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Student Perceptions of Critical Thinking Practice

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Abstract

The practices of articulating, defining, and studying critical thinking as an objective of any liberal arts discipline are difficult at best. Experienced teachers may have a good sense of how critical thinking can be encouraged or taught, but may have difficulties in finding valid and reliable ways of assessing critical thinking outcomes. Moreover, few measures exists that track how students perceive and understand critical thinking practice both in and outside the classroom. This study compared student perceptions of critical thinking practice in four types of courses offered at an English immersion liberal arts university in Japan. Students were provided with an on-line survey containing 80 items describing critical thinking practices in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation. Upper-class students (N=62) identified third and fourth year content courses taught in English by a single instructor as the type of course in which critical thinking practice was significantly more prevalent compared to both English and Japanese language courses taught by a single instructor, as well as to $1^{st}/2^{nd}$ year team-taught content courses taught in English. First year students (N=48) identified single instructor English language courses as the type of course for which they perceived critical thinking practice to be most prevalent. These results are discussed in the context of future assessment of critical thinking practice by type of course as well as by individual instructor. *Key words*: critical thinking assessment, liberal arts, English immersion, student perceptions, on-line survey.

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The mission statements of colleges and universities often explicitly underscore the importance of critical thinking. Indeed, disciplines across the spectrum of higher education reinforce the necessity of critical thinking throughout the trajectories of their own array of courses (Goldsmid &Wilson, 1980; McPeck, 1990; Grauerholz & Bouma-Holtrop, 2003). Miyazaki International College (MIC), the English-based liberal arts college in southern Kyushu, Japan, at which we teach, has at the core of its academic program a "philosophy of critical thinking" (MIC, 2011a:4). "This philosophy asserts that academic capability is not acquired through passive reading of text or listening to lectures, but is achieved through explorative activities that require students to be actively engaged in reading, writing and discussion as part of the process of problem solving. Through this kind of "active learning" (initiative based learning) students engage in the dynamic development of higher order thinking skills that enable them to analyze, synthesize, evaluate and create" (Ibid.).

The practices of articulating, defining and studying (Baker, 1981; Geerston, 2003) critical thinking as an objective of any discipline are difficult at best (Grauerholz & Bouma-Holtrop, 2003). In a rather brief but telling explanation, Grauerholz and Bouma-Holtrop (2003) note the peculiarities critical thinking presents for researchers:

> Critical thinking seems to be much like good art: we know it when we see it, we have some sense of how we might encourage or even teach it, but we are not sure how to assess or measure it. (p.485)

Rather than pursuing what definitively constitutes critical thinking or trying to define[1] sharply the boundary between this concept and other similar interpretive ventures (i.e. logic, reason, hermeneutics, etc.) this article focuses on how student

[1]For a review of definitions of critical thinking as understood in the social sciences, across the liberal arts curriculum, and in the natural and medical sciences, see Grauerholz & Bouma-Holtrop (2003); Verbeek (2006).

perceptions of critical thinking practice may be tracked across a four-year liberal arts curriculum.

At MIC student development is assessed throughout the four years both in and outside the classroom. English skills are regularly tested via level exams and TOEIC. However, critical thinking is difficult to assess via objective measures. This situation has created problems in explaining what, beyond English skills and overseas experience, MIC graduates have to offer the job market; critical thinking skills *per se* are often couched as problem-solving or communicative skills. Nonetheless, the attributes MIC students display in internships and interviews have helped the college maintain a high percentage of job placement for its graduates relative to that of other tertiary institutions in Japan (MIC 2011b:38).

One venue for potential assessment of engagement in critical thinking has been the course evaluation survey conducted in each class near the end of each semester (Appendix I). In early 2010 an ad hoc MIC faculty committee was formed to review and possibly revise the course evaluation survey. One of the first actions of the committee was to conduct a detailed comparison of data by type of course generated by the course evaluation instrument over eight semesters (2005-2008) [‘MIC Student Feedback on Teaching. Some Questions and Preliminary Analyses.’ Committee report available upon request]. The committee quickly realized that the critical thinking section of the survey deserved improvement as the sole item referring to critical thinking, “[the instructor] encouraged critical thinking,” showed either poor or no correlation with the other items on the form and was rated inconsistently across the different types of courses [i.e. language; integrated (team-taught); specialized] that were evaluated.

As committee members noted that meanings associated with “critical thinking” had their obvious limitations and may have, in effect, contributed to the variance in the results, critical thinking became one point of departure for further investigation. Most of the students at MIC have spent K-12 in the Japanese school system. The three years of Japanese middle school and high school tend to be conducted in a teacher / text-centered transmission style with little requirement for active learner participation. For example, commenting on a lack of active learned participation within Japanese education, Kawashima and Petrini (2004 cited in Verbeek, 2006) state:

> Learning skills that require students to formulate their own questions in academia or social events are not encouraged, and neither are autonomy and independent learning, all of which have been associated with the cultivation of critical thinking skills and dispositions.

Similarly, Nishibata (2010) noted that “until this situation is remedied education will continue to be limited and stagnant” (p. 229).

In addition to an educational background that may not be conducive to the development of critical thinking skills, the committee also focused on the Japanese translation of the term “critical thinking” as there was some concern that term itself may be problematic. On the current evaluation form, the term “critical thinking” is translated as 「問題意識」 which, broken into its component parts means 「問題」 *mondai* “problem / question” and 「 意識」*ishiki* “consciousness.” The lack of a clear and corresponding translation suggests that students may either misinterpret or experience confusion when answering a single question about critical thinking.

Outcomes assessments of instruction are commonly measured through student evaluation of teaching (SET) instruments. In a general survey of overall methods, a great deal of variation can result from such issues as administering SETs consisting of different class sizes (Bedard & Kuhn, 2008; Balam & Shannon, 2010); among in-class and online instruments (Sorenson & Reiner, 2003; Dommeyer, Baum, Hanna & Chapman, 2004); between qualitative and quantitative data gathering (Nasser-Abu Alhija, & Fresko, 2009); and, of course, throughout different geographical regions that place different values upon the meaning of outcomes (Burden 2008; Davies, Hirschberg, Lye, & Johnston, 2010). When designed properly, the results of these SET instruments may serve to verify instructor performance (Mason, Steagall, & Fabritius, 1995) and increase students' sense of participation in the educational experience.

Conversely, a number of these instruments have, at times, proven problematic to the careers of instructors (Newton, 1988; Sproule 2002; Stark-Wroblewski, Ahlering, & Brill 2007), as well as depicting students' educational experience inaccurately.[2]If, for example, a survey instrument combines several items that bear no logical relation to each other and then somehow summarizes these items by generating an overall average, it would follow that such an average or summarized score would be arbitrary at best. Furthermore, if such aggregated items have this tenuous relationship, there would be no real basis for interpreting what is actually being measured. With this line of reasoning, some scholars have emphasized a multidimensional approach geared toward capturing a larger breadth of items, and thus illustrating a more thorough and detailed evaluation of all educational

[2]Indeed, it has been noted by several scholars that due to the limitations of some instruments, sole dependence upon these evaluations for the retention, promotion and tenure of faculty may be equivalent to fostering a form of pseudoscience, rather than anything resembling the scientific rigor fostered by higher education. See Hills, Naegle & Bartkus (2009) and Sproule (2002).

performances (Marsh, 1982; March and Hocevar, 1991).

The intersection of these SET instruments and our own focus on the measurement of critical thinking is lacking in thorough research across the social sciences, and has thus created several limitations for researchers. Among these limitations are the arguments that the ambiguity of the term critical thinking, as well as the lack of definitive research about it engenders substantial speculation as to whether or not critical thinking can even be taught (McPeck, 1985; 1990). It may follow then, that measuring critical thinking is equally challenging. To complicate these and other matters associated with research on critical thinking, located at the intersection of these limitations are difficulties in interpreting evaluative data as a measure of student outcomes.

In spite of conceptual and practical difficulties such as discussed above, incorporating student data generated through self-reporting methods (Shepelak et al, 1992; Tam, Pak, Hui, Kwan, & Goh, 2010) as well as quantitative and qualitative surveys (Stoecker, Schmidbauer, Mullin, & Young, 1993), has certainly given way to promising departures in research on critical thinking in higher education (cf. Verbeek, 2006). Here we report on our committee's development, administration, and analysis of a multi-scale on-line survey designed to track student perceptions of the teaching of critical thinking skills across the four-year curriculum at MIC.

Method

The ad hoc course evaluation committee comprised of the authors and Gregory Dunne, acted as both a collegial advisory group as well as a research team interested in exploring the possibilities of creating a useful course evaluation instrument. Meeting

bi-weekly for roughly a nine-month period, we were able to review literature on course assessments; discuss the advantages and disadvantages that evaluations present for faculty, students and staff; assess the strengths and weakness of our own current evaluation instrument; devise a novel critical thinking practice evaluation instrument, the Critical Thinking Survey (CTS); run this instrument as a pilot; and finally, analyze the data that this new instrument generated. The CTS research was reviewed and approved by the Testing, Research and Assessment Committee (TRAC) at MIC.

Critical Thinking Survey (CTS)

In order to provide students with an understandable and accessible format for comprehending the concept of critical thinking, the committee identified specific examples of critical thinking in subject areas within the two main learning divisions of the humanities and the social sciences at MIC. After consulting with various faculty members from both of these divisions about how critical thinking is assessed and recognized in their respective disciplines, the committee then generated a list of items that captured the larger breadth of their suggestions.

Survey scales and subscales. The decision was made to incorporate the skills and sub skills of Facione [1990 adapted by Verbeek (2006)] into the item descriptors of critical thinking. An initial list of 110 items was created but was reduced to 80 items (Appendix II) in the interests of keeping the survey to a manageable length. The expertise and cooperation of bilingual faculty and staff was sought to translate these items into Japanese to ensure that students had the option to read items in both languages.

Table 1. Scales and sub-scales of the Critical Thinking Survey (CTS).

Main scale	Sub-scales	Number of items
Interpretation	Decoding significance	5
	Categorization	5
	Clarifying meaning	5
Analysis	Examining ideas	5
	Identifying arguments	5
	Analyzing arguments	5
Evaluation	Assessing claims	5
	Assessing arguments	5
Inference	Querying evidence	5
	Conjecturing alternatives	5
	Drawing conclusions	5
Explanation	Stating results	5
	Presenting arguments	5
Self-regulation	Self-examination	10
	Self-correction	5
Total		80

Table 1 presents the grouping of the final 80 survey items by 6 main scales and their corresponding sub-scales (N=15) that reflect the Facione (1990) critical thinking skills and sub-skills. The 80 items were listed on the survey in random order. Student participants were asked to check a box next to each of the following course type labels: Japanese language courses, English language course, Other language courses[3], Team-taught courses, and 3rd/4th year courses, for the aspect of critical thinking represented by the respective item that in their opinion was practiced in that particular type of course. For each item students were asked to check all boxes that applied. Through this method the students were asked for their memory-based perceptions of critical thinking practice by type of course. The data generated in this fashion thus provide insight into how students perceived similarities and differences in the

[3]Not included in the present analysis.

classroom practice of critical thinking across the MIC curriculum. These data do not, however, provide insight into how students evaluated individual courses or instructors on critical thinking practice.

On-line administration. In order to improve the survey-taking process, the committee decided to trial putting the new survey on line. The regular paper version of the MIC course evaluation is given in-class at the end of each semester and this practice takes up valuable classroom time and needs to be supervised by faculty not being evaluated. An on-line survey would allow for a more sensible use of student and faculty time. The other important benefit of an on-line mode would be ease of data collection, manipulation, transmission to stakeholders and the creation of a databank of responses. With technical expertise and cooperation from the system administrator, an on-line version of the CTS was developed and administered to a sample of 48 first year students and 62 third and fourth year students during the beginning of the 2011 fall semester.

Student sampling. All students present on campus during the planned time of administration (i.e. excluding 2nd year students on student abroad) were formally asked to voluntarily participate in the CTS. However, initially only a small percentage of them actually did so. Faced with this situation, the authors encouraged the students in their own courses to take the survey and in some cases escorted them to a computer lab to take the survey. Teachers of other courses, in particular those teaching Japanese language courses, did the same. These joint faculty efforts resulted in a total convenience sample of 110 students on which the analyses that follow are based.

Students took approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete the CTS and their responses were stored by student ID. Prior to the analyses the student IDs were

replaced by randomly assigned serial numbers thus ensuring the confidential nature of their participation.

Results

1. Statistical Analysis

Student responses were downloaded from the server and entered in a single data file. For each checked box in a student record a value of 1 was recorded and for each blank box a value of 0 (zero) and these selection data were used for all analyses reported below. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and t-tests were used to test for differences among type of course and critical thinking scales and sub-scales. We used two-tailed tests throughout. Controls for unequal sample size and variances were used when necessary. We first analyzed the responses of the first year students followed by those of the third and fourth year students. Finally, we compared the responses of the first year students to those of the third and fourth year students for the type of courses that both cohorts experienced so far, i.e. Japanese language courses, English courses and Team-taught courses.



Figure 1. Main categories of critical thinking skills items selected by first year students for Japanese-, English-, and Team-taught courses. Mean (range: 0-1) $\pm$ SEM are shown.

First Year Students (N=48)

Analysis by main critical thinking skills category. Two-way ANOVA with critical thinking skill (*interpretation*, *analysis*, *evaluation*, *inference*, *explanation*, *self-regulation*) and type of course (Japanese courses, English courses, Team-taught courses) as main factors was used for the initial analysis. There was a significant main effect for type of course, $F_{2,846} = 21.14$. $p < 0.0001$, but not for critical thinking skill, $F_{5,846} = 0.75$, $p = 0.59$, nor for the interaction, $F_{10,846} = 0.60$, $p = 0.82$.

Post-hoc Bonferroni tests showed that *interpretation* items were selected more often for the English courses compared to both the Japanese courses ($p < 0.05$) and Team-Taught Courses ($p < 0.01$) [Fig. 1; Table 3]. In addition, *evaluation* items were selected more often for the English courses compared to the Team-taught courses ($p < 0.05$), and the same pattern was found for *explanation* ($p < 0.05$) and *self-regulation* ($p < 0.05$) [Fig. 1; Table 3]. No significant differences were found between Japanese Courses and Team Taught Courses. Taken together these initial results suggest that the first year students differentiated between the three types of courses and preferentially linked the teaching of *interpretation*, *evaluation*, *explanation*, and *self-regulation* skills to the English courses.

Analysis by critical thinking sub skills. Separate two-way ANOVAS were conducted to explore which critical thinking sub skills contributed significantly to the course differences in *interpretation*, *evaluation*, *explanation*, and *self-regulation*. Each follow-up two-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect for type of course ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.001$, $p < 0.001$, respectively), but not for critical thinking sub skill nor for the interaction.

Table 2. Post hoc comparison of critical thinking sub skill items selections by 1st year students by type of course. Mean (range 0-1) ± SEM are shown.

	Type of Course		
Main skill/sub skill	Japanese	English	Team-taught
Interpretation			
Decoding significance	0.31 (0.05)	0.55 (0.06)	0.31(0.05)
	$p < 0.01$		$p < 0.01$
Categorization	0.44 (0.06)	0.50 (0.06)	0.35(0.06)
Clarifying meaning	0.35 (0.05)	0.65 (0.04)	0.38(0.06)
	$p < 0.001$		$p < 0.01$
Evaluation			
Assessing claims	0.36 (0.05)	0.42 (0.06)	0.23(0.05)
			$p < 0.05$
Assessing arguments	0.47 (0.05)	0.45 (0.06)	0.35 (0.06)
Explanation			
Stating results[1]	0.50 (0.05)	0.50 (0.06)	0.28 (0.05)
			$p < 0.01$
Presenting arguments	0.48 (0.05)	0.52 (0.05)	0.32 (0.05)
			$p < 0.05$
Self-regulation			
Self-examination	0.36 (0.05)	0.55 (0.05)	0.30 (0.05)
			$p < 0.01$
Self-correction	0.36 (0.05)	0.48 (0.06)	0.30 (0.05)
			$p < 0.05$

[1]Japanese courses > Team-taught courses, $p < 0.01$.

The results of Bonferroni posttests are summarized in Table 2. As shown, there were no significant differences among the courses neither for the *interpretation* sub skill *categorization* nor for the *evaluation* sub skill *assessing arguments*.

The course differences on sub skills revealed by the posttests mirrored those found for the main skills; noticeably, compared to Team-taught courses, students preferentially associated the teaching of all but two of the selected critical thinking sub skills with the English courses. Items belonging to the *interpretation* sub skill categories *decoding significance* and *clarifying meaning* were also selected significantly more often for the English courses compared to for the Japanese courses. There were no significant differences between Japanese courses and Team-taught courses with the sole exception of the *explanation* sub skill category *stating results* for which students favored the Japanese courses.



Figure 2. Main categories of critical thinking skills items selected by third and fourth year students for Japanese-, English-, Team-taught-, and $3^{rd}/4^{th}$ year courses. Mean (range:0-1) $\pm$ SEM are shown.

Third and Fourth Year Students (N=62)

Two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for type of course (Japanese-, English-, Team-taught-, and 3rd/4th year courses), $F_{3,1464} = 95.99$, $p < 0.0001$, but neither for main critical thinking category, $F_{5,1464} = 1.32$, $p = 0.25$, nor for the interaction, $F_{15,1464} = 0.55$, $p = 0.92$.

Bonferroni posttests indicated that for each of the six main critical thinking skill categories the third and fourth year students selected 3rd/4th courses significantly more often compared to English courses ($p < 0.001$), Japanese Courses ($p < 0.001$), as well as the Team-taught courses ($p < 0.001$) [Fig. 2]. No significant differences were found among the Japanese courses, English courses and Team-taught courses for any of the main critical thinking categories.

Comparison of the Critical Thinking Selections of First Year Students (N=48) and Third and Fourth Year students (N=62).

The critical thinking selections of the second semester first year students and the third and fourth year students were compared for the type of courses that both cohorts experienced: Japanese language courses, English courses and Team-taught courses. Unpaired t-tests with Welch's correction to control for unequal sample size and unequal variance were used for this comparison. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3. The comparison showed that the selections of the first year students (shown in bold face) significantly exceeded those of the third and fourth year students for both the Japanese language courses and the English courses, but not for the Team-taught courses.

Table 3. Comparison of critical thinking skill item selections by 1st year students (N=48) and 3rd/4th year students (N=62) for Japanese-, English-, and team-taught courses. Mean (range: 0-1) ± SEM are shown.

Critical thinking skill		1st year students	3rd/4th year students		*p*
Japanese courses					
Interpretation	**0.37**	0.05	0.21	0.03	0.009
Analysis	**0.38**	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.009
Evaluation	**0.42**	0.05	0.25	0.04	0.009
Inference	**0.38**	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.005
Explanation	**0.49**	0.05	0.28	0.04	0.001
Self-regulation	**0.37**	0.05	0.21	0.03	0.009
English courses					
Interpretation	**0.57**	0.03	0.33	0.03	0.0001
Analysis	**0.47**	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.0003
Evaluation	**0.43**	0.06	0.20	0.03	0.0006
Inference	**0.46**	0.05	0.20	0.03	0.0001
Explanation	**0.51**	0.05	0.27	0.04	0.0003
Self-regulation	**0.52**	0.05	0.26	0.03	0.0001
Team-taught courses					
Interpretation	0.33	0.05	0.23	0.03	n.s.
Analysis	0.31	0.05	0.22	0.03	n.s.
Evaluation	0.31	0.05	0.20	0.03	n.s.
Inference	0.26	0.05	0.20	0.03	n.s.
Explanation	0.30	0.05	0.23	0.04	n.s.
Self-regulation	0.30	0.05	0.21	0.03	n.s.

Discussion

Our study showed that when given the appropriate tools students clearly differentiate between courses in terms of their perception and recollection of the degree and kind of critical thinking practice that different types of courses tend to offer. Third and fourth year students identified single-taught third and fourth year courses as the type of courses in which critical thinking practice was offered to a significantly greater degree than in any of the other types of courses in the MIC liberal arts curriculum. In fact, this was true for each of the six main critical thinking skills (*interpretation*; *analysis*; *evaluation*; *inference*; *explanation*; *self-regulation*) measured by the 80 item Critical Thinking Survey (CTS) that we designed for this study.

First year students identified English courses as the type of course in which several aspects of critical thinking practice were significantly more often part of the classroom proceedings compared to team-taught courses and Japanese courses. For example, the responses of the first year students suggest that critical thinking practice in *interpretation,* and, specifically, in *decoding significance* and *clarifying meaning*, occurred significantly more often in the English courses compared to both Japanese language courses and team-taught courses. Practice in *evaluation* (*assessing claims*), and *explanation* (*stating results* and *presenting arguments*), was rated by the first year students as being significantly more prevalent in English courses than in team-taught courses. Moreover, the responses of the first year students suggest that compared to team-taught courses English courses were significantly more likely to inspire students to engage in critical *self-examination* and *self-correction* in the course of their studies.

Finally, when we compared the responses of the first year students with those of the third and fourth year students for the courses that both cohorts experienced, we

found that first year students consistently rated the incidence of critical thinking practice in both Japanese language and English courses significantly higher than the third and fourth year students did. There was no difference between the two cohorts in their perception and recollection of critical thinking practice in team-taught courses, which they both identified as being infrequent.

What do these results tell us? Can we assume that the student perceptions of differences in critical thinking practice among the types of courses more or less accurately reflect what goes on in terms of critical thinking practice in MIC classrooms? When we reflect on these questions we need to consider both the strengths and the weaknesses of our study. Starting with the latter, the convenience sample that we were able to work with (N=110), although sizeable in terms of the current total student enrollment (N=260), was limited in terms of its make-up, as it did not include second year students who were on study abroad at the time of the study. Moreover, the sample was a convenience sample, which does not rule out biased responding due to a particular motivation (or lack thereof) to participate in the CTS. Future studies should either use equal random samples taken from first- through fourth year student cohorts, or preferably, plan on surveying the entire student body.

Another limitation of our study is that the CTS administration procedure required student participants to recall their perceptions of critical thinking practice from memory. While recall from memory is a common procedure for most kinds of student evaluations of teaching, in this particular case the time frame differed between the two cohorts. We asked third and fourth year students to reflect on team-taught courses, which is a type of course they had taken two or three years ago. In contrast, first-year students were either enrolled in a team-taught course at the time they took

the CTS, or had been enrolled in this type of course during the previous semester. Interestingly, the perceptions of critical thinking practice in team-taught courses did not differ significantly between the two cohorts.

The main accomplishment of our study is that for the first time in the history of the institution it provides a detailed look at student perceptions of critical thinking practice in the different types of courses offered at MIC. As such it constitutes a major departure from the limited way critical thinking practice has traditionally been evaluated by MIC students, namely through a single item at the end-of-the-semester course evaluation form ["(The instructor) encouraged critical thinking"]. We hope, as we suggest in more detail below, that the CTS in its current -or in a modified form will became a standard assessment tool at MIC.

One of the strengths of our study is that we polled students on multiple aspects of critical thinking practice without ever mentioning the term critical thinking. Instead we asked students to select from a set of descriptions of critical thinking classroom practices that we developed based on previous research and the ideas and suggestions of faculty colleagues who teach the type of courses listed on the CTS. In this sense we believe that the CTS is a valid measurement tool of student perceptions of critical thinking classroom practice at MIC.

Another strength of our study is that the CTS is designed to generate data that allow for detailed comparisons among the various types of courses taught at MIC. Traditional course evaluations have been designed to provide data on individual courses and instructors, and such individualized data do not lend themselves well to valid comparisons among course types.

In conclusion, we clearly see a future for the CTS as the instrument of choice

to track trends in critical thinking practice at MIC. Keeping a finger on the pulse of critical thinking practice is important for faculty and administration alike as fostering critical thinking is central to the mission of the institution. We would like to suggest administering the CTS each semester, perhaps at the time of course registration. CTS data could be stored by individual student, and multiple assessments during the 4-year curriculum would allow for longitudinal developmental trend tracking, both individualized by student, as well as aggregated by cohort or gender, or other salient student characteristics (e.g. TOEIC scores, etc.).

As for the future assessment of critical thinking practice by individual course and instructor we suggest to revise the current student evaluation form by incorporating a selection of the most salient items from the CTS. To that end our committee will conduct a detailed item analysis using the current dataset and make recommendations to the Faculty Council based on the outcome of this analysis.

