COMPARATIVE CULTURE

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Reviews

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"Things Worth Living For": Poetry by American Women Veterans of the Vietnam War

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本稿は、ベトナム戦争に従軍したアメリカ人女性によって書かれた詩を検討する。本稿は、それらの詩を、男性退役兵によって書かれた詩とアメリカ国内における戦争に対する姿勢との文脈の中に位置づける。いかにして、女性の発言が、男性主体の戦争に関する言説によって周辺に追いやられていたか、また、女性がいかにして詩を通じて自らの発言や記憶を回復しようとしたのかを検討する。本稿は、詩は必ずしも最高レヴェルでの文学ではないかもしれないが、にもかかわらず、めったに表現されたり議論されることのない戦争経験に対する重要な証拠・証言であると論じる。

This paper looks at some poems written by American women who participated in the Vietnam War. It places the poetry within the context of male veteran writings as well as attitudes to war within America. The paper examines how women's voices are marginalised within the largely masculine discourse of war and how through poetry women attempt to retrieve their particular voices and memories. The essay argues that while the poems may not be of the highest literary quality they are nevertheless important testaments to war experiences that are seldom articulated or discussed.

Poems by male American veterans of the Vietnam War, particularly their more recent writings, offer new modes of perceiving the realities and aftermath of the war. These re-descriptions also encode a resistance to its masculine orientation and linguistic justification. Presidential speeches by Kennedy or Nixon projected involvement in Vietnam in paternalistic terms, and saw negotiation or withdrawal as a sign of weakness (Nixon's "pitiful, helpless giant" paradigm). Military training has always enhanced macho ideals of war and, as some commentators have pointed out, the consolidation of male warrior identity was based on opposition to the female "other". Robert Jay Lifton highlights this process in Marine training: Poems by male American veterans of the Vietnam War, particularly their more recent writings, offer new modes of perceiving the realities and aftermath of the war. These re-descriptions also encode a resistance to its masculine orientation and linguistic justification. Presidential speeches by Kennedy or Nixon projected involvement in Vietnam in paternalistic terms, and saw negotiation or withdrawal as a sign of weakness (Nixon's "pitiful, helpless giant" paradigm). Military training has always enhanced macho ideals of war and, as some commentators have pointed out, the consolidation of male warrior identity was based on opposition to the female "other". Robert Jay Lifton highlights this process in Marine training:

> [C]onfirmation as a Marine and a man were one and the same.... [T]o graduate from contemptible unmanliness - to be confirmed as a Man-Marine sharing the power of the immortal group - one had to absorb an image of women as a lower element. And that image fits in readily with (and is further magnified by) the male-female dimension of the gook syndrome in Vietnam.[1]

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[1] Robert Jay Lifton, *Home From the War: Vietnam Veterans, Neither Victims Nor Executioners* (London: Wildwood House, 1974), 242-243.

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The "gook syndrome" was translated into contempt not only for the enemy but also for South Vietnamese "allies" who were seen as effeminate or "queer". Within America, the anti-war movement, the press, and any other component of society that did not support the war effort were perceived in terms of the "other", specifically the feminine. In post-war America, as Susan Jeffords notes, reasons for loss were conflated with a peculiar feminisation of the "enemy":

> Although the feminine is used chiefly to account for failure and to provide explanations about the loss of the war, what becomes apparent is that the feminine is used finally to identify the "enemy" - that against which the soldier had to struggle in order to fight and possibly win the war in Vietnam, whether the Vietnamese, a difficult landscape, or the U.S. government itself.[2]

Jeffords' thesis is that within a remasculinized America women's voices are either non-existent or marginalized through derogatory representations. Her analysis ranges over political language, prose writings by veterans, politicians, and journalists, and film. While it is an acute dissection of the ways in which Vietnam has been recuperated in the post-war period, it ignores the voices of some male veteran poets.

Recent poems by John Balaban, Bruce Weigl, and W. D. Ehrhart can be construed as separate from this dominant strain of masculinist justification. Carol Cohn sees that strain as exclusionary: "What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, the human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity - all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse."[3] A specifically binary and gendered discourse of Vietnam representations such as Cohn's tends to ignore the nuances available in writings by Balaban, Weigl, and Ehrhart, for it is precisely these qualities of emotion, vulnerability, and particularity that we find in poems such as "In Celebration of Spring", "Her Life Runs Like a Red Silk Flag", or "The Farmer". The three poems are expressions of subjectivity and solidarity that contribute at least partially to the "feminising" of war discourse, and to posit a theoretical paradigm based on pure oppositions is to undercut the validity and complexity of poetry by men and women. For example, in "Her Life Runs Like a Red Silk Flag", Bruce Weigl dwells on the tangled web of memory and trauma, not from his point of view, but from the perspective of Miss Hoang Yen whom he meets in her home. Miss Yen recollects her childhood in Hanoi during Nixon's Christmas bombing:

> She let me hold her hand,
> her shy unmoving fingers, and told me
> how afraid she was those days and how this fear
> had dug inside her like a worm and lives
> inside her still, and won't die or go away.[4]

Miss Yen's fear is analogous to veteran trauma whereby the war became a continuous living presence and her account offers a unique perspective on the veteran-poets' troubles. Poetry written by American veterans in the immediate aftermath of the war portrayed post-war trauma as a phenomenon that haunted only US combatants. In this poem Weigl highlights the hitherto invisible and indicates a paradox whereby only the victim can offer "forgiveness":

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2 Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculanization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 155.

