's telegraphic style, with its lack of explicit transitions between arguments, reads like an internal memo of policy statements. The sequence of sentences itself implies their mutual relevance, and the absence of appeals to emotion or attempts at justification implies that such appeals are unnecessary. Text-Y presents itself as simply a list of truths meant to clarify a misunderstood issue.

Summary

This section has used Fairclough's description dimension to examine what lexical, grammatical, and textual structure choices were made in the production of the texts and how these choices reveal underlying ideologies. Both articles are

supporting a position rather than reporting objectively on facts, and this is in line with Fairclough's insistence that no text is objective because every producer has an ideology that influences what she believes and how she behaves (1989: passim).

CDA stresses the link between textual features and social power structures, and Description reveals how the text and discourse interact, but we must address Interpretation and Explanation to understand the connection to society and power. A full analysis would be out of the scope of this analysis, so we will address only the points most relevant to the texts compared here.

Interpretation

Seducing the ideal reader

The Interpretation stage deals with the interaction between the text and the reader. Fairclough asserts that texts in newspapers are written for an 'ideal reader' with access to knowledge about issues and familiarity with other texts (Fairclough, 1989, p.153). Text-I and Text-Y posit very different ideal subjects or interpreters, but in both cases, these ideal subjects are presented as desirable, encouraging the actual reader to conform to this role and accept the argument offered.

Text-Y presupposes an intelligent Japanese realist who cannot be deceived or manipulated by the propaganda of foreign governments; Text-I addresses an enlightened international realist who will not be deceived by the tactics of a right-wing Japanese minority. Even without explicit appeals, both texts seduce the reader into compliance by portraying him/her as too sophisticated to be easily manipulated. "Media discourse has built into it a subject position for an ideal subject, and actual viewers or listeners or readers have to negotiate a relationship with the ideal subject" (Fairclough, 1989, p.49), and when the ideal subject is flattering, the reader is more likely to comply.

Explanation

Societal power structures that shape the discourse

Both Texts must satisfy their respective readerships in order to maintain market share, so the newspaper must cater to the expectations of its readers. Text-I, in its appeal on behalf of human rights and justice, is "normative" (Fairclough, 1989, p.165) with respect to its liberal reader's MR. The original Japanese version of Text-Y published in the Yomiuri Shimbun, in its defense of Japan against unfair and opportunistic foreign criticisms, is also normative with respect to the conservative reader's MR. However, Text-Y itself, published in the English-language Daily Yomiuri which is read mostly by ex-patriots, is "creative" (Fairclough, 1989, ibid) with respect to the reader's MR, because it is challenging the reader's concept of Japanese wartime conduct.

The position of the discourse in relation to societal power struggles

Text-Y participates in power struggles on multiple levels. Locally, Text-Y is part of a struggle between the Yomiuri and its liberal rival, the Asahi Shimbun. Text-Y is the first of a three-part series, and the third article (Appendix 4) states that the comfort women issue is a misunderstanding caused by irresponsible reporting of statements made by PM Miyazawa in the Asahi Shimbun - "known for its leftist leanings" (Ogata, 2007, p.5). The opposing sides in this fight for readers and

political support are the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Yomiuri Shimbun against opposition political parties and the Asahi Shimbun. Text-Y maintains existing domestic power relations by presenting the views of the current administration as objective fact.

On the international level, this is a struggle for the power to define Japan's WWII conduct. Neo-nationalists in the LDP are want to rewrite constitutional prohibitions against the use of military power, and an official admission of WWII atrocities would make this difficult to justify. Also, many of the revisionists in the ruling LDP are, like Abe, from powerful political families with ties to WWII Japan, so the subject of war crimes is personally relevant for them. Pressures from China, Korea, and now the US are pressuring Japan to make amends to the women who served in comfort stations, and in the process, WWII Japan is being defined by the international community. Text-Y, by voicing the perspective of the Abe administration, aids the government in trying to take control of the issue by defining the terms used, what information is considered relevant, and who may contribute to the discussion.

Summary

Text-Y, which reads like a briefing of official "truth" with no individual agent responsible for the message, projects a less personal and more institutional tone than Text-I, which appeals to sympathy and morals. While Text-I presents the human consequences of the issue, Text-Y treats the very same subject as an unambiguous pseudo-controversy settled long ago.

Fairclough intended CDA to be used as a consciousness-raising exercise for language users - not only second-language learners, but also for native-speaking members of a society in a mediated world. Unlike sentence diagrams, CDA addresses concrete issues of who gets what and lives how in a society. CDA reveals the importance of language in social mobility and struggles for power, and according to Fairclough, the CDA practitioner has a responsibility to use this discipline for the common good.

The power of CDA lies in connecting formal features of specific texts to real-world consequences, and what is at stake in the struggle between Text-I and Text-Y is government compensation for surviving former comfort women, the conscience and prestige of Japan, and Japan's future as a pacifist nation.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Text-I "Japanese Prime Minister angers victims of wartime sex slavery" (The Independent)

Once a week, anger and the call of the past drags Gil Won-ok from her bed in a suburb of Seoul to the Japanese embassy in the South Korean capital. The frail 78-year-old is haunted by memories of what happened to her as a teenage girl when she was raped daily by Japanese soldiers in a Second World War "comfort station". "I was in so much pain. Sometimes I didn't know if I was going to live or die."

For 15 years, the Korean "comfort women" have stood outside this embassy to demand recognition from the Japanese government. Now, instead of an apology, they have heard another official denial. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said last week there was "no evidence" to prove the women were coerced. The statement has enraged the women. "They can't make this go away by lying about it," Gil Won-ok said.

Yesterday Mr Abe said the government stood by a 1993 admission that Japan had forced women into sexual slavery. But he also suggested that it would "reinvestigate" the comfort-women issue, a demand from about 120 politicians on the right of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who demand the admission be reversed.

Elderly women across Asia tell stories similar to the treatment of the Seoul pensioner. In the Chinese province of Shanxi, Guo Xi-cui was just 15 when she held in a comfort station for 40 days. She said Japanese soldiers stood watching as "two or three men" held her legs. "They spread them until I was injured and then they raped me," she said. "When they sent me home I was not able to sit properly."

Jan Ruff-O'Herne, an Adelaide grandmother, and her friends were taken from a Japanese concentration camp in Java to a comfort station. "We were given flower names and they were pinned to our doors," she told Australian television. Then aged 21 and planning to become a nun, Ms O'Herne was raped by an officer.

According to Amnesty International, thousands of women from across Asia - some as young as 12 - were "enslaved against their will and repeatedly raped, tortured and brutalised for months and years" by the Japanese military. Thousands died in painful silence after a lifetime of torment until a group of Korean victims began to speak out in the early 1990s. Ms O'Herne remembers watching the women on television: "I thought, now is my time to speak out."

But the issue has galvanised the Japanese right, who deny government involvement. "The women were legal prostitutes in brothels," Nobukatsu Fujioka, a revisionist academic, said. He is one of the leading figures in a movement that aims to overturn much of the accepted wisdom about what took place during Japan's rampage across Asia in the 1930s and 40s.

Twelve out of 18 members of Japan's cabinet belong to a political forum that wants to "rethink" history education and backs many of Professor Fujioka's views. His Society for History Textbook Reform has sold 800,000 copies of a revisionist history book that denies war crimes such as the comfort women and the Rape of Nanjing. Before coming to power, Mr Abe was one of the society's supporters.

The revisionist denials are refuted by many Japanese historians. "The military decided when, where, and how 'comfort stations' were to be established," Yoshiaki Yoshimi, a professor of history at Tokyo's Chuo University, said.

Former Japanese soldiers have also testified to their involvement in the wartime rape of Asian women. Hajime Kondo, who was stationed in China from 1940-44, recalled kidnapping a woman in Shanxi Province and taking turns with his comrades in raping her. He said the thought that gang rape was wrong "never occurred" to him until he had his own family.

The deniers, however, have grown stronger since a 1993 statement by chief cabinet secretary Yohei Kono that the military was directly involved. That statement has never been accepted by the right. Now, with the prospect of a US Congressional resolution calling on Tokyo to "formally apologise and accept historical responsibility" for the comfort women, a delegation of LDP politicians is to travel to the US to lobby for the resolution to be quashed.

Mr Abe's supporters say his plummeting approval ratingshave forced him to go for broke. "If he is true to his beliefs and says what he feels, his popularity will rise," Professor Fujioka said.

Appendix 2: Text-Y "BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / Comfort station originated in govt-regulated 'civilian prostitution" (The Yomiuri Shimbun)

Controversy over the so-called comfort women has been inflamed again. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking.

Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed_ The Yomiuri Shimbun carried indepth reports on the issue Tuesday.

The writers are Masanobu Takagi, Hiroaki Matsunaga and Emi Yamada of the political news department. Starting today, The Daily Yomiuri will carry the stories in three installments.

To discuss the comfort women issue, it is indispensable to understand the social background of the time when prostitution was authorized and regulated by the government in Japan.

Prostitution was tacitly permitted in limited areas up until 1957, when the law to prevent prostitution was enforced. Comfort women received remuneration in return for sexual services at socalled comfort stations for military officers and

soldiers. According to an investigation report publicized by the government on Aug. 4, 1993, on the issue of comfort women recruited into sexual service for the Japanese military, there is a record mentioning the establishment of such a brothel in Shanghai around 1932, and additional similar facilities were established in other parts of China occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army.

Some of them were under the direct supervision of the military authorities, but many of the brothels catering to soldiers were privately operated.

Modern historian Ikuhiko Hata, a former professor at Nihon University, says the comfort women system should be defined as the "battleground version of civilian prostitution."

Comfort women were not treated as "paramilitary personnel," unlike jugun kangofu (military nurses) and jugun kisha (military correspondents).

During the war, comfort women were not called "jugun ianfu" (prostitutes for troops). Use of such generic terminology spread after the war.

The latter description is said to have been used by writer Kako Senda (1924_2000) in his book titled "Jugun Ianfu" published in 1973.

Thereafter, the usage of jugun ianfu prevailed.

In addition to Japanese women, women from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, both then under Japanese colonial rule, and China, the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries invaded by the Imperial Japanese Army were recruited as comfort women.

Hata estimates that 40 percent of the wartime comfort women were Japanese, 30 percent Chinese and other nationalities and 20 percent Korean.

The total number of comfort women has yet to be determined exactly.

According to a report compiled by Radhika Coomaraswany of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1996, there were 200,000 comfort women from the Korean Peninsula alone.

The figure in the report was based on information Coomaraswany had obtained in North Korea. But this report contained many factual errors, and its quoted sources lacked impartiality.

Foreign Minister Taro Aso rejected the figure of 200,000 as "lacking objective evidence."

The reasons cited for the need for comfort women and wartime brothels are as follows:

-- To prevent military officers and soldiers from raping women and committing other sex crimes in occupied areas.

-- To prevent venereal disease from spreading through troops who would otherwise contact local prostitutes who did not receive periodic medical checks.

-- To prevent military secrets from being leaked by limiting the women who provided sexual services to officers and soldiers to recruited comfort women.

Such a system and the use of wartime brothels generally are not limited only to the Imperial Japanese military.

The U.S. troops that occupied Japan after the war used brothels provided by the Japanese side.

There was a case in which U.S. military officials asked the Japanese authorities to provide women for sexual services.

During the Vietnam War, brothels similar to those established for the former Japanese military were available to U.S. troops, a U.S. woman journalist has pointed out.

Hata said: "There were wartime brothels also for the German troops during World War II.

Some women were forced into sexual slavery. South Korean troops had brothels during the Korean War, according to a finding by a South Korean researcher."

Appendix 3: "BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / No hard evidence of coercion in recruitment of comfort women" (The Yomiuri Shimbun)

This is the second installment on the so-called "comfort women" controversy. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking. Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed_

The issue of the so-called comfort women has been brought up repeatedly because misunderstandings that the Japanese government and the Imperial Japanese Army forced women into sexual servitude have not been completely dispelled.

The government has admitted the Imperial Japanese Army's involvement in brothels, saying that "the then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women." The "involvement" refers to giving the green light to opening a brothel, building facilities, setting regulations regarding brothels, such as fees and opening hours, and conducting inspections by army doctors.

However, the government has denied that the Japanese military forcibly recruited women. On March 18, 1997, a Cabinet Secretariat official said in the Diet, "There is no evidence in public documents that clearly shows there were any forcible actions [in recruiting comfort women]." No further evidence that could disprove this statement has been found.

The belief that comfort women were forcibly recruited started to spread when Seiji Yoshida, who claimed to be a former head of the mobilization department of the Shimonoseki branch of an organization in charge of recruiting laborers, published a book titled "Watashi no Senso Hanzai" (My War Crime) in 1983. Yoshida said in the book that he had been involved in looking for suitable women to force them into sexual slavery in Jeju, South Korea. "We surrounded wailing women, took them by the arms and dragged them out into the street one by one," he said in the book.

But researchers concluded in the mid-1990s that the stories in the book are not authentic. On March 5 this year, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said at the House of Councillors Budget Committee that Yoshida's story does not prove that women were forcibly recruited. He said: "I think it was The Asahi Shimbun [that reported the story] that a man named Seiji Yoshida testified about his having searched for comfort women. But later [Yoshida's testimony] was found to have been made up."

As the comfort women issue started to take on political and diplomatic dimensions, some people in South Korea and also in Japan confused comfort women with female volunteer corps, strengthening the misbelief that there was coercion.

Female volunteer corps were, according to a historian Ikuhiko Hata's book "Ianfu to Senjo no Sei" (Comfort Women and Sex in the Battlefield), single women aged between 12 and 40 who were mobilized to work in factories, starting in August 1944, primarily to secure necessary labor.

There were cases in which malicious brokers sweet-talked women with promises of easy money or intentionally concealed from them what life was going to be like in brothels.

The War Ministry wrote a letter, dated March 4, 1938, to the troops dispatched to China. The letter, titled "Regarding the recruiting of women at the army's comfort stations," said there were malicious brokers who were recruiting women in a way "similar to kidnapping."