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APPENDIX I

In this course we learned new concepts to help our thinking.
ものごとを考える上で役に立つ新しいものの見方を学んだ

In this course we learned to tell the difference between reasonable and unreasonable arguments.
筋の通った議論とそうでない議論とはどう違うのかを理解した

In this course we were challenged to solve problems.
課題解決に努力した

In this class we looked at arguments from various perspectives.
さまざまな観点からある議論を検討した

In this course we learned to focus on the key points when we present an argument.
議論のキーポイントに注目することを学んだ

In this course we learned to explain how we arrived at a specific conclusion.
ある結論に達した筋道を説明することを学んだ

In this course we learned to clearly organize our thoughts.
考えを明確に整理することを学んだ

In this course we checked whether evidence is plausible.
論拠の合理性を検討した

In this course we learned to decide whether or not an argument is valid.
議論の妥当性を検討した

In this course we learned to present the good and bad points of an idea.
ある考えの短所と長所を述べることを学んだ

In this course we looked for the logic in arguments.
考えを順序だてて進める方法を学んだ

In this course we learned why some ideas are important and others are not.
何が思想の価値を決定するのかを学んだ

In this course we made connections between our learning and the world.
学習したことと現実の世界とを関連を考察した

In this course we applied our knowledge to new situations.
新しい状況に当てはめて獲得した知識を活用した

In this course we were taught to ask questions that help us understand.
理解するためには質問が大切であると教えられた

In this course we were encouraged to question ideas.
つねに問い直すようにと教えられた

In this course we examined our own ideas and feelings.
自分の考えと感情を吟味した

Because of this course I am motivated to stay well informed.
このクラスのおかげで今以上に知識を身に付けてゆきたいと希望するようになった

In this course we learned to draw conclusions that are consistent with one another.
一貫性のある判断を下すことを学んだ

In this course we learned to look for connections between issues.
問題間にある関連性を探求した

In this course we learned to recognize good evidence.
論拠の正否を識別しようとした

In this course we read texts and interpreted meaning.
テキスト読解の方法を学んだ

In this course we learned to develop an informed opinion about things.
知識に基く意見を積み上げてゆく方法を学んだ

In this course we learned the difference between a wild guess and an educated guess.
裏付けのない推測と経験に基づく推測の違いを学んだ

In this course we looked for all possible explanations for an event.
方法を尽くして事象を説明しようとした

In this course we learned why some popular beliefs are false.
どうして通説が時に誤謬であるのかを学んだ

In this course we learned to ask the right questions to help us learn.
理解するために正しく質問する仕方を学んだ

In this course we learned to recognize and correct our own biases and prejudices.
自分の偏見や先入観を認め、訂正することを学んだ

In this course we learned to challenge our own ideas.
自分の考えをあえて疑ってみることを学んだ

In this course we learned to identify biased opinions.
偏りのある意見をそれと認識する方法を学んだ

In this course we learned about the relationships between issues.
問題間にある関連について考察した

Because of this course I am more willing to reconsider and change my views.
このクラスのおかげで、自分の考えを再考、または変更することに対する抵抗が減少した
In this course we were challenged to change our opinions based on new evidence.
新たな根拠が認められた時には自説を改めることを求められた
In this course we learned about different ways of testing a premise.
議論の根拠を多方面から検討した
In this course we learned the difference between a personal opinion and an informed opinion.
個人的な見解と知識に基いた見解との違いを理解した
In this course we learned to clearly express our thoughts.
考えを明確に述べることを学んだ
In this course we learned not to blindly accept some conclusions or statements.
既存の結論や主張を盲目的に受け入れることのないように教えられた
In this course we looked for explanations that are relevant and can be tested.
適切で検証に堪える説明を追求した
In this course we learned to support our opinions with reasons.
自らの意見に筋を通すことを学んだ
In this course we learned to summarize and paraphrase reading passages.
テキストを要約し、また言い換える方法を学んだ
In this course we studied the cause and effect of things.
事象の因果関係を考察した
In this course we learned why some things belong together and others do not.
事柄を関係付けるものは何かを考察した
In this course we investigated why people can have different ideas about an issue.
同じ問題であっても、人によって見方が異なるのはどうしてかを考察した
In this course we learned the importance of being fair in our criticism.
公平な批判の大切さを学んだ
In this course we looked for the reasons why people hold certain opinions.
人がある考え方をするのはどうしてかを考えた
In this course we learned how to prepare a convincing presentation step-by-step.
説得力のあるプレゼンテーションをする段取りを順を追って学んだ
In this course we learned to keep an open mind for new ideas.
新しい考えを受け入れる心構えをもつように教えられた
In this course we learned to organize information systematically.
情報を整理する方法を学んだ
In this course we learned not to draw hasty conclusions.

性急に結論を出すことのないよう教えられた

In this course we compared and contrasted ideas.

思想を比較・対照して検討した

In this course we learned to present results based on evidence.

証拠に基づいて考えた結論を説明した

In this course we tested the advantages and disadvantages of competing ideas.

相反する考えそれぞれの長所短所を吟味した

In this course we learned to make a strong case based on clear premises and conclusions.

明確な根拠と、結果に基づいて強力な主張をする方法を学んだ

In this course we tested hypotheses.

仮説を検討した

In this course we learned to draw conclusions about characters in stories from their actions and dialogue.

その行動や話から物語の登場人物を判断する方法を学んだ

In this course we learned to question premises as reasons for accepting a conclusion.

結論を受け容れるために出される前提を問い直すことを学んだ

In this course we learned to look for premises likely to lead to the conclusion.

結論につながる前提を考えた

In this course we learned to focus on the most important parts of a problem.

課題の最重要点に注目することを学んだ

In this course we looked for similarities and differences between issues.

問題相互の類似と相違を考察した

In this course we learned the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning.

演繹と帰納との違いについて学んだ

In this course we monitored our own progress and sought help when we fell behind.

自分の学習の進み具合をチェックし、遅れていれば助力を求めた

In this course we learned to develop new ways of solving an old problem.

古くからある問題に対処する新しい解決策を考案した

In this course we learned how to draw logical conclusions from evidence.

論拠から論理的に結論を導く方法を学んだ

In this course we learned to identify the main issues of a problem.

問題の中心課題が何であるかを理解する方法を学んだ

In this course we learned to recognize weaknesses in our arguments.

自分の議論の弱点を認識する方法を学んだ

In this course we tested the evidence for popular beliefs.

通説の根拠を吟味した

In this course we analyzed language in order to learn.
言語を分析して学習する方法を学んだ
In this course we had the opportunity to write a defensible thesis and develop an argument.
十分議論できるテーマを提出し、議論を発展させる時間があった
In this course we learned to understand the reasons behind opinions.
どうして人がそのような考え方をするのか、それを知る方法を学んだ
In this course we learned to form explanations.
説明の仕方を学んだ
In this course we learned to explain the reasons for my opinions.
意見の裏付けを説明しようとした
In this course we learned to check whether evidence is credible.
論拠の信憑性を確認した
In this course we studied the pros and cons of an argument.
賛成・反対の両方の意見を検討した
In this course we learned to evaluate the merits of the literature we read.
どうすれば文献の真の価値が見極められるかを学んだ
In this course we learned to look for the evidence behind an argument.
議論の背後にあるべき論拠を追求した
In this course we learned to tell the difference between fact and opinion.
事実と意見との相違を分別した
In this course we checked evidence for a reliable source.
論拠の出典の信憑性を確認した
Because of this course I am more likely to persist until I find the correct answer to a problem.
このクラスのおかげで、以前より問題解決のための粘り強い努力が出来るようになった
In this course we learned to be logical when we present our arguments.
議論を論理的に展開することを学んだ
In this course we learned to look for other valid ways of obtaining evidence.
論拠に到達する適切な方法を模索し、それを獲得した

Testing Homogeneity Hypothesis of East Asians: Self-Description Ambivalence of American and Japanese

Futoshi Kobayashi

Abstract

Cultural psychologists claimed that self-construals of East Asians are qualitatively different from those of Westerners. The two previous studies with Chinese and American samples found that East Asians possess more ambivalent self-construals than Westerners. However, Chinese are not the only East Asians. By using Japanese and American samples, the present study refined and replicated these two previous studies. Both Japanese (460 high school students, 39 college students, & 90 adults) and American (58 college students, 91.4% Caucasian) participants wrote down 7 self-descriptions in an “I am …” format. The results indicated that Japanese wrote ambivalent self-descriptions more frequently than Americans as same as the previous studies found.

Key words

cross-cultural studies, Japan, self

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Testing Homogeneity Hypothesis of East Asians:

Self-Description Ambivalence of American and Japanese

Several cultural psychologists claimed that self-construals of East Asians are qualitatively different from those of Westerners because East Asians assume personality is created by the dynamic equilibrium of two opposing characteristics, not by dispositions of specific traits (e.g., Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2004). For East Asians, having two opposing characteristics (e.g., toughness and warm-heartedness) is essential for the integrity of a person (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). In order to test this claim, Spencer-Rogers, Peng, Wang, and Hou (2004) conducted self-description research. They computed the mean proportion of positive, negative, and neutral self-descriptions among each participants' total number of responses and compared the results of Chinese and Caucasian college students. Their conclusion was that the "Chinese exhibited

(non-significantly) greater ambivalence in their open-ended self-descriptions than did European Americans" (Spencer-Rogers et al., 2004, p. 1421). There were at least three issues regarding this research. First, the comparison of the mean proportion of positive and negative self-statements did not always indicate "the coexistence of evaluative opposites" (Spencer-Rogers et al., 2004, p. 1418). For example, "I am friendly" can be coded into a positive self-statement and "I am pessimistic" can be coded into a negative self-statement, but they do not signify ambivalence. In order to be ambivalent, a friendly person should also possess unfriendly characteristics sometimes, and a pessimistic person should also sometimes indicate an optimistic character. Second, the cultural differences they found were not statistically significant. Third, asking participants to write twenty self-descriptions might be an inappropriate research method with East Asians. Bochner (1994) concluded that the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), the test originally created to investigate the self-construal of the Westerners, should reduce the number of self-description from 20 to 7 when it was applied to Easterners, based on his extensive pilot tests and his own cross-cultural research (e.g., Bochner, 1976; Bochner & Perks, 1971). He argued that the Westerners had no problems in writing twenty self-statements, but the Easterners had difficulty in writing that many self-descriptions due to their collectivistic culture. In a collectivistic culture, people are supposed to keep harmonious relationships with their surrounding people so that they need to seek and store rich information of the others more than those who live in an individualistic culture. The richer information of the others they have (e.g., likes & dislikes, social status, family background), the higher probability they can relate to the others in an appropriate manner. On the other hand, those who live in an individualistic culture

keep richer, detailed, and complex information about themselves than they know about those who surround them (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Recently, Spencer-Rogers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, and Peng (2009) asked 3 bilingual research assistants to find various types of ambivalent self-description statements and reported that Chinese wrote ambivalent self-descriptions more frequently than their American counterparts in the Twenty Statements Test. However, Chinese are not the only East Asians. Further research that would use non-Chinese East Asian participants was needed to verify the claims of the cultural psychologists.

In order to address these issues, (1) the present study asked only 7 self-descriptions of the participants instead of 20, and (2) the bilingual coders were specifically instructed to find the self-description sentence containing two opposing cognitions (e.g., “I am afraid of death, but also longing for death.”) or two opposing self-description sentences in the same participant (e.g., “I am talkative”, in the first self-description, and “I am not good at chatting with others”, in the fifth self-description) instead of coding self-descriptions into positive, negative, or neutral, and (3) the present study used Japanese participants instead of Chinese. The author hypothesized Japanese participants would write ambivalent self-descriptions more frequently than Americans, as the previous research found in the Chinese and American comparison.

Method

The Japanese participants were 460 high school students (237 men, 223 women; *M* age = 16.6, *SD* age =.95), 39 college students (10 men, 29 women; *M* age = 20.8, *SD* age = .71), and 90 adults (58 men, 31 women, 1 unknown gender; *M* age =

39.0, *SD* age = 10.6) and the American participants were 58 college students (22 men, 36 women; *M* age = 23.8, *SD* age = 7.5). Ethnicity of Japanese participants was all Japanese, whereas 91.4% of American participants were Caucasians. In the present study, Japanese and American participants wrote down 7 self-descriptions in "I am …" format and two bilingual research assistants, who were unaware of the hypothesis of this study, coded them into ambivalent or not in following the specific instructions as above.

Results and Discussion

The self-description sentences of 18.8% of Japanese participants and 5.2% of American participants were judged as ambivalent, and the inter-rater reliability was .76. The independent t-test on the total numbers of ambivalent statements revealed that Japanese (M = .53, SD = 1.3) wrote ambivalent self-descriptions more frequently than Americans (M = .16, SD = .74), $t(96.6) = 3.35$, p = .001, r = .32.

The results suggested that Japanese self-construals were significantly different from those of Americans in the existence of opposing characteristics in the same person, as several cultural psychologists had argued. The present study was seemed to compliment earlier ambivalent self-description studies of Chinese participants (Spencer-Rogers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rogers et al., 2004). In the research of cultural psychology, many arguments had been done under the assumption of homogeneity of East Asians. The future research should use more diverse groups of East Asians in order to confirm the claims of cultural psychologists regarding East Asians.

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Gender Differences in Nonverbal, Interpersonal Sensitivity Across Three Cultures: Japan, India, and the United States

Prerna Sud

Abstract

The study examined how, and to what extent, gender and cultural differences affect subjects' interpersonal, nonverbal sensitivity. The researcher assessed male and female subjects, from Japan, India and the United States, on measured (The Interpersonal Perception Task-15; IPT-15) interpersonal sensitivity. Factorial analyses of the IPT-15 displayed a highly significant main effect of gender with women outscoring men across cultures. Overall, while American participants on average, scored highest on the IPT-15 followed by Indian participants, with the Japanese participants scoring lowest; the factorial analysis did not yield significant effect of culture on the IPT-15 scores. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Gender Differences in Nonverbal, Interpersonal Sensitivity Across Three Cultures: Japan, India, and the United States

The broad definition of nonverbal communication is "the communication effected by means other than words" (Knapp & Hall, 1997, p.5). Although nonverbal communication mostly refers to the display and judgment of emotions, it also involves the display and judgment of interpersonal orientation (dominance/subordination); attitudes ("She likes me"); and intentions or needs ("He wants attention") (Knapp & Hall, 2002). According to Judith Hall (1998), *nonverbal*

sensitivity pertains to people's ability to figure out the meanings of nondeceptive, nondiscrepant, nonverbal cues expressed in the face, body and vocal channels. This accurate understanding of nonverbal cues from emotional expressions and body language also seems to be a reliable predictor of better social adjustment, mental health, and workplace performance (Elfenbein, 2006; Riggio, 1986; Rosenthal et.al., 1979).

One way to look at nonverbal communication is to view it as a skill or ability. According to Riggio (2006), this "skill approach" focuses on one's capability in receiving (decoding), sending (encoding), and regulation (management) of nonverbal communication. Of these three aspects, nonverbal decoding skills lead to *interpersonal sensitivity* defined by Bernieri (2001) as "the ability to sense, perceive accurately and respond appropriately to one's personal, interpersonal and social environment" (pg. 3). As per Bernieri (2001), interpersonally sensitive people start with sensation and perception and then make perceptual, cognitive and motivational distinctions that enable them to respond appropriately to the environment and so they not only know the effective response but also the appropriate degree of the response. Given that both these skills focus on nonverbal decoding skills (the receptive aspect), the terms "nonverbal sensitivity" and "interpersonal sensitivity" shall be used interchangeably and/or in conjunction with each other through the course of this investigation.

The degree of sensitivity to nonverbal cues varies--some people seem more alert to nonverbal signals and more in tune with what these cues mean. Such individual differences are often conceptualized in terms of between-subject factors and within-subject traits and it follows that some aspects, more than others, will

indicate nonverbal sensitivity. The current study focuses on two between-subject factors: gender and culture.

In presenting ourselves to the outside world, a major component of our identity is our gender—male or female, and there are clear gender differences in nonverbal communication. The prevailing view in nonverbal behavior research (e.g. Hall, 1978, 1979) is that these gender differences are significant and that women show superiority in both aspects of nonverbal communication—emotion recognition (decoding) and emotion portrayal (encoding). Several studies have examined gender differences in people's ability to accurately decode nonverbal cues.

Hall's (1978) meta-analytic study was based on 75 studies (ranging from 1923 to 1978) of individuals (children through adults) who were asked to decode nonverbal cues presented by others via photographs, audiotape and or videotape (Hall, 2006). Overall 84 percent of the studies showed women to be significantly better decoders than men however, the effect size--while favoring women--was moderate, indicating that even as these studies consistently and reliably showed women to be better decoders, the differences were not huge, leading to the conclusion that, along with gender, nonverbal decoding ability is related to other personal and interpersonal factors (Hall, 1979). Other important conclusions reached from this pioneering research were that firstly, the gender of the stimulus person (target) does not make a difference in decoding accuracy. Secondly, this female advantage is more or less consistent over cultures and age groups (from third grade up into adulthood) of perceivers (Hall, 1979) and lastly, this greater decoding accuracy for females tends to be more pronounced for visible than vocal cues (Hall, 2006).

Since then, recent studies have continued to bear out women's superior ability

to interpret the meanings of nonverbal cues in different domains and settings. In terms of self-report measures of decoding ability, these gender differences favoring women were also confirmed in a study by Riggio (1986) wherein female participants scored higher than men on the Emotional Scale (ES scale) of the Social Skills Inventory (SSI; Riggio, 1986). The stereotype is that women are more expressive, warm, fluent and skilled in nonverbal communication than men (Hall, 2006) and this view also seems to coincide with how men and women describe themselves (Fischer and Manstead, 2000). In a meta-analysis, Hall (1984), tried to separate the actual versus stereotypical nonverbal gender differences and found that the stereotypes are largely accurate.

However, since research also suggests that men have an advantage in decoding anger cues and that women's decoding superiority is lower for spontaneous nonverbal cues (Fujita, Harper & Wiens, 1980), there might be other factors, such as culture, that moderate the relationship between gender and nonverbal sensitivity.

According to Matsumoto (2006), culture is "a shared system of socially transmitted behavior that describes, define and guides people's ways of life, communicated from one generation to the next" (pg. 220). In allowing for cultural influences on nonverbal sensitivity, it is important to recognize the universal bases of nonverbal behaviors, and to understand that culture's influence happens above and beyond this universality (Matsumoto, 2006). Several cultural differences have been found in decoding accuracy as assessed by performance tests like the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; Rosenthal et al., 1979) and the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT; Archer & Costanzo, 1988).

In a series of studies, the PONS was administered to over two thousand people

from 20 nations (Rosenthal et al., 1979). Americans were most accurate in judging nonverbal cues which suggests that people are most accurate in judging targets from their own cultures (Ambady, LaPlante & Johnson, 2001). In this series of studies, groups similar to American culture (in terms of modernization and widespread use of communications media) and whose experiences were comparable to college-educated American citizens scored higher than groups from less similar cultures (Knapp & Hall, 2002). Finally Rosenthal et al. (1979) also found that cultures whose language was English or most closely resembled English performed better than cultures who spoke a different language.

Another study (Iizuka, Patterson & Matchen, 2002), compared the accuracy and confidence of Japanese and American participants on the Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15; Archer & Costanzo, 1993). In the Visual-Only condition of the IPT-15 (where the sound was removed), both sets of subjects had nearly identical scores but American scores increased and Japanese scores decreased in the audiovisual condition of the study (Iizuka et. al., 2002). Japanese subjects with moderate proficiency in spoken English were more accurate than those with low English proficiency. On the confidence measure, Americans were more confident of their performance than the Japanese. While the score differences between the two cultural groups are explicable by the American participants' ease with the English language and the comparative language limitations of their Japanese counterparts, Iizuka et al. (2002), attribute the nearly identical scores on the Visual-Only condition to two facts, firstly, the behavior patterns seen on the IPT-15 transcend broad cultural differences between the two countries and secondly, most Japanese people have exposure to American social behavior through television and are familiar with

naturalistic interactions between Americans.

Finally, nonverbal sensitivity is also affected by cultural norms, values and practices (Hecht & Ambady, 1999). According to Hecht and Ambady (1999), individuals from a more hierarchically structured culture consider other factors such as status of the targets (whether the target is a superior, peer or subordinate) while decoding nonverbal cues.

The present study is an attempt to examine gender differences in interpersonal, nonverbal sensitivity by comparing the results across three cultures—Japanese, Indian and American.

It is hypothesized that firstly, women overall, will obtain significantly higher scores on the IPT-15 than men overall. Accordingly, American women will obtain significantly higher IPT-15 scores than American men. Indian women will obtain significantly higher IPT-15 scores than Indian men and Japanese women will obtain significantly higher IPT-15 than Japanese men. Secondly, American participants overall, will perform significantly better than Indian and Japanese participants on the IPT-15, and so accordingly, American females will obtain significantly higher IPT-15 than Indian and Japanese females, and American males will obtain significantly higher average IPT-15 scores than Indian and Japanese males.

Methods

Participants: The Indian group comprised of 103 (50 male, 53 female) post-graduate students from Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla, with an age range of 21 to 35 years and a median age of 24. The American group consisted of 101 (43 male, 58 female) undergraduate and graduate students at California State University, Fullerton,

ranging from 20 to 35 years with a median age of 23 for female subjects and 24 for male subjects. The Japanese group comprised of 63 participants (25 male, 38 female) undergraduate students at Miyazaki International College, Japan, ranging in age from 20 to 27 with a median age of 21. The medium of instruction at all three institutions is English.

Measures:

The Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15; Archer & Costanzo, 1993). The IPT-15 is an audio-visual test about nonverbal communication and social perception. It has an administration time of about 20 minutes and consists of 15 brief (28 to 122-second) "real-life" scenes. Each scene is paired with a question appearing on the screen before the scene starts. Each question has three possible answers—which help the viewer *decode* something important about people in the scene based on nonverbal and interpersonal cues. A brief blank interval on the DVD/videotape enables the viewers to enter their responses on the answer sheet.

Procedure: Similar procedures were used to collect data from all the participants. Students, who volunteered, participated in groups ranging from 6 to 30 individuals. Volunteers were instructed that they would be participating in a study on nonverbal communication. Instruments assessing general demographic information (age, gender and level of education completed) and nonverbal sensitivity (measured) were then administered. The participants filled out the demographic information forms and then completed the IPT-15 task including watching a DVD which was projected on a screen.

Results

Preliminary analysis, with reference to descriptive statistics, determined that for the American sample (Table 1), female participants performed better on the IPT-15 (in obtaining higher mean scores on the IPT-15) than their male counterparts. For the Indian sample, the analysis (Table 2) was analogous to the American one with Indian females also getting higher scores on the IPT-15 than Indian males. Similarly Japanese female participants scored higher, on average, than their male counterparts on the IPT-15 (Table 3).

Independent one-tailed t-tests were conducted to examine whether within each culture, American, Indian and Japanese women would obtain significantly higher IPT-15 scores than their respective male counterparts. The t-test results of the American sample ($t = 3.291$, $df = 99$, $p < .001$, one-tailed) were highly significant in favor of female participants. For the Indian group ($t = 2.132$, $df = 101$, $p < .05$, one-tailed) and Japanese sample ($t = 2.158$, $df = 61$, $p < .05$, one-tailed), the results again showed the difference in mean IPT-15 scores between females and males as significant and favoring women.

The factorial analysis of the IPT-15 also displayed a highly significant main effect of gender (Table 4) where women overall scored higher than men ($p < .001$). However, the between-subjects ANOVA (gender X culture) for IPT-15 scores did not show either a significant main effect for culture or a significant interaction effect between culture and gender (as seen in Table 4), thereby indicating that IPT-15 scores may not be a function of culture or be affected by culture and gender interacting with each other.

Discussion

The primary goal of this research was to investigate the salience of the relationship between interpersonal, nonverbal sensitivity and gender (being male or female), across three cultures—American, Japanese and Indian. All participants from all cultures were assessed on their interpersonal, nonverbal sensitivity in terms of their measurable nonverbal decoding skills (as assessed by the IPT-15). Upon different levels of data analysis, some fascinating results emerged that fell in line with our hypotheses and previous research, yet also offered up some interesting connotations.

Gender differences were evident with preliminary data scrutiny using descriptive statistics. As with previous research results, women obtained higher mean scores than men on the IPT-15. Interestingly, based on preliminary analysis and the t-test results, the gender differences (in favor of women) on the IPT-15 were more pronounced among American participants than among the Japanese and the Indian groups.

These gender differences within and across each culture may have cultural implications and explanations. The fact that female participants across the three cultures scored higher than their male counterparts on the skill measure of nonverbal sensitivity indicates that gender is by far the main determinant of differences in the ability to decode nonverbal cues. While these findings are as per our expectations based on gender stereotypes and past research (see Hall, 1978, 1984), and consistent with previous studies (e.g. Rosenthal et al., 1979) which demonstrate that gender differences in nonverbal ability significantly favor women across cultures; there is some differentiation in the extent of the gender gap in nonverbal sensitivity between the three cultures.

The comparatively smaller gender differences on the IPT-15 scores for Indian and Japanese participants may be explained by gender roles and cultural expectations. Research (Rosenthal & DePaulo,1979) has shown that sex differences in *accomodatingness* (being polite or giving in to perceived wishes of the expressor/target) are more pronounced in countries where women are less liberated (with females being more accommodating and more "polite" than men), consequently in such cultures, gender differences in accuracy of nonverbal cues are smaller (women in these places are not as nonverbally superior to their male counterparts as in other parts of the world). In the present research too, perhaps it is not so much that Indian and Japanese males were more nonverbally sensitive, but rather that Indian and Japanese females under-performed on nonverbal sensitivity measures out of a cultural expectation of politeness.

These cultural variations in terms of gender differences were clarified by factorial analyses to reveal further distinctions. By and large, our data replicated previous findings that gender affects nonverbal sensitivity. In the current study, women overall scored higher than men on IPT-15 which is consistent with our expectations and with original investigations done by the test authors of the IPT-15. Research on the IPT-15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993) has found that women were significantly more accurate than men on four scene types – status, kinship, intimacy and deception.

In the current research, IPT-15 scores were highly significantly affected by the participant's gender; this might signal that nonverbal skill measures (such as the IPT-15) are universal and hence more likely to follow standard gender differential patterns.

Contrary to our expectations, there was no significant effect of culture on the IPT-15 scores (Table 4). It had been anticipated that American participants would have an *in-group advantage* (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002) in decoding nonverbal cues presented in the IPT-15 because the expressors (the actors in the video clips) are from the same cultural group as the American sample. However the absence of significant cultural differences in IPT-15 suggests that, as a skill, nonverbal sensitivity is not a function of culture. This also fits with prior research (Iizuka et al., 2002) where the nearly identical scores of Japanese and American participants on the Visual-Only condition of the IPT-15 were partly attributed to the assumption that the behavior patterns of the IPT-15 scenes transcend broad cultural differences.

This result may be explained by the fact that American media is nearly ubiquitous around the globe. Increasingly, by virtue of the internet, television and movies, most Indians and Japanese (especially English-speaking college students) are familiar with American culture. This outcome also appears to be in keeping with a series of studies (Rosenthal et al., 1979) where groups similar to American culture and whose experiences were akin to college-educated American citizens scored higher on a nonverbal skills measure (PONS; Rosenthal et al., 1979) than those from less similar cultures. Both the non-American groups were moderately fluent in English and given that the language of instruction at all three institutions is English; the linguistic advantage of American participants may have been rather minimal.

In general, while the current study yielded a number of interesting and significant findings, it also had some limitations. The samples consisted of only college students who were from specific regions of their respective countries-- all the American participants were California residents, the Indian participants were from

Himachal Pradesh and the Japanese participants were from around the island of Kyushu. In each of these three cases, the samples might not be representative of the ethnic and regional diversity of each country and so further research is necessary to determine whether the current findings can be generalized to other populations.

Future directions of research include investigating the influence of within-subject traits as well as transient individual factors like emotional states (such as happiness and sadness) on interpersonal sensitivity. As a step further, one could investigate whether and to what extent, psychological disorders (such as anxiety and depression) affect the ability to decode nonverbal cues effectively. Another direction of exploration could be to analyze cultural differences in nonverbal skill by using the IPT-15 as a purely visual, nonverbal measure (with the sound removed) to counter any perceived or actual linguistic advantage that Americans might have in decoding the nonverbal cues.