3 Carol Cohn, "War, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War," in Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds, *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 232.

4 Bruce Weigl, "Her Life Runs Like a Red Silk Flag," *What Saves Us* (Evanston, Ill.: TriQuarterly Books, 1992), 13.

> And because she's stronger, she comforted me,
> said I'm not to blame,
> the million sorrows alive in her gaze.
> With the dead we share no common rooms.
> With the frightened we can't think straight;
> no words can bring the burning city back. (*What Saves Us*, 13)

The desire for absolution, "said I'm not to blame", is all too easily attained, but the poet acknowledges a weakness arising from guilt. Although he was not personally responsible for the bombing of Hanoi he takes on a collective burden. A process of healing and reconciliation that buried or rewrote the past (as some of the official reconciliation did) would be inadequate and would fail to establish any sympathetic connection. The poetic reconciliation is open to the contradictions and pain of the past and its reverberations in the present, and the focus on these continuities allows for a recovery of subjective fears and histories.

Poetry by women veterans expresses opposition to the war, but in its perception of the masculine as the "other" it reiterates the dichotomies that sustain war. This is a problem in some stateside poetry that tends to valorize the Vietnamese and project America as pure "evil". It is, I suspect, a factor that contributes to the anger and resentment in some women's poems I will be discussing.

The purpose of the exegesis outlined is not to denigrate the problem of a woman's language in a culture of masculine dominance, but to emphasize the inadequacy of simplistic theories within a complex literary and cultural context. It is undeniable that the masculinist discourse of war is powerful and dominant, but it is not a monolithic one. There are fissures within this discourse, and recent mature poetry by male veterans indicates divergences, as well as opening avenues for writing by women. There is a literary context that eschews masculine myths that led soldiers to Vietnam and thus there is an alternative discourse available to women poets. Of course, women articulate different experiences and perspectives. The equivalent of male combat poems are poems about the stresses and travails of nursing in a war zone; like their male counterparts, women write about their sense of exclusion and trauma in post-war America, but unlike them, there are few poems of solidarity with the Vietnamese. This is surprising, given the rich tradition of prose writing by women on Vietnam. Frances Fitzgerald, Susan Sontag, Mary McCarthy, Denise Levertov all visited the country and provided a sympathetic witnessing, particularly of the north Vietnamese. For combatants, perhaps, the proximity to battle and its horrors makes solidarity difficult. The war poetry by women is also one of mourning: for loved ones, for loss of innocence, for the difficulties of reintegrating a self marked by war. In that sense it is subversive, for grief, as Gill Plain notes, "is a problem: unpatriotic in war time and unwelcome in the brave new world of post-war reconstruction".[5] In the context of Vietnam, it is the not so brave post-war silence that women poets attempt to break.

Visions of War, Dreams of Peace: Writings of Women in the Vietnam War, published in 1991, was a seminal collection of poems by women veterans. The editors, Lynda van Devanter and Joan Furey, projected it as an important cultural statement rather than simply a literary one. They write in the Preface:

> Some of the works contained in this anthology may not be what is referred to as great literature, but first writings rarely are. We believe the poems and thoughts in this book

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[5] Gill Plain, "'Great Expectations': Rehabilitating the Recalcitrant War Poets," *Feminist Review* 51 (Autumn 1995): 41-65.

have great value beyond their literary quality. They help people to understand the reality of war from a perspective rarely seen or acknowledged.[6]

The representation of women in and after Vietnam had been either non-existent or stereotypical and this collection attempted to voice some of the traumas that women, like their male counterparts, had to contend with. While they shared the initial invisibility of male veterans, women found themselves excluded from the discourse on aftermath problems as the men found recognition and were appropriated into mainstream cultural and military myths. Part of the problem lay with the conception of war as a uniquely male domain, an initiation rite for young men into the mysteries and terrors of life and death. The idea of the male as warrior and the female as nurturer is not only central to war myths but is also reflected in women's representation of their experiences. Jean Elshtain defines the latter as the "Beautiful Soul" paradigm. Within these stereotypes, "Men fight as avatars of a nation's sanctioned violence. Women work and weep and sometimes protest within the frame of discursive practices that turn one out, militant mother and pacifist protestor alike, as the collective "other" to the male warrior."[7] The distinction, however, as Elshtain notes, is a biological one: "a woman's non-combatant status derives from no special virtue located within her; rather, male bodies are more easily militarized".[8]

The designation and perception of war as a masculine zone helps us to comprehend two dominant threads in the poetry by women. One is a sense of resentment at having been shut out of perceptions of the war, and the other, complementary impulse is the desire to insert a feminine discourse in the language of war. The elision of feminine experience is evident in the lack of information regarding women in Vietnam. As Kathryn Marshall observes in the introduction to her oral history of women in Vietnam:

> No one seems to have an accurate count. This apparent lack of data on the part of the Department of Defense and the State Department both serves as a reminder of government mishandling of information during the Vietnam War and points to the more general belief that war is men's business.[9]

It is estimated that between 33,000 and 55,000 women served in Vietnam. They volunteered for economic reasons, as well as being inspired by President Kennedy's ideal of service to one's country. They went there largely as "caretakers and helpmates", as "support" personnel, a fact that explains part of their invisibility and silence.[10] Veterans such as Retired Lt. Col. Ruth Sidisin, however, express a sense of pride at having served in Vietnam: "Yeah, if there was ever an example of brotherhood and helping and doing and love, that was it. I really feel very fortunate and very blessed that I was able to go to Vietnam and do what I could do."[11] Whether as nurses, engineers, or "donut dollies", women contributed significantly to the war effort. Their efforts were, however, subsumed within gendered notions of what exactly women *do* in war. As Renny Christopher writes:

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[6] Lynda van Devanter and Joan Furey, eds, *Visions of War, Dreams of Peace: Writings of Women in the Vietnam War* (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1991), XXIII. Subsequent references are indicated as *Visions* after the quotation.