It said, "Nothing should be overlooked so that the military's prestige and social orders are maintained." The letter indicates how the Imperial Japanese Army tried to make sure that women were not forcibly recruited.

However, in the confusion of war, elite Imperial Japanese Army soldiers who were on the fast track for officer status sent detained Dutch women to a brothel in Indonesia. The incident came to be known as the Semarang incident.

The Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters closed down the brothel immediately after learning of the incident, and soldiers involved received severe punishment--some were sentenced to death--at a war crimes court convened by the Dutch Army after the war.

Appendix 4: "BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / Kono's statement on 'comfort women' created misunderstanding" (The Yomiuri Shimbun)

This is the third and last installment on the so-called "comfort women" controversy. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking. Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed_

What made the issue of "comfort women" a political and diplomatic one was an article in the Jan. 11, 1992, morning edition of The Asahi Shimbun. The newspaper reported that official documents and soldiers' diaries that proved the wartime Japanese military's involvement in the management of brothels and the recruitment of comfort women had been found at the library of the Defense Ministry's National Institute for Defense Studies.

The article said Koreans accounted for about 80 percent of comfort women from the time that brothels were established and that the women, said to have totaled 80,000 to 200,000, were forcibly recruited under the name of volunteer corps after the Pacific War broke out.

As the newspaper's report came out immediately before then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's visit to South Korea, it triggered anger among the South Korean public. During his visit to the nation, Miyazawa met with then South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and was quoted as telling him, "It can't be denied that the Japanese military--in some way--was involved in the recruitment of comfort women and the management of comfort stations."

On July 6, 1992, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato released the results of a study showing that the wartime military was directly involved in such things as the operation of "comfort stations," but documents to prove that forcible recruitment actually took place were not found.

But as South Korea's criticism over Japan's actions continued, the government issued an official statement on the issue on Aug. 4, 1993, which became known as the Kono statement, after the government official who delivered it, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono.

But Kono's statement included ambiguous expressions and gave the impression that the government had acknowledged forcible recruitment by wartime Japanese authorities.

Regarding the recruitment of comfort women, the statement said: "The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The government study has revealed

that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, and so on, and that, at times, administrative and military personnel directly took part in the recruitment."

The statement also said the recruitment, transfer and control of comfort women on the Korean Peninsula was "conducted generally against their will." This expression became a strong indication that women, in most cases, were taken in a forcible manner.

By issuing the statement, the government aimed to seek a political settlement over the issue, as South Korea pressed the Japanese government hard to recognize that forcible recruitment actually took place. Then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara, who was involved in compiling the statement, said, "As there were no documents to prove forcible recruitment, it was concluded, out of comprehensively made judgments based on testimonies of [former] comfort women, that [recruitment] was forceful."

Kono's statement did not resolve the issue. Instead, it spread misunderstanding both inside and outside the nation on the "forcible recruitment" by government authorities.

A U.N. Human Rights Commission report, compiled by Radhika Coomaraswamy, referred to comfort women as sex slaves, and called on the Japanese government to compensate these women and to punish those responsible. The report reached these conclusions partly on the grounds of Kono's statement.

Mike Honda, a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives who led lawmakers in submitting a draft resolution denouncing Japan over the comfort women issue, also referred to Kono's statement as a basis for the draft resolution.

However, observers have pointed out, and The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the morning edition of March 16, that there are certain factors regarding Honda's electoral district--such an increase in the number of residents of Chinese or South Korean origins, while the number of Japanese-origin residents has decreased--that may be behind why the Japanese-American lawmaker of California is leading such an initiative.

Given the Kono statement, the government in July 1995 established an incorporated foundation called the Asian Women's Fund. It has provided a total of about 1.3 billion yen in compensation for 364 former comfort women. Letters of apology from successive prime ministers--Ryutaro Hashimoto, Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and Junichiro Koizumi--also were sent to those women.

On Oct. 5 at the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated a stance to "inherit" Kono's statement in principle, while denying forcible recruitment by government authorities.

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Motivation for Second Language Learning: An Exploratory Study in Japan

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本論文は日本における第二外国語学習意欲の研究である。英語のみで教育を受ける日本の大学生の内的意欲、外的意欲、意欲のなさ、多文化を理解したいという意欲、旅行や仕事のために外国語を学びたいという意欲が計測された。過去の研究結果(Gardner, 1985, Gardner & Smythe, 1975, Trafford, 1995, & Wright, 1999)から意欲について年齢差と性別差があることが仮定された。総合的に女子の意欲の高さが仮定された。大学一、二年生は高い内的意欲と意欲のなさを示す一方、大学三、四年生は大学卒業後の生活を考慮し始める為に高い外的意欲を示すことが仮定された。この大学の特性から、中退せずに在籍し続ける学生は総合的に意欲が高く、同時に意欲のなさは低いことが仮定された。結果として三つの異なる分野の意欲においては性別差が発見されたが、それらは仮定と相違していた。またひとつの分野の外的意欲と意欲のなさにおいては年齢差が発見された。しかし、上記以外には、特に顕著な相違は発見されなかった。今回発見された様々な相違についての可能な説明と日本の大学における学習意欲の研究をこれからどう進めるべきかについて考察された。

This paper presents a study of second language learning motivation in the Japanese context. Students at a sheltered immersion English college in Japan were measured on the variables of intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivation as well as integrative and instrumental motivation. Based on previous research (e.g. Clark & Trafford, 1995; Gardner, 1985b; Gardner & Smythe, 1975; Wright, 1999) it was hypothesized that there would be differences in motivation both by age and sex. Females were hypothesized to show higher levels of motivation overall. Younger students were hypothesized to show higher levels of intrinsic types of motivation and higher levels of amotivation, while older students were expected to show higher levels of extrinsic motivation as they begin to focus on their lives after graduation from university. It was also hypothesized that based on the unique nature of the university, students who stayed would show high levels of motivation overall and correspondingly low levels of amotivation. Results showed sex differences in the levels of intrinsic motivation—accomplishment; extrinsic motivation—introjected regulation; and extrinsic motivation—external regulation. However, these differences were not in the expected direction. Age differences were also found in levels of extrinsic motivation—external regulation and amotivation. However, aside from these specific domains of motivation, there were no major differences found across the spectrum of motivational levels. Discussion focused on possible explanations for the differences that were discovered as well as possible ways forward in researching motivation in Japanese universities.

Motivation has been studied across many different fields and in many different ways over the years. This has lead to an understanding of the different ways in which motivation manifests itself depending on whether the field of study is education, psychology, sociology, or other social science fields. Generally, motivation can be defined as "internal processes that initiate, sustain and direct behavior" (Coon, 2000, p.378). However, when developing theories of motivation, researchers have subdivided this broad definition to more clearly

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delineate the various forms of motivation and the situations in which those forms might manifest themselves.

Motivation-General

In education, motivation has generally been defined as taking three forms; that of intrinsic motivation (IM), extrinsic motivation (EM) and amotivation (Deci, 1975).

Intrinsic Motivation

Deci (1975) defined intrinsic motivation as participating in an activity because it is fun and satisfying. Vallerand, Pelletier, and colleagues (1992) further divide intrinsic motivation into knowledge, accomplishment, and stimulation. IM-Knowledge can be defined as the feelings associated with exploring new ideas and gaining knowledge. IM-Accomplishment describes the sensations related to mastering a task or achieving a goal. Finally, IM-Stimulation is related to sensations that are stimulated by performance of the task, such as excitement or fun. As can be seen from these definitions, each level of intrinsic motivation is related to the types of feelings associated with a particular aspect of learning. Thus, we can feel the enjoyment of learning new things (IM-Knowledge), the satisfaction of a job well done (IM-Accomplishment), and/or the excitement of performing a task (IM-Stimulation). Each of these relate the personal feelings involved in the task being accomplished.

Extrinsic Motivation

Extrinsic motivation can be defined as "actions carried out to achieve some end, like receiving a reward or avoiding punishment" (Noels, Pelletier, Clement, & Vallerand, 2003, p.39). Again, extrinsic motivation research led to the development of three levels of motivation based on the amount of self-determination involved (Deci & Ryan, 1985). These have been termed external regulation, introjected regulation, and identified regulation (Vallerand, Pelletier, Blais, Briere, & et al., 1993; Vallerand et al., 1992). External regulation occurs when activities are determined by sources outside the person, such as benefits and costs. Introjected regulation is activity due to some kind of previous external pressure that the person has made internal. Finally, identified regulation is activity by an individual because they choose to do so for some personal external goal.

With each level of extrinsic motivation, the amount of external pressure decreases, and the internalization of motivation increases. Thus, external regulation involves motivation due completely to outside sources, such as studying in order to get an A or avoid failing a course or behaving honestly because a person wants to avoid prison. Introjected regulation is motivation due to internalized external pressures such as striving to do well in school because it will please parents, or choosing to go to medical school because father was a doctor. The most internalized form of extrinsic motivation, identified regulation, is motivation for personal external goals, such as a desire to be the valedictorian of the graduating class or be promoted to a position in management. In this case, the motivation is still extrinsic, but there is no pressure or cost/benefit analysis involved, rather, the motivation is self-oriented.

Amotivation

When people see no relation between their action and the consequences, amotivation is the result (Noels et al., 2003). Instead, for these people, the consequences are seen as out of their control. In this case, a person would try to quit performing an activity as soon as possible (Noels et al., 2003). This often occurs in situations where the learner feels helpless to control their environment and views consequences of their actions as relatively random. As a result, they develop learned helplessness, which is often characterized by lethargy and unwillingness to attempt any activities.

Motivation-Language Learning Specific

Starting around the mid-1950s, researchers began to take note of motivational domains that appeared to be specific to the foreign language learning context (e.g. Cox, 1955; Gardner & Lambert, 1959; Lambert, Havelka, & Crosby, 1958). To this end, two language learning specific motivational forms have been theorized. Although similar to the general definitions of motivation discussed earlier, these forms take into consideration those aspects of individual values and attitudes which are seen to affect the learning of languages.

Integrative motivation refers to the desire to learn a language to become a part of the target community (Gardner & Lambert, 1959). There are three parts to this motivational type. They include integrativeness, attitude towards the learning situation, and motivation.

Integrativeness is an openness to identify, at least partly, with another language community. Recent research has indicated that of the three aspects of this domain, integrativeness can explain the greatest amount of variance in language learning outcomes (Csizer & Dornyei, 2005). Attitude towards the learning situation refers to the person's reaction to the immediate context of the learning situation. This can range from a complete dislike of the time spent studying the language and a feeling that it is a waste of time to a belief that the study of the language is extremely useful and enjoyable (Randhawa & Korpan, 1973). Motivation is seen as goal-directed behavior and refers to how much time and effort is spent on the language of interest, including reading or watching TV and movies in the target language, studying for class work, and completing assignments in a timely manner for class (Gardner, 1985b).

The second language learning specific motivation is called instrumental motivation. This refers to the desire to learn a language for utilitarian purposes such as travel or work (similar to aspects of extrinsic motivation) (Gardner & Lambert, 1959).

Japanese Context

The Japanese context for this study is a sheltered immersion English four-year college which teaches all the major content areas, with the exception of Japanese Expression classes, in English. Although it is expected that all students at this college would be highly motivated to study English, having chosen an English immersion college program, the form their motivation takes would not necessarily be the same. Thus, MIC is a useful context in which to study what form motivation takes in university students studying foreign language. It is hoped that this study will be extended to look at students in traditional Japanese universities and compare them to students in the various English immersion programs that are

becoming popular in Japan to see if motivation is different both by age and by type of university attended.

Sex and Age

A surprising amount of research has been carried out which indicates that, at lower grade levels at least, there are definite sex and age differences in attitudes towards and motivation for learning foreign languages (e.g. Baker & MacIntyre, 2000; Clark & Trafford, 1995; MacIntyre, Baker, Clement, & Donovan, 2003; Wright, 1999). Most of these studies have focused on the French-Canadian context and have primarily studied students in middle and high school grades. However, the research is strong enough to warrant an expectation that similar findings would show up in other contexts and with other age groups.

For example, Clark and Trafford (1995) found that modern language study was viewed as a feminine topic of study. Related to this, Wright (1999) showed that not only did girls show more positive attitudes towards learning French in an adolescent sample, but that sex was the strongest predictor of attitudes towards learning the language. Interestingly, Baker and MacIntyre (2000) found that in a study of high school students in immersion and non-immersion French programs, male immersion students showed higher levels of extrinsic or instrumental orientation for work, while female non-immersion students showed higher levels of motivation for travel, knowledge, and personal achievement.

Other research has measured differences in attitude towards the target language by grade and found an inverse curve in the attitude towards learning a foreign language. A number of studies have shown that students first learning a foreign language show highly positive attitudes toward the target language which fade through the middle years of study and then seem to show an increase in positive attitudes in the final year of study of the language in middle and high school (Gardner & Smythe, 1975; MacIntyre et al., 2003).

Hypotheses

Based on the previously described research, three hypotheses were proposed to test in this study. First, based on the unique nature of the college environment the participants are expected to show high levels of all forms of motivation and correspondingly low levels of amotivation. It was also predicted that there would be both sex and age differences in both the level and type of motivation experienced by the participants. Women were predicted to show higher levels of motivation than men. In terms of age, first year students were predicted to show higher levels of intrinsic and integrative motivation as well as amotivation and lower levels of extrinsic and instrumental motivation than upper division students.

METHOD

Participants

Participants in this study were 60 college students of which 37 were female and 21 were male (two students did not list their sex). The sample was comprised of 35 first year students and 24 third/fourth year students (one student did not list their year). All were students attending a small liberal arts sheltered immersion college.

Students were approached in various public spaces around campus and asked to complete a survey about motivation. They were informed that the survey would take approximately 15 minutes. Students were given the survey and told they could complete it in their own time and return it to a box in the lead author's office during business hours. Data collection occurred during a one week period in the Fall of 2006

Materials

Students were given an instrument comprising the Academic Motivation Scale (AMS) (Vallerand et al., 1992) which was adapted to fit the specific situation of language learning rather than learning in general, and the Motivation Test Battery (MTB) which was adapted from the Attitude/Motivation Test Battery (Gardner, 1985a) as well as basic demographic questions.