On the whole, it is evident that since nonverbal decoding ability has sizeable real-world applications, the current research has potentially wide-ranging implications. Professionals all around the world, in a multitude of settings, need to be cognizant of the fact that individual differences such as gender may hinder or help one's nonverbal decoding ability. In the field of psychology, therapists and counselors need to not only successfully interpret their patients' nonverbal cues, but also be aware of the nonverbal signals they themselves send. In the field of law enforcement--where detection of deception is a crucial job requirement—knowing that some people, more than others, will be better decoders of nonverbal cues could be valuable. Most importantly, with ever increasing globalization, the Indians and the Japanese (especially college students) are engaging in closer interaction with the world in

general and the United States in particular. A large part of that interaction involves interpersonal communication with others in varying professional arenas wherein being nonverbally sensitive is paramount to success. This research is crucial because it signals that when it comes to understanding and interpreting unspoken communication, the differences between these once divergent cultures are getting smaller.

In conclusion, the present study has provided clear evidence that, regardless of what part of the world one lives in, there exists an important yet complex relationship between interpersonal, nonverbal sensitivity and these two aspects of our identity. How people interpret everyday interpersonal and nonverbal cues as well as how they judge others' nonverbal behavior varies significantly by their gender and is notably influenced by their culture.

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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for American Participants

Gender		Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Male	IPT-15 scores	5	11	8.14	1.46
Female	IPT-15 scores	7	13	9.12	1.50

NOTE : N (male) = 43, N (female) = 58

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for Indian Participants

Gender		Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Male	IPT-15 scores	4	13	7.90	1.99
Female	IPT-15 scores	5	12	8.66	1.62

NOTE : N (male) = 50, N (female) = 53

Table 3.Descriptive Statistics for Japanese Participants

Gender		Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Male	IPT-15 scores	4	12	7.52	1.71
Female	IPT-15 scores	4	12	8.47	1.72

NOTE : N (male) = 25, N (female) = 38

Table 4.

2 X 2 Between-Subjects ANOVA for IPT-15 Scores

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
gender	48.40	1	48.40	17.452***
culture	15.52	2	7.76	2.80
gender*culture	.99	2	.49	.178
Error	723.74	261	2.74	
Corrected Total	790.00	266		

NOTE : *** $p < .001$

What Impact Does Work Experience in the Field of ELT have on Teacher Use of Moodle, a Well Known Course Management System?

Iain Stanley

Abstract

This paper looks at the impact that work experience has on the use of technology, specifically, a Course Management System, called Moodle. Participants came from a private language university in Japan. Participants completed an online survey relating to their use of Moodle, and their work experience in the field of ELT. Prior research had indicated that work experience was a factor in the use of technology. A Spearman's Rank Order correlation test, and a Kruskal-Wallis means test was used in SPSS to analyse the results from the online survey. No correlation or link was evident.

Introduction

Research in the past decade has shown that computer technology is an effective means for widening educational opportunities. The advancement of technology in the field of education has been rapid, and in the last ten to twenty years, the development of tools for teaching through technology has been astounding, so much so that educators and curriculum planners have found it difficult to keep up with the pace of the technology. However, research has also indicated that most teachers neither use technology as an instructional delivery system, nor integrate technology into their curriculum.

There have been a variety of reasons put forward as to why technology has not been integrated into education as ubiquitously as it has been in everyday life. Some reasons include a lack of pre-service training; a lack of in-service opportunities; a lack of confidence in using technology; a disconnect between teaching values and perceptions of technology; and a lack of understanding in using specific forms of technology.

The purpose of this study is to look at the impact that work experience has on the use of technology. Specifically, it is looking at faculty members at a private language university in Japan, and what impact their work experience had on their uptake and use of a Course Management System, called Moodle.

Moodle

It is important in the context of this study to explain what Moodle is, and how it relates to the advances in educational technology and the availability to educators. Moodle is a well-known e-learning platform in educational institutions, including universities and colleges. Since its inception in 1999, many universities and colleges have chosen to use Moodle as their exclusive CMS. Indeed, as of October, 2011, there were 56,349 active Moodle sites, that had been registered from 213 countries. Some well known universities and colleges currently using Moodle include University of California, Irvine; Dublin City University, Ireland; University of York, UK; California State University, Humboldt; The Open University, UK; Louisiana State University, USA; Idaho State University; USA; The University of Barcelona, Spain.

One advantage of using a CMS such as Moodle, is that teachers can keep everything centralized in the one online learning environment. Teachers at any place that has Moodle installed simply create a course, name it accordingly, have their students enroll in the course and then upload any files they need to. They can also create any number of activities for students to participate in. Some typical features provided by Moodle include file upload / download; assignment submission for students; online quizzes; instant messages; email; online calendar; online news and announcements (at a site-wide level or single-course level); discussion forums; wikis; and grading features.

Importantly also, is the fact that Moodle is consistently ranked among the top CMSs available. An annual evaluation of different CMSs (and any other form of technology) is that done by the Centre for Learning and Performance Technologies (http://www.c4lpt.co.uk/), a well-respected and publicized website that houses one of the most complete compilations of trends and tools in the emerging technologies landscape. In its 'Top 100 Tools For Learning' guide for the years 2007-2010, it listed Moodle as the top CMS each year. In 2007, Moodle was ranked equal 12th (and top CMS); in 2008, Moodle was ranked 9th (and top CMS); in 2009, Moodle ranked equal 14th (and top CMS), 2010, Moodle ranked 10th overall (and top CMS), in 2011, Moodle ranked 5th overall (and top CMS).

The explanation of Moodle is an important point in the context of this study, because particular forms of technology are vitally important in the decision-making process of educators to use them or not. All technology is not the same. As Rogers (2003) says, the importance of a particular innovation cannot be underestimated in the diffusion process. Thus, in demonstrating that Moodle is indeed one of the top forms

of CMSs available, it serves to illustrate that faculty members had the opportunity to incorporate one of the most potentially beneficial tools into their teaching practice.

However, the fact remains that Moodle was very much underused at the university. There may have been a number of reasons for that, but to look at them all is beyond the scope of this study. This study will focus on work experience, and examine what impact it had on the decision of faculty members to use Moodle or not.

Literature Review

Work experience has consistently been referred to as an influential factor in relation to technology use and take-up by teachers (Dupagne & Krendl, 1992; Fordham & Vannatta, 2004; Hadley & Sheingold, 1993; Honey & Moeller, 1994; Jaber & Moore, 1999). Rogers' diffusion theory (2003), states that the process of innovation adoption is certainly influenced by one's experience. According to Rieber and Welliver's (1989) model of instructional transformation, experience is a fundamental part of taking up an innovation.

A good example of prior research which indicates the role that work experience may play in technology use and take-up by teachers was that done by Meskill et al. (2002). In her study, Meskill and her colleagues examined L2 teachers' use of computer technology in relation to prior technology training, by focusing on the contrast between novice and experienced teachers. The findings of the study showed that the novice teachers, even if they had received prior, formal technology training, felt less comfortable in using computer technology for their classroom instruction, than did the experienced teachers with no, or relatively little, formal technology training. The implication here is that teachers with more years in the ELT field, regardless of

training or prior education in the use of technology, are more likely to use and/or feel more comfortable integrating technology into their teaching practice. This sentiment is further reflected by Jacobsen (2000), who says through his research that years of experience in a particular field has a big impact on the decision to use and integrate technology into teaching practice.

In addition, Tornatsky and Klein (1982) found that an important innovation characteristic which had a positive correlation with technology adoption was ‘compatibility’. In explaining ‘compatibility’, Tornatzky and Klein describe it as the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of the users. In relation to the work experience of a teacher, the interesting point about this is that if new, relatively inexperienced teachers are consistently being hired at universities, with little to no pre-service training or past experiences, then it may be arguable that such teachers have any ‘existing values’, ‘past experiences’ or particular ‘needs’. As Tornatzky and Klein indicate, ‘compatibility’, in the form of existing values and past experiences, are seen as important in the take up and use of technology. Ritchie and Wiburg (1994) add further weight to this idea by saying that "traditional perceptions of what teaching, learning, and knowledge should look like are major limiting factors to integrating technology" (p. 152).

A further study which echoed the sentiments above was that done by Russell et al (2003). The study highlighted important relationships among teachers’ levels of computer use and their beliefs about, and confidence for, using technology. Surprisingly, high confidence for using technology was not a direct predictor of teachers’

classroom uses. It indicated that, while new teachers may be more comfortable with the technology tools, they may lack an appreciation for the value of technology as an instructional tool. Alternatively, they may lack the organization and management skills needed to use technology effectively in the classroom, which are skills that are developed through years of experience. The salient point being made here is that experience is a more pertinent issue in relation to teacher take-up of technology.

The literature seems to suggest that work experience has a powerful influence on the adoption rate of technology. The issue seems to revolve around the experience that a teacher has, and how that experience shapes their beliefs and values about education, teaching, and pedagogy. This would suggest that teachers with more experience, and years in the ELT field, would be more likely to take up technology, or identify an innovation as being consistent with their own ideals. In turn, one might infer that if teachers with little, to no prior experience in the field, are hired for positions, then they would be far less likely to use an innovation or see it as consistent with any values they may have had. It will be interesting to see if the ideas posited are consistent with the results of this study.

Methodology

This study used a quantitative approach. Quantitative research is usually linked to the notion of science as objective truth or fact, and usually begins with pre-specified objectives focused on testing preconceived outcomes. When applying quantitative methods, numerical estimation and statistical inference from a generalizable sample are often used in relation to a larger "true" population of interest. As a result, quantitative research is most often seen as a method trying to demonstrate

relationships under standardized (controlled) conditions. (Casebeer & Verhoef, 1997). In this study, a quantitative approach was used to ascertain any relationships between work experience and use of Moodle.

Data Collection Method - Online Survey

An online survey was used to collect data relating to use of Moodle, and experience in the field of English Language Testing (ELT). The online questionnaire was created using www.esurveyspro.com. It was designed so that when participants opened their email they had to click on a link embedded in the email, which then directed them to the survey. An online questionnaire was the most efficient and convenient way of collecting data from faculty members, as the majority of faculty members had easy access to the internet and email. In the case of this particular study, because of the spread of participants around the world at the time the survey was sent, and a lack of home or work addresses for each, an online survey was the easiest and most efficient method of acquiring responses. The survey was sent to every teacher who was employed during the 2008/9 academic year, numbering 51. It was hoped that about 40 teachers would respond. In the end, a total of 42 teachers responded.

The dependent variable consisted of one item, relating to use of Moodle. The item that participants had to answer was *How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9? (over both semesters),* with the answer options being Never; In one or two classes; In some classes; In most classes; In all classes.

The independent variables related to experience in the field of ELT. There were 4 items, or questions, sent to participants. The items, and the answer options available, were:

1. *How many years' teaching experience had you had in ELT (any kind of job) by 2008?*

   It was my first year; 1-3 yrs; 4-6 years; 7-10 years; 10+ years

2. *How many years' teaching experience had you had at the university level by 2008?*

   As above

3. *How many years' teaching experience had you had abroad at the university level by 2008?*

   As above

4. *How many years' teaching experience had you had at the university level in Japan by 2008?*

   As above

Participants

For this study, the subjects used were university teachers who were working at a private language university in Japan in the 2008/9 academic year. The total number was approximately 50.

Analysis

Analysis of the online survey was carried out using the statistical software package, SPSS. In relation to the question in this study, a variety of statistical methods of analysis were used.

A Spearman's Rank Order Correlation test was run to test for relationships between the dependent variable '*How often did you use Moodle?*', and each of the 4

items, or questions, in the category ‘Work Experience’. A Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test was preferred to the Pearson Product Moment Correlation test. Even though the Pearson Product Moment Correlation test is one of the most common tests to be used in correlation tests, it can only be used when the two variables to be measured are on either an interval or ratio scale (Laerd Statistics, n.d; Brown, 1998). The variables used in the correlation tests in this study were on an ordinal scale. Using an ordinal variable in the Pearson Product Moment Correlation test would necessarily violate the assumptions necessary. If the variables are on an ordinal scale, the Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test is the preferred test to use (Brown, 1998).

Furthermore, in order to make comparisons between multiple groups of teachers, a Kruskal-Wallis test was preferred to the one-way ANOVA. The Kruskal-Wallis Test is the nonparametric test equivalent to the one-way ANOVA and an extension of the Mann-Whitney Test, to allow the comparison of more than two independent groups.

Moreover, it is used when the basic assumptions of a parametric test (including the one-way ANOVA) are not met. The three basic assumptions that need to be met if a parametric test is to be used are explained below.

1) You must have data that are from a measure that is at least interval - nominal and ordinal variables are not good enough (Holttum & Blizard, 2003). An interval scale is one in which intervals at different points on the scale are equal. Examples are the Celsius and Fahrenheit temperature scales (Everitt & Wykes, 1999).

2) Your data must be from a population that has a normal distribution.

3) If you are comparing samples, the variances within each sample must be similar - this is known as homogeneity of variance (Holttum & Blizard, 2003).

If each of these three basic assumptions are not met, then a parametric test, including the one-way ANOVA, should not be used (Holttum & Blizard, 2003). In the case of my data, the basic assumption of the first criteria of parametric tests was not met. The variables used in my data were of a measure that was ordinal, not interval. For example, in the item '*How many years had you worked at university in Japan by 2008?*' the options were 'it was my first year; 1-3 years; 4-6 years; 7-10 years; 10+ years. In this case, it is clear that the intervals on the scale are not equal.

Therefore, it was not appropriate for me to use a parametric test, such as the one-way ANOVA. In that case, the equivalent non-parametric test was preferable. The non-parametric version of the one-way ANOVA, is the Kruskal-Wallis test.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 below illustrates the descriptive statistics for each of the 5 questions that participants had to answer. In relation to the dependent variable *How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9? (over both semesters)* the most common response was 'Never' (signified by the number 1). The mean score was 1.95 (1= Never, 2 = In one or two classes). For the item relating to experience in the field of ELT, the mean score was 3.48 (3 = 4-6 years, 4 = 7-10 years). This would suggest that most participants were not completely new to the field of ELT. The three items relating to university experience

each had a mean score around 2.00 (2 = 1-3 years), which suggests that most participants were relatively new to teaching at the university level, both in Japan and

internationally.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for each item in the online survey

Descriptive Statistics						
		How many years teaching experience had you had in English Language Teaching (ELT) (in any kind of teaching job) by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had at the university level in ELT by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had abroad at the university level by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had at the university level in Japan by 2008?	How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9? (over both semesters)
N	Valid	42	42	42	42	42
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.48	2.10	1.98	1.88	1.95
Mode		4	2	2	2	1
Std. Deviation		.890	.821	.841	.739	1.431

Spearman's Rank Order Correlation test

A Spearman's Rank Order correlation test was run to determine the relationship between the dependent variable *How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9 (over both semesters)?* and the category *Work experience* (consisting of 4 items). The results indicate that there was no significant correlation between the dependent variable and any of the independent variables.

The results from the Spearman's Rank Order correlation test can be seen in full below.

Table 2: Spearman's Rank Order Correlation test results for Use of Moodle / Work Experience

Dependent Variable: **How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9? (over both semesters)**		How many years teaching experience had you had in English Language Teaching (ELT) (in any kind of teaching job) by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had at the university level in ELT by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had abroad at the university level by 2008?	How many years teaching experience had you had at the university level in Japan by 2008?
Spearman's Rank Order Correlation test	Correlation Coefficient	-.050	-.029	-.127	-.068
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.753	.853	.422	.670
	N	42	42	42	42

Kruskal-Wallis means test

Finally, a Kruskall-Wallis means test was used in order to test for differences among the means of teacher groups in relation to use of Moodle, and work experience.

For the four items in the 'Work Experience' category, teachers were placed into one of five groups, depending on their answers. The different groups were*: it was my first year; 1-3 years; 4-6 years; 7-10 years; 10 + years*.

The results from each of the Kruskal-Wallis tests used on each item in the 'Work Experience' category, indicated that there were no statistically significant differences between group means, relating to use of Moodle. This means that teacher use of Moodle was not influenced by the groups that teachers belonged to, as determined by the Kruskall-Wallis test. The table can be seen in full below.

Dependent Variable: How often did you use Moodle in your classes in 2008/9 (over both semesters)? **Grouping variables below (1-4)**	**Chi-square**	**df**	**Asymp.Sig (*P* value)**
1. How many years' teaching experience had you had in ELT (any kind of job) by 2008?	1.938	3	.585
2. How many years' teaching experience had you had at the university level by 2008?	1.073	3	.784
3. How many years' teaching experience had you had abroad at the university level by 2008?	4.042	3	.257
4. How many years' teaching experience had you had at the university level in Japan by 2008?	3.639	3	.303

Table 3: Kruskal-Wallis test results checking for difference between group means

Discussion

Initially, it appears that the results here are contrary to what was suggested in the literature review. The results in the Spearman's Rank Order correlation test, and the Kruskal-Wallis means test, indicated that there was no correlation, or link, between work experience and use of Moodle. Granted, the literature review did not specifically look at Moodle, but as the review of Moodle illustrated, it is one of the top forms of technology available to educators, and arguably the top Course

Management System. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that Moodle itself was inherently any different from what the authors were describing as ‘technology’ in the literature review, or that it was somehow worse than any other form of technology the authors may have been referring to.

At an individual level, there was no correlation between use of Moodle and work experience, and at a group level, there was also no difference among the means of each group, in relation to their use of Moodle. This means that work experience had no bearing on how a much a faculty member used Moodle or not. It is interesting that Everett Rogers (2003), considered by most to be the pre-eminent scholar in diffusion theory, suggests that experience has a key role to play in the diffusion process. It is interesting because in his diffusion theory, Rogers places innovation adopters into five distinct categories - Innovators; Early Adopters; Early Majority; Late Majority; Laggards. However, in admitting individuals into one of the five categories, Rogers doesn’t really attribute any clearly defined characteristics to each category, and therefore they may be somewhat broadly interpreted and inclusive. For example, in discussing the dominant characteristics of each category, Rogers characterizes innovators as ‘venturesome’, early adopters as ‘opinion leaders’ who are widely respected in their social circle, early majority members as ‘deliberate’, the late majority as ‘skeptical’ about the value of an innovation, and laggards as ‘traditional’.

Though people may get a basic understanding of the type of innovator, or technology user, Rogers is trying to identify, it is not clear from these characteristics what role work experience might play in terms of the characteristics. For example, it is fair to say that a teacher with 10 years’ experience, or a teacher with 10 weeks’ experience, could both be deemed as ‘venturesome’ and willing to take risks in their

teaching practice. The teacher with 10 years' experience may be in a better position to use the technology more effectively and efficiently, but it doesn't necessarily mean he or she is more 'venturesome'. Alternatively, there is no clearly defined maxim that states that a teacher with 10 years' or 10 weeks' experience will be any more or less 'skeptical' about an innovation than the other. The characteristics of Rogers' innovator groups are not overly clear, and perhaps it is understandable then, why the results from the analyses indicated that work experience did not show any significant relationship with the uptake, or use of, Moodle.

It is also interesting to note that the majority of the participants had between 1-3 years' experience at the university level. The descriptive statistics indicated that the total number of years' experience in ELT for participants was mostly between 7-10 years. However, at the university level, it was only 1-3 years for the majority of participants. This illustrates that the majority of participants were new to the level of university teaching, and thus relatively inexperienced at that level. However, the results from the analyses indicated that this had no bearing, or correlation, to use of Moodle. Some teachers with few years' experience at the university level used Moodle a lot, while other teachers with few years' experience at the university level used Moodle sparingly, if at all. Furthermore, some teachers with a higher number of years' experience in ELT used Moodle a lot, while other teachers with a higher number of years' experience in ELT used Moodle sparingly, if at all.

Conclusion

This study examined the impact that work experience had on the use of Moodle, at a private language university in Japan. Prior research indicated that work

experience was influential in a teacher’s decision to incorporate technology into their teaching practice or not. An online survey was sent to approximately fifty teachers, asking them about their use of Moodle at the university, and their work experience in the field of ELT.

Despite indications of prior research, the results here showed that there was no correlation, or link, between work experience and use of Moodle. The results of this study seem to contravene a lot of the prior research on the subject. However, work experience itself has never been listed as a singular, or dominant factor, in the use and/or uptake of technology. It has always been presented as a factor, among many others.

There may have been other, unique, circumstances that were more of a factor in faculty use of Moodle. However, in looking solely at work experience, it appears that in the context of this study, it was not a factor in why Moodle was relatively underused at the university, or why some faculty used it much more than others.

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Polyglots and Their Approaches: Points of Interest for Language Learners and Teachers

Brendan Rodda

Abstract

This paper is a preliminary step in studying the largely ignored topic of polyglots, people who have learnt many foreign languages to a high level of proficiency. The paper profiles seven polyglots to investigate approximately how many languages each one mastered and how they learnt their languages. Certain features that often appear in the language learning experiences of the polyglots are identified and discussed.

この論文は今までよく調べられていない数ヶ国語に通じるポリグロットという人達についての予備的研究である。七人のポリグロットのプロフィールを基にその習得した言語学の数と習得方法を調べる。この人たちの言語取得の経験の中でよく起こる事を見つけ論じる。

Introduction

Despite their extraordinary success in language learning, polyglots have received very little attention from researchers in the field of language acquisition. This is in contrast to common practices in other fields of endeavour – science, art, business, sport and so on – where the most successful participants tend to be the object of close observation, analysis, discussion and imitation by others who wish to understand and reproduce their success. It seems reasonable to suspect that polyglots too, with their

mastery of 10, 20 or sometimes more languages, may provide insight into the language learning process, bringing benefit to many other learners, whether those learners wish to master one language or many.

Why polyglots have been largely ignored up until now is not very clear. It may be that researchers have doubted the truth of the polyglots' claims, dismissing the claims as the products of over-active imaginations, the language learning equivalents of Hercules myths or Bigfoot stories. Alternatively, researchers may have dismissed polyglots as genetic outliers, from birth possessed with such astounding aptitude for language learning that their experiences were not applicable to the typical language learner. These responses are understandable – after all, most of us have experienced difficulty making progress in one foreign language, so the notion of mastering a large number of them is almost inconceivable and we may instinctively consider polyglottery irrelevant or worse.

Nevertheless, it is somewhat odd that the topic has not been investigated in more depth. At least, research could confirm whether the above assumptions – that is, that the claims are false or that the polyglots have rare and innate aptitude – are supported by what we know of polyglots. If either assumption is indeed supported by the weight of evidence, then the topic can safely return to its place of obscurity in the field. On the other hand, it might emerge that there is truth to the claims and that the polyglots' success with languages stems from factors other than natural talent, in which case their experiences become highly relevant for the typical learner. It could be argued that research into polyglots has no more to offer than research into learners who have mastered just one foreign language and indeed there is a large body of such research – the so-called good language learner studies (e.g. Naiman et al, 1978;

Stevick, 1989). However, as well as offering a slightly different perspective from bilinguals, polyglots can be expected to have refined their learning approaches to a higher degree than bilinguals and therefore provide a more reliable perspective on successful language learning.

This paper provides an overview of the lives and achievements of several purported polyglots, based on a variety of non-academic sources. My aim is to determine whether their claims for language acquisition appear to be supported by evidence and, if so, whether the evidence suggests that the exceptional acquisition was the result of innate aptitude. I also attempt to identify the language learning approaches used by the polyglots. After the overview, I present several points of interest that emerge from it. Because of the non-academic nature of the source material, the conclusions reached here are preliminary.

Definition of terms

Strictly speaking, a polyglot is a person who has proficiency in three or more languages; that is, a multilingual person. However, in general usage, the term refers to people who have mastered a substantially larger number of languages. This is the way it is used by Krashen and Kiss (1996), among others, and is the way it is used in this paper.

In relation to acquisition, I use the terms ‘mastery’ and ‘highly advanced level/proficiency’ interchangeably. They refer to a somewhat general concept that includes a high – but not necessarily native-speaker – level of precision, ease and fluency of communication using listening, speaking, reading and writing skills in a wide variety of situations.

Polyglots and their achievements

Because of the dearth of academic study on the topic of polyglottery, it is necessary to turn to other sources for information about the phenomenon. Fortunately, extensive records of the language achievements of several polyglots appear in biographies, memoirs, letters, language learning guides and, in the case of a living polyglot, a website. Based on such materials, the following are profiles of seven polyglots who lived in the period from the late 18th century to the present. Multiple sources in direct contact with the polyglot support the claims in each case and other circumstances – for example, the polyglot's work or publications – tend to further the reliability of the claims in each case. During the period covered here, it is probable that there have been dozens of other polyglots but information about them is scant, inaccessible, unsupported or otherwise unreliable.

William Jones

Jones was born in London in 1746. His mother began to educate him intensively from the age of three. Jones began attending Harrow school at six. He did not show any special interest or aptitude in foreign languages at first, but at the age of 10 his interest in Latin grew and within a few years he had reached a high level of proficiency. At 12, he entered secondary school at Harrow and began studying ancient Greek. He may have also begun studying French at this time as, by the age of 14, he was at least considering writing lengthy letters to his sister in French (Teignmouth, 1807, p.30). At the age of 18, in addition to his mastery of Latin, ancient Greek and French, he had enough understanding of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese to be able to "read the best authors" (ibid, p.42).

In his first year at Oxford University, he began studying Arabic, going so far as to hire full-time for several months a Syrian resident of London to assist him with listening and speaking skills. Soon afterwards, he began studying Persian. It seems that Jones mastered these languages within a few years and, at the age of 22, his fame had spread to the point that he was asked by the King of Denmark to translate a long Persian text into French. Around the same time, Jones published other literary studies in French. In his late 20s, while working as a tutor and writer, he began to study German and appears to have reached a fairly high level in that language too, as Teignmouth (ibid, p.465) claims that Jones "was thoroughly conversant in German", among many other languages.

In his mid-30s, Jones was appointed as a judge to the high court of Calcutta, where he turned his interest to several Indian languages, mastering Sanskrit and reaching a fairly high level of proficiency in Hindi and Bengali. Incidentally, it was at this time that he made the observation for which he is most remembered – that the languages Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, Persian and Celtic all derived from the same original language, now known as Proto-Indo-European.

Jones once wrote that he had mastered eight languages: English, Latin, ancient Greek, French, Italian, Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit (ibid, p.465). However, he may have been unduly modest or harsh on himself for Teignmouth claims that he knew 11 languages thoroughly (ibid). Jones's approach to language learning included the use of grammar textbooks, conversation with native speakers or highly advanced learners of the language and reading literature in the language. It is clear that he also did a great deal of writing in his foreign languages.