[7] Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987), 3-4.

[8] *Ibid.*, 183.

[9] Kathryn Marshall, *In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966-1975* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, 12.

[11] *Ibid.*, 32.

Women in the military often felt that what they were doing was not as important as what the men were doing, and that in addition to their own jobs they also had the responsibility of acting as mother, sister, and girlfriend to male soldiers. Having absorbed the gender role stereotypes of the larger American society, these women were expected to submerge their own needs, and to take care of the men, whose role as combat soldiers was valued more highly than that of nurses or other "support" personnel.[12]

This submergence carried over to post-war existence, and it was only with the commemoration of the Vietnam Memorial and personal accounts, such as Lynda van Devanter's *Home Before Morning*, that women veterans started to speak of their experiences and trauma. Poetry by women veterans enlarges the discourse of Vietnam, but it paradoxically encodes problems and contradictions that it might hope to counter by its inscription in the first instance.

Dana Shuster's "Like Swans on Still Water" begins with an idealized portrayal of Vietnamese women, and contrasts that picture with the speaker's personal inadequacies:

Like swans on still water they skim over the war
Ao dais gliding, rustling serenely
gleaming black hair pulled primly away
from faces that reveal nothing save inner repose,
a beauty so deep even war can't defile.

I note my reflection in their obsidian eyes -
an outsized barbarian, ungainly, unkempt,
baggy in ever-wilted greens,
five-pound boots taking plowhand strides,
face perpetually ruddy, dripping in alien heat.

In their delicate presence I exhume teenage failures -
the girl in the back row forever unnoticed,
the one no one ever invited to dance,
the one never voted most-likely anything,
the one who was never quite something enough.   [*Visions*, 17]

This vision of Vietnamese women is one of beauty and inscrutable depth and it serves to highlight the intrusive and alien character of the American presence. The language is accurate in its summation of that difference: "outsized barbarian", "ungainly", "plowhand strides". Perhaps this awareness implicitly hints at the politics of domination that underlay the American presence. Written in 1966, this portrait of serenity is ironic in the context of the brutalization of Vietnamese women that had been taking place since Dana's male counterparts had been pouring into the country from early 1965. The "I" in the poem is a curiously masculinized entity with her "five-pound boots" and baggy greens, and the sense of inferiority is related to a stereotypical notion of what femininity implies. Her "teenage failures" refer to a past where she seemed to lack the qualities that define a desired feminine appeal, and her work in Vietnam provides her a sense of self and purpose:

But once in a while, on a crazy-shift morning,
when I've worked through the night and I'm too tired to care,
a young man who reeks of rice paddies lies waiting
for someone to heal the new hole in his life.
He says through his pain, all adolescent bravado,
"Hey, what's your name? Let's get married. I love you."

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12 Renny Christopher, "'I Never Really Became a Woman Veteran Until...I Saw the Wall': A Review of Oral Histories and Personal Narratives by Women Veterans of the Vietnam War", in Jacqueline Lawson, ed., *Vietnam Generation*, Vol. 1, No. 3-4 (Summer-Fall 1989), Special issue: *Gender and the War: Men Women and Vietnam*: 33-45.

And just for a moment I become Nefertiti
and for all the Orient's pearls and silks
I would not trade the glamour and privilege
of these honored hands, licensed to touch
one filthy GI.   [*Visions*, 17]

Self-validation occurs through work, its healing and service ideals, but it is also premised on male acceptance. The poem opens with an awareness of "otherness", but the turn in the fourth section ignores the questions raised. It is the male GI who confers worth, and in its reference to Nefertiti and "the Orient's pearls and silks", the poem reverts to stereotype, unable to imagine the real hardships of the women who inhabit a different world. The poem tells us more about the individual insecurities of an American nurse and presages some of the problems inherent in poetic representations of the war by women. As aliens in a strange land the women find that their roles, while crucial, are circumscribed within gender stereotypes, the need to be the "round-eyed", all-American lover and saviour of the men who are fighting to protect the very society that sustains these paradigms. Shuster's poem tentatively hints at an alternative notion of commitment centred on her work of healing. This paradigm, as Susan Jeffords observes, is at variance with the masculine one of validation through war: "Feminine commitment - that there are 'things worth living for' - proves destructive to a masculine commitment - that there are 'things worth dying for.'"[13] The binaries, however, are too neat, and several women veterans implicitly accept the masculine idea by accepting the official American view of the war. Lt. Col. Marsha Jordan rationalized her involvement by echoing the dominant political justification: "That's the way I looked at it. If we weren't there, then their [the Vietnamese] living conditions are going to get worse, they're going to be under communist rule, so we're there to try and prevent that."[14] Another veteran, Pinkie Houser, an African-American in the Army Engineer Corps, declared her distaste for the people her government had sent her to "save": "So you want to know what were my feelings toward the Vietnamese: well, I didn't like them at all. I shouldn't hate them but again I think I have a reason to because of the war."[15] Participation in the war, whether as warrior or healer, engendered hatred of the "other", and it was primarily after the war that some women perceived the actuality of the commitment to "things worth living for".