The Academic Motivation Scale measures intrinsic motivation-knowledge, intrinsic motivation-accomplishment, intrinsic motivation-stimulation, extrinsic motivation-external regulation, extrinsic motivation-introjected regulation, extrinsic motivation-identified regulation, and amotivation. Participants read the question "Why do you study a foreign language?" and then read a set of 28 statements and mark how much they agree or disagree with each statement on a scale from one to seven in relation to the original question. The original AMS includes statements such as, "Because with only a high school degree I would not find a high paying job later on…" or "Honestly, I don't know; I really feel I am wasting my time in school…" as well as statements such as, "Because I experience pleasure and satisfaction while learning new things." These statements were adapted to a language context by changing specific situations to language-based contexts. For example, the first statement listed above was changed to "Because with only one language I would not find a high paying job later on." While the last statement regarding pleasure and satisfaction was left as written. In all, ten statements were adjusted to show a more language-oriented context.

The Motivation Test Battery consists of thirty statements on a seven-point Likert scale that measure instrumental motivation, integrativeness, attitude toward the learning situation and motivational intensity. The scales of integrativeness, attitude toward the learning situation, and motivational intensity may be combined to determine a total score on integrative motivation.

This scale was originally written to measure the second language learning motivation of students studying French. It was adapted from the original with the change of the language listed such that for example, "I love learning French…" was changed to "I love learning English."

Procedure

Before beginning the study, the survey instrument was translated into Japanese and then back-translated by a second individual to test for accuracy of the translation. Students were approached in public areas of the college and asked to complete and return the survey in their own time. The surveys were completed anonymously and placed in an envelope. Analysis consisted of calculating descriptive statistics and ANOVA by sex and year. As this study is exploratory in nature and a pilot test to determine the usefulness of further research, a Type I error level of 0.1 was chosen to maximize the possibility of finding significant results in the data.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Cronbach's alpha for each scale was strong at .90 for AMS and .85 for MTB, indicating good inter-item reliability. Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of each of the variables of interest.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics ranked by mean

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Attitude Towards the Learning Situation	5.69	.84
Integrativeness	5.60	1.66
Intrinsic Motivation - Knowledge	5.11	1.19
Instrumental Motivation	4.98	1.57
Extrinsic Motivation - Identified Regulation	4.82	1.28
Motivational Intensity	4.72	.86
Extrinsic Motivation - External Regulation	3.96	1.45
Intrinsic Motivation - Accomplishment	3.47	1.32
Intrinsic Motivation - Stimulation	3.36	1.19
Extrinsic Motivation - Introjected Regulation	3.3	1.23
Amotivation	1.86	1.01

ANOVA by Year and Sex

ANOVA was calculated for the various motivational variables by both sex and year in college. Sex differences were found in intrinsic motivation-accomplishment, extrinsic motivation-introjected regulation, extrinsic motivation-external regulation, as well as extrinsic motivation overall. Table 2 shows the mean, standard error, ANOVA statistics and significance for each of the measures where differences were found.

When comparing students by year, the ANOVA showed that only two of the variables showed a significant difference. These were extrinsic motivation-external regulation and amotivation. However, as with the sex differences, the overall level of extrinsic motivation was also found to be significantly different between lower and upper division students. Table 3 shows the ANOVA data by year.

Table 2. Selected ANOVA Results by Sex

	Sex	Mean	S.E.	Source	DF	SS	MS	F	Sig.
IM-Accomplishment	Female	3.20	.21	Sex	1	8.16	8.16	5.03	0.03
	Male	3.98	.28	Error	56	90.88	1.62		
EM-Introjected Regulation	Female	3.08	.19	Sex	1	7.34	7.34	5.31	0.02
	Male	3.82	.26	Error	56	77.40	1.38		
EM-External Regulation	Female	3.74	.22	Sex	1	9.72	9.72	5.46	0.02
	Male	4.60	.29	Error	56	99.75	1.78		
EM-Total	Female	3.86	.17	Sex	1	5.01	5.01	4.83	0.03
	Male	4.48	.22	Error	56	58.10	1.04		

Table 3. Selected ANOVA Results by College Level

	Class Level	Mean	S.E.	Source	DF	SS	MS	F	Sig.
EM-External Regulation	Lower	4.29	.24	Year	1	7.02	7.02	3.59	0.06
	Upper	3.58	.29	Error	57	111.60	1.96		
Amotivation	Lower	2.09	.16	Year	1	4.33	4.33	4.41	0.04
	Upper	1.54	.20	Error	57	55.97	0.98		
EM-Total	Lower	4.26	.18	Year	1	4.09	4.09	3.58	0.06
	Upper	3.23	.22	Error	57	65.18	1.14		

DISCUSSION

Before discussing how the results relate to the hypotheses first stated, it is important to look at the limitations of the study. First, the study uses a small sample size and so it is not possible at this time to generalize results beyond the current sample of students. Second, the sample was drawn from a single college with a unique mission in higher education in Japan. Again this limitation renders generalization to a wider context impossible. Finally, at the time of submission of the survey, some students expressed concern that some of the questions seemed strange and not easy to answer. This indicates that there is a possibility that a more emic approach to studying motivation in Japan may be needed in the future.

In looking at the results of the study each prediction was at least partly supported. As was predicted in hypothesis one, students at MIC show high levels of motivation overall and low levels of amotivation. More specifically, it was found that this sample shows high levels of intrinsic motivation for knowledge as well as two of the three subscales of integrative motivation, integrativeness and attitude toward the learning situation. The high levels of integrativeness in particular fit well with the statistical work done by Csizer and Dornyei (2005) who highlighted the importance of integrativeness in developing foreign language skills. It is, however, surprising that instrumental motivation was not more highly rated, as both integrative and instrumental motivation are seen as language specific types of motivation. This difference may indicate that this set of students, at least, are more highly motivated by a desire to be able to fit in with those who speak the target language than by pragmatic reasons. This may be due, in part, to the fact that they are attending a college where the majority of faculty are from outside of Japan, giving students a reason to try to fit in to what they perceive as the target culture of MIC.

This leads into an explanation for the high levels of intrinsic motivation for knowledge. As students at MIC, they have entered the college with an understanding that education is handled differently when compared to other colleges and universities in Japan, and that MIC uses a student-centered approach to learning. This may make them feel more in control of their surroundings and more able to take pleasure in learning for learning's sake, rather than merely as a means to some end.

Hypothesis two predicted that differences would be seen in the motivational types shown by upper and lower division students. Indeed, first year students showed significantly higher levels of amotivation than upper division students. However, it is important to reiterate that for all students the level of amotivation was extremely low and students in this sample, at least, seem to have very little feeling of being unable to control their situation, nor do they show much in the way of learned helplessness. It is, however, possible that as first year students are still relatively new to the MIC context, they are not yet sufficiently confident in their abilities to feel in control when compared to the upper division students who have had time to become acclimated to the unique teaching style and have the added benefit of having spent a semester studying abroad.

First year students also showed higher levels of external regulation and extrinsic motivation overall. As external regulation is, to a certain extent, motivation due to a cost-benefit analysis (Vallerand et al., 1993; Vallerand et al., 1992), it is probable that first year students are motivated to study because of some external set of benefits or costs to them. Perhaps, they are worried about disappointing their parents, or looking foolish in front of their peers. It would be useful to conduct interviews asking students for more detail about their specific reasons for studying English.

The significant difference between first year students and upper division in extrinsic motivation was in the opposite direction of that predicted. It was hypothesized by the authors that first year students would be eager and excited about the immersion context they were entering and would be motivated primarily by an interest in the target language culture as well as positive attitudes towards that culture. Also, based on anecdotal evidence it was thought that the first year students would be much more intrinsically motivated, while upper division students would have lost that initial enthusiasm and developed a more instrumental

and extrinsic orientation towards the learning of English (Baker & MacIntyre, 2000; Gardner & Smythe, 1975).

Finally, the third hypothesis that there would be differences between men and women was also shown to be as predicted. Interestingly, in all three types of motivation where a significant difference was found, men scored higher than women. This comes as something of a surprise as most instructors would probably be able to tell many stories of high achieving women and low achieving men in their classrooms. However, men were found to show significantly higher levels of accomplishment, introjected regulation, and external regulation as well as extrinsic motivation overall. Perhaps the definitions of these types of motivation can give some clue as to why they would be higher for men in this sample. According to Vallerand and colleagues (1993), accomplishment is motivation to complete something for the feeling of mastery of the task while introjected regulation is an external pressure that has been internalized and external regulation is due to external sources. When viewed in relation to the work by Baker and Macintyre (2000), these results begin to make more sense. Baker and MacIntyre found similar gender differences across three of four orientations towards language learning in a sample of students in a French immersion program. Men showed a nonsignificant increase in orientation for job, orientation for meeting francaphones, and orientation for personal achievement. The only orientation where women in this study showed higher means was in the orientation for travel. These results at least partly support the findings of the current study.

CONCLUSION

This research represents a first step in understanding motivation to learn foreign languages in Japanese college students. Although there were only a few differences found between men and women and upper and lower division students, differences were found, lending support for developing a larger scale study to probe more deeply into foreign language learning motivation in Japan. The next step will be to expand this study both to other immersion style colleges as well as to more traditional public universities to determine if these results are unique to the MIC context, or can be generalized to Japanese students across Japan. Once this has been established, it is hoped that cross-cultural research can begin to determine similarities and differences between students of foreign languages in other countries and contexts.

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U.S.-Japan Security Relations in the post-Cold War: Redefinition or Entanglement*

Yukinori Komine

本稿は冷戦の終結後の最初 10 年の日米関係における主要な変化と発展を検証する。具体的には、 1 ）米軍の東アジアからの削減あるいは撤退の可能性への日本側における懸念、他方で、米国が関与する可能性がある地域紛争、例えば、朝鮮半島と台湾海峡、に巻き込まれること（エンタングルメント）への日本側の懸念、　2）米日安全保障関係の強化における「再定義」か「再確認」の問題、そして 3 ）米国と日本の相互協力および安全保障条約の 2 つの主要な役割、すなわち、日本の防衛と東アジアの安定の維持、の三大側面を考察する。

This paper examines the major changes and developments in the U.S.-Japan security relations during the first decade after the end of the Cold War in terms of the following major aspects: 1) Japan's concern about the reduction of U.S. troops or military withdrawal of the U.S. from East Asia, and the subsequent reverse concern about possible Japanese "entanglement" in regional conflicts in which the U.S. is involved, in such major areas as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait; 2) the question of "re-definition" or "re-affirmation" regarding the strengthening of U.S.-Japan security arrangements; and 3) the inter-relationship between the two major roles of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty: the defense of Japan and the maintenance of stability in East Asia.

During the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the U.S.-Japan alliance completed a series of coordination efforts in order to adjust to a new security environment.[1] Since the principal threat to the alliance, the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist, the U.S. and Japanese governments had sought to re-examine the roles of their security arrangements by strengthening and expanding defense cooperation in major areas, including regional contingency planning as well as intelligence sharing. It appears that the alliance still serves the respective interests of the two governments. From Washington's point of view, it is essential to retain its forward base structure for the maintenance of regional security in East Asia and also to preserve bilateral security arrangements with its major ally, the second largest economic great power, Japan. From Tokyo's point of view, it is vital to maintain the alliance with the world's sole remaining superpower for national and regional security, both of which are based on its nuclear umbrella (the U.S. providing nuclear deterrence). Together, the United States and Japan continue to share a broad strategic objective, namely the maintenance of stability in East Asia. Hence, the two governments had taken three major initiatives to coordinate and strengthen the

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1 The author has been conducting a larger project on U.S.-Japan security relations consisting of: 1) The evolution of U.S.-Japan security arrangements during the Cold War era, 1945-1991; 2) Coordination of the alliance system during the post-Cold War era, 1992-2000; and 3) Changes of the alliance system in the post-9/11 era, 2001- to the present.

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alliance system, namely the Nye Initiative of February 1995, the Japanese National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of November 1995, and the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996. The U.S.-Japan alliance during the 1990s, however, was also challenged by a number of complex problems of tension and mistrust, including:

- Washington's concern about Japan's intentions and commitment to the re-strengthening of the alliance, and Tokyo's unease about the U.S.'s insufficient attention to major areas of political-security importance to Japan in East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait
- The rapid increase of severe domestic political pressure in Japan over U.S. bases in Okinawa Prefecture after the rape of an Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen in September 1995
- The growth of China as a military and economic power (the "China Threat" debate), the March 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis (the U.S. sending two destroyers to deter China's testing of missiles over the Taiwan Strait), and President Bill Clinton's trip to China in June 1998, which caused criticisms of "Japan passing" (namely passing Japan by on the way to China) from the Japanese public and concerns among Japanese officials about Washington entering into a long-term tilt toward Beijing
- North Korea's nuclear development, including the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis and the August 1998 launch of a Taepodong three-stage ballistic missile over Japan, which elicited different responses from the U.S. and Japanese governments, namely Japan being firm and the U.S. being more reserved

From a historical perspective, as former adversaries, the U.S.-Japan relations had the "victor-loser" and "conqueror-conquered" structural and psychological asymmetry in its origins. Hence, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements still play a vital role as the "cork in the bottle" in order to restrain the emergence of an independent Japanese defense policy. Of equal importance are the long-lasting fears among Asian neighbors about Japan's future military-security role in the region. Finally, the Constitutional restriction by Article 9 also remains as a key devise that functions as a brake to Japanese substantial rearmament.[2]

However, there has been a growing tendency within Japanese policy-making circles to pursue a more independent path for Japan's foreign and defense policy, as the U.S. intention and commitment in East Asia became questionable during the early and mid-1990s. On the one hand, the Japanese government had been concerned whether the U.S. would reduce its military presence in East Asia, which might ultimately lead to its withdrawal from the region. On the other hand, Japanese officials were aware of the possible danger of involvement in U.S. military operations in East Asian regional conflicts.