Guiseppe Mezzofanti

Mezzofanti was born into a working-class family in Bologna, Italy in 1774. From the age of three, he attended a small, neighbourhood school, where the teacher noticed that he learnt quickly. He was soon promoted to another school, and then another. His strongest subjects were languages, at first Latin, then Greek and Spanish. Before he was 20, he had mastered them and was well on his way to mastering Arabic, Hebrew, Coptic, French and German.

Mezzofanti became a Catholic priest and was appointed professor of Arabic at the University of Bologna at the very young age of 23. His work in the church and at the university enabled him to meet people from all over the world and to converse with them in their native languages. In addition, he had the time, motivation and skills to study foreign languages by himself. Over the next decade or so, he added Russian, Hungarian, English, Persian, Swedish and Turkish, among others.

He became quite a celebrity and was often sought out by foreigners who wished to challenge him in the languages they knew. In 1817, when he was 43, he met Lord Byron and another English poet, William Stewart Rose. Both of them attested to his superb proficiency in English and other languages. Rose spoke with him at length on several occasions and found that he spoke English to a near-native degree, with great fluency and “extraordinary precision” (Russell, 1858, p.226). Byron was impressed by his thorough knowledge of English dialects, slang and swearing. His biographer, Russell, wrote that his own response to Mezzofanti’s English pronunciation was not that it was incorrect but that it “was almost too correct to be appear completely natural” (ibid, p.403). A German theologian, August Tholuck, visited him in 1829 and was more critical of his skills in various languages, though

still very impressed. In 15 minutes of conversation in German, Tholuck found four minor mistakes and noted that his accent, while good, was closer to Poles' pronunciation of German than native pronunciation. Tholuck tested him in several other languages that he knew – Arabic, Persian, Dutch, Danish and English – and found that Mezzofanti had problems only with Dutch, which he did not know, and Danish, which he could understand but could not speak.

In his biography, Russell presents strong evidence that Mezzofanti mastered more than 25 languages and had good knowledge and skills in 10 or more other languages. Mezzofanti does not seem to have had any secret method of learning. He told Tholuck that his "way of learning new languages was no other than that of our school-boys, by writing out paradigms and words, and committing them to memory" (ibid, p.278). He also read a great deal of literature in his foreign languages and took every opportunity to speak the languages. Although his success is often explained as the fruits of an innate gift, it is clear that he worked very hard almost daily for decades to acquire and maintain his languages.

Richard Burton

Burton was born in Torquay, Britain in 1821.As a boy, he travelled widely with his family in Europe and lived for a few years in France. He showed early talent for learning the languages and dialects of France and Italy. In 1840, he entered Oxford University, where he studied Arabic until he was expelled the following year because he had attended a horse race.

After his dismissal from Oxford, Burton joined the British Army and was stationed in India for seven years. Unlike most of his military colleagues, he

immersed himself in Indian culture, including study of at least five of the languages. It is not clear what level he reached in these languages but it seems that in Hindi, at least, he had advanced proficiency. He was also said to be able to pass himself off as a local when he spoke Sindhi and dressed in disguise (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911). While he was acquiring these languages, he continued his study of Arabic and Persian. He used Arabic extensively in 1853, when, in disguise as a Muslim, he joined a pilgrimage to Mecca, a transgression that would have been punished by death had he been discovered. Although there is no doubt that his Arabic proficiency was very good, he might not have been at a highly advanced level at this time as he failed an army translator's Arabic test just after he returned from Mecca. In his 30s, he became an explorer in Africa, then a diplomat, based first in Africa, then Brazil, the Middle East and Austria. In each location, he continued to study local languages, although reports of his proficiency in these languages are sketchy. Later in life, Burton took to translating into English famous Indian and Arabic texts, such as *The Kama Sutra*, *The Arabian Nights* and *The Perfumed Garden*.

It is difficult to quantify the number of languages that Burton mastered. Some sources put the figure at more than 20, including dialects. That figure, however, is likely too high, probably including many languages that he was familiar with but had not mastered. A more conservative count of mastered languages would include: English, French, Italian, German, Latin, Greek, Hindi, Sindhi, Arabic, Persian and possibly Portuguese, with good proficiency in several other languages. Wright, although critical of Burton's work as a translator, acknowledges that he was an exceptional polyglot – "the greatest linguist and traveller that England ever produced" (Wright, 1906, p.xii).

Burton's approach to language learning began with memorisation of a list of sentence types, essentially a basic grammar. He would read through the list and a list of basic vocabulary several times a day, limiting each study session to 15 minutes because he felt that he lost concentration after that (Wright, 1906, p.65). He acquired these basics in a week or two and then began reading authentic literature, often a gospel, because he found these easy to understand. Using the text, he would greatly expand his lists of sentence types and vocabulary. He would repeat the process with more difficult books, always reading out loud so that "the ear might aid memory" (ibid). Burton also paid attention to speaking skills, repeating difficult sounds hundreds of times a day until he mastered them and sub-vocally repeating the sentences he heard in conversation with native speakers.

Harold Williams

Williams was born in Christchurch, New Zealand in 1876. His father, a Methodist clergyman, tutored Williams from a young age. At first, he did not show much talent for learning but, according to Williams himself, he experienced a mysterious cognitive transformation at the age of seven and began making quick progress in his studies, especially Latin. While still a young boy, he coupled his two strong interests – Christianity and languages – by reading the Bible in Dobuan, a Melanesian language, and then constructing grammar and vocabulary lists from the text. In a biography of Williams, his wife claims that, at eleven, in addition to Dobuan, he knew Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, German, Italian and Maori (Tyrkova-Williams and Williams, 1935, p.3), although she gives no indication how well he knew them. By his late teens, the list had grown to include Dutch, Spanish, Fijian, Samoan and

Tongan (ibid, p.14). When he moved to Auckland at 17, he was able to practice speaking many of his languages with sailors at the port.

In his early 20s, Williams began studying Russian and Polish while working as a clergyman. After coming into conflict with church authorities, he left New Zealand for Germany, where he began studying at university. He eventually gained a doctorate in languages from Munich University. Next, he moved to Russia, where he worked as a correspondent for British newspapers. While there, he added several languages from the region, including Finnish, Latvian and Georgian. After World War One, he was unemployed for a time in Britain and took the opportunity to teach himself Hungarian, Basque, Chinese and Japanese. That he managed to teach himself to read Japanese newspapers is testament to his thoroughness. In 1921, he became the foreign editor for the *London Times* and so was given further opportunities to use his languages.

It is not clear how many languages Williams mastered in total. One estimate that is often given is over 50, but this is probably based on the languages listed by his wife in her biography of Williams, a list that might not be completely reliable and, in any case, does not take into account the question of whether Williams mastered the languages or simply had some proficiency in them. Nevertheless, given his extreme interest in and widely acknowledged talent for language learning, his doctorate in languages, his many years of living, studying and working in foreign countries while using the local languages and the accounts of many contemporaries, it is probable that he mastered 10 or more.

Kato Lomb

Lomb was born in Hungary in 1909. She did not have any special interest or

proficiency in foreign languages until her 20s, although she had studied some French, German and Latin in her childhood. While studying for a doctorate in chemistry, she started taking French classes and had some success. After she obtained her doctorate, she began taking classes in English while at the same time doing a great deal of self-study in the language, such as using a textbook and reading English novels (Krashen and Kiss, 1996).

Lomb enjoyed the process of learning foreign languages so much that she moved on to other languages – German and Russian. At the end of World War Two, she used her Russian skills to interpret for Russian troops that had occupied Hungary. She next devoted herself to Romanian and Italian. At around 40, she began taking Chinese lessons at a university and became fascinated with the language and culture. A few years later, after reaching an advanced level in Chinese, she moved on to Japanese and eventually worked extensively as a translator and interpreter in both these languages. She continued learning new languages throughout her life, beginning her last one, Hebrew, in her 80s. She worked as a translator with a total of 16 languages but stated that she was not at an advanced level in all of them. In addition to her native Hungarian, she was at a near-native level in English, French, German and Russian and had a very high proficiency in five other languages: Italian, Chinese, Japanese, Spanish and Polish (Lomb, 2008).

Lomb wrote at length about her approach in *Polyglot: How I learn languages* (Lomb, 2008). Typically, she began her study of a language by perusing a dictionary with Hungarian translations. She did not necessarily learn words this way but gleaned basic knowledge of the writing system, phonology and morphology. This preliminary step was her way of sampling the language, “making friends with it” (ibid, p.148).

From there, she moved on to a grammar textbook. As well as completing exercises in the textbook, she would write similar sentences in a notebook. Because “all of this is a bit tedious” (ibid, p.149), she would at the same time read a novel in the language. At first reading, she simply tried to understand words from the context and write them down in their context in her notebook for review. Later, she would read the book a second or third time, each time trying to understand more of the story and hence the language. She would also listen to radio broadcasts in the language and record them for re-listening. Later in the learning process, she would study with a native speaker, focusing on listening and writing. She felt that writing was pedagogically superior to speaking because people are more likely to use more difficult language in writing and can thereby “expand the framework” of their understanding of the language. She would begin by writing her own compositions but, after she had progressed to a higher level, she would translate other texts into the language because this forced her to use language she otherwise would not have used. She valued speaking skills also – as would be expected of a simultaneous interpreter – but seems to have believed that other skills should be developed first.

In addition to the above activities, Lomb put a great deal of emphasis on attitude. For her, interest in the language was paramount, far more important than a gift for language learning, which was a concept that she believed to be largely an illusion. Nevertheless, she encouraged learners to use the concept to their own advantage, writing that they should convince themselves that they are linguistic geniuses because a positive attitude was important for success with languages (ibid, p.173).

Kenneth Hale

Hale was born in 1934 in Illinois, USA and grew up in Arizona. From a young age, he showed an interest in other languages, learning the native American languages Navaho, Jemez, Hopi and Tohono O'odham from classmates in school and university, and learning French and Spanish in high school classes. His high school teacher recommended that he focus on one language at a time but Hale felt that he learned better when studying multiple languages simultaneously.

He obtained a doctorate in linguistics from Indiana University and did field work with ethnic groups whose languages had not previously been studied in depth by linguists, most notably several years of work with various Australian Aboriginal tribes. Later, he became a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he specialised in the languages of small minority groups. Hale himself was modest about his language abilities, which makes it hard to judge his actual accomplishments. He stated that he was fluent in only three languages: English, Spanish and Warlpiri, an Aboriginal language (Keyser, 2001). However, many of his fellow linguists attest to his advanced skills in many other languages, especially his native-like pronunciation and profound understanding of grammar. There are dozens of anecdotes relating how quickly and how well Hale acquired new languages (e.g., Yengoyan, 2003). Some of these – such as the story about him speaking fluent Japanese after watching a Japanese movie with sub-titles – are almost certainly exaggerated. Others are supported by multiple, reliable sources. As with other polyglots, the high figure that is touted in newspaper articles and websites – in Hale's case it is 50 – is likely to be the number of languages in which he had intermediate proficiency or better. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests the number he mastered was at least 10, many of

them languages spoken by small minority groups.

Hale said that he preferred to learn a language by talking with a native speaker. Then, using the knowledge he had acquired from conversation, he would write down his own sentences, the more complex the better. He was also said to use dictionaries, textbooks and novels if they were available in the language he was learning.

Alexander Arguelles

Arguelles was born in the USA in 1964. According to his own account, he was not very successful at foreign language learning as a child and teenager. It was only when he entered Columbia University that he began to make significant progress. His language classes there met five days a week, had small numbers of students, were taught by enthusiastic teachers and took a traditional grammar-based approach. These conditions enabled Arguelles to progress to a good level in French and German by the time he graduated, though he does not make clear exactly how well he knew the languages at that time. During the same period, he also took classes in Latin, ancient Greek and Sanskrit, and studied Spanish by himself, using a grammar translation textbook, listening tapes and casual conversation with native speakers. His level in these languages was somewhat lower than his French and German at the time.

While studying for a doctorate in comparative history of religions, Arguelles continued his study of foreign languages, especially archaic languages such as Gothic, Old French, Old Norse, which were related to his thesis topic. He also used French, German and Latin for research and regularly spoke Spanish in social situations. After completing his doctorate, he received a grant to do research in Germany. In Germany, he made a point of avoiding English, going so far as to make German his “mental

operating system" (Arguelles, 2011a). He travelled throughout Europe at this time and found that, by virtue of his proficiency in several Romance and Germanic languages, he could very quickly reach an intermediate level in new languages, such as Italian, Dutch and Swedish.

After living in Germany for two years, Arguelles spent the next eight years, from the age of 32, working as a professor at a university in Korea. His position gave him considerable time to devote to language learning and he took full advantage of the opportunity. He claims to have often spent 16 hours a day studying, almost entirely by himself with textbooks, tapes and reading material, such as readers or novels (ibid). He focused at first on Korean and then explored a wide array of languages, some of which – Russian, Arabic, Persian and Greek – he learnt to a high-intermediate or low-advanced level. At the age of 40, he took up a position at a university in Lebanon and set about further developing his Arabic proficiency. Now at 47, he lives in Singapore and continues to work at strengthening his most advanced languages. Through his own and other websites, Arguelles has provided some information about his level in various languages. However, he tends to focus primarily on his level of reading comprehension in the languages and gives relatively little information about speaking and listening skills. Some assessment of his speaking skills in some of his languages can be made from internet videos in which he speaks the languages (e.g. Arguelles, 2008; Arguelles, 2011b). Furthermore, several people attest to his speaking skills in the various languages that they have heard him speak (e.g., McCormick, 2009). These remain somewhat unreliable measures of proficiency – as is the case with other polyglots – but they indicate that Arguelles has probably reached a highly advanced level in at least 12 languages: English, German, French,

Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Swedish, Latin, Old Norse, Old French, Korean, Russian and Arabic, with Portuguese, Greek and perhaps Persian on the cusp of that level.

Like Lomb, Arguelles has written at length about his approach to language learning. In the early stages of learning, he prefers to work by himself with grammar-based textbooks, such as the old versions of Assimil, Linguaphone or Teach Yourself series. He listens a great deal to the recordings that accompany the textbooks and also reads readers or other easy reading material. He has long used two somewhat unusual techniques: shadowing and scriptorium. Shadowing involves listening to speech in the language and immediately repeating it out loud. This leads to more intense concentration on the listening task, helps to develop better pronunciation and speaking speed and may also promote noticing of grammatical structures. The scriptorium technique involves reading out loud and then copying down sentences from written texts. After copying down the sentence, the learner checks any unknown grammar or vocabulary in it. This technique ensures a more thorough consideration of the language of the text, while also providing further practice of speaking skills. When he has gained a solid foundation in the language, Arguelles often takes private lessons with native speakers to improve his speaking skills and reads authentic native-speaker texts, such as novels. He also tries to speak the language as often as possible, writing that, for the purpose of language learning, he became a more outgoing person “who sought out and created conversational opportunities” (Arguelles, 2011a). He tends to study more than one language at a time and usually spends only 15 minutes or so on each activity, so that a two-hour block of study, for example, often includes as many as eight different activities with two or three languages.

Discussion

In the experiences of polyglots profiled in this article, certain features appear with such regularity that it is reasonable to suspect that they have widespread relevance in second language acquisition. Several of those features are outlined below. Of course, emerging as they do from brief and general profiles of only seven polyglots, these points do not represent firm conclusions but, rather, preliminary points of interest that would attain more significance in combination with similar findings in other studies of polyglots or other areas of second language acquisition.

Polyglottery is possible

Even allowing for some imprecision or exaggeration in the source material, it is probable that each of the people profiled here reached a highly advanced level of proficiency in at least eight languages and that some of them mastered many more than that. The main finding, then, from this overview is that mastery of eight or more languages is possible. Some people would counter this assertion with the argument that these polyglots have a special and innate aptitude for language learning and therefore their experiences are not applicable to typical language learners. This argument leads us to the next point.

Innate aptitude is a poor explanation for at least some cases of polyglottery

Despite studying languages from childhood, both Lomb and Arguelles failed to make progress in foreign languages until relatively late ages (Lomb in her 20s; Arguelles at around 18). This indicates that they did not possess a special innate aptitude for languages and that such aptitude is not a factor in the extraordinary

success that they achieved after that. In fact, Arguelles (2011b) has stated that he does not believe he has special talent for language learning.

Even in cases when polyglots acquired multiple languages as children, they did not always experience the quick and straightforward progress we would expect from naturally gifted learners. Jones and Williams began learning a foreign language at very young ages – probably before five in both cases – yet neither of them made much progress for the first few years. Until the age of 10, Jones's results for Latin were worse than many of his classmates at Harrow. If Jones and Williams did have extraordinary natural talent, it is odd that it took years of language learning before it became apparent.

Intense study

Lengthy and focused study explains the polyglots' success far better than innate aptitude does. Arguelles spent years studying languages for many hours a day, often as many as 16 hours a day. In her book *Polyglot: How I learn languages* (Lomb, 2008), Lomb makes it clear that she too put a lot of study time into her languages. Teignmouth wrote of Jones that "he was no less indebted to his uncommon industry and method for his attainments, than to his superior capacity" (Teignmouth, 1807, p.43). Russell (1858, p.476) wrote similarly of Mezzofanti that "the eminence to which he attained is in great part to be attributed to his own almost unexampled energy, and to the perseverance with which he continued to cultivate (his) gifts to the very last day of his life." What fueled this intense study? Each of the polyglots had different reasons for learning foreign languages – Hale wanted to preserve endangered languages; Jones and Arguelles wanted to understand great works of foreign literature

in the original languages; Lomb wanted to further her career – but in addition to those reasons they all seem to have shared an intrinsic interest in languages and taken some delight in learning languages simply for the sake of learning and figuring them out, as if they were a game.

Self-directed active learning

All seven of the polyglots directed their own learning to a very large degree, usually deciding of their own accord which languages they would learn and how they would learn them. That is not to say that they did not receive help from teachers and others. Even in that respect, though, the polyglots had very clear ideas about how to benefit from others' help and seemed to be very adept at implementing those ideas. In all aspects of the language learning process, they tended to be in control of their own learning.

Grammar focus

Since the 1970s, there has been an ongoing and often intense debate in the field of second language acquisition about whether learners should or should not focus on grammar in their study. Although most of the polyglots profiled here were dead by that time and perhaps never gave the issue much thought, the beliefs of all of them are clear from their approaches – a focus on grammar is important for language learning. All of the polyglots made a point of paying close attention to the grammar of each language they studied. They did not necessarily study grammatical formulas or attempt to gain meta-cognitive knowledge of grammar but they did at least focus on grammar in context, especially by writing out and studying sentences that exemplified

grammar points that they wished to acquire. Krashen and Kiss (1996) downplay the importance of grammar study in Lomb's approach. However, Lomb herself states clearly in her guide to language learning that she spent considerable time focusing on grammar by doing textbook exercises, writing sentences based on certain grammar points and having her grammar (and other) errors corrected by a native speaker (Lomb, 2008, p.148, p.155).

Communication focus

On the other hand, the polyglots also made strong use of communicative methods in their study. In accounts of their lives, it is very common to read that they went out of their way to find native speakers or advanced learners with whom they could practice speaking. It is interesting to note, too, that all of them read a great deal of authentic native speaker texts – novels and so on – in the languages they studied, often from the first stage of learning a language. In most of these cases, they appear to have focused more on the message in the book than the language, which means their reading was a communicative language learning activity. Thus, we see in the polyglots, approaches that always include both a grammar focus and a communication focus.

Learning more than one language at a time may have a synergistic effect

Hale was the only one to state that he believed that learning more than one language at a time made it easier to learn each of the languages but most, or possibly all, of the polyglots did at some stage study two or more languages together. This suggests that there is a possibility that it has a synergistic effect. Hale's recommendation alone makes it worthy of consideration.

Languages can be mastered relatively late in life

One of the persistent myths of language learning is that adults – and especially middle-aged or older adults – cannot make much progress in learning a foreign language. The myth is countered by all of the polyglots. Lomb is a particularly good example of an adult going from no knowledge to mastery. In her 30s, she began learning Russian and eventually reached a very high level in the language. In her 40s, she did likewise with Chinese and Japanese, her first non-Indo-European languages.

It is not necessary to spend time in a country where the language is spoken

This is an obvious point. However, spending time in a country where the language is spoken sometimes appears to take on exaggerated importance in the mind of learners and lack of it is sometimes used as an excuse for poor results actually caused by lack of study. The most striking rebuttal to the belief is that Mezzofanti mastered more than 25 languages without ever leaving Italy. Lomb wrote that going to a country where the language is spoken often provides no benefits that could not have been attained in the home country and that it has very little benefit for learners in the early stages (Lomb, 2008, p.158-9).

Study every day

The two polyglots who have written about their learning in most detail, Lomb and Arguelles, both recommend frequent study periods until a reasonably high level of proficiency is reached. In fact, Lomb's first rule of language learning was: "Spend time tinkering with the language every day" (ibid, p.159). Arguelles (2011a) states that one reason why he began to improve in French after entering university was that

he took French classes every day at university, unlike high school. Although it is not clear, it may well be that other polyglots placed similar emphasis on the frequency of study.

Multiple short periods of study

Burton (Wright, 1906, p. 65) stated that he did not like to spend more than 15 minutes studying a language at one time. He certainly spent more time than that studying each day but rather than studying in one long block of time he used multiple short sessions. Arguelles appears to do something similar. Although he continues studying for longer periods of time, he tends to change activities roughly every 15 minutes, often changing from one language to another. Lomb also appears to have changed learning activities several times during each day's study.

Conclusion

It is likely that the polyglots' success owes more to their regular and persistent study than any innate aptitude. As such, their approaches to learning have relevance for anyone attempting to learn a foreign language. Of special interest are the features that appear frequently in different polyglots' approaches, several of which emerged in the overview here. On the whole, the topic of polyglottery seems rich enough to warrant considerably more attention than it has received up until now.

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The Romanticized Plato

Peter Cheyne

Abstract

This paper argues for a reading of Coleridge that not only claims a philosophical lineage going back to Plato, but also that one which recognizes that Coleridge modified the Platonic epistemology and ontology to yield a philosophical frame for Romanticism. An analysis of Plato's Divided Line passage in Book VII of the *Republic* provides a scheme for Plato's scheme of knowledge and being, and this is shown to lie behind, with modifications, Coleridge's polar scheme of the mental faculties (1). It is argued that Romanticism is not only a movement with a Platonic heritage, but also that it is a modification of Platonism, the major difference being a new understanding of the imagination more consonant with Plato's actual use of poetic description, symbol, and myth, followed by the elevation of this imagination to a position above the understanding, Plato's *dianoia*. By recasting the Divided Line that harmonizes the faculties into a polar scheme, Coleridge returned a dignity to *aisthesis*, sensory intuition, such that it could be recognized as the unselfconscious counterpart of reason, able to recognize beauty in the sensible, and to have a sense—although largely without comprehension, first principles, or even logical consistency—of meaning and value.

Reading a Romantic Plato is possible in two different but complementary ways. There is the Plato of the Romantics, that is, Plato as read through and interpreted by the Romantic philosophers and poets. There is also the proto-Romantic Plato, anticipating the nineteenth century Romantics by over two thousand years and influencing them directly, as well as through the neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus (204 – 270); the Italian Renaissance humanists such as Marsilio Ficino (1433 – 1499) and his Florentine Academy, recreating of the Academy of Plato, and Pico della Mirandola (1463 -1494); the German mystic, Jakob Böhme (1575 -1624); and the Cambridge Platonists, most notably Henry More (1614 -1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617-1689). There are elements throughout Plato, and specific passages in his works, that can be read as proto-Romantic. There is also a proto-Romantic strain throughout Plato in the dynamic and creative tension between rational, intellectual philosophy and its expressions in impassioned and imagistic poetic form.

Here I examine how Platonism was transformed in the hands of the

Romantics. The most important of these changes was in the role of imagination. Through imagination as Coleridge recast it, Ideas can affect the understanding. Without this imaginative act, the understanding is the lower understanding only, remaining at the level of concepts and abstractions as though this were the end and apex of thinking, which is, of course, Coleridge's criticism of empiricism. I examine a central schema of Plato's epistemology and ontology, the Divided Line analogy, and argue that Coleridge creatively recast this schema, mainly by finding a higher role for a radically re-thought imagination. The result of this recasting can be described as a Romantic Platonism.

Authors such as Mary Ann Perkins (2), and R. M. Hare (3) have argued for a reading of "two Platos". I basically sympathize with such readings, as I find both a creative tension in Plato between the sometimes quite dry search for definitional clarity, and metaphysical precision, and the poetic turns taken when Plato wishes to gesture towards ineffables such as the state of contemplating the Forms, the confrontation with Beauty, or the encounter with a daimonic conscience. However, I prefer not to talk of "two Platos", because that binary phrase is not subtle enough express the notion of the creative tension as being always present in Plato. In my opinion the creative tension is not so much a creative tension in one man, Plato, but a dynamic seen to be necessarily present, if pursued in good faith, in the nature of the problems he pursued.

James Vigus has recently published a book about the influence of Plato on Coleridge, and he does a very good job of tracing Plato's influence within the Coleridgean corpus (4). I agree with Vigus that Coleridge's Platonism was genuine, and I add that Coleridge then modified Platonism, sometimes in the light of Plotinus,

sometimes in the lights of Kant and Schelling, towards the direction of German and, from his and Wordsworth's own creative endeavours, British Romanticism. Raymond Geuss has fairly recently continued what I believe to be the mistaken, Nietzschean (and what Geuss calls post-Romantic (5)), interpretation of Plato that holds that Plato championed propositional knowledge as the ideal and apex of all ethical and practical life. This I believe to be mistaken because for Plato the highest form of knowledge, *noesis* and its eventual contemplation of the Forms, is ultimately non-propositional, despite the epistemological ascent to this position through conceptual *dianoia* and logical dialectic. I partially agree with Geuss's position that Plato considered poetry to be 'not a reliable vehicle for correct knowledge' and that the 'Romantics tried to reverse Plato's specific account of poetry and its valuation, claiming that it was an important kind of knowledge' (6). However, the reality is not so simple, especially when considering Plato's use of elevated, poetic language to symbolically convey the perhaps otherwise ineffable views from the summits, as it were, in his dialogues.

The poetry of Diotima's instruction, to Socrates, on the ladder of love, in the *Symposium*; the winged charioteer of the *Phaedrus* symbolizing the soul's spirited ascent to contemplation of the Forms as an ascent occasioned by the encounter with Love and Beauty; the allegory of the prisoners in the cave in the *Republic* to show the political task of the philosopher as having to descend back into the cave and point out the illusory, shadowy nature of what is being taken for reality; the myth of the demiurge in the *Timaeus* to convey the theoretical role of the Forms as not creating the world, but as being needed for the order experienced in it: these are passages of the greatest poetical genius. While Plato knew he ought to use the clearest

propositional language as far as it could take him, he was equally certain that propositional explication could not take us all the way, as far as the dialectic goes.