A further paradox in this commitment appears with the need to insert a feminine discourse of participation in the war within a male domain. This is a necessary and salutary intervention, but it obscures the distinctiveness of a feminine voice. A large number of poems in *Visions of War, Dreams of Peace* are marked by anger and resentment at being "pushed to the back of the bureaucratic filing cabinet".[16] This is similar to the resentment that male poets expressed in some early poetry. With women veterans, however, the anger is sharper since they are excised from the representation of war altogether. Their poetic intervention is crucial because it creates a potential space for alternative discourses. As Carol Lynn Mithers points out:

To admit that women serve and suffer in war is to destroy the claim to special male knowledge and all the privileges it brings. To admit that women have been in danger and

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[13] Susan Jeffords, "'Things Worth Dying For': Gender and the Ideology of Collectivity in Vietnam Representation", *Cultural Critique*, Number 8, Winter 1987-88: 79-103.

[14] Kathryn Marshall, *In the Combat Zone*, 165.

[15] *Ibid.*, 41.

[16] Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 109.

died is to contradict the myth that women need to be protected. Most of all, to hear the stories of combat nurses is to contradict the myth of war's glory itself.[17]

While Mithers" contention is theoretically accurate and desirable, it is not wholly borne out by testimonies of nurses and by the poetry. The alternative perspective is inevitably bound up with dominant male discourses on war, particularly the ways in which women justify their involvement. Winnie Smith in her memoir, *Daughter Gone to War*, draws upon a lineage of male soldiers in the family: "I came from a long line of warriors, at least back to the Civil War, when my mother's great-great grandfather served as a bugle boy for the Confederacy."[18] Her desire to accept dominant war myths is disturbing even if it is linked with the idea of healing. "War's glory" is undiminished as long as the feminine intervention does not question the premises of war. In some poems, such as Diane Evans's "Our War", the emphasis is on a collectivity rather than on difference:

> I'm a woman
> And I have tasted
> Man's hell - his war.
> Our War.   [*Visions*, 96]

The transition from the "I" as "woman" to "his" and "Our" is predicated on invisibility, a paradoxical disappearance of the self soon after its assertion. War, the larger entity into which the self is submerged, is not questioned; what is queried is the absence of the feminine in that world. The poetic voice is enclosed within the larger discourse of war as "Man's hell" and cannot make the imaginative or intellectual leap that will allow for freedom from its patriarchal power structures. Grace Paley posits an alternative that most women poets do not envision: "As far as I'm concerned, I would not like to be equal with men in being enlisted. I wish that men would be equal with me in not being drafted, in not being enlisted, in not going to war."[19] Perhaps participants in war find it difficult to achieve the clarity advocated by Paley, but there are some voices that are more aware of complexities in their delineation of war experience and its aftermath.

Lady Borton was sent to Vietnam by the American Friends Service Committee in 1969 to be assistant director of the Quaker refugee programmes in Quang Nai, a provincial capital in central Vietnam. She was there for two years and has made several trips back to Vietnam since the war.[20] In several poems she expresses a heartfelt sympathy for the Vietnamese, especially the children. In "Row Upon Endless Row", however, she dwells on the memory of war at a point when American troops were being withdrawn. The violence inflicted in Vietnam has its source in the US and the poem conveys the terror within:

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[17] Carol Lynn Mithers, "Missing in Action: Women Warriors in Vietnam", *Cultural Critique*, Number 3, Spring 1986: 79-90.

[18] Winnie Smith, *Daughter Gone to War: The True Story of a Young Nurse in Vietnam* (London: Warner Books, 1992), 20. Later in the memoir she writes: "If I could, I'd be a man. Then I'd be a chopper pilot and fly every day" (143).

[19] Grace Paley, "Of Poetry and Women and the World," The Writer in Our World: A Symposium, *TriQuarterly*, Vol. 65, Winter 1986: 247-253. Paley echoes an earlier statement of exclusive pacifism by Virginia Woolf: "we [women] can best help you [men] to prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods but by finding new words and creating new methods". *Three Guineas* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1938), 143.

[20] Borton's *After Sorrow: An American Among the Vietnamese* is perhaps the most insightful and moving account of Vietnamese women and their involvement in the war. It expresses the kind of post-war solidarity seldom available in American representations of Vietnam.