Do the recent differences and disagreements between Washington and Tokyo indicate the rise of tension between the two sides in the long-term? Will the causes of these tensions bring about a fundamental restructuring of the bilateral security arrangements, such as reducing the number of U.S. troops from bases in Japan and encouraging a more expanded overseas role for Japanese Self-Defense Forces? Or,

[2] Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan renounces "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" and the maintenance of "war potential." It is the basis of the Japanese government's public position that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective defense.

could these tensions still be resolved within the existing framework of alliance management with more effective coordination and communication?

This paper examines the major changes and developments in the U.S.-Japan security relations during the first decade after the end of the Cold War in terms of the following major aspects: 1) Japan's concern about the reduction of U.S. troops or military withdrawal of the U.S. from East Asia, and the subsequent reverse concern about possible Japanese "entanglement" in regional conflicts in which the U.S. is involved, in such major areas as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait; 2); the question of "re-definition" or "re-affirmation" regarding the strengthening of U.S.-Japan security arrangements; and 3) the inter-relationship between the two major roles of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty: the defense of Japan and the maintenance of stability in East Asia.

U.S. Strategic Realignment in East Asia in the post-Cold War era

Since the 1940s, the United States has been taking a forward-base strategy in East Asia. According to Article 6 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, U.S. forces in Japan have access to bases and facilities for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in East Asia. Under the treaty arrangements, the United States is "committed to consult with Japan prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons, including intermediate and long-range missiles, and prior to launching from the bases military combat operations not directly related to the defense of Japan except for combat operations in immediate response to an attack against the UN forces in Korea."[3] The so-called prior consultation arrangements thus allowed the U.S. free use of its bases in Japan in the case of Korean contingencies. During the Cold War, this asymmetrical strategic relationship with U.S. forces was an effective security arrangement for Japan. Tokyo could retain Washington's defense commitment without taking substantial responsibilities for regional security that might undermine its political and economic relations with its neighbors in East Asia. In the post-Vietnam era, there was a growing concern among Asian states about a possible U.S. withdrawal from East Asia. However, Japan gradually moved toward more explicit security cooperation with the United States in order to ensure the U.S. continuing presence in the region. During the 1980s, the Japanese defense budget increased by an average of 6 percent per year. U.S. and Japanese forces promoted joint training and exercises under a division of roles between U.S. forces as the "spear" and Japanese Self-Defense Forces as the "shield."[4]

The fluidity in the security environment since the end of the Cold War influenced East Asian regional security as well as Japan's domestic political situation in terms of security policy. The collapse of bipolarity in international security created new opportunities for the "Asianization" of Japan: the re-examination of Japanese identity as a part of Asia.[5] A significant turning point for the Japanese government was the outbreak of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis and

[3] Extracts of "U.S. Policy Toward Japan" (Approved June 11, 1960), p.1, attached to Blouin to General Twining, The Joint Chief of Staff, "U.S. Policy Toward Japan" August 18, 1960, 0000036536, Reversion Issues, 1959-1972, Edward Freimuth Collection, Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

[4] Michael J. Green, "The Search for An Active Security Partnership: Lessons from the 1980s," in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (eds.). *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001*. (Tokyo, New York, London: Kodansha International, 2001), pp.142-144.

[5] Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 1993), pp.75-85.

the subsequent Gulf War which raised Japanese awareness of the reality of the nature of the security environment in the post-Cold War era. Japanese officials took a painful lesson from the ineffectiveness of Japanese security policy after Japan's financial contribution (of $13billion) failed to receive any credit from the international community. Nor could the Japanese government send any forces, even for non-combat operations, to the Persian Gulf region because those operations had not been defined as responses to a direct threat to Japan. A U.S. official criticized Japanese responses for being "too little, too late."[6] The Gulf operations demonstrated that the United States and the world still measured security in terms of the traditional means of military force. Hence, after the so-called Gulf War "trauma," the Japanese government more actively sought to share responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability in the international community. Accordingly, the passage of the 1992 Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) bill legalized limited participation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in UN peacekeeping operations. [7]

From the autumn of 1993 to the spring of 1994, the newly empowered and internationalized SDF revealed its ineffectiveness when a new crisis took place on the Korean Peninsula. The United States prepared for economic embargo, blockade, and even possible war with North Korea regarding its stubbornness over a suspected nuclear weapons development program. When Washington approached Tokyo about joining this attempt, the Japanese government was unable to participate in any significant planning, because the new peacekeeping mission for the SDF did not apply to cases where hostilities were imminent. In the end, the North Korean nuclear crisis was resolved without conflict. However, from it the Pentagon, the Defense Agency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all took home a lesson for future bilateral security arrangements: the necessity for Japan to be more fully integrated into U.S.-Japan regional security policy in East Asia.

Within the context of Japanese domestic politics, the 38-year-long rule of the Liberal Democratic Party ended in August 1993 when Ichiro Ozawa took an initiative to form a coalition government under Prime Minister Morohiro Hosokawa. Ozawa advocated the significance of Japan becoming a "normal state" by exercising the right of collective security and actively enhancing its international contributions through UN Peacekeeping Operations.[8] In February 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa established an advisory group to review Japanese defense policy for the post-Cold War international security environment. The outcome of the review, the so-called Higuchi Commission Report of September 1994, emphasized the promotion of multilateral defense cooperation in regional and global security through multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations, as the new top priority in Japanese defense policy within a newly-emerging world order.[9] After the collapse of the short-lived coalition government and the return of the LDP to power, the Socialist Party (later re-named to the Social Democratic Party), the largest party opposed to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's security policy during the Cold

6 Hidetoshi Sotooka, Masaru Honda and Toshiaki Miura, *Japan-U.S. Alliance Half Century: Security Treaty and Secret Agreement* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsya, 2002), pp.412-416.

7 Shellia Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronnin (eds.). *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p.85.

8 Makoto Iokibe, Motoshige Ito, Katsuyuki Yakushiji (eds.) *Testimony of the 1990s: Ozawa Ichiro Government Takeover Theory*. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsya, 2006), pp.184-196.

9 Sotooka, Honda and Miura, *Japan-U.S. Alliance Half Century: Security Treaty and Secret Agreement*, pp.491-494.

War, reversed its position under the leadership of Tomiichi Murayama (who became prime minister in June 1994). Murayama declared that the SDF was constitutional and that he would support the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. Thus, the LDP-Socialist rivalry, which characterized the basic pattern of debate on Japan's defense and security policy during the Cold War, lost its political dynamism.

From Washington's point of view, however, the Higuchi Report raised a question of Japanese commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance because it listed the improvement of the functions of U.S.-Japan security relations as the second priority of Japanese defense policy. Thus, U.S. policymakers, historians, policy analysts, economists, and international relations theorists who were engaged in the policy and the scholarly debates regarding U.S. security relations with Japan produced a report entitled "Re-defining the U.S.-Japan Alliance" in November 1994.[10] The report presented a more active agenda to strengthen U.S.-Japan security cooperation (rather than re-interpreting or revising the Security Treaty). It also expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of managing international security through multilateral institutions and warned that the motives and resources of Japanese policy planning were drifting away from the U.S.-Japan alliance. Finally, the report raised a significant point of further discussions and assessments for the two governments – whether the on-going review would be either "re-affirmation" or "re-definition" of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

When a Harvard professor of International Relations, Joseph S. Nye Jr., was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs by Secretary of Defense William Perry in November 1994, he was determined to produce a new strategic outline for U.S. policy toward East Asia.[11] Nye and Perry basically sought to stop the unilateral reduction of U.S. overseas forces, especially from the Asia-Pacific region, initiated by the George H.W. Bush administration, which raised concerns among Asian states about a possible U.S. withdrawal from the region. The Nye Initiative, officially known as "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region," was published in February 1995.[12] Nye described "security like oxygen: you tend not to notice until you lose it."[13] The forward presence of U.S. troops provided the "oxygen" for the stability in East Asia that enabled economic development. The document reaffirmed U.S. commitment to maintain a stable forward presence in East Asia, at a level of around 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future. It also declared that the security alliance with Japan would remain the "linchpin" of U.S. security policy in Asia and that the U.S. must never allow trade friction to undermine its alliance with Japan.

Importantly, however, there were two perspectives within the U.S. government regarding the promotion of the Nye Initiative. First, there was a group of officials who focused on "re-affirmation" of U.S.-Japan security arrangements to adjust to the post-Cold War world. Second, specialists of international security and Japan policy intended to materialize a "re-definition" of the alliance system so that it could play a much more active joint role in the new security environment in East

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10 Ibid., pp.495-498.

11 Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*. (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp.248-276.

12 U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 27, 1995.

13 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "East Asia: The Case of Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1995), pp. 90-102.

Asia. Regarding the role of Japan, U.S. officials who wanted to put more pressure on Japan to increase its military role in regional security argued that re-definition would be insufficient. On the other hand, outside observers of Japanese defense policy, especially in other Asian states, considered that re-definition would go too far because it would stimulate the rapid development of Japanese military role in East Asia.

In Nye's view, the new initiative was principally about a Washington-Tokyo joint "re-definition" of the U.S.-Japan alliance in relation to the rapid growth of China's military and economic power as well as to North Korea's nuclear development.[14] The stronger U.S.-Japan security relations would provide credibility for a U.S. forward military deployment in East Asia as well as the U.S. pursuit of engagement policy with China. Japan's closer security ties with the U.S. would more effectively prevent the re-emergence of the historical Sino-Japanese rivalry in the region than Japan's pursuit of an independent defense policy. Finally, the revitalized U.S.-Japan alliance would deter Beijing's attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo.

Nye saw three major steps toward this re-definition: his initiative; Japan's revision of the 1978 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO); and the joint declaration on security for the twentieth century by a U.S. President and a Japanese Prime Minister, resulting in the revision of the U.S.-Japan Joint Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.[15] The Nye Initiative was planned at the assistant secretary level in the Washington bureaucracy. Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye was assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Bennett. They also consulted with Japan experts, such as a senior analyst at the National Intelligence Council (NIC), Ezra Vogel, and a Japan analyst in the Institute for Defense Analysis, Michael J. Green. This group of policy planners coordinated with the State Department, most notably the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord. Because of the Defense Department's major role in burden-sharing in the forward deployment of U.S. troops in East Asia, especially Japan, the State Department, the White House, and the National Security Council did not oppose the Nye Initiative. The Clinton Administration mainly focused on U.S.-Japan trade relations, which consequently enabled a bureaucratic initiative in the security field at assistant secretary level. Clinton himself won his first presidential election by his campaign for the re-activation of the U.S. domestic economic situation and was re-elected by his continuing emphasis on U.S. economy as well as international trade. Thus, although the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security introduced three pillars of U.S.-Japan cooperation (security, economy, and trade), the Clinton White House itself was still primarily focusing on U.S. economic relations with Japan.

Regarding the growing necessity to cover regional contingencies, the Japanese response toward the Nye Initiative was the revision of the Japanese National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) (which had already been under way since 1993). The new NDPO, also the first Japanese official response to the changing security environment in the post-Cold War world, was approved by the Murayama cabinet on November 28, 1995. The new NDPO shifted the focus of Japan's basic defense concept from defense against "small-scale limited invasion" to response to

14 Funabashi, *Alliance Drift*, pp.254-256.

15 Ibid., pp.264-273.

the new regional security developments.[16] First, while the "possibility of a regional armed conflict has become remote, complicated and diverse regional conflicts are taking place in the Asia-Pacific and new trends of dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are on the increase." Second, "in the area surrounding Japan, the possibility of a situation which would seriously affect the security of Japan cannot be excluded." The new NDPO explained the three major roles of Japan's defense capabilities:

- National defense
- Response to large-scale disasters and other situations in the areas surrounding Japan "which would have an important influence on national peace and stability"
- Contribution to the creation of a more stable security environment, such as participation in international peacekeeping activities, promotion of security dialogue and exchange among defense authorities, and cooperation in the areas of arms control and disarmament

Under the new NDPO, the role of the Self-Defense Forces was expanded beyond the defense of Japanese territory in two major areas:

- "[V]arious situations including a situation in the areas surrounding Japan," which require the building up of the SDF in order to cope with such contingencies as large-scale disasters, terrorist activities, and flows of refugees, as well as the SDF's support for the U.S. military operations in Japan's surrounding area for the security of Japan
- "[T]he establishment of a more stable security environment," through the SDF's participation by non-military means in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The new NDPO defined four main functions for the U.S.-Japan security arrangements to secure and maintain:

- Japan's security
- Peace and stability in the surrounding region of Japan
- A more stable security environment
- Peace and stability of the international community

Overall, the new outline sought to clarify an interaction between the U.S.-Japan alliance's role: to defend Japan and to maintain East Asian regional security. It remained unclear, however, what kind of role Japan could play for the maintenance of regional security because of the constitutional restrictions, which still remain unaltered today.[17]

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16 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996," November 28, 1995 <http://www.fas.org/news/japan/ndpo.htm>

17 Thomas U. Berger, "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronnin (eds.). *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp.199-201. In 1999, the Japanese National Diet established a research commission on constitutional issues. Opinion polls in 1998, for example, indicated that a majority of Japanese citizens favored the revision of the Constitution of Japan. However, only a minority supported the elimination of Article 9.

On April 17, 1996, the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security signed by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto "reaffirmed" the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as "the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region" for the twenty-first century.[18] In particular, the two governments agreed to "undertake efforts to advance cooperation" in five major areas:

- Continue close consultation on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, as well as the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region
- Initiate a revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in order to deal with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and that may have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan
- Promote a bilateral cooperative relationship through the April 1996 signing of the Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services
- Enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment
- Cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

In short, the U.S. and Japan shared a regional outlook on the Asia-Pacific region. In the short-term, the two governments would continue to focus on the remaining tensions on the Korean Peninsula which constituted a source of instability and uncertainty in the region. In the long-term, U.S.-Japan security arrangements would play an essential role in continuously ensuring U.S. "engagement" in the Asia-Pacific region.[19] The joint declaration also highlighted cooperation in regional multilateral security forums as a significant objective for the United States and Japan in the next century. In theory, peacekeeping is a legitimate and significant area for an independent Japanese contribution to the international community. In practice, however, Japanese officials during the mid-1990s still remained sensitive to the possibility of Washington constraining and even controling Japan's peacekeeping role within the alliance system. For the same reason, the SDF had also been reluctant to include peacekeeping as a major area of cooperation in U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Finally, the two governments agreed to review the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United States and Japan along the same lines as the 1996 Joint Declarations on Security. After several years of bilateral negotiations and political debate, the Japanese government approved the new guidelines in September 1997, and the National Diet approved legislation to implement them in June 1999.