My argument is basically that Romanticism can be understood as a modification of Platonism. I propose that Coleridge made some of those important modifications to Platonism to fashion a Romantic mood and system out of the Platonic system. Ernst Cassirer insightfully commented that 'To poeticize philosophy and to philosophize poetry — such was the highest aim of all romantic thinkers' (7). This is an accurate description that can be verified by tracing the development of philosophical concerns throughout Romantic poetry, as well as explicitly in Schelling's assertion of Art as the highest expression of a culture's philosophy, and in Coleridge's self-declared mission, in *Biographia Literaria*, requiring the difficult pursuit after the rigorous logic of poetry.

One of Coleridge's key modifications to Platonism was to place his Romantically reconceived category of Imagination between Plato's levels of *noesis* (reason) and *dianoia* (mathematical and scientific understanding), perhaps even straddling both. The dividing lines are not to be conceived strictly. Indeed it is well to recall Coleridge's maxim that, 'It is a dull and obtuse mind, that must divide in order to distinguish; but it is a still worse, that distinguishes in order to divide' (8).

The point is not to stress an insistence on a fragmented mind, but to show first a Platonic and then a Romantic (Coleridgean) model of mind, to see how the latter is a modification of the former, how both show different models for the unified, harmonic nature of that mind, and how the Coleridgean remodeling provided a system resulting in a Romanticized Platonism. To explore this modification is to follow the direction of the changes made, and to consider the meaning of these changes

concerning the dynamics of the whole system.

A creative tension is evident in Plato's writings that can be felt in his epistemology, and throughout his works. It is the tension between the mystical and the logical. This tension is doubtless partly related to Plato's attraction to Pythagoreanism, with its tendency to number mysticism, the belief that number is the fundamental constituent of the universe, and that the harmony of the spheres is the result of the mathematico-musical order held to be found in the cosmos. The Pythagorean School held that number is mystical. On the mystical side of Platonism is the example of Socrates' *daimon*, like a call of conscience, which brought him to a trance when he said or was about to say something "offensive to the gods". The original meaning of '*mystikos'* was 'closed lips/eyes' and later meant an initiate, and describes in literal terms a response to the acknowledgement of the ineffable. The inspiration described in the Ion, a dialogue exploring how the rhapsodist can persuade the audience, is an example of pre-philosophical, rhapsodic persuasion that works, so the analogy went, like a kind of magnetism, transmitting the inspiration of the poet to the audience. The Socratic trance of the *daimon* experience is of a higher level, and is taken by Plato to be something more mysterious. Rhapsodic persuasion can be understood as a kind of human magnetism or hypnotism, lulling reason to sleep, but the moral intuition that Socrates was described to have experienced is one that awakens reason to the Good. An example of this is outlined in the Phaedrus.

R.M. Hare saw this tension as leading to two ways of interpreting Plato, which then leads to a view of two Platos, Pato and Lato. The one interpretation of Plato is of an eternity inspired mystic advocating an ascetic life of mystical contemplation, eschewing worldly opinion and ambition. This interpretation is one

perhaps originally exaggerated to by the religious Gnostics, which view (the also mystical) Plotinus attacked as simplistic and reductive, with the Gnostics interpreting Plato as proposing that the phenomenal world is a dreary prison for the divine spark of soul (9). Hare suggests that this mystical Plato "would have been at home in a Zen Buddhist monastery" (10). The "other" Plato pursues analytic philosophy, is concerned with definitions and problems of linguistic meaning, and skillfully employs dialectic method to unravel ethical, ontological, and epistemological problems, revealing their *aporia*, and is more often than not more content to leave a problem unsolved, but now more clearly comprehended, than to propose theories or to be otherwise dogmatic.

Hare presents a breezy, cheerful account of two Platos, but this account risks missing the point of the one Plato working within a creative tension of currents. By proposing that the pursuit of definition and the exploration of positions through dialectic is that of a rational, analytic Plato, one could easily miss the point that the purpose of dialectic is to 'follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us' (11). The logic of dialectic leads the participants in directions, with its turns and returns, that are not always comfortable. It is not a dry, professionally academic process that necessarily excludes the possibility of 'spiritual journey'. Hadot has described the Socratic dialectic of Plato's dialogues as 'spiritual exercise', indeed as a 'Way of Life' (12). The pursuit of dialectic sometimes benumbs the participant, with the exposing of *aporia* in their arguments and definitions leading to a feeling of being stung by a stingray. This process of elenchus, or cross-examination, in dialectic is used to show up *aporia* or ignorance and from this, newly recognized, startling position, to foster a desire for genuine examination, both self-examination of virtues,

beliefs and opinions, as well as examination of external states of affairs. The elenchus and continuation of dialectic is a spiritual exercise in the sense of being a philosophical pilgrim's progress.

Mary Ann Perkins challenges, following Bernstein (13), a modern-postmodern view of Plato as the villain of philosophy who elevated reason to an absolute power and who inflicted an ideal of universals, grand schemes, and absolutes onto subsequent thinking. Perkins identifies this anti-Platonic view with a twentieth century move, particularly in Continental Philosophy, against logocentrism, best exemplified in Derrida, deconstructing Platonism, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism. Over 150 years earlier, Coleridge was defending Plato against charges of 'estranging the mind from sober experiences' and that Plato was indeed 'inductive throughout' (14).

Perkins argues that Coleridge's "other Plato" warns against the atomizing experience into only phenomena from the senses, and with "unmitigated hostility […] pursues the assumptions, abstractions, generalities, and verbal legerdemain of the sophists!"(15). This was the Plato who, in recognizing the unity of the True and the Good, paved the way for Kant's deontological ethics, showing how a non-empirical ethical system can be reached by pure practical reason. For Perkins, Coleridge's preferred "other Plato" is opposed to that reading of Plato which represents him as representing the absolute, the universal, and the eternal. The "other Plato" is taken as understanding that the objects of *noesis* cannot be represented, for any representation would be in concepts and images, abstractions, and thus fall short of the measure of the *noemata*. Hence, the "other Plato" often discusses the movement towards the *noemata*, the Ideas, with self-consciously poetic symbolism, allegories and similes.

The misrepresentation of Plato in Coleridge's day perhaps was partly derived from the empirical tendency to understand symbolism as abstraction from phenomenal experience. In this case, as abstraction, Plato's symbolic passages would necessarily be merely fanciful and fallacious, however, Coleridge's point is that Plato's symbolism was not pushed from behind, from sense experience and abstractions therefrom, but was pulling upwards to indicate Ideas, the final ascent to which could not be present in any concept or symbol.

Perkins attributes the skewed, negative opinions of Plato and Coleridge to a 'philosophical collective unconscious' which, since the seventeenth century, has separated reality 'into a "really real" which is phenomenal, and directly experienced […], on the one hand, and a parallel but entirely subjective reality, on the other. The latter may be emotionally, aesthetically and morally significant but has no claims to universality' (16). Platonism is hence prone to be dubbed "other-worldly", and Coleridge thought to have been better off 'confining his metaphysical meanderings to poetry' (17). Contrary to this opinion, Coleridge held that he was pursuing an ideal Realism, certainly insofar as he, with Plato, held principles to be logically antecedent to phenomena.

Coleridge faced a seemingly insurmountable difficulty in the dogmatic empiricism of his day, a day in which Kantianism was not yet widespread in England, which presumed that principles can only be abstractions from phenomena, rather than being their causes, constitutors and constant regulators. The challenge Coleridge faced against this metaphysical prejudice of empiricism was recounted in an entry of his Table Talk, recalling a conversation with an acquaintance:

> He told me that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute ground of, principles; to which I said, that unless he had a principle of selection, he would not have taken notice of those facts upon which he grounded his principle. You must have a lantern in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them; and if you could, you could not arrange them. "But then," said Mr. —, "that principle of selection came from facts!" — "To be sure!" I replied; "but there must have been again an antecedent light to see those antecedent facts. The relapse may be carried in imagination backwards forever, but go back as you may you cannot come to a man without a previous aim or principle." (18)

Coleridge's "other Plato" was not only set against the empiricists of the day, but also against some of Coleridge's recent contemporary Enlightenment and Romantic philosophers. Coleridge showed Plato symbolically expressing, in his dynamic philosophy, the unity of reality as a unity with distinction, as opposed to Schelling's apparently Parmenidean Absolute as a unity of utter sameness, which unity Hegel criticized as 'the night in which all cows are black' (19).

The notion of two Platos in Hare seems to be useful at first, in identifying different currents at work in Plato, but ultimately must be seen as superficial. Perkins' "two Platos" notion seems to bring us closer to the reality by contrasting not two Platos, but two interpretations of Plato. Within the so-called analytic Plato operates the current aiming towards ultimate knowledge, via a process that requires *aporia* to be contemplated, ignorance to be recognized, and stubborn, cherished opinions to be abandoned as the participants negotiate the rational and spiritual obstacle course of dialectic.

Within the so-called mystical Plato, exhorting the audience to seek knowledge in invisible Forms, are quite logical arguments that assert, for example, that any, indeed all, sensible examples put forward as examples of Justice are flawed, and in some way or other can also be shown to be unjust. Any particular police officer,

any particular lawyer, and particular law in any particular nation can be shown to suggest Justice, especially when all the particular examples are considered together, but will always also be able to be shown as capable of leading to injustice in some case or other. That is, the particulars taken to exemplify Justice can always be shown to be not universally Just, that is to say, Just in every possible and imaginable circumstance. This is not to make the trivial observation that particulars are not universals. Plato does not argue the trivial point that particulars are not universals, but rather that if we wish to know what, say "intelligence" is, observing examples of intelligent men and women will provide an initial guide, but will also lead us astray until we then progress from the stage of observing sensibles and move into a more general approach dealing with abstracts. And again, from the abstracts, which are dealt with according to theories and their schemata with axioms taken for granted in subjects such as Geometry, one can progress to another stage, that of dialectic leading to *noesis*, which is taken to be an intuition of Ideas without either a perception of sensibles or an imaging of mathematical or conceptual schemata.

The Phaedrus contains an excellent example of the poetic Plato. Jowett summarizes this very well, in his introductory essay to the Laws, 'the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the chirping of grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the *agnus castus* [chaste tree], and the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse' (20). In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates attempts to better Lysias' speech on love, wherein Lysias argued that the beloved should choose a "lover" who is calm, rational, and not really in love. In competitive response, Socrates grows eloquent in his speech against eros and in support of the non-lover. However, the *daimon*, Socrates' inner voice or inner god,

stills Socrates' speech, calling him to silence and reflection before an improved argument can be formed. The previous arguments, Socrates realizes, were 'clever, but not wise'. Then Socrates gives the celebrated account of love as an irrational, but extraordinary, madness, a divine madness. Plato relates this inspiration of wisdom above cleverness to his theory of the Forms. The genuine lover, described as a charioteer driving a pair of winged horses, controls the sensual, unruly, Earth-bound horse to be kept in harness with the noble, pure, heaven-bound horse. Beyond heaven, all is without shape, and can only be "seen" with the intelligent mind. In this state, such Forms as Justice, *Sophrosune* or Self-possession, and Beauty can be contemplated. In the analogy, experiencing beauty in another person is a spur to contemplation of the Form of Beauty, hence it is argued to be unwise to either eschew beauty or to give way to it only sensually.

This is a progression whose movement is born of poetic imagination and is given expressively. What Plato actually meant by dialectic is a topic of perennial debate. Popper considered Plato's dialectic to be based on a doctrine of mystical intuition and wrote off Plato as a mystic with totalitarian tendencies (21). By dialectic, did Plato mean only an apparently irrational connection to knowledge itself, through intuition of the Forms? Or is the movement of dialectic wholly logical, advancing by refutations and modifications, as in the very method Popper held as enabling progression in science? Evidence for both of these interpretations can be found in Plato's writings, and the creative tension described above works between these meanings. The mystical *noesis* inspired by the *daimon* in the dramatic dialogues shows a proto-Romantic side to Plato, who then expressed this inspiration with poetic analogies.

With Coleridge developed a rise in the status and function of imagination, both in general culture and within the Platonic tradition. From Plato, through Plotinus, to the Romantics, the role of imagination grew in importance, finding its high point in Coleridge's system.

This resulted in a Platonism more receptive to exploring and communicating ideas in and through the arts than Plato himself advocated. This Romantic, art-friendly 'Plato' (cf. Mary Ann Perkins' "other Plato") became an idealized figure for Romantics from Schelling to Shelley. Plato explored questions of the highest philosophical and intellectual order by using the form of the dramatic dialogue, rather than first-person, scholarly exposition. This method remains true to the Socratic intuition that education, as *educare*, or drawing out, and especially within philosophy, is more akin to midwifery, the profession of Socrates mother, than to the attempt to fill their charges with knowledge as jugs to empty vessels as the sophists professed they were doing.

Plato recognizes the need in philosophy for the moods of wonder, of amazement, of being shocked and dumbfounded, and even of that philosophic frenzy exemplified by Diotima, the mantic priestess. Far from Plato representing the denigration of human emotion in favour of a pure, mathematical reason replacing all organic lines with right angles and integers, Plato presents a higher synthesis of a material, sensible, chaotic world given intelligibility insofar as it has a formality through the Ideas, the laws of phenomena that are not themselves phenomena. For Plato, spiritedness, receptiveness to sensual love and beauty, and the mood of wonder are important motors for the highest *noesis* of the philosophical attitude. Hence the appeal of Plato to the Romantics who sought to unite deep feeling with profound

thought.

In discussing what he recognized as the particular genius of Wordsworth's poetry, Coleridge wrote that, 'it was the union of deep feeling with profound thought, the fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed' (22). Wordsworth saw reason in passion in much the same way as Plato, in dialogues such as *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, saw that cleverness is not the same thing as wisdom, and that wisdom is present in such "divine madness" as love and philosophical frenzy. Wordsworth spoke of 'passion, which itself / Is highest reason in a soul sublime' (23). 'O for some Sun', called Coleridge, seeking for wisdom with love, the intelligible with the sensual, 'that shall unite Light and Warmth' (24). From here we can see the natural connections and affinities which led to the Romantic embracing of Platonic themes such as the unity of Truth and Beauty, explicit in Keat's 'Ode to a Grecian Urn'; and which explain Shelley's devoted translations of Plato's Ion and Symposium. Shelley called Plato, 'essentially a poet' in a tract that I would like to quote from at length as it exemplifies so well the connections between the Platonizing Romantics and the proto-Romantic Plato:

> The distinction between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error. The distinction between philosophers and poets has been anticipated. Plato was essentially a poet—the truth and splendor of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are the most intense that it is possible to conceive. He rejected the measure of the epic, dramatic, and lyrical forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in thoughts divested of shape and action, and he forebore to invent any regular plan of rhythm which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style. Cicero sought to imitate the cadence of his periods, but with little success. Lord Bacon was a poet. His language has a sweet and majestic rhythm, which satisfies the sense, no less than the almost superhuman wisdom of his philosophy satisfies the intellect; it is a strain which distends, and then bursts the circumference of the reader's mind, and pours itself forth together with it into the universal element with which it has perpetual sympathy. All the authors of revolutions in opinion are not only necessarily poets as they are inventors, nor even as their words unveil the permanent analogy of things by images which participate in the life of truth; but as their periods are harmonious and rhythmical, and contain in themselves the elements of verse; being the echo of the eternal

> music. Nor are those supreme poets, who have employed traditional forms of rhythm on account of the form and action of their subjects, less capable of perceiving and teaching the truth of things, than those who have omitted that form. Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton (to confine ourselves to modern writers) are philosophers of the very loftiest power. A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth (25).

The Romantics were drawn to the unity of opposites they read in Plato: the epistemology written in dramatic form; the synthesis of reason and passion; the poetic passages to continue where rational argument with literal concepts must give way to the symbolic. Coleridge's scheme, his counterpart to Plato's Divided Line, is a polarity with harmonies between the extremes, and the two middle sections on either side, and on the two parts that meet in the centre. Thus in Coleridge's writings, it is made explicit that reason is present in sense, and in that way, sense is closer to its opposite in the scale (reason) than to its neighbour (fancy). While such harmonies might be imagined in Plato's system, they are never explicit in Plato's writings.

Hence we can see Coleridge's scheme as a modification of Plato's that (a) allows artistic activity to co-operate in the highest intellectual activity, as argued by Schelling: because 'aesthetic intuition is merely intellectual intuition become objective, it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form [...]. Art is paramount to the philosopher [...] it is art alone which can succeed in objectifying with universal validity what the philosopher is able to present in a merely subjective fashion' (26); and (b) allows phenomena to appear from out of natural laws as ideal reality in an organic fashion in a way that does not conceive phenomena as comprising a "second world".

This point allows for a discussion of the Plato of the Romantics and whether

Romanticized Plato might be a modification of Plato, or an exploration of one aspect of Plato, the proto-Romantic Plato. The Romantic return to Platonism was seen as both a correction to empiricism and a progression from Kant.

Coleridge's polar diagram elegantly communicates the Romantic return to Platonism and the major difference between this Romantic Platonism and Plato's scheme in the Divided Line is obvious, namely, the elevated place of imagination. The preceding page shows Plato's Divided Line above Coleridge's harmonic polarity of the mental powers that he sketched out while reading Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*. I propose that Coleridge's scheme is a modification of Plato's Divided Line that both Romanticizes Plato and develops a Romantic scheme from Platonism. In the tables above, Coleridge wrote out the order of mental powers twice, in opposite orders, in order to emphasize the harmonies between the poles. Note also that both tables are best written out vertically, rather than horizontally, but for sake of clarity regarding reading the words I wrote this out horizontally. This relation of Coleridge's scheme to Plato's Divided Line has not previously been made in the secondary literature, nor was it mentioned by Coleridge, but I believe it is an important tool in both showing and exploring how Coleridge fashioned his Romanticism out of a proto-Romantic Platonism that needed a few tweaks, such as the elevation of the imaginative faculty, to become appropriate for the anti-mechanistic, post-Kantian Romantic movement of the nineteenth century.

The influence of Plotinus on Coleridge is apparent. Plotinus quietly passed over Plato's imitative theory of poetic-artistic representation, his own theory proposing that poetic-artistic creation springs from the same reason-principles, or laws, as nature itself. This would be no mere reproduction, but aesthetic production forming

its material. Thus for Plotinus, beauty in poetic-artistic representation and beauty in nature develop from the same principles. Plotinus argued in the Enneads that the aesthetic contemplation of art and nature leads beyond merely discursive reason and on towards the Ideas, or reason-principles, which neo-Platonic argument also appears in Schelling, as mentioned above.



direction. Plotinus did not reject outright Plato's position of imagistic representation as mimetic, as we can see in *Ennead*, IV. 3.10, where Plotinus describes the imitations of art as dim and feeble copies, mere eidola (idols) as so many "toys". Again, this time in *Ennead*, V. 9.11, Plotinus joins painting and sculpture to dancing and mime as art forms that take their models from the outward appearances of the world of sense in contrast to the higher art form of music, which takes the intelligibility of the essences, the Reason-Principles of things, as its models. Here also, Plotinus raises architecture and carpentry above painting, sculpture, dance, and mime, because the productive arts are founded on the Ideal principles of proportion, and moreover, their aim is actuality,

not appearance, and they take their model from the Idea, the purpose, function, and necessary properties, of a building, of a bed, and so on, rather than imitating any appearance, which position is basically the same as that expounded by Plato in *Republic*, Book X, namely, that of the carpenter's bed as being less far removed from reality than the doubly mimetic bed of the painter. So far Plotinus does not diverge from Plato's explicitly stated views regarding imagistic representation.

However, Plotinus' explicit statements on the subject go beyond what Plato explicitly stated. Whether or not what Plotinus says about artistic production goes against Plato is a matter of debate, and there is no doubt that Plotinus would have been sure that his position was certainly in the spirit of Plato and exemplified Plato's own practices as witnessed in the dialogues. Audrey Rich brings together the materials in Plotinus to describe his distinctively neo-Platonic contribution to aesthetics (27). Plotinus, there is no doubt, considered himself a Platonist, and would not have considered himself to have contributed anything un-Platonic to that school of philosophy. Nevertheless, the Plotinian theory of artistic creation is to be considered a novel contribution, one which came from out of Platonism, but was not in the original Platonic corpus itself. For Plotinus, the artist bases the work not on the material model, but on the contemplation of the Ideal and the principles of the thing portrayed. Rich points to Plotinus' example of the sculptor Phidias (28). His celebrated statue of Zeus was based on no human model, but was an attempt to convey how Zeus would appear, were he to manifest himself to us. Art remains a kind of mimesis, but it is a first-hand mimesis, contemplating the Ideas themselves and giving them sensible expression. However, Plotinus' view goes deeper than that, as in *Ennead*, V, 8.1, he states that artists do not merely reproduce the model, but indeed 'run back to the principles from

which the natural objects derive.' Here we have a model of artistic creation that is not so much copying as running in parallel with its depicted subject. The artist calls upon the principles of creation which created the model, draws them together in her imagination, and uses these principles to recreate the object in a different material setting. Rather than being a copy of a copy, genuine art is a copy of the essence itself, or even a parallel of the essence itself. I do not wish to push this idea of artistic creation as a kind of parallel creation in Plotinus to far, because, for Plotinus, 'something ugly that is alive is actually preferable to a beautiful statue' (29). Still, we can see that in a modified Platonic view, artistic production is more imaginative than imitative. Indeed, it could be considered erroneous to judge Plato's statements regarding imagistic reproduction and stylization as referring to what we, and Plotinus, called art, because Plato did not have the concept of "Art" that we are now using. However that point may be taken, certainly we can detect see a lineage from Plato to Plotinus to Coleridge's theory of the imagination, involving an imaginative contemplation of the principles within the subject of the artistic work, and not merely a skillful depiction of its outward forms.

This division in Platonism is not, I think, one quietly introduced by a Plotinus wishing to both remain faithful to Plato and keep his devotion to aesthetic contemplation. It can be argued that it comes from a tension enjoyed by Plato himself in some of the more dramatic and poetic scenes in his dialogues. The most relevant to consider here is when Socrates is seduced from his wonted urban environment to follow Phaedrus beyond the city walls and discourse along the river bank between a cypress and a plane tree. Socrates is seduced by the chance of a good discussion as Phaedrus holds in his hand the script of a speech on love recently made by Lysias, yet

of the proposal to hold this discussion in the countryside, where he fears his reason might fall under the sway of river nymphs, he objects: ‘the landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me, only people do’, (*Phaedrus*, 230d). In the spirit of this scene of natural riverside beauty, in a spot between the chaste tree and the plane tree, with the general topic of the lover and the beloved, we see Socrates move from merely rational, self-interested logic to an impassioned, elevated logic inspired by Socrates’ feeling the warning sign from his *daimon*. Had he continued the speech in favour of the rational detachment of the non-lover, he would have offended something sacred. Socrates begins again, this time wholly in favour of a spirited love that might sometimes appear to have a touch of madness, but this is a divine madness, like poetry or prophecy. Without doubt, Plato relished inscribing this dramatic irony, having Socrates's *daimon* chide his first, too coldly logical speech, and inspire Socrates to sing his paean to the divine madness in love and poetry. Here we have the proto-Romantic Plato, beloved of Schelling, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley.

Plato's model of thought and thinking is implicit throughout his writings and is most explicit when he directly discusses epistemology. In such passages as the Analogy of the Divided Line in the *Republic*, Book VI; the *Phaedrus* Analogy of the Charioteer struggling to steer the white, noble winged horse and the dark, dappled, earthy one; and the Ladder of Love in the *Symposium*, Platonic epistemology and ontology are seen to be inextricably related. The *Theaetetus* is a dialogue discussing the nature of knowledge. It is almost entirely epistemological, considering theories of knowledge as merely perception; knowledge as true judgement; and knowledge as true judgement with an account. Here Socrates argues against Theaetetus’ theory (and a related Protagorean, relativistic argument) that knowledge is nothing but perception.

The *Theaetetus* is Plato's purest exploration of epistemology, elsewhere in Plato the epistemology is always intermixed with ontology.

Knowledge is then considered as true judgment, but this is also dismissed, as one might by pure luck be possessed of true judgement, with no way to distinguish it from false beliefs. Eventually, the definition of knowledge as 'true judgment with an account' is also seen to be unsatisfactory, because defining 'an account' as 'knowledge of the distinctions of the thing to be known' would make a circular argument. The Platonic ontology of the Forms does not have a strong presence in this dialogue. In the *Theaetetus* we can read a presentation of epistemology carefully isolated from ontology. This epistemological argument follows an explicit progress through a dialectic advanced by Socrates playing midwife to the young Theaetetus' search to clarify what is and what is not knowledge.

In the Divided Line passage of the Republic, we see a simple rendering of Plato's epistemology as it relates to his ontology, the theory of Forms. This passage may be read both epistemologically and ontologically. The Divided Line, with its four main divisions, represents stages along the way towards knowledge: from shadows and reflections; to the visible three-dimensional things that cause these images; through concepts derived from these and mathematical notions as refinements of these; to the knowledge of the Forms themselves. To read the Divided Line as progressing through stages of human awareness is to read it epistemologically. This direction moves from murky, distorted apprehensions of reality to an increasingly general, abstract, clear knowledge of reality, culminating in the contemplation of the Forms and the Form of the Good. Obviously epistemology and ontology are intertwined in the analogy of the Divided Line. The ontological reading would be in

reverse order, beginning with the most real in Plato's system, the Form of the Good, and the other Forms; then descending through mathematical notions and general classes of things; to the individual, sensible things; which in turn create the shadows, reflections and basic images from which we humans begin our individual epistemological adventures.

Plato's Divided Line, read epistemologically, moves from aesthesis and *doxa* (sense perception and belief) about *eikasia* and *pistis* (images and opinions relating to perceived objects), through *dianoia* (logical reasoning and scientific, abstracting, empirical approaches) involving *mathematika* (concepts to be found in mathematics and in the empirical generalizations of science), and finally to reason's dialectical attainment to noetic knowledge of the Forms. In this direction, following the epistemological current that builds towards true knowledge, we read the line starting from shadowy acquaintance with sense data, images and reflections, which basic forms of acquaintance yield imagining and perception. Plato's model then moves through the common sense 'animal faith' of belief and opinion regarding perceptions. Beyond this stage, conceptualization leads to thinking, after empirical generalizations produce the schemata required by science and the technical arts. Then *dianoia*, rational thinking, produces the elements and formulae of mathematics. Finally, through dialectic and through sustained contemplation, there is the stage of episteme, which allows for a *noesis*, or rational intuition, of the Forms, and, ultimately, the Good or the Form of Forms.