It was the summer of 1971
America seemed wild and frightening,
brazen with freeways.
...
Then,
on both sides of the highway,
as far as I could see,
stretched a graveyard.
Stone after gray stone.
...
The tombstones went on and on
like rows of parading soldiers.
...
The radio announcer listed the body count
for American soldiers
disregarding the Vietnamese.
...
The road and the water grayed
until panic washed over me.
I pulled off onto the shoulder of the road
and wept.   [*Visions*, 53-54]

This vision of violence within America manifesting itself in Vietnam, and then returning to haunt the country is available in poems by Robert Bly and Allen Ginsberg. While the latter tend to dramatize the apocalyptic nature of that involution, Borton, like John Balaban, internalizes the pain and horror of war. The parade of tombstones emphasizes a basic fact of war: it kills and maims. These acts of injury, as Elaine Scarry notes, are often made invisible through re-description. Thus, kamikaze pilots in the Second World War were called "night blossoms", and in Vietnam euphemisms such as "collateral damage" or "pacification" attempted to relocate the war in a neutral domain. That psychological displacement is resisted in the poem as the poet writes the fact and memory of death. "War memory," as Scarry observes, "is etched in the land and the body for both "winners" and "losers" - without specifying political beliefs." This "fluidity of referential direction" dislocates the carefully constructed political oppositions on which wars are based.[21] Thus, although the radio announcer disregards the Vietnamese losses, reconstructing an opposition that allows for the dehumanization of the "other", the poem is inclusive in its awareness of this process of exclusion. The idea of reconstitutive grief, that which will not make the distinction between "friendlies" and "enemies" is summed up in the desolation that overwhelms the poet at the end: "I pulled off onto the shoulder of the road/and wept." It is a personal sense of horror, hopelessness, and inadequacy, but it also encodes a resistance to dominant representations of the war.

Implicit in Lady Borton's poem is a notion of personal anguish and protest at the continuing insanity of war. In her work for Vietnamese children and in her poems, Borton gestures to an aftermath where grief and desolation combine with resilient memory and hope. The idea of a feminine discourse that transcends the binary paradigm indicated by Jeffords is implicit in Borton's poem, and her concern with the aftermath of war in terms of grief, trauma, and healing, is also available in Tran Mong Tu's work.

In "A New Year's wish for a little refugee", Tran Mong Tu, who worked with the Associated Press in Vietnam during the conflict, deals with the theme of exile in post-war America. In a different context and milieu Tu highlights the sense of alienation so powerfully articulated by Borton.

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21 Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 63, 115.

Let me send you some words, a simple wish.
On New Year's Day, alone on foreign soil,
you feel just like a seaweed washed ashore -
you don't know what the future holds for you.

No lack of kindly hands to welcome you
and take you home to change what's now your name.
They'll turn you into some new human breed
that thinks your yellow skin is cause for shame.

They'll send you off to school, where you'll be taught
their own land's history, modern ways of life.
You will grow up denying what you are -
you'll never hear your forebears spoken of.
...
O little child, may you retain intact
your past of sorrows, all your world of griefs.[22]

Tu projects her anxieties onto the future of a child and is acutely conscious of lives divided by memories, loss and, paradoxically, freedom. It was a conception of un-freedom back home that led to their fleeing in the first place. "Home", in a curious throwback to and extension of American veteran's alienation, is a spatial and psychological goal that is unattainable. The predicament of the immigrant is compounded by the need to conform, to learn the history and "ways of life" of the host country, and forget, if not repudiate, one's homeland. In fact, the "otherness" of the original country is further emphasised by the repression of that matrix of culture and memory. There is a peculiar necessity and aggression involved in the process of socialisation in the new country; to belong to the great "melting pot" one must acquiesce, since there is no "home" to turn to. Edward Said writes that "Exile is predicated on the existence of, love for, and a real bond with one's native place; the universal truth of exile is not that one has lost that love or home, but that inherent in each is an unexpected, unwelcome loss."[23] Said is accurate in emphasising the exile's bond with his native country, and Tu's poem emphasises the bond precisely through the loss of home. It may be theoretically possible to work through attachments rather than rejecting them, but the recovery of home is impossible. The repetition of "they" in the poem underlines this sense of inexorable assimilation. The Vietnamese experience in America is further defined by the relationship between the two nations during the war. Politically and ideologically the Americans were there to "defend" and "save" South Vietnam. In this endeavour, however, they destroyed large areas in the south, disrupted family and village life, and treated their "allies" with scant respect. US administrators and soldiers expressed grudging respect for the commitment and endurance of the Vietcong in contrast to the cowardice and corruption of their "allies". Indeed, a succession of South Vietnamese military leaders were more keen on power than on fighting the communists. As an exasperated American official asked: "What are we doing here? We're fighting to save these people, and they're fighting each other!"[24] In defeat, these leaders and their devastated people sought refuge in America and it was unlikely that they would be treated with more respect there. The child in the poem may be welcomed by "kindly hands", but those hands will mould him anew, instilling a sense of shame premised on origin and race. The poem conveys an anxiety of rootlessness very different from Kevin Bowen's notion of "rootedness" in Vietnamese poetry.

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[22] Huynh Sanh Thong, ed., and trans., *An Anthology of Vietnamese Poems From the Eleventh through the Twentieth Centuries* (New Haven, CT., and London: Yale University Press, 1996), 198-99.

[23] Edward Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), 407.

[24] Cited in Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (London: Pimlico, 1994), 460.

The intricate networks of family, memory, and land that sustained a meaningful community have been irrevocably disrupted, and the poet's exhortation at the end is a forlorn one. The poem articulates adult anxieties as if to prepare the child for a difficult future and the legacy the speaker bequeaths is one of sorrow and grief. "A New Year's Wish" is enmeshed in history and memory, and in its self-reflexive meditations it transcribes sad conclusions to a terrible war.