[18] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," April 17, 1996 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the Defense Guidelines review had originally been planned for the fall of 1995, however President Clinton had postponed his visit to Japan November 1995 to April 1996 because of budgetary problems in the winter.

[19] The joint declaration, however, did not explicitly refer to the rapid growth of China's military and economic power.

Of particular importance, throughout the process of reviewing and approving of the new Defense Guidelines, there remained the dilemma of "entrapment or abandonment" for the Japanese government.[20] The new guidelines clarified functional areas of cooperation in the event of a regional crisis that had a direct effect on Japanese security, including logistical support for U.S. forces, sea-lane patrol, intelligence sharing, non-combat evacuation operations, and other missions that would not put Japanese forces into forward combat roles in third countries. Thus, the new guidelines potentially provided the U.S. and Japan greater flexibility to respond to crises. However, a greater flexibility also implied a greater integration of planning and decision-making in defense policy, which the Japanese government had resisted during and since the Cold War. In short, joint defense-planning, which is not necessarily the same as a treaty, only provides a blueprint for the implementation of bilateral operations, if civilian Japanese officials make a decision to participate in them. However, even this extent of integration appeared to be threatening to Japan's traditional fear for "entrapment" in U.S. military involvement in regional conflicts. On the other hand, the Japanese government was also eager to increase burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to prevent a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, especially the U.S.'s "abandonment" of the bilateral security arrangements. Conceptually, the remaining structural problems in U.S.-Japan joint military operations could be overcome by changes in the Constitution of Japan by either recognizing the exercise of the right of collective defense or abolishing its Article 9 as a whole. In reality, however, despite a growing political momentum for the re-examination of the Constitution among conservative politicians and their supporters, these changes are unlikely to take place in the short-term. The majority of the Japanese public still desires a constitutional restriction on the roles of the SDF, and Japan's Asian neighbors are also concerned about any important changes in the legal constraints on the Japanese military role.

U.S. Bases in Japan: The September 1995 Okinawan Crisis

After the end of the World War II, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) remained under the administrative control of the U.S. military authority (High Commissioner of the Ryukyus from 1945 to 1972). The successive U.S. administrations also recognized that Japan retained "residential sovereignty" over the islands and were "publicly committed to return them at a time and under conditions as yet specified."[21] During the Vietnam War, U.S. bases in Okinawa had been used extensively for U.S. military operations, including the launching of B-52s, and therefore anti-war sentiment spread widely among the Japanese public. In the November 1969 joint communiqué, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato agreed to the reversion of the administrative rights of Okinawa from the U.S. to Japan. On the one hand, the Japanese government continuously sought to achieve the so-called "homeland level," namely the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Okinawa in accordance with the three non-nuclear principles of 1967 (Japan would not possess or produce nuclear weapons; and it would not allow the entry of nuclear weapons into Japanese territories). On the other hand, the U.S.

[20] Michael J. Green, "The Search for An Active Security Partnership: Lessons from the 1980s," in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (eds.), *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001*. (Tokyo, New York, London: Kodansha International, 2001), pp.152-153.

[21] "Japan: Okinawa Reversion," p.1, attached to Memo from Sneider to Bundy and Brown, "Trip Report: Okinawa Reversion on the Front Burner" December 24, 1968, Sneider, Richard L., Box 834, Name Files NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National Archives.

government was determined to obtain Japan's assurance for the "maximum conventional free use" of its bases on Okinawa in cases of regional contingencies, including major areas as the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Indochina (for the continuation of conventional military operations for the Vietnam War).[22] Nixon and Sato also made a "secret pact" regarding the re-entry and transit of nuclear weapons in cases of great emergencies.[23]

Particularly significant, declassified U.S. governmental documents show the evolution of the confidential understandings among U.S. officials regarding the inter-relationship between the free-use of U.S. bases in Okinawa for conventional combat operations and the re-entry and transit of nuclear weapons. For example, the May 1969 'National Security Study Memorandum 5' (hereafter referred to as NSSM 5) paper suggested that: "by prior agreement the United States could bring in nuclear weapons when, in the opinion of the U.S., an emergency existed, such as major hostilities in Korea or a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan": or "the U.S. and Japan could agree to consult when in the opinion of either, an emergency existed; if they agreed there was an emergency, then the U.S. could bring in nuclear weapons to Okinawa."[24] On the right of transportation of nuclear weapons through Japanese territories, this declassified document revealed an understanding which was then confidential within the U.S. government that: "Japan now acquiesces in transit by naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons."[25] Despite the Japanese government's public assurances that no nuclear weapons would be allowed in Okinawa after reversion, the NSSM5 paper already made it clear that "this right [to introduce nuclear weapons onboard warships] would extent automatically to Okinawa" following reversion.[26] This evidence confirms that for U.S. officials, re-entry and transit rights of nuclear weapons were the common understanding even before the beginning of U.S.-Japan negotiations for Okinawa Reversion. The U.S. government sought to utilize both the joint communiqué in public and confidential agreement in private to preserve the effectiveness of U.S. base functions as well as nuclear deterrent capabilities. Therefore, despite the wide-spread public sentiment in Japan for non-nuclear reversion, Okinawa remained as the "keystone" in the U.S. strategic thinking in East Asia for the rest of the Cold War.[27]

When three U.S. servicemen abducted and raped an Okinawan girl in September 1995, tremendous protests erupted throughout Japan. Officials in Washington and Tokyo, as well as governments in Asia, monitored the Okinawan situation with deep concern.[28] The U.S. government regarded the approximately

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22 National Security Decision Memorandum 13 (NSDM13): Policy Toward Japan, May 28, 1969, p.2, National Security Study Memorandums, Box 365, Subject-Files, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives.

23 Kei Wakaizumi. *I would like to believe that there was no other policy option*. (Tokyo: Bungeisyunjyu, 1994).

24 National Security Study Memorandum 5 (NSSM 5): Japan, April 28, 1969, pp.24-25, Attachment to Memo, Jeanne W. Davis, National Security Council, to Office of the Vice President, "U.S.-Japanese Relationship: Summary," April 29, 1969, Records of National Security Council, RG 273, National Archives.

25 Ibid., p.25.

26 Ibid.

27 Okinawa's role in U.S. strategy toward East Asia, see, for example, Chalmers Johnson, *Okinawa: Cold War Island*. (Cardiff, California: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

28 Those three criminals were Marine PfC Rodrico Harp, Marine, Pfc Kendrick Leder, and Seaman Marcus Gill.

forty-seven thousand U.S. troops based in Japan as the touchstone for stability in the U.S.-Japan alliance and East Asia as a whole. However, as the Japanese public grew increasingly uneasy with the overwhelming U.S. military presence in Okinawa, the base issue became the central cause of friction and mistrust in the U.S.-Japan bilateral relations. There was also tension between Tokyo and Okinawa. Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord explains: "The Okinawans felt that they were carrying the brunt of the inconveniences of the American presence and that Tokyo politicians, as they weren't on the island, thought that they could let the Okinawans worry about it. On the mainland of Japan, these politicians were not disposed to carry the full burden."[29] Thus, there were a number of negotiations between Prime Minister Hashimoto and Okinawan authorities, especially Governor Ohta regarding "the division of labor and the economic help provided to Okinawa to compensate Okinawans for the burdens they were carrying."[30]

In order to unify, realign, or reduce U.S. bases on the islands, and also to diminish any inconveniences, such as noise-pollution, environmental destruction, accidents, and crimes, the U.S. and Japanese governments established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). In particular, the SACO sought to discuss a more flexible interpretation and application of the Status Agreement for U.S. forces in Japan.[31] The U.S. government agreed in April 1996 to return the Marine Corps air station at Futenma, one of the most controversial bases in Okinawa because of its enormous presence in the center of Futenma City.[32] Moreover, when former Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota refused in March 1997 to extend leases on U.S. bases that were to expire, the Japanese National Diet passed by an 80 percent majority a special legislation overriding the Okinawa Prefectural Government decision.[33] In the end, although there was a growing expectation within the Japanese public that the number and size of U.S. bases would gradually be reduced, it did not create a much broader and grass-rooted opposition to U.S. bases in Japan. In the short-term, for example, because of growing security problems caused by North Korea and China (which this paper discusses later), the Japanese government still

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29 Winston Lord, Oral History Interview, p.418, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collections (FAOHC), The Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Special Collections Division, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

30 Ibid.

31 Its official full name is: Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0009.html>

The Status of Forces Agreement states: "When U.S. servicemen and their families commit crimes, they shall be detained by U.S. authorities until Japanese law enforcement agencies file complaints with prosecutors' office based on clear suspicion." This enables U.S. authorities to refuse Japanese investigators' requests to handover suspects related to the military.

32 Although the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa [SACO] had materialized smaller base reductions and reallocations, Futenma is still used by a number of U.S. Marine Corps helicopters.

33 In November 1998, Ota was defeated in a prefectural election by the LDP candidate, Keiichi Inamine. Sheila A. Smith, "A Place Apart: Okinawa and Japan's Postwar Peace" in Akira Iriye and Robert A.Wampler, *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001*. (Tokyo, New York, London: Kodansha International, 2001), pp.188-197.

saw the value in the continuation of a forward U.S. military presence in Japan. In the long-term, however, changes in the strategic environment in East Asia, such as re-unification on the Korean Peninsula or a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Strait situation are likely to influence the size and function of U.S. forces in Japan.

On the other hand, there has been the evolution of a more alarming perception which regards the 1995 Okinawan Crisis as an embodiment of U.S.'s over-extension in the international security arena that subsequently caused fragmentation in its relations with allies. For example, Chalmers Johnson utilizes the concept, "blowback," to explain and analyze the depth of complexity in U.S. security policy toward East Asia. He defines "blowback" as "the unintended consequences of [American] policies that were kept secret from the American people."[34] During the Cold War, the U.S.'s two major military operations against Asian communism, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, could not have been conducted without the massive use of U.S. forces on Okinawa. In the post-Cold War Asia, Okinawa still remains a military frontline for the Pentagon's forward-deployed strategy, and is extensively used to project American hegemonic power throughout Asia. In particular, aspects of the American military presence on and control of Okinawa includes:

- As a prefecture of Japan, Okinawa has only 0.6 percent of Japan's total land-area, however, about 75 percent of facilities used by U.S. forces stationed in Japan are concentrated in the islands.
- U.S. military controls 20 percent of the principal agricultural land in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. The U.S. also controls 29 areas of the surrounding seas and 15 air spaces over the Okinawan Islands (which enable U.S. forces to operate for regional contingencies in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait).
- Okinawa contains 39 bases, including Kadena Air Force Base, which is the largest airfield in East Asia.[35]

If the U.S. and Japanese governments continue to delay or fail to reduce an overwhelming burden of the U.S. military presence on Okinawan citizens, it could bring about further fragmentation in U.S.-Japan relations. Overall, the most fundamental shortfall of the February 1995 Nye Initiative was that it overlooked the significance of reassessing the political, social, and economic environment surrounding U.S. bases in Japan, because the United States could not physically exist in East Asia as an Asia-Pacific power without its forward base structure in the lands of its Asian allies, including Japan.

Relations with China and the March 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the long-term question of China's future role in East Asia, together with North Korea's nuclear development, has enhanced the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. and Japanese governments share common objectives in their relations with China, such as respect for human rights and the establishment of consistent rule of law, the promotion of China's integration into the global economy by granting its membership in

34 Chalmers Johnson. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire.* [With a New Introduction on Blowback on the post-9/11 World] (New York: Henry Halt and Company, 2004), p.7. "Blowback" is originally a CIA term used to explain the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran.

35 Ibid., pp.36-37.

international organizations, peaceful settlement in Beijing-Taipei relations over the Taiwan Strait, and reassurance for the renouncement of the use of force to resolve territorial disputes with Asian neighbors. Importantly, however, there has never been a sense of equilibrium between Washington and Tokyo regarding their attitude toward Beijing.

During the first two decades of the Cold War, the U.S. and Japanese governments pursued the policy of containment and isolation of the People's Republic of China (Beijing), while supporting the Republic of China (Taipei) as the official representative of Chinese people at UN.[36] In the so-called Taiwan clause in the 1969 Sato-Nixon-Sato joint communiqué, the two governments expressed their common security interest in the stability of the Taiwan Strait areas. Sato stated that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was "a most important factor" for the security of Japan.[37] In private, Japanese officials gave private assurance to their U.S. counterparts regarding "the necessity for military combat operations from bases in Okinawa and Japan if Taiwan was attacked."[38] In response, Beijing strongly criticized an "increased U.S.-Japanese military collusion and a Japanese military role in Asia" as well as "looser ground of US use of its bases in Japan" as an increased threat to its security.[39] After the U.S. rapprochement with China, symbolized by the so-called "Nixon shock" of July 1971 (Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing and Nixon's announcement of his presidential trip to China in 1972), Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with China in September 1972. Because of the deepening Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, Chinese leaders privately agreed to the continuing existence of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which served both to counter-balance the Soviet military threat along Sino-Soviet border areas and to contain the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism. Therefore, the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo strategic triangle against Moscow became the central geopolitical framework of East Asian security for the final two decades of the Cold War.[40]

In the mid-1990s, however, the mechanism of the U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations began to change because of the rapid growth of Chinese military and economic power. Japanese relations with China became complicated as a new generation of more nationalistic political leaders replaced the elder generation both in Tokyo and Beijing who favored diplomatic normalization of the 1970s. In July 1995, China tested nuclear-capable missiles before joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[41] The Japanese Foreign Ministry unsuccessfully sought to preserve Japanese foreign assistance to China against the pressures from anti-communists on

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36 Japan maintained informal economic relations with the mainland through the so-called L-T trade during the 1960s. LT stood for the two signatories, Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, to a 1962 trade agreement despite the absence of official diplomatic relations.