When read ontologically, the movement through the divided line is to be understood in the reverse order. Reading the divided line ontologically is to see it as a model of reality with its reflections and shadows cast into faculties of mind

corresponding to levels of reality. In the order of thinking, proposes Plato's model, we tend to move from images, through opinion, to concepts, to pure science, to that imageless contemplation or *noesis* that is, he asserted, to be won through dialectic. This is a movement from shadows, reflections, images, and opinions, through conceptual and dianoetic refinements, to noetic contemplation.

However, the order of our usual thinking is an order that traces backwards, from what is most obvious and apparent (phenomena) to what is not phenomenal at all, and is the dialectical opposite of appearance. Usually our thinking moves inductively from appearances to concepts and plans, or rules. In the order of being, rather than of thinking, Plato's dynamic moves the other way, from the higher forms, through mathematical and then empirical concepts, to physical objects and then their images, shadows and reflections. That is, from sun, as it were, to shadow. It should also be kept in mind that while the epistemological movement can properly be described as having the movement outlined above, the ontological movement in Plato should be understood only metaphorically as movement and transition. The epistemological movement really is a transition from basic intuitions to more cognitive and developed levels of acquaintance with and knowledge of images, objects, concepts, and Ideas. We can see this movement in studies of child development, such as in Jean Piaget's psychological work in what he called genetic epistemology. The movement along the epistemological direction really is a movement because it requires and takes time; it moves along stages. But following the other direction, the ontological direction, the movement can only be metaphorical. For Plato, the ultimate reality is, and all of its epiphenomena, its concepts, reflections, shadows, and images exist simultaneously, rather than being progressing through stages that must take time to develop.

Forms do not become concepts, objects, and then images, in Plato's system, although concepts and phenomena (veridical or confused) are existentially dependent upon the Forms. Thinking about thinking about being (epistemology), in Plato, involves studying transitions of ever-closer approximations to truth from shadowy acquaintance, through doxic and conceptual comprehensions, to *noesis*. Thinking about being (the exercise of ontology) as such is in a sense always going to be off balance, external to where it intends to be, because it is thinking about being instead of being the being, until, that is, the ideal attainment of *noesis*, when the Idea in the mind is, ideally, identical to the object of contemplation. Whereas a concept is a concept of a thing, or rather of a class of thing, and is separate from the thing, or class, itself, providing philosophers with the epistemological gap, such a gap does not exist with the Platonic Idea and its apprehension or contemplation.

Of course, "Idea" is a sometimes troublesome translation of "*eidos*", and "Form" provides difficulties too, both words being all too familiar, hence easily misunderstood. "*Idea*" is not to be understood as a purely mental occurrence, as when someone "has an idea." There would be Ideas, whether or not there were philosophers to think them. *Noesis* of a Form or Idea is not a thinking that is separate from its object, unlike someone now thinking in an office of the actual Eiffel Tower in Paris, as opposed to just thinking its image. Coleridge described this important Platonic nuance when he argued that it is the "Queen Bee in the hive of error" to think that the same Idea in two minds would be two different Ideas. Another way of putting this is to stress that while the attainment and development of knowledge, studied in epistemology, is a process that requires time, this is not something that can be said of ultimate reality, modeled in ontology, according to Plato's model.

As in Plato, Coleridge's writings are united by the motif of thinking about thinking, with Platonic and neo-Platonic strains being the dominant tendencies. Coleridge's scheme of types, or faculties, of thought from fancy, through the understanding in its lower and higher forms, then imagination and finally reason provides a model that I read as being a Romantic recasting of the Platonic scheme of thinking from Sense to Reason, remodeling Plato’s scheme from *eikasia* to *noesis*.

Plato's model is a deliberate polarity wherein the distinctions between the perception of changeable sensible objects and the thinking of stable intelligibles (concepts and Forms) are offered a setting and a solution. It is a deliberate polarity because he carefully inscribed in the Divided Line his solution to what he saw as a central problem in the possibility of knowledge. Plato saw a disparity between the flux of sensible objects versus their stable universal concepts, and sought to solve this disparity with a polarity. Coleridge's scheme is also a deliberate polarity between the intelligible Forms and the objects of sense. In Coleridge's system the intelligible Forms include, as well as Plato's *eide* (Ideas), natural laws as things which are real but not strictly phenomenal, and which give rise to phenomena. For example, in gravitation, gravity itself is never seen, it a law, not a phenomenon, and it gives rise to phenomena such that understanding the law helps to understand the phenomena. ‘Plato treats principally of the truths, as it is manifested at the ideal pole, as the science of intellect’, Coleridge noted, whereas Bacon applied himself, ‘to the same truth, as it is manifested at the other, or material pole, as the science of nature.’ Coleridge was impressed that Plato wrote of ‘Living Laws’, and that Bacon termed, ‘the laws of nature, Ideas’ (30). Coleridge here provided a refreshing view on Plato’s Theory of Ideas, appealing to many engaged in a mathematical study of the laws

behind phenomena that could not themselves be phenomena.

While in Plato the affinities between *eikasia* and *noesis* are neither obvious nor elucidated, in Coleridge the affinities between sense and reason are never forgotten. These relations are described as harmonious, with the higher being detectable, though not self-conscious, in the lower. This is to say that Coleridge argues for harmonies of Form and reason between the phenomena of sense and the movement of reason. In Coleridge, there can be more easily appreciated an impression of reason—of logos, law, ratio and idea—in the phenomena of *aisthesis* that is implicit in Plato but is not drawn out into an explicit topic of discussion until the neo-Platonists. An impression of reason in aesthesis would come from hints of rhyme and reason in our qualitative and subjective experience. It is not surprising that a Romantic poet, engaged in poetizing sense experience, and uniting this poetry with philosophical interests, expressed the idea of such a harmony.

This idea is not explicit in Plato's writings, and the case for an interpretation finding it implicitly there would not be persuasive to many. There are hints, most notably from Aristotle, that Plato's lectures and discussions in the Academy treated of the relation between the Good or the One, the Ideas, and phenomena more fully, less metaphorically, and as his own developed theory rather than through the devices of the dramatic Socrates, Timaeus, or the Stranger. Indeed, in the *Timaeus* myth, Plato argues for an ultimate failure of harmony between the Forms and chaotic matter. Plato describes primal chaos being ordered with the Forms by a demiurge. Although this order resulted in a world of order that can more or less be understood, an element of intractable chaos remains in sensible objects and our feelings related to them. Coleridge's Romantic harmony, on the other hand, has no place for an intractable

element of chaos that cannot be harmonized with reason. In Plato's writings, the strongest hints we detect of any harmony between *eikasia* and *noesis* are in the Symposium, when Socrates relates Diotima's allegory of the Ladder of Love. In this story, beauty is judged to be both perceivable and intelligible: a chink through which the Forms can illuminate the sensible, thus providing the first rung on the Ladder of Love from sensible and material concerns, up the rungs of intelligible Forms to the Sea of Beauty and direct contemplation of the Forms in their pure aspect.

Eikasia

The object of *eikasia*, acquaintance with the world through images, is the phenomenal as images, *eikones*, icons. It is the realm, as it were, of colours, shapes, sounds, and other sensations taken at face value without critical reflection with respect to what they are images of. As such, it is it is naïve; Plato calls it a state of ignorance. Eikasia is neither true nor false, being derived from aesthesis, our raw aesthetic experience. The sophist in *Theaetetus* claimed this *aisthesis* to be all that there is to knowledge. In some ways a classical counterpart of Hume, Theaetetus (the dramatic character in the eponymous dialogue), influenced by the theories of Heraclitus and especially Protagoras, argued that all we can know is what can be apprehended by the senses. We can think of *aisthesis* as imagistic cognition; an intuition prior to existential judgments. In *eikasia*, a parade of icons, there is no claim to truth. *Eikasia* is the beholding of images, being a fixation on the image in the dream, memory, reverie, or on the reflection, the shadow, or the painted, poetic, or other likeness. *Eikasia* is a fixation in so far as it does not contemplate the image as merely an image of something else.

There is discussion in the secondary literature regarding whether *eikasia* is an illusory misapprehension of the images of things for the objects that they are merely likenesses of, or whether something somewhat different is supposed to be going on. Hardie suggests that *eikasia* means 'conjecture' in general, so that people in *eikasia*, like the prisoners in the cave, make conjectures, theories, and likely stories about what is going on, without necessarily making conjectures regarding any supposed originals the existence of which accounts for the appearances of the likenesses (31).

I take *eikasia* to be similar to what Heidegger's described as the state of fascination, which state is taken to describe being immersed and absorbed in the (usually inherited and unquestioned) concerns of everyday life in its average everydayness. In *eikasia*, we are held, almost held captive, by the appearances and by the images. I read *eikasia* as thus being fascinated by the appearances. The pleasures of the sparkles of surface beauty, the pains of everyday frustrations can pull the mind into this level where one becomes caught up in concerns at this level without looking at the possibilities of reality beyond these appearances. The charms of *eikasia* involve *phantasia*, the accepting of images and appearances woven into stories. Here is a level that can be illuminated with a famous word from Coleridge, speaking of 'that willing suspension of disbelief that constitutes poetic faith' (32). Polarizing the Divided Line gives back a dignity to *eikasia's* objects – *eikasia*, become the Romantic imagination, is now also intuition, it also has deep truths, but the epistemological *pathema* that goes with it is the lowest, the least capable of knowing truth, the most ignorant. Two points though, Plato in 532c does talk about moving from seeing divine reflections as a way to move up to genuine knowledge. At the second point, *eikasia's* focus is such that the objects in its perspective should be taken not as following along the path of

knowledge to truth (and thence goodness) but rather along the path of appreciation, of aesthetics, to beauty (and thence goodness).

There is neither truth nor falsity in *eikasia*, but rather a kind of reverie. In this dream-like state, what appears are *gignomena*, which Plato describes as the things which tumble about between being and not being. The *eikasia* of the Republic, Book VI has a broader reference than the *aisthesis* discussed in relation to the *doxa* in the *Theaetetus*. *Aisthesis*, as defined in the *Theaetetus*, is a 'passive affection of the mind'(33), and refers to sense impressions, whereas *eikasia* refers to sense impressions of images, but also to mental images, such as those experienced in dreams, delirium, and madness.

The objects of *eikasia* are described as shadows, reflections, dreams, and human productions of likenesses: a painting of a house "is a sort of dream created by man for those that are awake" (34). Plato suggests, in his Divided Line, that as *eikasia* dreams of actual objects, the *mathematika* of *dianoia* dream of being (35).

In the *Theaetetus*, the objects of *aisthesis* are colours, sounds, and other phenomenal basics. The objects of *doxa* are contrasted as *ta onta*, those things which have being, because they are held to be more real than the phenomenal basics by which we infer their existence. The *aisthesis* and *doxa* in the *Theaetetus* can thus be mapped onto the *eikasia* and *pistis* of the Divided Line in the Republic. In the Republic, *eikasia* and *pistis* together represent *doxa*. *Eikasia* takes the images at face value, whereas *pistis* takes the everyday objects and opinions about them at face value. Within these two modes of *doxa* in the Republic, *ta onta* is now referred to as the true object of episteme, beyond both *eikasia* and *pistis*. Plato's theory did not change, but the context of the discussion changes. In the Republic, *doxa* is considered within the

fuller scheme as a prior stage to episteme, so it becomes, by this fuller relation, less appropriate to describe *doxa* as relating to *ta onta*. In *Theaetetus*, *doxa* is considered in relation to *aisthesis*, with *doxa* better approximating reality. In the *Theaetetus*, the Forms as the proper objects of genuine knowledge are not mentioned, so it is fitting in that narrower context to call the objects of *doxa ta onta*, in contextual contradistinction from the sense-perceptions of *aisthesis*. In the Republic, we have an enlarged context juxtaposing doxa and episteme, with doxa further subdivided into pistis and eikasia, neither of which can be seen as knowledge within the larger context.

Eikasia is a primitive, pre-conceptual experience. *Noesis* is an advanced, praeter-conceptual experience. Everyday understanding, as well as the understanding of science and mathematics, lies in between. Within the polar scheme of Coleridge there is a harmony between the poles of sense and reason such that reason can be said to be sleeping or dreaming—that is to say unconscious—within our experience of *eikasia*, which for Coleridge becomes Sense and Fancy, only becoming enlightened and awake in self-conscious reason. For Coleridge, there is reason in sense, although this reason is ‘sleeping’ or ‘dreaming’. It is difficult to express this meaning clearly, and that obscurity is at least part of the Romantic point. Parting company with, or perhaps preferring to say modifying, Plato, Coleridge’s Romantic scheme does not see Reason as the absolute opposite to Sense, but rather its harmonic opposite. Describing the harmony from the other perspective, now looking for Sense in Reason, is easier, because the Platonic understanding of Reason at the end of dialectic is of a direct intuition without the intermediaries of schemata. Sense intuits phenomena; Reason intuits Forms (and in Plato *noesis* intuits Forms while *dianoia* imagines Forms,

employing, for example, geometrical diagrams, and so on).

Coleridge's sense of the harmony between *aisthesis* and Idea allows for a Romantic impression of the artist as working through and with Ideas while simultaneously remaining within the aesthetic, sensory pole of *eikasia*. This Romantic Platonism is familiar by now, and a modern example can be seen in Thomas Mann's *Tod in Venedig* (1912). The example I refer to is particularly appealing in this context because it involves explicit allusions to Plato's *Phaedrus* which show that Plato at least sometimes, and especially during his poetic descriptions, believed the *eidos* of beauty to be accessible to the senses as well as to the intellect. In this scene, the intellectual composer and professor of music, von Aschenbach, hopes to recuperate his staid passions and tired mind with a vacation to Venice. A beautiful youth, Tadzio, captures his fascinated imagination and while on the beach, fully dressed in his suit and hat, the professor, at a table incongruously placed on the sand, attempts to create a musical composition while apparently the forms of beauty, life, joy, and goodness in the classically beautiful youth before him inspire a reverie of Platonic Ideas.

In Plato, the artist makes no existential claims—universals may be explored, but the art is sustained in *eikasia*. At the level of *pistis*, on the other hand, exists the work, the material object side, of the artwork, rather than the art as such. As with Sartre, for the artist in Plato's *eikasia* the object intended in art exists only in imagination. From the level of *pistis*, the painting, for example, is oil on canvas, an historical artifact.

Coleridge, however, stresses the harmony between sense and reason—*gignomena* (that which passes between being and non-being) and eidos (Form). Coleridge can therefore have an account of how the Idea can bring pleasure

through artistic expression, and how the artwork as artefact can inspire intellectual enjoyment. This account can support the argument in the *Symposium* that beauty is an *eidos*, yet one that can be seen by the eye as well as by the intellect.

In *eikasia* we have a kind of reverie: an ingenuous consciousness. Ingenuous because this consciousness makes no interpretative alterations and accepts appearances on face value. In *Theaetetus*, *aisthesis* is also ascribed to madness and the fevered delirium of sickness. Its object is whatever appears, whether in dream, delirium, or to the senses. Its object is the 'idea' in the empirical terminology of Locke and Hume. A sense of aesthesis and *eikasia* can be detected in Heidegger's 'fascination', which is a state of being held captive by the comings and goings of average everydayness and being held in the sway of the common interpretations of history, reality and morality found around us and taken as given. Plato's *eikasia* is a state of 'the unexamined life', unquestioningly accepting moral codes as given, and this stage is therefore pre-ethical. The condition of the prisoners in the cave, described in the Republic just before the Divide Line passage, outlines this aspect of *eikasia*. The prisoners are fascinated with the shadows on the wall and have no intellectual tools to criticize their own perspectives and theories of reality from the outside. Hegel's project of Phenomenology of Geist is obviously a descendent of the Platonic theory of evolution of consciousness according to its objects, and *aisthesis*/*eikasia* would naturally feel at home in Hegel's stage of 'sense certainty'.

In *eikasia* the Heraclitean flux is uncritically reflected in the mind. For Coleridge, this sensory flux is then further dispersed by the fancy, as it generates streams of association from this flux. Plato and Coleridge alike stress the impermanent character of the objects of consciousness considered at what might be

called the naïve pole of experience. In Plato, the argument presented through Socrates was directed against the position that knowledge can only come from and be of the objects of the senses, and hence of the necessarily subjective and relativistic nature of any possible knowledge. In Coleridge, the argument was against a similar empirical position, this time the modern position coming from Locke, Hume, and Hartley. The sophist in *Theaetetus*, as well as the empiricists in and preceding Coleridge's day, often argued that the only kind of knowledge possible was that of *aisthesis* or *eikasia*, and the only possible object was the phenomenal object that Plato here describes.

While both Plato and Coleridge were arguing against similar empirical positions, Plato can be seen to have chosen the tactic of diminishing the importance of the sensory along the pole of knowledge, his Divided Line, whereas Coleridge Romanticizes this scheme to show that a harmony can be detected between the ends of the pole. Coleridge finds intimations of reason in non-reflective aesthetic experience and the immediacy of the sensible (without the sensible itself) in the intuitions of reason.

Pistis

The objects of *pistis* are described in the divided line passage as those things made by God, animals, plants, etc., and man-made articles. These are distinguished from divine and man-made images, e.g., shadows, reflections, dreams, and painting. The objects of Plato's *pistis* are the actual objects of the ordinary world considered apart from their reflections and other images of them.

While *eikasia* is fascinated, accepting with neither prejudice nor concern for contradiction the phenomena composing its consciousness, *pistis* is characterised by

judgement. The judgements of *pistis* arrive at *doxa*, or opinions, by the process of "the soul debating with herself," affirming and denying (36). This process is akin to the presence of (unenlightened) negative reason in the lower understanding of Coleridge's scheme. Although *pistis* arrives at judgements by comparing and relating perceptions, it does not subject these to any critical analysis.

Indeed, in the *Theaetetus*, this mode of *doxa* is said to contain both an element of *aisthesis*/*eikasia* and an element of pure thinking (37). The counterpart of the element of *aisthesis*/*eikasia* in Coleridge's lower understanding would be the fixed and definite thoughts fashioned by the fancy associated from the stream of sense. For Coleridge, these fixed and definite thoughts work like pre-concepts, or counters, pebbles still wet from the stream of sense experience from where they were lifted.

Within Plato's scheme, the inclusion in *pistis* of the principles of affirmation and denial, corresponding to the presence of negative reason as the principle of contradiction in Coleridge's lower understanding, the categories of reality and unreality arise in distinction to the level equality of unprejudiced experience in *eikasia*. The prejudice and existential affirmation necessary for judgement arises in *pistis*, thus completing the dynamic of *doxa*, or opinion. In *eikasia* a distinction between reality and unreality would be meaningless since every appearance is what it is as such, appearing or disappearing, not referred in judgement to anything else, yet often referred by association or delirium to other phenomena, none of which are distinguished in themselves as being either objective or subjective. Objectivity requires judgment, which distinguishes subject from object, perception from perceived, quality from qualified.

The judgments of *pistis* include much of empirical knowledge. It judges a

posteriori, asserting that this follows that without necessarily involving any theoretical framework or thinking as to why something is the way it is or follows the process it does. *Pistis* is pragmatic, as in the farmer who has true opinions regarding when to sow and when to harvest coming from a posteriori judgments. Such opinion may well be true, by accident or experiment, but is not concerned with a theoretical account, so for Plato it is not knowledge proper.

Aisthesis/*eikasia* presents what the empiricists would later call secondary qualities, the qualia, about which there can be no question of error. The secondary quality is neither more nor less than exactly as it appears, being pure appearance. On the other hand, to achieve a judged opinion of something is the style of *pistis*, requiring experience in dealing with the objects. Hence *pistis*, being object-directed, obtains a level of objectivity not present in *eikasia*. This objectivity, however, still deals with objects relative to purposes and points of view.

When the objectivity of the object becomes the focus of thought, then measurement and arithmetic set the object apart—*to metrein kai arithmein kai istanai*—in order to more fully reach objective qualities (38). At this point, we leave the level of *pistis* and progress to *dianoia*. Thus the object becomes amenable to *mathesis*, that is, it can be taught and learned according to its *mathemata* rather than only experienced according to its *pathemata*. By postulating an object set apart from the subjective experience of it, these measurable and calculable qualities allow for the possibility of affirmation and denial; for the judgements of truth and falsity; and for those of reality and unreality.

Pistis segues into *dianoia*, with the experiential counters of actual entities in our ordinary world of sense-perception being exchanged for intellectual, empirically

abstracted concepts derived from pistic experience to enable the level of thought specific to *dianoia*. To experience the entities of *pistis* as actual objective entities as such, in distinction from the presentations in *eikasia*, wherein the objective actuality or not of something corresponding to the presentation is not considered, requires a degree of thought which is then refined in *dianoia*.

Dianoia

The genealogy of *dianoia* is apparent not only from *pistis* but also from *aisthesis*/*eikasia*. *Dianoia* is a way of thinking and knowing that has been built up from earlier stages. Following the Divided Line thus far from ingenuous, imagistic consciousness of shadows, reflections, and other, e.g. painted, images towards higher mathematical reasoning and *ergon logistikou*, (39) or rational power, then towards the dialectical approach to Ideas, we see an epistemological theory of consciousness that is built up developmentally from the ground of sensation. The stages in Plato's epistemological model progress along a similar path to that taken in Jean Piaget's constructivist model of genetic epistemology, which shows children developing from mastery of sensorimotor operations and concrete intelligence to representational and conceptual thought. However, Plato's epistemology, while the main focus in Socrates' telling of the Divided Line to Glaucon1, is secondary to Plato's ontology, which moves in the other direction: beginning with the Ideas and the Form of the Good and ending in reflections, shadows and other images.

This is because Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the best methods of education, so the attainment of knowledge is here the foremost topic.

Following the divided line epistemologically, moving from naïve consciousness to

empirico-scientific and mathematical thinking, everything seems to be built up from the empirical ground of sense-perception and its appearances, which are omnipresent and dominant in *eikasia*. Thus far, it appears that Plato has no skyhooks descend. Thus far, that is to say, this epistemological model is being built from the ground up, from sense-perception, though the kind of ‘common-sense’, conventional, ‘animal faith’ use of beliefs and opinions, to conceptual and mathematical thinking in *dianoia*, before the movement toward the Forms and the Form of the Good in *noesis*. There is no chance of a mystical access to Ideas with a capital 'I' from some secret world behind the scenes.

As in the analogy of the prisoners in the cave, which immediately follows the Divided Line passage, the way to the Ideas is difficult ascent after being released from the chains which compelled the prisoners to watch only shadows on the cave wall and hear only distorted echoes. After the release from the chains, the freed prisoner makes slow epistemological progress, first able only to observe shadows and dark colours, then brighter colours on the objects themselves, until the fire itself in the cave can be observed, showing the way of the path up to the cave’s exit. Here again, the freed man moves from shadows, to dark colours, to bright objects, to the source of all light, the sun. For Plato, the philosopher may contemplate the Forms and the Form of the Good only after a long process ascending through necessary stages. The chained prisoners cannot reach the Forms by some lucky guess extrapolating from the shadows and echoes that constitute their world. As was argued in the *Theaetetus*, any lucky conjecture would be no more than that, rather than knowledge, for it could not be known as such by being differentiated from any other conjecture. True belief, and even true belief backed up with a likely story, is not knowledge.

Plato showed that before knowledge is reached, we much first work our way from the *phantasia* of imagery in *eikasia* to the confidence of everyday dealings in *pistis*. From here, the first step to knowledge can be made, when we can think through problems with concepts and mathematical forms in *dianoia*. *Dianoia* is literally thinking through, but instead of thinking directly with the Forms, it has uses the images and diagrams given by representational concepts and geometry. Hence, *dianoia* is a form of episteme, but remains a shadow of *noesis*. Coleridge retains this slow build-up towards knowledge in his model, working up out thinking from Sense and Fancy, through the Higher and Lower Understandings, until Reason, the counterpart of *noesis,* is reached.

When it comes to achieving self-conscious Reason, Coleridge was as cautious as Plato, saying that the progress is one of slow ascent with necessary processes along the way. However, Coleridge added a Romantic twist. Coleridge often mentioned his distaste for overly clear distinctions that seem to have been made merely in order to divide what is not essentially in division. A clear-cut series of divisions creating a faculty psychology was not to Coleridge's taste. Coleridge presented a dynamic model emphasizing the "each-in-all" aspect of the "faculties" such that there is Sense in Reason and Reason in Sense, with traces of Fancy, Understanding, and Imagination running through. Whether a particular instance of thought is to be considered Understanding or Imagination depends on what aspects are conscious and what remain unselfconscious. In this way, Coleridge made room for the Romantic notion of a Romantic presentiment of mystery and Beauty, of Truth and the Forms, that was accessible, but not as self-conscious knowledge, at the lowest

levels of sensory and aesthetic experience.

Plato is often thought of as being an idealist. He is often misrepresented as arguing that matter is an illusion, and that the everyday concrete objects we deal with are merely shadows cast by the Forms. This misinterpretation comes from a shallow reading of the Allegory of the Prisoners in the Cave, and other passages in the dialogues. The understanding of things in the states of *doxa* (*eikasia* and *pistis*) is indeed 'shadowy', which is to say lightweight and insufficient, but the objects of the opinions and beliefs are not always mere shadows (although they are sometimes, literally shadows), they are indeed material objects (or their images, which include shadows).

In the *Timaeus*, Plato describes the demiurge as using the Forms as models to create an ordered world out of the chaos of matter that preceded the cosmos, the ordered world. Although in this creation myth, a creation or order, not a creation ex nihilo, the demiurge employs the Forms of the Platonic solids, built up from triangles, to order the world, the matter thus ordered was already in existence. The same matter exists before and after the ordering. The Platonic point that is often confused is that the objects of sense-experience are material, but because they are transient, ever-transforming, and always coming-to-be and passing-away, they can be understood to be less real than the laws and Ideas responsible for their essential patterns and appearances.