The Vietnam Memorial constitutes one powerful mode of reconciliation, and is seen as such by many veteran poets and commentators. Laura Palmer, a journalist in Vietnam, acknowledges the therapeutic power of the Wall:

> Vietnam isn't behind us at all; it's in us. Sometimes it is only a shard of memory; sometimes it is a ferocious trauma. It defined one generation and influenced those that preceded and followed. To understand it, we need to think about it and feel it; the memorial is the one place we have in common where those feelings can be expressed. Until we go there, we are, in a sense, incomplete and so is the memorial. [*Visions*, 143]

Palmer is accurate in her summation of the continued presence of the war as memory and trauma, but she perceives the Wall as a holistic site of healing. That this has actually been the case for many veterans points to the ways in which the Wall encodes the desire for closure through acknowledgement of grief. This closure subtly edits questions regarding the morality of the war, its effect on another people and culture and, perhaps, the need to turn away from the structures of war itself, of which the memorial is an embodiment.

In her collection, *The Widow's Quilt*, Castan articulates personal grief in conjunction with awareness of other losses and sorrows. "Unveiling the Vietnam Memorial" moves beyond the sublimation offered by the Wall:

> In the failing light, survivors
> found the name they sought
> cut in the polished stone
> and they stroked it
> as if it were a person.
> I watched on television,
> far from that monument, far
> from your grave.
> If I do nothing
> to release myself from this pain,
> I will never forget you.
> In the village of my body,
> I, too, am a burn victim,
> draped in wet skin.
> And I will be buried as you were,
> unhealed, as were the others -
> Americans and Vietnamese.[25]

The poet distances herself from the collective therapy offered by the Wall, and the mediation of an event by television (an echo of the "television war" beamed to American homes) further alienates that scenario. The alienation from a socialized outpouring of grief leads to a concentration on - and a movement beyond - the realms of a purely personal loss. The Wall allows for a convenient encapsulation, an enclosed world to commemorate memory and loss. The poet, however, wishes to transcend that circle for without release from pain she feels circumscribed in a solipsistic memory warp: "If I do nothing/to release myself from this pain,/I will never forget you." Forgetting her dead soldier is not a sign of callous disregard but an

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[25] Fran Castan, *The Widow's Quilt* (New York: Canio's Editions, 1996), 37. Subsequent references are indicated as *Quilt* after the quotation.

articulation of the need to remember why he died, to comprehend the war and its consequences. Without that responsibility to herself and to the dead she feels she too will wallow in purely personal mourning: "And I will be buried as you were, /unhealed, as were the others– /Americans and Vietnamese." The apparently feminine role of mourning must be enriched with a larger idea of a woman's role in post-war America. The poem begins with the classic paradigm of the bereft woman and then moves on to healing that is neither self-centred nor limited; the conjunction of the Americans and the Vietnamese is significant precisely because of its inclusiveness.

While the idea that there are "things worth living for" is indicated in the first part, it is developed in the second:

> Remember our dog?
> She rolled in feathers, in leaves,
> even dried turds – anything
> to disguise herself, to stalk her prey.
> How did we learn
> to make a monument to some
> and to call others enemy,
> to conceal our species from itself?
> With the body of each warrior
> we place in the earth,
> we etch ourselves most truly
> into the cold memory of stone: the acid
> history of our kind, which murders its own.   [*Quilt*, 37-38]

The analogy with the dog stresses similarity and difference: war is perceived as an inevitable rite of passage for each generation, the expression of an instinctive social violence, yet it is a peculiarly human construction. That the Vietnam Memorial is inadequate as a symbol of loss is evident in its suppression of the "other". The problem lies not only with the American memorial, since Vietnamese ones would equally deny their "enemy's" loss. Castan turns therefore to the essential site of war, the body that is injured or killed. Elaine Scarry points to this basic location of war:

> a cousin whose damaged hip and permanent limp announce in each step the inflection of the word "Vietnam", and along with the injuries of thousands of his peers assures that whether or not it is verbally memorialized, the record of war survives in the bodies, both alive and buried, of the people who were hurt there.[26]

Scarry is right about the inscription of war in injured bodies, but it is also the verbal record that locates the meaning/s of that war. Disabled bodies were paraded by Vietnam veterans to protest against the war; similar mutilated veterans joined the Welcome Home parade that rehabilitated the soldier in American historical memory. It is the specific location and writing of those bodies that imbues them with particular meaning. The Memorial in Washington is both a physical entity and a literal inscription of the dead. As Harry Haines says, "Each name locates the meaning of war in the lived, individual experience of a specific casualty, whose absence from the social network extends the meaning of war to the community."[27] Those meanings of Vietnam are mediated verbally as well, so that the Memorial can also be seen as a sign of healing and reconciliation that blandly ignores historical complexities and the "other", the enemy against

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[26] Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain*, 113.

[27] Harry W. Haines, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Authority and Gender in Cultural Representation", in Jeffrey Walsh and James Aulich, eds, *Vietnam Images: War and Representation* (Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), 208.

whom these deaths were sustained. This is the mediation that Castan refuses in her poem. Behind the Memorial she sees the bodies and lives destroyed, and beyond that an insight into the condition of human history as manifested in war: "the acid/history of our kind, which murders its own". The poem has traversed the path from personalized mourning to an awareness and remembrance of the costs and continuing legacy of Vietnam. Fran Castan etches a new paradigm of looking at the war, one that implies the possibility of "things worth living for", but only within a context of responsible memory and solidarity.