37 *The New York Times*, November 21, 1969.

38 Memorandum by Sneider, "Current Status of Negotiations," August 30, 1969, p.4, attached to Haig to Kissinger, "Letter from Dick Sneider – Okinawa Reversion Negotiations," September 3, 1969, Sneider, Richard L., Box 834, Name Files NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NA

39 Intelligence Note, "Communist China: Strong Negative Reaction to the Sato Visit," December 3, 1969, Box 2245, Pol 7 Japan, Central Foreign Policy File, 1967-69, Records of State Department, RG 59, National Archives.

40 The U.S.-Chinese-Japanese diplomatic relations also helped to restore and stabilize U.S.-China relations after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, when Japan played a mediating role between the U.S. and China.

the right and anti-nuclear activists on the left. China's March 1996 missile tests in the Taiwan Strait areas further deepened suspicion of Chinese aspirations among Japan's political leaders.[42] After the U.S. and Japan issued the April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security and announced a review of the Defense Guidelines, the Chinese government condemned the revival of Japanese militarism and U.S.-Japanese joint efforts to "contain" China.[43] Beijing also feared that the re-strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance would be a major obstacle in its attempt toward re-unification with Taiwan.

In 1997, Japanese relations with China took a turn for the worse because the two governments confronted each other over the sovereignty of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the normalization of relations, the Foreign Ministries of their respective governments attempted to stabilize diplomatic relations, declaring 1997 the "year of China" for Japanese diplomacy. However, the momentum of celebration did not last beyond the November 1998 summit between President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. During the summit meetings, the Chinese side demanded a formal Japanese expression of "apology" (owabi) and "remorse" (hansei) for the Japanese aggression during Sino-Japanese war (1931-1945). The Chinese also insisted on apologies from the Japanese government in all future bilateral sessions. Nevertheless, the Chinese received only an expression of remorse. In the end, Japan's policy toward China shifted from the promotion of economic interdependence to the pursuit of a more realistic security approach to deal with the growth of Chinese military power.[44] Former U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, reassesses, "The Japanese still knew that they had to and wanted to deal with China, but they began to see that China is going to be a real rival in the region."[45]

In the mid-1990s, U.S. relations with China also entered an era of instability and uncertainty. In January 1993, Bill Clinton came into office after attacking the George H.W. Bush administration for coddling the "butchers of Beijing." For the two four-year terms, the Clinton administration sought to accomplish its own political and diplomatic stability agenda on U.S. policy toward China. Initially, Clinton's China policy was dominated by the demand for an improvement of China's human rights record, which was insisted on as a pre-condition for according

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41 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes as follows:

- Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
- Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and signed by 71 states in New York. The CTBT has now been signed by 176 states and ratified by 135. Not only China but also the United States has not ratified the CTBT.

42 Some missiles even landed within 100 kilometers of Okinawa.

43 Patrick E. Tyler. *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, an Investigative History*. (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp.21-36.

44 Robert A. Manning, "Northeast Asian Future Shock and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronnin (eds.). *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p.56.

45 Lord, Oral History Interview, p.423, FAOHC.

Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment to China. In June 1995, the administration allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, which deepened Beijing's displeasure with Washington's policy toward Taiwan. The Clinton administration, however, did not respond to the Chinese launching of nuclear-capable missiles in the July of the same year, which caused Chinese miscalculation of U.S. intention and commitment toward Taiwan in the following year. On March 5, 1996, China announced that it would test ballistic missiles. On March 7, China began to launch those missiles close to Taiwan in order to warn and discourage Taiwanese politicians in their legislative and presidential elections from pushing in the direction of independence. In response, President Clinton ordered two U.S. aircraft carriers from the Pacific Fleet (including the U.S.S. Independence, which home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan) to be dispatched to the Taiwan Strait areas in order to signal U.S. concerns about the Chinese tests. The U.S. even declared its intention to use force for the defense of Taiwan. It appeared that Beijing did not expect such a firm reaction from Washington. Former Defense Secretary William Perry asserts: "the fact that they were surprised means that they were misreading how seriously we took this [Chinese missile testing]."[46] The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Chinese missile exercises were not a sign of attack or invasion of Taiwan.[47] After a month of tension and uncertainty, the crisis passed, and U.S. Navy carriers steamed out of the Taiwan Strait areas. In his memoirs, Clinton recalls: "finding the right balance between economic pragmatism and aggressive nationalism was a constant challenge for China's leaders, especially during election season in Taiwan. But I thought China had gone too far with the missiles test."[48] Thereafter, the U.S. government continued to pursue the policy of "one China, but not now" and encouraged Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences peacefully.

In 1997 and 1998, the Clinton administration thus attempted to re-direct the U.S. domestic political debate regarding "China Threat" by introducing a broader objective of engaging China into the international community and establishing a "strategic partnership" with Beijing instead of a policy of "containment."[49] In October 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Washington D.C., received a warm welcome, and affirmed the evolution of common ground between the two governments, namely the responsibility to create a world of peace, stability, and prosperity into the new century. In June 1998, supported by the U.S. business community, President Clinton took a trip to China and held summit meetings with Jiang Zemin. However, the notion of "strategic partnership" exaggerated the newly emerging common interests in Sino-American relations and played down the remaining issues of disagreement between the two governments. In Japanese domestic politics, moreover, there was a controversy over Japan "passing," namely the tilt by the Clinton administration toward China, bypassing Japan. Finally, the administration's China policy of engagement was further undermined by such problems as the Cox report on Chinese nuclear espionage in May 1999 and the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign in May of the same year.[50]

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46 Funabashi, *Alliance Drift*, pp.370-371.

47 Ibid.

48 Bill Clinton. *My Life*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), p.703.

49 Manning, "Northeast Asian Future Shock and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," pp.59-60.

50 The Cox Report is named after the Chairman of a congressional committee, Christopher Cox. The United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National

The U.S.-Japan alliance coordination has not always been smooth because each side has found difficulty in finding its appropriate stance in relations with China. Of particular importance, the U.S. and Japanese governments still struggled to reassure Beijing about the non-threatening nature of the revised Defense Guidelines. For example, the U.S. government gave private assurances, which Lord describes: "We briefed the Chinese just before the announcements in Japan. …We made clear that our defense treaty was not directed at China and that we wanted constructive relations with China."[51] Nevertheless, Beijing still made an unsuccessful demand that Washington and Tokyo make a public statement that Taiwan would lay outside the areas to which the guidelines applied. The Chinese government also expressed concern that the April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security was designed to encourage Japan to play a larger role in East Asian regional security. The U.S. and Japanese governments coordinated their responses to China's criticism and explained that the guidelines were the outlines of mission, not the agreement for specific scenarios. According to Lord, "we neither confirmed nor denied that the defense guidelines covered this [Taiwan]. In effect, we said that this relates to situations, not geographic entities."[52] In fact, the United States has no official defense commitment to Taiwan, and therefore Washington has no political authority to integrate Tokyo into its formal policy planning for the defense of the island. However, Beijing saw little value in yielding to such an explanation, criticizing it as evidence that the U.S.-Japan alliance was a threat to China's Taiwan policy, subsequently complicating Washington-Tokyo diplomatic coordination with Beijing. In the end, it was the May 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis that subsequently made "a stronger defense statement and greater movement on the defense guidelines" for the U.S. and Japanese governments.[53]

The above-explained incidents do not necessarily indicate that U.S. and Japanese interests regarding China policy were seriously in conflict during the 1990s. Nor do they suggest that the U.S.-Japan alliance should have been fundamentally restructured to improve relations with China. A substantial reduction in U.S. forces in East Asia would induce Chinese geopolitical aspirations in the region. Expanding Japanese offensive military operations or demanding collective defense could provoke Chinese attempts to collude with other concerned Asian states against Japan. Tokyo should measure more carefully the effectiveness of its independent diplomatic proposals that could lead to joint Sino-American opposition. Japanese diplomatic relations with China could be more effective, if the United States and South Korea (and other states with common interests) were supportive of it. Washington should consider carefully the possible outcomes of discouraging Japanese diplomatic initiatives which would be consistent with U.S. attempts to integrate China into the international community. Although fundamental U.S. and Japanese interests in China are largely similar, a U.S. attempt to restrain Japanese objectives could lead to a difference in strategies in the long-term.

Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, May 25, 1999 <http://www.house.gov/coxreport/pref/preface.html>

Regarding the Belgrade incident, see BBC News, "NATO Hits Chinese Embassy," May 8, 1999 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/338424.stm>

51 Lord, Oral History Interview, pp.423-424, FAOHC.

52 Ibid., p.420.

53 Ibid., p.421.

Tensions in the Korean Peninsula: North Korea's Nuclear Development

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Japanese governments have shared objectives regarding the Korean Peninsula, including the promotion of stability, reduction of the North Korean military threat, de-nuclearization, and gradual transformation of the North Korean regime and subsequent reconciliation with South Korea. During the first two decades of the Cold War, the maintenance of stability in the Korean Peninsula was one of the major security issues in East Asia for Washington and Tokyo. In the November 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communiqué, the two governments expressed common security interests in the Korean Peninsula. In particular, Sato stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was "essential" to Japan's own security.[54] In the unilateral statement, Sato confirmed further that if the U.S. should need its bases in Japan to meet an armed attack on Korea or Taiwan, the Japanese government "would decide its position positively and promptly."[55]

During the final two decades of the Cold War, however, Japanese security relations with the peninsula were not always inter-related to the functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although U.S. bases in Japan had a significant role for the defense of South Korea, Tokyo sought to moderate its position as stated in the 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué, declining any active role or interests in the security of the Korean Peninsula. During the 1970s, the Japanese government even denied that there was a North Korean threat to Japan. South Korean government became deeply suspicious of the Japanese attitude speculating that Japan was pursuing separate relations with North Korea to delay or even to hinder re-unification of the peninsula. Finally, Japanese moves toward North Korea, such as the 1990 summit between a senior LDP leader Shin Kanemaru and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, reinforced South Korean suspicions of Japanese intentions.[56]

Since the early 1990s, however, Japan had greatly increased its realization of the North Korean military threat. For example, Tokyo took very seriously North Korea's May 1993 test launching of the Rodong missile. After the 1993-1994 nuclear crises, therefore, Japanese officials re-examined the prospect of Japan's entrapment in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.[57] In consequence, the nuclear crisis brought about trilateral diplomatic coordination among Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul.[58] In 1995, moreover, Japan expressed its willingness to play a role in multilateral security on the peninsula and joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was established in order to provide light water reactors (LWR) to North Korea (within the framework of the October 1994 U.S.–North Korea Agreement). During the same period, however, Japan's relations with North Korea took a turn for the worse because of the revelations about North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. After the August 1998 Taepodong missile launch, the Japanese government perceived North Korea as a major threat to peace and stability for Japan and East Asia. Thus, Tokyo agreed to joint research regarding regional contingency planning as well as intelligence

54 *The New York Times*, November 21, 1969.

55 Ibid.

56 Sotooka, Honda and Miura, *Japan-U.S. Alliance Half Century: Security Treaty and Secret Agreement*, pp.455-456.

57 Ibid., pp.483-485.

58 Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, pp.280-294.

sharing with the United States based on the immediate threat caused by North Korean missiles.

U.S. and South Korean relations with North Korea were extraordinarily tense during the 1993-1994 nuclear crises. At an NSC (National Security Council) meeting, for example, President Clinton was close to deciding to direct a major build-up of U.S. forces. As Former Secretary of Defense William Perry later recalled, Northeast Asia "came as dangerously close to war as it had ever [been] since the Korean War."[59] Then the message of a possible breakthrough came from former President Jimmy Carter who was visiting North Korea and holding talks for a negotiated settlement with Kim Il Sung. Accordingly, in October 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed a key non-nuclear proliferation framework agreement in order to freeze all nuclear-related activities in North Korea.[60] According to former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian-Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, "Essentially what we did was to reach an admittedly imperfect agreement aimed at closing off the North Korean nuclear capability over time. This was in exchange for economic help to North Korea to replace the energy they wouldn't have, with the ability to call off all bets if the North Koreans started violating the nuclear agreement."[61] The U.S. government thus expected that North Koreans would "freeze their nuclear program and ultimately dismantle it."[62] In the Four-Party Talks, which included the United States, North and South Koreas, and China, the Clinton administration sought to keep encouraging direct talks between the mutually suspicious North and South Koreas regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula while inducing China to put pressure on the North Koreans for a negotiated settlement.[63] The U.S. general strategy was "to integrate North Korea into regional and world system, so that they would be less paranoid and disruptive."[64]

In February 1998, newly elected South Korean President Kim Dae Jung reversed decades of the confrontational policy of "containment" toward North Korea by introducing the so-called "Sunshine Policy," which entailed a broader political, economic and diplomatic process of "engagement" with North Korea.[65] Accordingly, the United States and Japan also began to reassess their respective roles. From the U.S. and South Korean perspectives, it appeared that Tokyo's continuing hard-line attitude toward Pyongyang was in friction with U.S. and South Korean engagement policy with North Korea. Hence, Washington and Seoul pressed Tokyo to provide food aid to Pyongyang in order to maintain its commitment to KEDO, and to promote normalization with North Korea. After the Keizo Obuchi cabinet unilaterally suspended its participation in the LWR funding talks as a result of the August 1998 Taepodong launch, Japan's commitment toward KEDO became a

59 Ibid., p.281.

60 Johnson, *Blowback*, pp.122-128.

61 Lord, Oral History Interview, p.427, FAOHC.

62 Ibid., p.431.

63 Ibid., p.438. U.S. officials considered that by cooperating on the Korean Peninsula issue, the U.S. and Chinese governments could demonstrate to their respective domestic audiences as well as the world that they "could work together" on some regional, global, and strategic interests. The U.S. also kept the Japanese and Russian governments informed of the four-party talks, however, they preferred a six-party approach.