Think of a small eddy in a river. It is fascinating to observe, perhaps calming even. Imagine a naïve someone who finds it so alluring, so beautiful, that they want to take it home. They try to catch the eddy in a bucket and are disappointed when in the bucket all they seem to have caught is still water, while the eddy remains swirling just

downstream of the rock in the river. Of course the eddy is a material phenomenon, manifested only in material fluids. But the actual matter that happens to be doing the manifesting is something quite interchangeable and inessential. To really know the eddy, the observer needs to appreciate, first by induction, through observation, the commonalities in all such patterns in liquids and gasses. From this the essential features can be separated from the interchangeable. Observations, conjectures, experiment, concept-building all work together until what one is really thinking of are no longer particular instances. What one begins to think about in essentially knowing the eddy are not less-vivacious sense-impressions called memories, nor "hieroglyphic" images working as conceptual counters.

Knowing the eddy eventually amounts to knowing the bodiless, invisible, laws or principles, what Plato called the Forms, which obtain even when the material is not there to instantiate the laws. This amounts to, as Coleridge argued, understanding that the laws responsible for phenomena are not themselves phenomena. Plato just argued that these laws, or Forms, are to be thought of as more real than the phenomena. To understand this way of talking is to focus on the thought that the eddy's being has more to do with the laws governing how fluids behave when a solid partially interrupts the flow, than with the particular matter that instantiates the eddy phenomenon at any one time. The eddy is a possibility the laws of which always exist, or perhaps better, obtain, even if the phenomenon is, at any time, not being instantiated at a particular place. What accounts for this eternal factor, the 'always' in the possibility of the appearance's coming-to-be, is the set of laws or principles that account for (epistemologically) and are logically and chronologically prior to and responsible for (ontologically) the phenomenon.

A ground-up reading of Plato's Divided Line, as epistemological progression, understands 'ground' as the starting position of the experiencing subject commencing the journey to knowledge (episteme) from interconnected imagery (*eikasia*). 'Ground' in this context cannot mean something foundational, that is to say logically originary, in Plato's theory, because the originaries, or *archai*, are the Ideas or Forms themselves, which are the starting point when the Divided Line is read in the other direction, ontologically.

The epistemological reading, which is the way Plato primarily intended the Line to be read, given the context in the discussion on education, describes the path to knowledge by perceiving subjects who have the ability to reason. The epistemological ground-up reading retains sense-perception, belief, an opinion as early stages, but proceeds from them and beyond them. This is what Coleridge also does when he retains the theory, but not the conclusions, of the mechanists and associationists (such as Hartley and Locke) within his broader scheme. As Plato saw sense-perception and opinion as gathering a store of images and recognizable objects and patterns which are then able to be operated on, by deduction and abstraction, into mathematizable concepts that can be processed in the absence of their phenomenal manifestations, so Coleridge acknowledged the place of the empirico-associationist account of sense experience being built up from the ground of experience through sense awareness.

The mechanisms of sense-perception and association were not disputed by Coleridge, but were retained as the mechanisms of Sense and Fancy, the pre-rational process of re-arranging impressions which can be then worked into concepts, allowing for thought processes about general events and object-kinds in the absence of both the phenomena and the memories of the phenomena. Up to this point in the essentially

parallel schemes of Plato and Coleridge, there is nothing major that Protagoras and Theaetetus (representing the relativism of Plato's day, along with the (empiricist) thesis that knowledge is nothing more than sense-perception, the main thesis shown to collapse into *aporia* in the Theaetetus) or Locke and Hartley would contest.

Coleridge's system was synoptic. In a sense he was a traditionalist and a hoarder, loathing to abandon what has been and still can be seen to be useful. In his twinned essays on Bentham and Coleridge, Mill asserted that these were the "two great seminal minds of England in their age" (40). Mill continued, 'Bentham was a Progressive philosopher, Coleridge a Conservative one. . . . To Bentham it was given to discern more particularly those truths with which existing doctrines and institutions were at variance; to Coleridge, the neglected truths which lay in them' (41). Mill saw that Bentham, regarding ancient or received opinion, would always ask, Is it true? but Coleridge, What is the meaning of it? Where the one would call for the extinction of the old institutions, the other would aim for their realization, 'reasserting the best meaning and purposes of the old.' This appraisal by his later contemporary would have appealed to Coleridge. 'I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist', he wrote in *Biographia Literaria*, 'I care not from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible' (42).

With his synoptic system, Coleridge could retain the empirico-associationist mechanisms as explanations of how memories come to be; how concepts can be initially shaped as abstractions; and how fancy in poetic and other works, and in fevered brains, can come about. This level of explanation could be retained from the level of Sense to the concepts in the Understanding without needing to retain such conclusions as Hume's that aesthetic and moral values are nothing more than

projections of pleasurable and painful sensations; that knowledge is nothing more than sense-perception or generalizations therefrom; or, stretching back to Aristotle, that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses, which dictum Coleridge could only accept with Leibniz's addition, '…save for the mind itself.'

Coleridge argued that the presence to the lower understanding, which occupies a similar position and has a similar functional role to Plato's *pistis*, of reason in its negative aspect is the first stage in the awakening of reason in the self-conscious human mind. Prior to this, reason is present, but we are not present to it insofar as we are not aware of it as such. The universal applicability of reason in its negative aspect as the law of contradiction impresses the mind with the force of reason, both formal and applied. The point is that the law of contradiction is understood as being neither inductively derived from experience, nor formulated from concepts abstracted from sense-perception, and yet it is universally applicable. Coleridge argues that a mind's being impressed with this logical, universal applicability that is not derived from experience constitutes a dawning moment when the lights come on. This is the moment the understanding ceases to be mere understanding. Coleridge argued that reason slowly awakens in us, negatively at first, an appreciation of reason's scope and force; on the other side the empiricists argued that not only a conceptual armoury but also the logical techniques of wielding it are fashioned and evolved out of sense-perception and its traces.

With a neo-Platonically inspired poetic description, Coleridge described the presence of awakening reason as "the downshine of reason", suggesting the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation from the One towards the appearances of matter. Although Coleridge appreciated Plotinus' doctrine as poetry, he saw it as a noble

failure philosophically, which is how he described it in Aids to Reflection, so I do not think that Coleridge intended this 'downshine' to be taken in a literal, neo-Platonic sense of Nous emanating from the One to irradiate with order chaotic matter. It seems likely that by it he intended to describe something akin to Schelling's principle that "Mind is invisible nature; nature visible mind" (*Natürphilosophie*). In this sense, "the downshine of reason" would suggest the view that reason is not just something that conscious subjects have access to through thought, but that it is the rational order of the universe and the ground of all laws and truths.

A recurrent theme in Coleridge is that natural laws have an ideal (Platonic, not subjective) nature. Laws of nature account for phenomena, without themselves being phenomena. As such, they lie behind, as it were, phenomena, being prior to them in the order of thought rather than appearances. Laws as things real, like gravitation, yet obviously not phenomenal, like actual apples, can help argue to the mind of empirical, scientific bent the reality of a fundamental order of being that is not phenomenal, thus not graspable within the empiricist's net. For Coleridge, this opened the door on the natural, physical side for natural laws to be understood Platonically, intellectually, as real and effective ideals. Indeed, Coleridge pointed out that Plato sometimes referred to Ideas as 'living laws' and that Francis Bacon, in *The New Organon*, sometimes described his notion of natural laws as 'living Ideas' and as 'Forms'.

Returning to my example of the eddy, when the observer notices general effects, such as warm and cold water eddies swirling in opposite directions depending on the location in the North or South hemispheres, the classification of evidence, the application of concepts, and the generation of theories remains within the sphere of

dianoia, or for Coleridge, the higher Understanding. When the thinker stops taking the axioms and concepts for granted, and inquires into their logical foundations, then the dialectical movement to episteme begins.

Plato's first example of a science exemplifying *dianoia* is geometry (43). Geometers employ hypotheses, which are then assumed, rather than being investigated themselves, after all, the hypotheses of geometry cannot be used to investigate the hypotheses of geometry. Plato's other examples of the sciences in *dianoia* are arithmetic, and harmonic theory (music, necessary for developing reason, grace and discernment (44)), and astronomy. These are not exhaustive, and Plotinus added, by way of example, architecture and carpentry. *Dianoia* creates technical subjects, treating of its various subject matters with abstracted concepts and visual aids, taken from the objects in pistis, that are to be understood in terms of number, space, and time. Arithmetic, geometry, and music are therefore taken to be the highest sciences in dianoia, alongside astronomy, which studies number in space and time. Dialectic takes the study a stage further, working not from hypotheses, but a priori, towards the Forms themselves and their first principle, the Form of the Good.

Dianoia works downwards, from hypotheses and unexplored assumptions, which are taken for granted, towards conclusions. *Dianoia*'s strength is that it is deductive, but its weakness is that most of its premises are unexamined assumptions, such as 'the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles' (45). Moreover, although *dianoia* aims at the Forms, it is constrained to use visible diagrams. 'These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought' (46).

Dianoia is, then, akin to *eikasia*, but at a higher level, in its reliance on images. *Dianoia* does not travel upwards from its hypotheses to examine, and thus really know, its first principles. It is thus incapable of reaching beyond its hypotheses. Hence, those thinking while they are in *dianoia*, 'have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them' (47). A difficulty in this presentation, of which Plato was fully aware, is that the Simile of the Divided Line is but a conceptual model and as such, it is an example of *dianoia*, with its respective insufficiencies. At the beginning of the Divided Line passage, Socrates says that he is aware that in the following, 'I am omitting a great deal' (48). In practice, the Divided Line is a pedagogical model that uses the image-making and manipulating capacities of *dianoia* to begin to explain the four major epistemological faculties.

Kenneth Dorter presented a good case that for Plato, the Divided Line was a 'disappearing ladder" that "vanishes as soon as we try to grasp hold of it' (49). Dorter's argument is that Plato was well aware of the shortcomings of trying to present a conceptual image of an idea that aims to point out the limitations of models, abstracted concepts and images. Indeed, just before the Divided Line model is described, Socrates asserts that what follows is more like his best opinion, rather than a conveyance of knowledge. The method of using poetic description (as in the chariot myth of the soul in the Phaedrus, or the ladder of love in the Symposium) or of conceptual models (as in the Divided Line) to point towards, rather than fully explicate, positions that are held to be praeter-conceptual is a method that led authors such as R.M. Hare and Mary Ann Perkins to write about two Platos, or 'The Other

Plato."

However, we do not need to attribute a split personality to Plato if we recognize Plato's models and poetic descriptions as following the arguments to where the concepts of *dianoia* alone cannot progress. The opening words of The Republic, 'I went down to Piraeus', has been traditionally interpreted as focusing our attention on the phrase 'I went down', alluding to Socrates returning descent from *noesis*, through *dianoia*, *pistis* and *eikasia*, back to the prisoners in the cave, to try to teach from his perspective in a way that can be understood in the lower epistemic and imaginative levels, all the while educing a desire in the audience to make the ascent for themselves. As much the Sun cannot be properly described to lifelong prisoners chained to stare at shadows and hear echoes, true knowledge, and its perspective, cannot be described to the student in its own terms; Socrates, in this role, has to use the tools of *eikasia*, *pistis* and *dianoia* to indicate a truth and perspective beyond those levels. It is fitting that this descent back into the cave is made in The Republic, a political work primarily on Justice, one of the main theses of which is that the philosopher, even though inclined to remain in an ivory tower, detached from the political main in order to contemplate the Forms, has a duty to "go down" and teach, that is to say to educate—draw out—the inhabitants of the cave of puppets and shadows.

Noesis

As *dianoia* was described as moving down from its hypotheses and assumptions towards conclusions, *noesis* begins from the same hypotheses but moves upwards, towards the first principles, through the Forms and ultimately to the principle of the unity of the Forms, the Form of the Good. The important point here,

concerning knowledge, is that *noesis* is not satisfied with taking any concept, diagram or hypothesis for granted just because it is practically useful. *Noesis* is a search towards the first principles. From this point, *noesis* is in a position to do two things.

Firstly, and Plato argues this is the most attractive option to the philosopher, at the point of *noesis* the thinker is in a position to contemplate the Forms and to contemplate their unity as a kind of architectonic of Reason finding their necessary principle of unity in the Form of the Good. Because of the attractiveness of this apparently disinterested position, the philosopher must be compelled to descend from the beatific vision to the preceding levels in order to educate and to share insights with others. As Plato has Socrates say, 'Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted' (50). Although the philosopher described in the Republic needs to be compelled to descend from contemplation of the Forms and the Good, this should not be a difficult task, seeing as the desire of the philosopher in *noesis* is concentrated on virtue as application of the principles of Good, and therefore the general good is intended as a goal, and not merely the self-interested aesthetic enjoyment of contemplation.

Secondly, the thinker at the stage of *noesis* is in a position to return from and via the first principles to interpret and educate those in the stages of *dianoia*, *pistis*, and *eikasia*. Much of this work must be allegorical in nature, because *dianoia*, *pistis*, or *eikasia*, in their own terms alone, and take strictly literally, cannot advance beyond their own spheres. The limits of their languages are indeed the limits of their worlds. If concepts go in, concepts come out; and the same goes for beliefs, conjectures, and

images. The Socratic method of dialectic must therefore proceed by showing the seeds of contradiction already lying within each of the epistemic and doxastic levels preceding *noesis*, which levels depend upon sensory images, empirical evidence, experience of everyday dealings, but not on what Plato takes to be the eternal truths. While *dianoia* has access to the Forms, taken, perhaps indirectly, as mathematicals, these are not understood with reference to first principles, but are hypotheses and assumptions demonstrated to have powerful practical application.

The most usual demonstration of *noesis* in Plato comes indeed in the form of Socrates' dialectical method. The participants typically begin by trying to pin down the meaning of a single term, usually a value or a virtue, such as courage, piety, beauty, friendship, knowledge, and proceed by illustrations, questions, answers and cross-examination until the original definitions and assumptions are found to be self-contradictory. Socrates then, as in the earlier dialogues, leaves the audience aware of their ignorance, with the *aporia* now glaringly and dumbfoundingly apparent, but perhaps now with an enlivened desire to know. In the middle and later dialogues, this model continues to advance by a series of tacks, pushing against contradictions and drawing towards necessities. On this path, the movement is to follow the argument wherever it will lead.

So Plato describes two modes *noesis*: one of contemplation of the Forms, the other as the procedure of dialectic intended to reveal *aporia*, foster genuine intellectual curiosity, and to move by theses and antitheses toward ever finer definitions until first principles may be reached. The second, dialectical mode is primarily governed by the law of contradiction as way of showing the *aporia* in assumptions and arguments as being self-evident. Invariably, Socrates' procedure

appears as ironic, as if he is speaking in one realm, say that of *pistis*, while thinking in another, *noesis*. He often needs recourse to parables, similes, analogy and symbol in order to convey the noetic insight that cannot be described in the terms and counters of *eikasia*, *pistis*, or *dianoia*. Socrates must keep one eye, as it were, on the object of *noesis*, and another on the development of thought among those in the discussion. Naturally enough, Plato describes *noesis* as the "eye of the soul" with its own objects, the Forms, appropriate to its own methods of apprehension (51). The Form of the Good is held to "enlighten" the soul, and this "eye of the mind" is held to be "sun-like", and those who have reached the goal 'fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all' (52). In his 1810 introduction to his Theory of Colours, Goethe wrote, following Plato: 'If the eye were not sun-like, it could not see the sun; if we did not carry within us the very power of God, how could anything God-like delight us?' This notion of a part, or function, of the soul itself resembling the fundamental principles, or Forms, held an appeal to the Romantics, for whom the Kantian critiques held a hope for belief in a noumenal reality, but also disappointed in barring all access to this reality for any creature whose knowledge can only be of phenomena and the projected categories necessary for intuition. Just as the ocular eye must be somehow sun-like if it is to see, Reason must be Form-like, and resemble the Good, the argument goes, if it is to contemplate in noesis.2

So Plato described at least two modes of *noesis*, corresponding to what Coleridge would call Reason. There is the mode of dialectic, moving through examining theses in dialogue, upwards from hypotheses and aiming toward the first principles, or the *arche*. The second, exalted, mode of *noesis* is the contemplation of the Forms. This mode dies not lend itself well to verbal description, and has indeed

been described by Plato and the neo-Platonists as ultimately ineffable. Perhaps for this reason more than any other, Plato had recourse to simile, metaphor, analogy, and most of the poetical devices and flourishes to be found in the Platonic dialogues. There are two places in Plato where I think he expressed most clearly the ineffability of this contemplative mode of *noesis*, and both are in the Republic.

At 533a, at the very end of the discussion of the Divided Line, Socrates tells Plato's brother Glaucon,

"You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm. But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm. Is not that so?" "Surely." "And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal this, and that only to one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?" "That, too," he said, "we may properly affirm." "This, at any rate," said I, "no one will maintain in dispute against us."

Basically, Socrates is given to say that the highest level of *noesis*, the end-point of dialectic, is beyond what can be put into words, and can only be demonstrated by being induced through dialectic.

The second place where Plato affirms the ultimate ineffability of the contemplation of forms, indeed of the very principle of the Forms, is when he makes perhaps the deepest single statement in the Platonic corpus, in his description of the Form of the Good. At 509d10, Socrates asserts that, '…the Good is not being but superior to and beyond being in dignity and power.' The Good, for Plato the Form of

Forms, is ideal in nature. It is not an existent being, but its reality is known through its power. What is this power? There is a clue in a later dialogue, the Sophist, wherein the visiting Stranger (Xenon, Greek for ‘stranger’) is debating with the materialist Theaetetus, a bright young student of Mathematics and other higher studies, about materialism and anti-materialism. Xenon, championing an anti-materialist cause, proposes that he must only get his opponents to admit the reality of any ‘entity’, no matter how trivial, that is bodiless, in order to defeat the hard materialist position that the only things which exist are bodies (*somata*). ‘If they can concede that there is something or other, even a trifle, which we can characterize as *asomata*, then that is already enough’ (53). Here Xenon invites discussion about what it is to be, and the notion that whatever is must have a power to effect, that is to say, a causal influence, is accepted. He argues that bodiless forms such as Justice, and their contraries, such as injustice, turn out to be powers, real movers, even though ideal, whether adjectival or substantial. Justice, wisdom, ‘and the soul in which they come into being’ are real things which are themselves neither visible nor touchable. This clue from the Sophist shows Plato arguing that power is to be understood as a causal influence, and so we can argue that for Plato, the power of the Good which surpasses being can be seen as an ideal, the contemplation of which has a pre-eminent power to influence Reason, and hence choice, behaviour and ethical consideration. Of course, for Plato, the power surpassing being held by the Form of the Good is even greater than this, which depends on rational contemplation to stimulate ontological and ethical consideration; beyond this, Plato argued that the Forms themselves, and hence the law-like behaviour of the universe, are ultimately derived from the Form of the Good. The actual matter of the universe is not derived from this Form of Forms, as Plato

proposed in the *Timaeus*, but the intelligible order of the structures, functions and laws by which this matter is anything knowable at all, rather than just chaos, is owed to the Form of the Good.

Aristotle mentions Plato's method of the 2-stage argument, firstly towards first principles (*arche*), away, as it were, from the natural (actual) order (the epistemological direction of the Divided Line), which is analysis, a term used metaphorically and taken from geometry, and then from theses to first principles, to reconstitute the "natural" order, a process of synthesis. The neo-Platonists took this movement of synthesis as describing the emanation from the One, to the three hypostases of Being. Coleridge's admired this very literal notion of emanation, although he saw it ultimately as a grand failure, in which no others have fallen from so high, so ambitiously.

Exploring the differing models of Plato's Divided Line and Coleridge's harmonic polarity provides a schema for appreciating how Coleridge Romanticized Platonism. The assimilation of Platonism to Romanticism required certain changes to allow a modified Platonism to fit well with the Romantic program. In Coleridge's scheme, the place of *eikasia* is given to Sense and then Fancy. Plato's *eikasia* has often been translated as 'imagination' (54), and Plato accorded it the lowest position, representing an insubstantial, illusory 'shadow-world' that was a state of virtual ignorance. While Coleridge placed Fancy at this level, he placed Imagination proper on the other side of the polarity, which in Plato would be the side of episteme. Coleridge placed Imagination above the higher Understanding and below Reason. Thus Imagination, for Coleridge, becomes that art necessary for episteme, that is for drawing down, or drawing to, Reason and its Ideas. Imagination's symbols and

schemata allow access, in Coleridge's Romantic modification to the Platonic scheme, to Ideas that remain inaccessible to the Understanding alone.

Fancy, in the lower pole, is mimetic, aping shape and other properties accessible to Sense. It alters by association, addition, subtraction, contiguity, similarity, inversion, and other basic operations that can be supported by the mechanical model. On the other hand, the Coleridgean Imagination is never simply productive of external shaping processes. That is to say, it does not merely copy and process. The products of Imagination aim towards an internal resemblance of their objects. In fact, Coleridge expresses this in stronger terms, saying, "the living educts of the imagination; of that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and con-substantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors" (55).

'Consubstantial' is the stronger term Coleridge used here. By being consubstantial, Coleridge means that Imagination, 'always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in the Unity, of which it is the representative' (56).

This higher role of Imagination beyond the capacity to have representations (as perceptions, memories, mental images) based on what are taken to be external resemblances, and beyond the facility to create representations (such painted likeness, or written prosaic -or fanciful- descriptions -or recombined descriptions) is a departure from the Platonic scheme. I propose that this departure was a major

contribution to the formulation of a Romantic philosophy. In this sense, Romanticism is a modified Platonism. One might wish to call it a neo-Platonism, were that term not already taken to describe the philosophers in late Antiquity from Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus and Porphyry through to Damascius (the last scolarch of the School of Athens when the emperor Justinian I destroyed the school in his persecution of the neo-Platonists) and his student Simplicius.

The neo-Platonists were, however, an actual influence on the creation of Romanticism as a modification of Platonism. In 'On Intelligible Beauty', Plotinus makes some remarks that could be interpreted as gentle criticisms of Plato's position on art as mimesis, which criticisms constitute a departure from Plato (57). Elsewhere in the Enneads Plotinus raises no objections to the doctrine of representation as mimesis, and even endorses the view. In *Ennead,* V 9.1, Plotinus classifies the arts and here asserts that painting, sculpture, dancing, and mime are all, and not only the latter, *mimetikai*, or mimetic, because they are based on models from sense experience. Music is contrasted against these arts as higher in origin because its model is not a sensible but rather the symmetry and order of the intelligibles. With music, perhaps surprisingly, Plotinus ranks also architecture and carpentry, because their use of necessary proportions connects them, without the intermediary of a sensible model, with Ideal principles, especially those of Geometry. The deductively provable axioms of Geometry are, of course, almost emblematically typical examples of what Plato considered as knowledge, episteme rather than *doxa*.

Plotinus' ranking music, architecture and carpentry as higher arts that model at least the *mathematika* (for example the axioms of Geometry) and hence rank as genuine knowledge, as opposed to painting, sculpture, dance, and mime does not

contradict anything in Plato. Although in the Divided Line Plato places painting in the category of *eikasia*, along with natural images such as shadows and reflections, he does not mention anything of music, architecture or carpentry in this passage. Nevertheless, on the argument that these arts derive from use of the mathematicals, we can see how they can be placed along the Divided Line as an application of *dianoia*. On the same theme, but now much later in The Republic, in Book X, Plato compares the bed of the carpenter with that of the painter, and it is almost certainly this that Plotinus has in mind when he ranks carpentry as a higher art, next to music. Famously, Plato argued that while painter is two removes from the *arche*, or original, of the bed, the carpenter's bed, which is the model for the painter is only one remove from the Idea of the bed. Although Plato talks of the bed made by God, which is a Form (the Bed), and the bed of the carpenter (a bed), it seems to me unlikely that Plato really means that there is a Form of the bed, or of other artefacts. I think this for reasons that I will explain elsewhere, sufficing to say for now that I take the passage on The Bed to be a didactic analogy to explain the difference between originals and imitations, so that Socrates can explain his argument for the exclusion of poetry.3 This is an argument that the Romantics, especially Coleridge, would obviously wish to modify, and Plotinus' modification would allow poetry, as itself using music, to have the status of *dianoia*, and not merely *eikasia* (which it would still also have, insofar as it was sensibly representational).

In Coleridge's system, Sense (*aisthesis* in Plato) harmonizes with Reason (*noesis*). Although Plato's Divided Line is dynamic, and may be read in both directions (starting from images to read epistemologically, and starting from Ideas to read ontologically), Coleridge's model adds the further dynamic tension of polarity.

This is what brings out harmonies along the pole. Hence Coleridge shows how Sense rhymes, as it were, with Reason. Sense itself cannot be mistaken, although opinions (*doxa*) about it can be. Sense and Reason have an intuitive immediacy that is absent from the levels in between.

Configuring the line as a polarity, Coleridge dignified Sense by bringing out its affinities with Reason. This move is a significant move in Romanticizing Plato. With this polar harmony, Reason can be seen as more like its polar counterpart, Sense, and less similar to Understanding, despite Understanding being a nearer neighbour.

Coleridge's tweaking of Plato's Divided Line into a harmonic polarity also brings out some lines of speculative inquiry that appeal to the Romantic imagination. If Reason is more present, although somnambulant, in Sense than in Understanding, we might ask if some Ideas can be intuitively felt in aesthetic experience, in *aisthesis*. Could this provide a way of framing how, for example, moral qualities can be felt almost palpably?

When Socrates turned philosophy's questioning to Ethics, was he creating Ethics? As the initiation of well-formed questions regarding the Good, yes, he was. Although dialectic is the best way to proceed to the Forms, there are other ways: prophecy; divine madness; love; contemplation of Beauty. Dialectic is the best, because its method is transparent, demanding rational assent along every step of the way. Aesthetic ascent demands assent too, but the 'yes' of pleasure is not the 'yes' of reason. But what is the difference?

One will only grant assent to pleasure if that pleasure is felt. Equally, however, one will also only honestly give assent to reason if that reason is understood. Don't they both demand their own kinds of *pathemata*, of subjective experience?

A Platonic response to that question could be that reason does not provide *pathemata*, only *noemata*. Here we have a spanner in the works that prevents a smooth transition for Coleridge to polarize Plato's Divided Line. Ideas are not sensations, and this really is an obstruction that accounts for a main and necessary difference between Romanticism and Platonism. For the Romantics, deep feelings could be united with profound thoughts. Of course, there is even a clue in the choice of the word “profound”, because the word “transcendent” could equally well have been used here, also connoting extremity, but in the opposite direction. For Plato, poetry, and heightened states of feeling can also ascend to the heights, as it were, as thought can, but they are of a lower value they are a kind of lucky trick, a gift from the gods, and not constituted by the effort of ones own reason.