"Unveiling the Vietnam Memorial" is an exception within the body of poetry written by women. As noted earlier, most poems in *Visions of War* are constrained by anger and resentment. Diane Jaeger's "My War" is typical of the need to insert a feminine presence, without any questioning of the paradigms of war itself: "Did I ever tell you about being a nurse in a war.... My War?" [*Visions*, 79]. One of the consequences of this anger and reactive energy is that the poems are often repetitive and their quality suffers. The quality of many poems written - by both men and women - about Vietnam calls to mind Virginia Woolf's observations on Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*:

> She will write in a rage where she should write calmly. She will write foolishly where she should write wisely. She will write of herself where she should write of her characters. She is at war with her lot.[28]

Of course, the American women who went to Vietnam lived in a society less constrictive than Bloomsbury, and being in the war had given them a sense of empowerment largely absent in the world that Woolf delineates. Yet gender stereotypes persist, and the poetry is often written in "rage" at the elision of women's experience from the language of Vietnam. The emphasis on "My War" or "Our War" is indicative of the attempts to resist marginalization. Women participated in Vietnam as nurses and healers, as well as engineers, clerks, and entertainers, and some testimonies and poetry reveal bigotry and hatred very similar to that of their male counterparts. That is a problem during a war marked by racism and atrocity, and the difficulty of transcending this dichotomous perception is evident in most of the poetry. The neat binaries of men as warriors and women as peacekeepers is complicated by the large number of men who either evaded the draft or opted for conscientious-objector status, and women (such as the Gold Star Wives) who staunchly supported the war and accepted the POW/MIA myth. The masculinist mode of war and its specific encoding of male virtues are undeniable, but it is evident from some of the poetry by women that they implicitly accept those paradigms.

The problem of writing different perspectives is partly related to the inadequacy of a radically alternative language. As Lorrie Smith points out, "the woman subject seems to disappear into the gap between the masculine discourse of war and the female experience of war, with no language to assert women's presence and authority".[29] The poets negotiate an often unclear path between trauma and resentment, on the one hand, and "things worth living for", on the other. However, poetry by women veterans offers a valuable intervention in a dominant climate of amnesia, providing an insight into war experiences excluded from Vietnam

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[28] Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1929), 73. Although Woolf's comment on *Jane Eyre* is applicable to the poems I am discussing, I do not mean to imply that the poems are comparable to *Jane Eyre* as literature.

[29] Lorrie Smith, "The Subject Makes a Difference: Poetry by Women Veterans of the Vietnam War," *Journal of American Culture*, Volume 16, No. 3, Fall 1993: 71-79. The difficulty of narrating war from a woman's perspective is evident in Bobby Ann Mason's *In Country*, where the protagonist Samantha can enter the world of Vietnam only through male perceptions and voices.

poetry anthologies and from popular culture representations such as films.[30] There are exceptions to the invisibility that Smith refers to, such as Fran Castan's poem that authorizes a distinctively feminine vision of the consequences of the Vietnam War. Perhaps that inscription is a beginning within a body of poetry that is relatively new and often obscured by the politics of war and its gendered construction.

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[30] W.D. Ehrhart, in his "Foreword" to *Visions of War*, mentions the fact that *Winning Hearts and Minds*, the seminal anthology of veteran poetry "contained only two poems by women, only one of whom had actually been in Vietnam". The companion anthology, *Demilitarized Zones: Veterans After Vietnam*, "contained only five poems by women, none of whom had been in Vietnam" (xvii). Hollywood representations, ranging from *The Deer Hunter* to *First Blood*, seldom feature women except in supportive or derogatory roles. See Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculanization of America*, Chapter Four.

Are People Things?
Final Debate of the Introduction to
Philosophy Class, December, 2005

Scott Davis

2005年、十二月の一年生の哲学入門クラスで，"人類は物ですか"と言う討論を行った。その討論の実録と注解を提供するものである。その思考の深さを通じて、文本は2005年一年生の秀逸ぶりを讃えるものである。

The final meeting of the Introduction to Philosophy class of Fall Semester, in December 2005, featured a debate on the question of whether one can say that human beings are things. A transcription of the debate is provided along with commentary on a lightly edited version. This article celebrates the first year students of 2005 through their reflections on a deep and fascinating argument.

Cast:

Yes! People are things!	No! People are not things!
Martin	Judy
Rune	Mary
Jezebel	Zoe
Sara	Ann
Theodore	Marjorie
Timmy	Fay
Ray	Maggie
Henry	Sally

When we teach at Miyazaki International College, we face the need to elicit spoken production from students who would often rather not speak at all. Perhaps we are dealing with cultural factors that encourage silence, tacit deixis, ambiguity. But we can fight ambiguity with ambiguity, can't we? One way to enjoy spoken response is resolutely to present students with ambiguities to resolve. For instance, one can use double aspect pictures (e.g. the duck-rabbit) and ask students to interpret or give their perspective. As in a question pattern of Chinese languages, when one presents a contradiction, one expects its resolution as a response (*Ni hao bu hao*? literally "You good not-good?" which expects the listener to reply with one of the alternatives). Thus for our philosophy class, one way to approach a deep series of issues about human culture and values is to insist throughout the course upon the ambiguous question of whether human beings are things or not. It is not the best question to ask about the matter, of course, but it is the clearest invitation to expressing a chosen interpretation. Tell us, in what respect are people things, or not things? In our class, after a semester of preparation, we staged a debate. Students were given the choice of team, or were assigned if they had no choice. After some team preparation, they held the following conversation. The names are changed to protect the individuals involved. The rules of the discussion stipulated that two pairs of contenders exchanged views, following which a round of general discussion was opened. This was repeated four times until all had their say and the final test session drew to a close. This teacher took notes and wrote up the debate as follows. The actual protocol is first presented, and subsequently a slightly revised version with light editing is offered along with brief commentary on the course of the students' considerations. I submit this testimony as a celebration of the extraordinary energy, insightfulness and teamwork of the students involved in the debate.