64 Ibid., p.435.

65 Eundak Kwon and Jae-Cheon Lim, "Crossing the river that divides the Korean Peninsula: an evaluation of the Sunshine Policy," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 6 (2006), pp.129-156.

major concern for the U.S. and South Korea. On the other hand, Tokyo became annoyed by Washington's and Seoul's insufficient attention to the North Korean missile threat.[66]

Differing priorities between the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean over missile tests, proliferation, and engagement with North Korea threatened to undermine their joint diplomatic effort toward the peninsula. In October 1998, therefore, South Korean President Kim took diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with Japan by holding a summit meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi. The Kim-Obuchi summit resulted in a joint declaration, "A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century."[67] The declaration resolved long-term fishery disputes, introduced a formula in which Japan expressed "apology" [owabi] and "remorse" [hansei] for its aggressions during the colonial era, and proposed closer security consultations in the future. The improvement of Japan-South Korea relations created better opportunities for trilateral security coordination with the United States. Secretary of Defense Perry initiated a review of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula and arranged regular trilateral consultations with senior officials from Japan and South Korea. In June 1999, Perry took a trip to Pyongyang and presented a comprehensive U.S. diplomatic proposal that reflected the integrated U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral approach in future dealings with North Korea.

Overall, the United States, Japan, and South Korea still shared broad objectives regarding the Korean Peninsula during the 1990s; however, they differed in priorities among those objectives. Japan was more concerned about missiles (which flew over the Sea of Japan and the Japanese mainland) than the United States and South Korea. Tokyo also regarded the resolution of the abduction issues as a pre-condition for economic aid to North Korea. The United States put the highest priority on North Korea's potential to resume its nuclear weapons programs. South Korea pursued a policy of engagement that might move beyond the domestic political restraints at work in Washington and Tokyo. Hence, policy coordination between the U.S. and Japan remained crucial but difficult. Moreover, despite the beginning of the trilateral consultation process, any formal U.S-Japan-South Korea defense arrangements would provoke the Chinese government. The historic North-South summit of June 2000 brought about a new fluidity and complexity to U.S.-Japan coordination on Korea policy. Tokyo did not greet the summit as enthusiastically as Seoul did. The Japanese public remained deeply skeptical of the North Korean intentions because of the complex issues related to missiles, abductions, and nuclear weapons. The North-South process of engagement and reconciliation provided political opportunities for the reduction of threat on the Korean Peninsula. However, it also posed new challenges for the U.S.-Japan alliance planning and diplomatic coordination toward the development of a common long-term strategy.

Conclusions

The coordination of U.S.-Japan security arrangements in the first decades of the post Cold War era was launched by the Nye Initiative, reinforced by the NDPO, and completed by the April 1996 joint communiqué. The whole negotiating process

66 Johnson, *Blowback,* p.132.

67 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century," October 8, 1998 <http:// www.mofa.go.jp/ region/ asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>

demonstrated that the U.S. and Japan continued to share fundamental strategic objectives in East Asia. The overall direction was moving toward the strengthening of the alliance in which Japan would take more responsibilities for its defense policy as well as regional security in East Asia, while joint planning and coordination between the two governments in cases of regional contingencies were still evolving.

Continuing U.S. deterrent capabilities, guaranteed by the confidential understanding between the U.S. and Japanese governments regarding the maximum use of U.S. bases for conventional combat operations as well as the re-entry and transit rights of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan in great emergencies, remained the central force of U.S. military presence in East Asia. Regarding possible regional contingencies, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait were the two major areas of security interests for the U.S.-Japan alliance. On Korea, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Washington and Tokyo were clear and precise about the functions of emergency operations. On Taiwan, however, the two governments remained ambiguous about their respective operational roles as neither of them held official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. Moreover, Beijing kept claiming that the Taiwan issue remained China's domestic issue, which allowed no foreign intervention.

The changes and developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance system included both short-term and long-term aspects. In the short-term, the evolution of realism in Japanese security thinking provided opportunities to strengthen the alliance and integrate security cooperation. In the long-term, however, if the U.S. government did not sufficiently consult with the Japanese government regarding East Asian regional security, it could increase misunderstanding and mistrust in the alliance. Tokyo would become concerned about the danger of "entanglement" with U.S. involvement in East Asian regional conflicts. Or, Japan might become anxious for U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, which might result in U.S. abandonment of the bilateral security arrangements. Conceptually, the U.S. and Japanese governments could re-structure the alliance system by jointly examining possible scenarios of regional crises. For example, the U.S. government could increase pressure on the Japanese government to make active commitments toward a more explicit role in the defense of Taiwan as well as a combat operation role in the Korean Peninsula. In reality, however, the post-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism within the Japanese public still remain powerful as a political brake to restrain Japan's overseas military operations.

Those structural changes, moreover, could be highly problematic in East Asia. A more explicit Japanese commitment to assist the United States in the defense of Taiwan would provoke the Chinese government. A Japanese governmental acceptance of a combat operational role on the Korean Peninsula would damage Seoul-Pyongyang diplomatic dialogue as well as Tokyo-Seoul political relations. Reducing U.S. forces in Japan might undermine the effectiveness of U.S. conventional operations from Japan. There would also be concerns among Asian states regarding the U.S. intentions to continue committing itself in East Asia. Finally, enhancing a more symmetrical military role for Japan in the U.S.-Japan alliance would not necessarily create equilibrium in bilateral relations or stability in East Asia.

Asian neighbors still see a larger Japanese security role with suspicion. Because of the history of wartime aggression in the Asia-Pacific region, an increased Japanese security role would be too large and threatening for Asian states. For the United States, on the contrary, Japan's continuing reluctance to take more substantial responsibility for its national security as well as for East Asian regional

security would appear to be too small and irritating for U.S.-Japan burden-sharing. The indication in the Nye Initiative of the continuing presence of 100,000 troops in East Asia could be regarded as a sign of the lack of confidence in Japanese defense contributions on the U.S. side as well as the lack of sufficient mutual trust and understanding between the U.S. and its allies in Asia, including Japan.

Finally, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements require more effective consultation. It is the U.S. government that has not conducted sufficient and regular high-level coordination with its Japanese counterpart. During the Clinton presidency, Japanese defense and security policy was handled at the level of deputy assistant secretaries in Washington. On the other hand, within the Japanese government, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and vice ministers were in charge of managing U.S. defense and security policies.[68] In the long-term, however, this operational asymmetry would not be sustainable in the security arrangements. The U.S.-Japan alliance thus requires an indication of a consistent strategic direction clearly set at senior official levels which are based on continuing coordination between the two governments.[69]

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[68] It does not mean, however, that the two governments had fully realized the importance of regular defense planning and intelligence sharing. In fact, during Clinton's two terms, there were seven prime ministers in Japan. In contrast, despite initial differences, Clinton developed much more cordial political relationship with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin who ruled China during the 1990s.

[69] The U.S.-Japan alliance would go through a substantial re-strengthening process after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. However, that will be a new subject for other research and writing.

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Poems

Bern Mulvey

BUTSUMA

Time to meet the relatives, only they're dead.
It's like a WWII newsreel, all the black-and-white,
the *marugari* and *fukurasuzume* hairstyles,
the *montsuki*, the formal death kimonos, even a sword

or two. Why am I here? My mother-in-law-to-be
narrates causes of death. This one, stomach cancer,
that one, cerebral hemorrhage. She fast-forwards
to her brother, machine-gunned then left in a ditch to die.

By *Americans*, she says. I look up at his picture,
more handsome than I'll ever be, a dark haired
Emilio Estevez--*this was no monster*
I am being told. She wants an explanation,

they all do--I know it's trite, but I feel them,
all 20 or so, they want an apology. And I can't do it,
and I can't explain, not here, not before the dead,
how I have my own dead, my great-uncle sodomized

by bayonet until he too died in a place called Bataan.
Senso wa hidoi koto da--War is a horrible thing.
I say this, and she starts to cry. After a while,
she says to me, *We will need your picture too,*

just in case.

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JIZOU AT TSURUGA BAY

For M

Is this your answer then, to become a god?
They found the body already transformed,

bursting its seams. My wife touched the rents
as if she could still find you in, bent over

your books, too busy to answer a simple
knock. Do you remember that final walk,

the cold water to your ankles, your knees,
then upward until the life bubbled out?

Mother-in-law has shown me your room.
See, she said, *it is untouched*, as if I

had doubted, as if such fidelity
must matter. Brother, on your beach the wind

raises *naminohana*, like quicksilver
ghosts. They summon you, it is the *kagura*,

the dance of the gods. Be with us now,
allow us at least this solace, plum wine

in a shared cup, *daikon* from our garden,
the mourning candle, its long, fragrant leaving.

SUMMER FESTIVAL IN TAMURA VILLAGE

We're busy, for the Dead are coming.
Tomorrow is Obon, the day of return,

12 generations--can you imagine that throng,
that gaggle of souls? So much to do,

tatami waiting to be swept, onigiri rolled,
nasubi laid each into its plate. Outside,

the neighborhood boys cry *Wasshoi! Wasshoi!*
as their fathers bless our house, the mikoshi

lifted three times always, despite the heat,
the incalculable weight of god.

*

Late afternoon is for festival. We fold
like origami into our summer robes,

four awkward cranes, then teeter off *clacketty*
clocketty on wooden sandals. The path

is a rainbow of shades, the men azulene
and indigo, turquoise and daylight, women

carmine and fiesta, a clutch of amaranth.
Above, the shrine's gates signed by their maker,

Abe 1871. Nearby's his family grave,
an old refrain, *senshi, senshi, senshi*.

*

Evening. Mother-in-law tells us to walk ahead.
Her bones are tired. *Just go home*, she says,

make grandchildren. We hear them laugh behind us.
Lanterns line the riverbanks, heart flames each

an invocation. The Dead are coming,
and they must eat. Their photos grace the walls,

whites on shadow, presence. My wife
and I set out plates, pour wine into tiny cups.

Outside, the moon is huge, and in its light,
two figures in the garden, keeping watch.

THE WINDOW TRIBE

Eiheiji Temple

Liquid evening, leaves wind-loosed with thunder.
The old Japanese are naked to the waist,
swollen grey bellies dripping spring water
as they fill their liter jugs. *Umee*, they say,
delicious, holy, a flavor to heal,
to soften the leaving, gravel hardening
with new rain. Light flies like an arrow.

*

Fukui Prefectural Hospital

Shujutsu-chuu....
Like the old *On Air* signs, it means *the Show's On*,
knives out, bellies up. Nervous Dads-to-be
line the halls, you cannot see, do not know whose
is next, his, yours, each of you the same question.
You listen for a sign, eyes on the one god,
your oracle, a red light flashing.
Then, there's a cry, doors open, someone's
a father, and so the numbers dwindle
down until only you are left, the word
complications echoing like death
in that emptied corridor.

*

Bayville, Long Island

Without regard, without regard, the neighbor's children
are in my garden again, my roses are drooping,
my daffodils, my peonies stomped and plucked,
my irises twisted into knots. You'd think
they'd be ashamed, you'd think they'd been taught differently,
that an old woman deserves better in her own garden.

*

Eiheiji Temple

He teaches me the breath of an insect,
bones of a horse. *Polish your arms, leave
water undisturbed*. Above us, the gate,
gods of East and West crouch and glare, a thousand-
year cramp. *It rains spears*. His grandson cries
for his pacifier, the *child silencer*.
Passing it he says, *Ripe grain lowers its head*.

*

Bayville, Long Island

My mother lifting again the plate
shakes with the weight of it. The meat is raw.
I help her upstairs, her bones ache--they are chalk--
each step a milestone, a universe.
She tells me, *I'll dream about you tonight*,
as if that is all it takes, a little
concentration, will-power. She asks me,
How did I get so old?

*

Eiheiji Temple

Three of us, waiting out a storm.
He teaches me, *Decorate the end with beauty*;
the elements up, words dissolve like salt.

WALKING

For Takato

A step! Even the dog
blinks as the now bi-legged
nuisance straightens,
the unsteady lawn
a ship's deck, a carpet
about to be pulled.

You were so
early. I remember leaning
my head to your chest,
how hollow it sounded,
like an empty jar, the faint
rat-a-tat-tat

of a heartbeat.
I imagined
my strength leaking
into you, through my fingers,
my left cheek, as if
I could charge you.

And now, the grass
conspires. Knees buckle,
then find their true
shape, as with a victorious
shake of hand,
you stand.

FACE

She tells me how she flew, how air
became wind, how the jealous ground
rose up. When I lift the pink cloth,
I see a vent, pale eye of bone,
then, quick as breath, the freed blood.
Just four, my daughter exceeds me,
doesn't cry until the doctor,
already masked, taller even
than I, asks, *Are you ready?*

We can put her under, easy
needle in the arm. The stout nurse
moves too slow to my nod. *I'll be good*,
as if *bad* is why we're here, searching
for the true vein. *Hold me*, she says,
my torn, tiny bird, and I do.

KOTODAMA

The word as event
kotodama
raindrops falling
kotodama
the shamaness visited
possessed, the water's light
touch unnoticed
for how could she
filled with *word*,
God, the gather and burst
of it?

A word, say *beauty*
the fat sheep everyone wants
say *home*
pig under roof
the procedure of exclusion
not your pig
the (my) Japanese son
hands two angry points
Go home, he tells me
an event that signifies
Not.

But the word
is it vessel or mirror
to the event?
Not
that dancer always on the rim
of apocalypse
tassels and long hair
weighted with ash
how long have we moved
together (prayer or lesson?)
before the advancing fire?

My most selfish gift
what I am
outside
(r)
round
eyes, my unholstered
nose, long tongue lofting
lateral
liquid 'l's
volition
love.

Kotodama
spirit words God
as breath
event *the possession*
of use
I wait ready
here
my *not home*
a beauty in eight directions
the hunger I feel
the long wait to swallow.