We can imagine what Plato was doing and exemplifying by his use of poetic descriptions. But was the poetry Plato's way of gesturing to, with symbols that use the sensible, what he had already encountered in more pure form, with *noesis* alone? Or were the poetic flights as useful for Plato's ascent as he intended them to be useful for his students and readership? Poetry, love, madness, and prophesy can also ascend to the Forms, as Plato had Socrates argue in the Phaedrus. But they retain a sensuality, a lower soul, as he put it, (spirit and appetite, but not nous, reason) attachment to sensation. Their ascent is not the purest, non-imagistic dialectic.

Can people be good without being rationally so? To help illustrate the question with a setting, Kant would have answered it in the negative. For Kant, only a rational being can be ethical, because only a rational being can be free from the sway of sensuality and choose its own law, the moral law that is demonstrably non-contradictory if universalized. Hence only a rational being can have autonomy.

Could there be a dialectic of the heart? Or, of the lower soul, the spirit and the appetite? If so, could its dynamic be anything other than the heteronymous use of sensation by reason? The heart does not announce its reasoning step by step with logically connected propositions. But then why should it? It is not the mind. Inasmuch as the mind may look down on the heart's apparent naivety, it cannot look down on its contradictions, because only propositions can contradict one another. And besides, the heart could just as well feel the mind's impotence and irrelevance to the experienced situation as the mind deduces the heart's seemingly incommensurable methods of finding the truth.

The Romanticization of Plato, remembering that Romanticism is itself a descendent of Platonism, is therefore a call to try to listen to both sides at once. The Ideal is not being renounced as illusory, merely metaphysical, creations to be committed to the flames in favour of the purely phenomenal, as the empiricists championed. The Romantic position of the Ideal remains unmoved, but it becomes relatively changed as Coleridge claims powerful polar status for the aesthetic extremes Plato knew as *aisthesis* and *eikasia*. Coleridge even moved Plato's *phantasia*, imagination, a great part of *eikasia*, way beyond the median point and up beyond *dianoia*, or the higher understanding, to become Reason's nearest neighbour and handmaiden.

Disgust, aversion, revulsion, as well as admiration, are impressions that have an intuitively moral feel to them. However defeasible these experiences are, moral qualities in people’s characters tend to be experienced as things felt. A person can be experienced as creepy, slimy (as Sartre analyzed), shifty, chilling, as well as firm, dependable, and warm. Indeed, in the experience of feeling, correctly or not, these

qualities are taken as directly as perceiving someone as tall, blond, and loud.

Coleridge's Romanticizing the Divided Line into a harmonic polarity provides a schema that expands Plato's model to accommodate some of Plato's own views on beauty. The divine madness that Plato describes in Symposium and Phaedrus is a state in which one "intuits Beauty itself" (58), inspired to this vision by the attraction felt towards the appearance of a beautiful person.

The harmony between Reason and Sense can also be recognized when we reflect that the intuitions of *aisthesis* are direct, because the objects are immediate. The red patch I intuit in Sense is precisely as it appears, no more and no less. Whether it is a representation or an effect of something inaccessible to Sense is irrelevant to saying that the red patch as such is exactly as it appears. This directness and immediacy of the state of mind to its object is a harmony between Sense and Reason in Coleridge's schema.

Whereas belief, opinion, understanding through the concepts, using empirical generalizations, and dianoic thinking involve an inevitable distance between the thing thought and the thinking, this epistemological gap is not held to exist in Plato's account of *noesis*, called Reason in Coleridge's system. In *noesis,* the mind is in a state of direct contemplation of the Idea. Indeed, even that formulation implies a distance or difference that is not intended in the account of the Middle Platonists and of, later, the neo-Platonists. For them, a more accurate account is to say that in the act of contemplating an Idea, the contemplation is identical with the Idea. There is no Idea on one side with the thought of it on the other side. This does not mean, however, that a Platonic Idea is an "idea" in the ordinary sense of the word, denoting something mental, or that can only exist in a mind. The translation of "*eidos*" and "*idea*" into

"Idea" can lead to such mistakes, and of course the alternative translation, "Form", is not less prone to being misunderstood.

Draw a triangle and it is obvious in what respects this concrete image is only indirectly related to the Idea or Form of the triangle. No matter how sharp the pencil, there will always be inaccuracies. Also, the drawn triangle will have lines of a specific length, which would be a serious limitation on its usefulness if the same were true of the Form of the triangle. Perhaps more importantly, the Idea of the triangle has perfect mathematical lines. That is to say, its lines have length, but no width. When this point is grasped, it becomes obvious that the Form of the triangle can never be drawn. Now close your eyes and imagine three points, then imagine three lines so that two lines intersect each point. Here the imagination can bring us closer, although even here, the imagined triangle has specific angles, if we must imagine three points with specific relations to each other, even though it has shaken off the inessential details of line width and specific length. The angles in the Form of the triangle have a sum of 180 degrees, but the specific number of degrees in any of those angles is, in this context, an inessential particularity.

I have proposed a proto-Romantic Plato who sometimes has been interpreted as being at odds with his own more linear, logical expositions. This proto-Romantic, poetic Plato was not merely an interpretation of Plato by the Romantics, but can be justified by inconsistencies in Plato (within single dialogues, and not only from book to book) between his poetic word-paintings and his more 'straight' expositions and discussions, that is, in dialectic.

The place of imagination in Coleridge's system is a revision of the place of its counterparts in Plato, *aisthesis*, *eikasia,* and *phantasia*. None of Plato's terms here

really stood for what Coleridge meant by imagination, the secondary imagination at work in poetry and philosophy, There is a sense of what Coleridge meant by imagination in Plato, and that is in the implicit Plato, where Plato takes recourse to poetic description to gesture towards the noetic Forms that cannot be described with the concepts and *mathematika* of *dianoia*, or the understanding. For Plato imagination, described as *aisthesis*, *eikasia*, and *phantasia*, occupies the lowest level of thought, whereas for Coleridge it represents the only form through which the mind can access Ideas, considered as intellectual objects beyond concepts.

Proto-Romantic, poetic Plato saw the need for a poetic vision necessary for *aisthesis*/*eikasia* to experience beauty as ideal and astonishing. This Plato, most prominent in Phaedrus, *Symposium*, *Timaeus*, and Book VII of *Republic*, was undoubtedly at self-questioning rather than dogmatic, most lucidly and explicitly in the *Parmenides*. Without doubt there was another side to Plato, the esoteric side, being the Plato who gave his most thorough explanations in the lectures and discussions in his Academy, the most thorough record of which, tiny though it is, being Aristotle's bemused account of Plato's lecture on The Good.

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Professional Development for JTEs and ALTs, A Non-Intensive Approach

Julia Christmas

Abstract

In 2008, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Technology (MEXT) has established a "New Course of Study" for elementary, junior and senior high schools in Japan. The key changes in this document include a requirement that English will be required for the elementary fifth and sixth grades (from 2011), and also include major alterations to secondary school course descriptions which further the official goals of Communicative Language Teaching (CLT). These MEXT driven directives have serious implications for classroom practices, however an analysis of the literature regarding training and professional development of Japanese Teachers of English (JTEs) and Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs) demonstrates that there is still a large gap in knowledge and understanding of CLT. Furthermore, although professional development for teachers involved in elementary, and secondary English teaching endeavors has come a long way since the inception of the JET program in 1987, there is still much room for improvement. The following paper offers alternative ideas for professional development based on an examination of programs throughout Japan and investigation of the needs of JTEs and ALTs who have taught or are currently involved in teaching English.

Introduction

Since the introduction of the “JET” program in 1987, the presence of native English speakers alongside primary and secondary Japanese teachers of English (JTEs) in the classroom, and the use of English in the classroom either for communication or pedagogy, has become a given thing. Recent changes in the “New Course of Study” (national curriculum guidelines handed down by MEXT) have further complicated the approach that teachers are required to take regarding English language teaching in primary and secondary schools throughout Japan (MEXT, 2008). As a result of these changes, teachers have had to receive training in areas related to English language teaching. Although very sketchy during the initial phases of the “JET” program, professional development regarding team teaching, communicative language teaching (CLT) and language acquisition have come a long way. Nevertheless there are still many weaknesses in the administration and implementation of in-service training.

The Current Situation in JTE and ALT teacher training

Teacher training for in-service Japanese Teachers of English (JTEs) and Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs) is often in the form of “intensive” workshops and seminars offered or required by local boards of education. This approach does offer some benefits, however in most cases these sessions, rather than actually providing professional development, become a high speed English (“machine-gun” English that most JTEs are unable to follow), venue for griping, lesson plan sharing, and story-swapping between native English speaker (Matheny, 2005; personal observation JET Mid-year seminars 2006, 2007, 2011). Additionally, the lack of

cohesion inherent in these once or twice a year seminars leads to a sense among JTEs and ALTs alike that their time is being wasted (Matheney, 2005; Crooks, 2001). In light of these issues, a more effective method would be to offer a set of courses based on quantitative and qualitative teacher needs-analysis and which offer clear, systematic and easily accessible instruction.

Teacher training, both in-service and pre-service, regarding CLT, EFL, team teaching, or general language learning for Japanese teachers is lacking (Gillis-Furutaka, 2004). The pre-service training of secondary level JTEs in these areas is haphazard (Izumi, 2007; Lamie, 2000; Yonesaka, 1999) or in the case of elementary level currently virtually non-existent (Kusumoto, 2009). The pre-service training for ALTs involves mostly survival tips (McConnell, 2000, Crooks, 1991) and their opportunities for in-service training have become further limited as city and prefectural budgets shrink (Gillis-Furutaka, 1994, personal communication, S. Matsumoto, E.T.C., Wakayama Pref. B.O.E., 2006, personal communication, T. Ishii, Supervisor Miyazaki Pref. B.O.E. Educational Policy division, 2011). In addition to the shortcomings of pre-service or in-service training programs, JTEs have very little chance of going abroad for language study or training programs. Lack of funding, lack of institutional support at peer and supervisory levels are key barriers preventing participation in overseas educational opportunities (Matheny, 2004; McConnell, 2000, Tanabe, 2004).

A Professional Development Semi-Success Story

In answer to the present haphazard and non-coherent actualities of pre and in-service teacher training, some prefectures are taking serious measures to improve the situation. One example of this occurs in Sendai where the prefectural B.O.E has developed a system of professional support for its JTEs and ALTs. As Crooks (2001) explains, in many prefectures attendance of professional development workshops can be hit or miss. Seminars and lectures organized by local governments are a tricky thing. They are either mandatory and therefore grudgingly attended, or are not required (and not connected with salary increase (McConnell, 2000)) and thus frequented by teachers who need them least. Sendai's approach to all of these problems was to create a more cohesive system that addresses the needs of JTEs and ALTs alike.

The program created by Sendai includes and initial orientation for newly arrived ALTs in the shape of an "overview of ESL/EFL techniques along with cultural and survival tips for working and living in Japan" Crooks, 2001, p.38). In addition, two hour, bi-monthly seminars are offered in English, on topics relevant to teaching language and EFL, to both JTEs and ALTs (ibid, p.39).

The shortcomings of the Sendai program seem to occur in spite of efforts taken by the planners who have tried to offer workshops that are accessible to JTEs, (i.e. simplification of spoken English or pre-assignment of longer texts used in the seminars). A number of factors appear to hamper JTE attendance including lack of language ability (real or perceived), lack of time, lack of support from peers and superiors and lack of positive associations with previous professional development experiences (Crooks, 2001).

Proposal for Further Success

A program to foster development of JTEs needs to consider the factors mentioned above. Japanese teachers are dedicated to their jobs, constrained by their curricular and extra-curricular duties, and suffer from peer-pressure to stay at their desks even if they want to attend workshops or seminars. Creative ways to work around these issues could include

1) "demae" or "take out" workshops where the seminar instructors deliver their classes in situ at the school where the target teachers are employed. This would help to cultivate a school-wide acceptance of attendance.

2) top-down measures that include creating bonds between universities and local boards of education which would allow individual schools to ask for seminars whenever timing is convenient.

3) invitation of principals and other administrators to take part in mini-workshops that help them better understand changes in MEXT policies regarding language education. These would have a better chance of taking place if the bonds mentioned in 2 above were in place.

4) bi-lingual seminars or seminars that are separated into English and Japanese streams that would allow teachers to choose a workshop based on the language that they feel comfortable using. Determine who will be the better teacher—experienced JTEs (see Cross, 2005), native-teachers of English or a team-taught combination of both.

5) specific English skills workshops that allow English teachers or elementary teachers to improve their own personal language skills and at the same time these workshops could allow participants to pick up techniques regarding the

delivery method of those skills.

6) mimic and improve—examine successful and non-successful programs throughout Japan. Determine what their weak points were and discuss with local Boards of Education and teachers for ideas to create better models.

These six examples are by no means an exhaustive list of ideas, but are meant to be a simple illustration of possibilities—of ways to improve the existing conditions of professional development for primary and secondary teacher of EFL/language in Japan.

Conclusion

Whoever plans and delivers any type of in-service program for Alts and JTEs needs to be very aware of the obstacles that impede success. Awareness teamed with creativity has helped to greatly improve the situation during the past 20 or so years of the “JET” Program and while the wheels of bureaucracy (and a few “sour grapes” individuals) can give one a sense of despair for the entire system, it is more useful to remember that there are many, many dedicated teachers who truly want to improve their understanding of CLT, and language acquisition. It is for these beleaguered colleagues and their students that we should keep striving to design fruitful development programs.

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Writing From Wilderness: On the Use and Extension of Keats' "Negative Capability in the Poetics of William Stafford

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Abstract

John Keats coined the phrase "Negative Capability" in a letter to his brother in 1817 when he spoke of a particular "quality" that went into forming a "Man of Achievement" in literature. He define this quality as akin to a state of mind "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason – ." Generally, the term has been understood to refer to a capability utilized by the poet in the early stages of composition. This understanding of the term may owe its origins to Keats' commentary on Coleridge's inability to remain in "mystery" and "half knowledge" in the early phases of composition: "Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half knowledge." The poetics of William Stafford draw upon the theory of Keats and extend it beyond the early stage of writing. This paper examines how Stafford uses the theory of Keats – how he elaborates upon it to – and reaches a fully articulation of its implications.

Key words: John Keats, Negative Capability, poetics, William Stafford, wilderness.

A poem is a serious joke, a truth that has learned jujitsu. Anyone who breathes is in the rhythm business: anyone who is alive is caught up in the imminences, the doubts mixed with the triumphant certainty of poetry.

William Stafford

The poetics of the American poet William Stafford owes much to John Keats theory of Negative Capability. In this paper, I will look at how Stafford makes use of Keats' theory and extends it. I aim to demonstrate that what Keats injected into the discourse of poetic theory many years ago, via a private letter, has found significant correspondence in the theory and poetry of William Stafford. In this way, I will demonstrate the generative and productive work the theory of Keats' accomplishes in the poetics of William Stafford.

In writing to his brothers George and Tom in 1817, John Keats commented on "what quality went to form a Man of Achievement" in literature (Keats 193). In this letter, he used the term "Negative Capability" and defined it as being something akin to a state of mind or an attitude "when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason – . . ." Shakespeare, Keats tells us, possessed this quality "enormously." Coleridge on the other hand, seems to be faulted by Keats for lacking this quality. Immediately after defining Negative Capability, for example, Keats comments on Coleridge: "Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half knowledge." This comment by Keats on Coleridge is important because it suggests that Negative Capability is something made use of while the poet is in the composing process of writing, and perhaps at the very earliest stages of the writing process. Keats

tells us that Coleridge would let go of some thing encountered in the writing because he couldn't pin it down sufficiently. He couldn't understand what it was, or felt it didn't know what it was. He was "incapable" of remaining content with something he couldn't completely understand or know.

Stafford shows a similar sensibility and awareness to that of Keats when he writes of how he prepares himself for the act of composition. He seems to physically and mentally place himself in a frame of mind, an attitude, which is open and capable of being in uncertainties. He is not running after facts or reasons. In this way, he may be said to be drawing upon Keats' notion of Negative Capability and using the theory:

> When I write, I like to have an interval before me when I am not likely to be interrupted. For me, this means usually the early morning, before others are awake. I get pen and paper, take a glance out of the window (often it is dark out there), and wait. It is like fishing. But I do not wait long, for there is always a nibble – and this is where receptivity comes in. To get started I will accept anything that occurs to me. Something always occurs, of course, to any of us. We can't keep from thinking. Maybe I have to settle for an immediate impression: it's cold, or hot, or dark, or bright, or in between! Or – well, the possibilities are endless. If I put down something, that thing will help the next thing come, and I'm off. If I let the process go on, things will occur to me that were not at all in my mind when I started. These things, odd or trivial as they may be, are somehow connected. And if I let them string out, surprising things will happen.
>
> (Stafford 17 WAC)

The way that Stafford speaks of the pre-composition phase of writing sounds very much like the application of the Keatsian theory: “I get pen and paper, take a glance out of the window (often it is dark out there), and wait.” Stafford emphasizes here that for him writing is, in part, a passive activity: a matter of waiting. It does not appear to be a matter of going out in search of something. It is *not* like hunting. It is “like fishing.” Further, Stafford suggests the process occurs in a space of incomplete understanding: “it is dark out there.” In addition to connoting the obvious pre-dawn dark of morning, the word “dark” calls to mind such everyday expressions as “being in the dark,” that is, being in a place of not knowing, not having all the answers, having only partial or incomplete information or understanding.

In the above quotation, we might also begin to discern where and how Stafford begins to extend the Keatsian theory of Negative Capability and apply it to something beyond the pre-compositional phase of writing. We detect this extension when he speaks of needing to be receptive while in the process of writing: “I do not wait long, for there is always a nibble – and this is where receptivity comes in.” This capability of being receptive while showing some relationship to Keats idea of being “capable of being in uncertainties . . . without a reaching after fact & reason” goes further than Keats to provide a working definition of how Negative Capability might actually function in the process of poetic composition. Stafford’s theorizing provides a more complete articulation of what is going on inside poets as they write and remain in the realm of uncertainty: they must be receptive to what is going on between themselves and the language on the page as they proceed – what thoughts, what images, what memories, what emotions, are being called up within them as they move through the writing process.

In responding to being pejoratively tagged a “regional poet” – “regional” in the sense that he writes largely out of his experience of living in the region of northwestern United States: the state of Oregon – Stafford articulates his sense of receptivity to language and process in a conversationally relaxed and yet remarkably precise manner:

> . . . doing art takes a kind of sniffing along, being steadfastly available to the signals emerging from encounters with the material of the art – the touches, sounds, balancings, phrasings – and the sequential and accumulating results of encounters.”
>
> To look up form the sniffing, in order to find a critic’s approval or a public’s taste, is to forsake the trail. And the trail is one-person wide, terribly local and provincial: art is absolutely individual in a non-forensic but utterly unyielding way.
>
> Anyone actually doing art needs to maintain this knack for responding to the immediate, the region: for that’s where art is. Its distinction from the academic, the administrative, the mechanical, lies in its leaning away from the past and into the future that is emerging right at the time form the myriadly active, local relations, of the artist. Others – administrator, professors, mechanics, or whoever – can of course also be responsive to where they find themselves: artists have to be. That’s the ground for their art, the place where they live.
>
> (Stafford 10 MNT)

In the paragraphs above, Stafford describes the complex activity involved in the poet's being receptive while in the act of composition: "Doing art . . ." one must remain "steadfastly available to the signals emerging from encounters with the material of the art – . . ." We understand that "doing art," in the poet's case, involves the writing of poetry, and, as such, the poet must remain "steadfastly available" to what is occurring between the poet and the language on the page as the process unfolds: "the sequential and accumulating results of encounters." This "receptivity" that Stafford speaks of is applied – made use of – by the poet in the compositional phase of writing – not merely the pre-compositional phase, as was the case with the Keatsian theory. Stafford distinguishes art, and in this case poetry, from "the academic, the administrative, [and] the mechanical," precisely because it leans away from the past "and into the future that is emerging right at the time from the myriadly active, local relations . . .[This] . . . future that is emerging . . . [is] the ground for their art, the place where they live."

The ability of the poet to be actively receptive at the immediate and local level is one of the distinguishing characteristics upon which Stafford extends the Keatsian theory. In the quotation sited earlier, Stafford details his own movement into the compositional phase: "If I put down something, that thing will help the next thing come, and I'm off. If I let the *process* [my emphasis] go on, things will occur to me that were not at all in my mind when I started. These things, odd or trivial as they may be, are somehow connected." Stafford indicates that he sees writing as a series of events – a "process" and acknowledges both his control and limitations within the process.

As Stafford moves beyond Keats, he remains grounded in a disposition that is Keatsian. That is, as he moves forward into the process of writing, he remains in the region of Negative Capability. He is in the "uncertainties" that Keats spoke of. "Somehow," he says, these things are connected. He *doesn't know* how. Thus we see Stafford applying the Keatsian theory to both the pre-composition phase of writing, as well as to the later phases of writing. And presumably, Stafford will continue to listen carefully, to be receptive, as he moves deeper into the process through successive drafts of the poem. He will continue to be receptive to the draft's promptings and suggestions until he finds it completed as a poem.

In addition to possessing the capability of receptivity in later stages of composition, Stafford's theorizing calls upon the poet to maintain, develop, or be capable of possessing what he terms a "readiness to fail." If the poet is going to continue through the writing process – to "keep on writing" – she must be willing to fail:

> I must be willing to fail, if I am to keep on writing, I cannot bother to insist on high standards. I must get into action and not let anything stop me, or even slow me much. By 'standards,' I do not man 'correctness' – spelling and punctuation, and so on . . . I am thinking about such matters as social significance, positive values, consistency, etc. I resolutely disregard these. Something better, greater, is happening. I am following a process that leads so wildly and originally into new territory that no judgment can at the moment be made about values, significance, and so on.
>
> (Stafford 19 WAC)

"Willingness to fail" in the composition of a poem can be seen as something that draws from Keats and extends his theory forward into a practical application by Stafford, but a fuller understanding of it, and a fuller appreciation of it, would have us looking further back than Keats to Kant. Stafford's claim, to do away with "standards," might be understood to mean that he doesn't sit down to write with a defined purpose. For if, by a kind of reverse logic, the writer had a purpose, he/she would have "standards" that would include the consideration of things such as "social significance, positive values, consistency, etc." Stafford's theory of process, as outline here, carries a trace of the Kantian notion of "purposiveness without purpose" – the Kantian notion that I suspect was already embedded in Keats' formulation of Negative Capability for how can one exist in a place of "uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts," and write out of it, if one were being driven by the impulse to seek a defined end, a purpose (Kant 14)? Purpose is conclusive in so far as it represents a terminus, an aim towards which one is intending, as such, it is antithetical to mystery, doubt, and uncertainty.

What Stafford is able to achieve in this formulation – this emphasis on failure in the process of writing – is to underscore how failure is a part of the writers' capability to remain in uncertainties. In other words, to really proceed in the process of composition and to remain in a Keatsian world of Negative Capability the writing must come to see "failure" as part of the process, if not the process itself. To understand failure in this way is to see the possibility within it. Just as poets would do well to develop an appreciation for Negative Capability, Stafford suggest they would do well to develop a "readiness" to fail, a further capability.

In theorizing his own poetic practice then, Stafford stays true to Keats: there is

no reaching after fact and reason. He doesn't know how things are connected but believes "somehow they are." He is "following a process," as he puts it below, a process "that leads . . . wildly . . . into new territory." What he finds there, it is important to emphasize, he finds by way of *being led*, not by leading. In the poem, "A Course in Creative Writing," we see much of this theorizing in summary. In a rhetorical fashion, this speaks about the difficulty creative writing students have in understanding the process of writing a poem. The poem attempts to return the students to the "wilderness" of their own minds, to a wilderness that cannot be mapped, a place of Negative Capability, where the students must go if they are to write their way out into a poem:

A Course in Creative Writing

They want a wilderness with a map –
But how about errors that give a new start?
Or leaves that are edging into the light? –
Or the many places a road can't find?

Maybe there's a land where you have to sing
To explain anything: you blow a little whistle
Just right and the next tree you meet is itself.
(And many a tree is not there yet.)

Things come toward you when you walk.
You go along singing a song that says
Where you are going becomes its own
Because you start. You blow a little whistle –

And a world begins under the map.

(Stafford 185 TWII)

Stafford's concept of wilderness as a source of vitality and inspiration – "the world begins under the map" – echoes Thoreau's adage, "In wilderness is the preservation of the world." Stafford's formulation might be read, "In wilderness – in

the unknown and uncertain – is the preservation of poetry." In the poem, Stafford likens poetic composition to walking into a wilderness without a map – the poet must write from that place of wilderness. This place, this realm of the imagination, in so far as it is undefined, unmapped, unknown, undisturbed, invites, discovery. For Stafford, poets need not know where they are going in the compositional process, but they must be answerably alert to what the process suggests along the way.

Thus Stafford develops a poetic theory that extends off the Keatsian theory. He follows out the Keatsian theory's implications to achieve a more detailed articulation of what the earlier theory can actually mean when applied in practice. Stafford's concepts of active receptivity and readiness-to-fail represent two critical extensions applicable in the later stages of writing.

One way to appreciate what Stafford is suggesting in the poem above is to turn the rhetorical situation of the poem around so that it investigates the following question: "If we were to have a map for our lives, what would be lost of the richness that springs from the unmapped, unknown, unplanned for events of the day? Or, as Stafford questions: "But how about the errors that give life a new start? / Or leaves that are edging into the light? – / Or the many places a road can't find?"

What will happen tomorrow? Or, as a poet may want to ask, "What will happen with this poem I am writing? What will it be about?" For Stafford the impulse behind these questions – the impulse to know – whether in life or in the poem one is writing – are not dissimilar. Stafford reminds us that the *known* is suspect and that the unknown is the stuff of life and poetry. No one knows what tomorrow will bring. We live in a world of incomplete knowledge – in a world of not knowing – a world we continuously investigate and attempt to understand, one day a time.

If a poem is to be truly alive, it must have this quality about it: a sense of active engagement with an uncertain world, and an uncertain existence. There are “many places a road can’t find,” Stafford says, suggesting the poet ready herself to metaphorically step from the car, or off the trail, and head into the unknown, undiscovered wilderness of writing. The poet begins in uncertainty and proceeds mindfully and receptively through all that is immediately occurring, as the process of writing unfolds: “Things come toward you when you walk / You go along singing a song . . .” The poem is created from the ongoing and uncertain event of life, as such it breathes – it lives.

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