BLIZZARD IN SABAE

Seven years here and never this, drifts three feet and up,
Awara Avenue now this narrow path, the body
a sly numbness, a stumble, a handprint framed in snow.
Besides me, nobody is out, everything shades of white,
houses mushroom-topped, signs bearded in ice,
my awkward steps soundless in the sudden rush of wind.
Miles inland, yet even here how strong the sea smell,
the taste of salt! I walk in my adopted city;
when the hush does come, I am almost home. The moon,
unveiled, shatters, becomes a million reflected stars.

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Transformation*

By Stephen J. Davies

"The rich live differently; I guess they die differently, too."

From the movie "The Black Dahlia".

After the gang attacked my wife, I knew I had to do something.

"Stay at home," I told her. "It's too dangerous on the roads."

"But I want to go back to work," she insisted. "We need the money."

"Are you sure you're ready?"

"What do you mean?"

"You've just had a transplant."

"So what? I feel fine."

"But –"

"But what?" she asked, her cheeks a little flushed. "You think I'm too old for work? Is that it?"

There was a slight pause. I noticed she was breathing heavily.

"No, Martha," I said. "Of course you're not too old."

She held out her hand: "Well, give me the car keys then."

"Just make sure you drive in the fast lane," I said, smiling.

After breakfast, I watched her reverse the car, a Korbus 2, out of the garage. The solar plates on the car roof shone in the cold morning light: it was an economy model from the Mother Earth range – but, driven flat out, it was still fast enough.

Martha waved goodbye to me, accelerated down the exit ramp, and powered up the street.

After she'd gone, I went back inside the house to check my email and finish my morning coffee. I was working the afternoon shift, so I had a little free time.

But, about thirty minutes later, I heard the car on the ramp again.

Next, the front door de-sealed.

"They've attacked me again," Martha said, stepping into the kitchen.

"Where?" I asked her.

"On the speedway. Near the intersection."

"Are you okay?"

"I think so."

"What about the car?"

"There's a big dent in the back."

"You think it was the same gang?"

Martha nodded, her eyes a little tearful now. "But this time they yelled at me. They called me a 'fucking senile'."

The ugly curse words hung in the air.

"Were you in the fast lane?"

Martha shook her head. "I was too scared."

"Then stop driving."

* A special thanks to: Subarno Chattarji, Bern Mulvey, Micheal Thompson, Debra Occhi, and Peter Verbeek.

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"But how will I get to work? You know it's too dangerous on the streets." Her voice wavered a little.

I stood up, crossed the room, and gave her a hug. She felt frail and bony under my fingers. "I'll talk to Lenny," I said. "He might be able to help."

"John, they think I'm finished," she said, sobbing now. "I don't want to be forced off the road by thugs. If only..."

"If only…what?" I asked gently.

"If only the transplant had worked."

'Don't be silly,' I reassured her, trying not to think about the web of purple scars that stretched across her chest …

Later, I put on a necktie – Cybertech College, a gift from Martha's father – and drove to the local garage. Some people said the gangs took pay-offs, that they could be bought. I figured that if anyone knew about this stuff, Lenny would.

"Hi John," Lenny said, standing up and holding out his hand.

I looked around the workshop. There were several rows of shiny tools on the wall, and a power drill was lying next to the top-of-the-range Korbus 8 that Lenny had been working on.

"What can I do for you? Is Martha okay?"

"What do you mean?"

Lenny level-gazed me for a few seconds. "Hell, John, I was only asking. I know she's been in hospital and all."

"Martha was attacked," I told him. "On the road."

He stiffened slightly. "I can fix the car. You know that."

"Lenny, come on. What's going on? It's the second time she's been hit. How much will it cost to call the gang off?"

Lenny shrugged. "How bad is the car?"

"Just a dent in the back. Nothing serious. But how do I find the gang?"

Lenny shook his head: "They don't usually negotiate. Not these days, anyway."

"Why not?"

Lenny glanced towards the garage door, then pointed at the small office at the back of the workshop. "You want some coffee?" he asked me.

"Sure."

In the office, Lenny told me what he knew. He said the garages were making money by claiming the wrecked cars were write-off's, then fixing them up and selling them on. And the hospitals were making money too, if the victim still had any useable organs. Some people said the hospitals were even financing the gangs, but Lenny didn't know about that. Still, he would see what he could find out. Until then, he had a suggestion for me. A sales guy from an agency had left his card at the garage. He pressed the card into my hand. He said the guy could sort something out for Martha.

As soon as I'd finished talking with Lenny, I drove to the agency. It was on a wide, tree-lined street not far from the clinic where Martha had her first operation.

I parked in front of the main building, and walked towards the entrance.

Above the door was a sign that said: 'Sweet Sunsets'.

I crossed the plush carpet to a desk where a young man was sitting in front of a computer screen.

"Jed Stone," he said, holding out his hand. "How may I help you, sir? Do you have a loved one in need of assistance?"

"Maybe," I said, feeling uneasy. Jed had the tanned confidence that youth and money bring. "I think you know a friend of mine. His name is Lenny."

Jed smiled. "The garage mechanic? Sure, he's doing some work on my car… Why don't you sit down?" he asked, pointing at a chair.

As I sat down, Jed pushed a glossy magazine towards me.

On the cover was a picture of an elderly couple of retirees drinking glasses of champagne. Nearby, some fat lobsters were roasting on a charcoal grill. In the background, a tropical sun was setting over the ocean.

"Now, I'm guessing that you're looking for a Sunset Package? For a loved one? Well, you've come to the right place. Just look at the enormous range of options in that brochure. By the way, I take it the loved one is still mobile?"

"Is this a resort?" I asked him. "It looks kinda fancy."

"…In a way, yes. You could call it that. Now, why don't I run through some of the choices, Mr…?"

"Smith," I said, "John Smith."

"Excellent, John. Let's start with the top of the range. Always go for the best, I say. Look at page 37. These are what we call our 'Themed Departures'. For instance, we can arrange for a sporting event to go wrong – a capsized canoe, maybe, or a parachute that doesn't open. A while ago, we even had someone fired out of a canon into a brick wall."

"We're talking about my wife," I said. "She's 89."

"Your wife?"

"Yes. I don't think she'll go for anything athletic."

"Why not? Have you consulted her?"

"I don't need to. That's not her style."

"People might look old, Mr. Smith, but that doesn't mean they want to finish old. Anyway, we have plenty of other options. Is your wife a movie fan by any chance?"

"Yes. And her name is Martha, by the way."

"A very nice name. Now, we have a number of movie simulations that have proved to be very popular with our customers. And we can also arrange some modifications if you like, so the loved one can make a personal and stylish exit from the main stage. Let me give you an example. A few years ago, an elderly spinster, a history professor, asked if she could play the part of Deborah Kerr in the final scene in 'From Here to Eternity'. You know, the one where she is having that passionate kiss with Burt Lancaster on the beach? Anyway, the professor wanted it arranged so that she fell asleep in Burt's arms. And it all went very well, only the stand-in actor said she'd bitten his chest in her final spasm."

"Final spasm?"

"Sorry," Jed said, coughing.

I looked at the brochure. In the top corner was a table of prices. "100,000 dollars? To suffocate on a beach?"

Jed frowned. "I said we'd start at the top. Of course we have other options. Our standard is called 'Dinner Delights'. We can arrange for any kind of locale," he added. "As you can imagine, the tropical setting is the most popular. We get the couple to sit for a final photo together – included in the package, of course – then, when they are feeling nice and cosy, the Finalizer sends the loved one to eternity."

"How?"

Jed lowered his voice. "Well, that depends. We have a number of closure methods. A plasma bullet in the back of the head is quick and painless. But neurotoxins are also good. We have a variety of designer brands, synthesized from natural venoms: snake, centipede, stonefish…you name it."

"And what's the cost of these…methods?"

"Well, we have a number of factors to consider. We out-source the Finalizers, and they don't come cheap. If we use neurotoxin, we need to test for contra-indicators. I mean if the loved one has a weak liver, it could get fried before the brain shuts down."

"How about hearts?"

'Hearts?"

"Yes. Martha's just had her fourth transplant. And it looks like her body is rejecting it."

Jed looked puzzled. He leaned back and put his hands behind his head. "I don't understand," he said, finally. "Hearts are the easiest to fix. Why don't you fit her with an Ever-Lasting battery model? They've been on the market for ten years already. Martha would be guaranteed another fifty years of good health. As a matter-of-fact, I've just bought one for my father's birthday. Of course, you would still be able to buy our Sunset Package for Martha. That way, you'll benefit from buying at today's prices. Just like a futures option. It's a total win-win situation."

"We don't have that kind of money."

"But you're a Cybertech graduate. You're wearing the tie. I noticed it as soon as you sat down. It pays to notice these things, you see. I had a friend who went to Cybertech and he told me their graduates make at least 300k at entry-level. Beats the hell out of this job."

It was my turn to smile. "The tie was a gift. From Martha's father. I never went to Cybertech."

"Is he still alive?"

"No."

Jed glanced at his watch. "I see," he said, frowning. "Then I guess you won't be needing that." He held out his hand.

I gave him the brochure.

"I'm sorry, Mr. Smith," he said. "Now, if there's nothing else…"

"Martha's been attacked," I told him. "Twice. I want her to go with… dignity."

Jed exhaled heavily. "Do you have any money at all?" he asked, reaching for a notepad.

"A little."

"Any collateral?"

"There's the house. My car. Not much else."

"What about you?"

"Me?"

"Have you had any major operations?"

"No."

"Any transplanted organs?"

"No."

"Blood diseases? Bone disorders? Lung trouble?"

"No."

"How old are you?"

"75."

"A lot younger than Martha. Based on what you've told me, you could live for another fifty years. How will you survive if you sell the house?"

I shrugged. "I don't know."

As I drove away from the agency, I thought about Martha. I wanted to help her…I wanted…

The car phone rang. I flicked the speaker button to the 'on' position, and listened to the answer phone taking the message.

It was Lenny from the garage. "John, you there? I've talked to someone who thinks he can do a deal. He wants fifty thousand up front, the rest later. He thinks he can get the gang to hold off for the time being, but he says there's someone at the hospital who is in the loop. A guy up there is giving out information to the gang, telling them stuff about patients. So, like I said before, the gangs are getting money from the repair shops and the hospitals. He says the gang know Martha has a rare blood type, am I right?"

I switched the phone off.

I slowed at some red traffic lights. There was a young traffic cop standing next to the lights who looked a bit like Martha had when I first met her…

I remember the day well. I was sitting in the Personal Enhancement Center, waiting for a consultation with my new life coach. A few weeks earlier, I'd signed up for a course of transformational therapy, and I was looking forward to my first session.

"Mr. Smith?"

"Yes."

"This way please."

A receptionist – all hair and teeth – led me towards a cubicle where a life coach was checking data on a screen. The coach stood up as I approached her desk.

"Hi. My name is Martha. I'm going to help you overcome your self-defeating behavior."

Back then, Martha talked like that. She tried to convince me I could handle 'high-stakes situations', that I could win my 'inner resolution game'.

But during our next session, a week later, she told me I was her very first client. "You see, John, I need your transformation to work," she said, smiling. "For both of us."

Somehow, I must have convinced her that I could transform myself, because a few months after that we were talking about marriage.

The real problem, though, was Martha's father. He was a high-level, Tier-3 worker, who only wanted the best for his daughter.

Of course, I told him I was going to get to the top, that I would make Tier-2 before I was thirty. And Martha must have persuaded him I would do okay because we were married in the fall of the same year.

Then, after he died, her inheritance money got us through some bad times. The worst was when my business went under – I guess, in the end, I was never cut out to be a manager.

Martha's symptoms started about six months after that. She was always tired. She had a cough. She couldn't sleep.

We went to see a doctor. He listened to her chest, made some notes on a pad, and gave Martha a prescription for some pills.

"The heart's not right," the doctor told her the next time we went to see him. "We're gonna have to put a new one in. It'll cost 100 grand. Talk to reception. They'll sort out the details."

"Don't worry about me," Martha said, when they took her to the theater for the first operation.

Later, in the recovery room, as I lifted a cup of water to her lips, I tried not to look at the chest drain they'd put in her, or at the bag of blood by the side of the bed.

I'd lost track of how many operations she'd had since that one, of how much it had all cost. Martha had already cashed in her pension plan, but things were still very tight. We both needed to work to pay the bills, but there was no way she could take any more surgery… she was so frail…

The light turned to green, and the cop waved me forward. I drove on until I reached Turn 27, then slowed at the exit.

It took about 20 minutes to reach the house. I parked the car on the ramp, and de-sealed the front door.

The hallway was quiet. I guessed Martha was upstairs resting, so I decided to make some coffee. I went into the kitchen and put the kettle on.

Just then the phone rang.

'Mr. Smith? This is Jed. We were talking about a Sunset Package for your wife? Well, I've come up with a great deal. We can offer you the Tropical Dinner Delights, after all."

He sounded pleased with himself.

"What about the cost?" I asked him. "Are you offering me some kind of discount?"

There was a slight pause, a crackle on the line. "In a way, yes. Here's what we can do. We can fly you to the departure site, we can fix up the hotel, and we can provide the Finalizer. Then, when the job's done, we'll fly you back."

"You still haven't told me about the cost."

"Don't worry about that. The company will sort out the details."

"How?"

"We need your organs, Mr. Smith. All of them. Of course it will be done in the hospital. And you'll be sedated beforehand. You won't feel a thing."

"And afterwards?"

"We'll cremate you with your wife. It will look like you bought the Sunset Package together."

"You mean my organs will cover all the expenses? I've already told you I'm 75. My organs can't be worth that much."

"You're right – we'll need your house, the car, and anything else you have of value."

"So there'll be nothing left? After a lifetime of work?"

"Think of it this way, Mr. Smith. Your organs will help other people, and Martha can stop worrying about that gang."

"… I need to sort out a few details," I told him. "Then I'll call you back."

The kettle was boiling, and I wanted to get off the phone.

After I'd replaced the receiver, I made two coffees and put them on a tray.

Martha was awake when I walked into the bedroom. She looked like she'd been crying again.

"Who were you talking to?" she asked. "I heard you on the phone."

I looked out of the window. Heavy rain was falling from dark, broken clouds.

"I've booked us a vacation," I said. "Somewhere nice and sunny."

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