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Round One

Henry: People are made of molecules just as other things because all of things are made of molecules and humans are made of many kinds of parts, for example bones, skin, etc. so skin and bones are things, because they are made of molecules. In the machine's case, too, machines are made of many of parts, for example, bolts and metal, so they are also made of molecules. So machines are made of molecules. We want to say the relationship of humans and machines is the same: made of molecules.

Mary: Our definition is that a thing is an object in time and space. A thing is an object in natural time and natural space. So we define people are not objects in natural time and space. For example, horses run on land, fish swim in water, and birds fly in the sky. But people run, swim and fly, but it is not natural, because people fly not of oneself—it is not natural for people but we use materials like a plane. Horses can go 60 kilometers per hour, and humans can too, but it is not natural. We use materials, like a car. With a car, we save time. People control time and space, but not natural time and space.

Timmy: Humans are things. People are things that have many kinds of skills. Mary's statement is about humans' skills. We don't agree that things have any skills is human.

Judy: We define "things" as object exists in natural time and space. People are not natural time and space. Use of a car is itself not natural. We don't have artificial time and space, so we think people exist not natural time and space. Henry said, "People (are) made (of) molecules." We agree all things are made of molecules— robots are machines and molecules, but is different quality—and so this is not significant.

General Discussion:

Martin: What do you mean by "natural" time and space?

Mary: We define that things is an object in natural time and space. We don't have artificial time and space.

Sara: What is natural time and space?

Mary: Time and space as they were.

Sara: And what is artificial time and space?

Mary: "Artificial" means something made by humans.

Martin: Using a car is *not* natural... what?

Judy: Because it is artificial.

Martin: So you're saying only people do artificial things.

Marjorie: For example, the sky is natural for birds but not for people—so use airplane gives us skill, but not natural for us—not natural time and space.

Martin: Flying skill is to fly. It is a human skill; why is it not natural? Humans have their own human skills, for example, flying skills. Why mention this?

Theodore: Why do you think living things exist in natural time and space are not things?

Mary:	The definition of "things" is "an object in time and space": when we strongly think object is in natural time and natural space.
Sara:	You said: "Humans don't have artificial time and artificial space. Humans are not in natural time and natural space," right? So, where are humans in?
Marjorie:	Humans are in non-natural or artificial time and space.
Sara:	But we don't have artificial time and space!!!!
Henry:	If we're not doing things, what are we? So things means we exist the place so we can see each other and we speak, listen, move… if we are not things, we never exist on earth in the world, so instead of… What do you want to say instead of "things" that we are?
Marjorie:	What you said is not the subject of this debate—we're just discussing, "Are people things?"
Henry:	If people are not things, what is…
Judy:	Humans are humans… can't name for him.

Round Two:

Sara:	Your idea is very paradox things. (You say): "It is not the same as natural time and space. We don't have artificial time and space." Answer this question: "Where are people in?" Which time and space are people in?
	My opinion is that people are ordinary things. Humans can be humans after learning various things. Do you know a girl grew by wolves? Finally, she could not learn about various things humans should learn.
	Humans are containers; like a computer, humans can't work without a brain, or a chip—they are the container for content. Chip is molecules; content is molecules. People and computers are things.
Ann:	Animals act just by instinct. Animals' purpose is to give birth. Humans keep trying to develop their techniques.
Rune:	Ann said that animals have instinct, but humans are the same, acting just by instinct. Acting just instinct is brain. Animals act just by instinct: it is the same as people. Humans think about something.
Sally:	People create new things because people want to live more easily. People can make many a lot of inventions. For example, car, train, plane, etc. including computers. Things are necessary for human life to live easily. So people can create new things.

General Discussion:

Sara:	Do you think animals are things?
Judy:	Just people are not things.
Sara:	Animals' purpose is to give birth?
Judy:	Basic…
Sara:	Humans' purpose is that too!
Judy:	Not only! Humans want to make more. They keep trying to develop techniques, animals are not are this way.

Sara: Can you prove it?

Judy: Humans make cell phones more better. Animals don't have them.

Henry: A long time ago, humans can't make them, like animals. Do you know chimpanzees can use tools? But the tools are very simple—in the past, humans also use simple tools but their brain develop. They get ability which they make new development things of tools. And do you know the difference of chimpanzees and humans? The capacity of brain is different. Human brain capacity is too small, like lemur.

            Brains have many functions—thinking more deeply—discover new things—the more capacity things have, they discover or make new things. What I wanna say is: you say only humans develop techniques, only humans are not things, and animals are not things; but the system of their body is similar to humans. I think the difference of humans and mammals is the capacity of the brain.

Judy: So you want to say, humans' brain is different?

Henry: No difference, only capacity.

Sara: Things around us are made by humans. If humans are not things where do humans come from?

Round Three:

Ray: I think people are things. Humans by our brain. Brain is like chip.

Fay: People can control earth. People control better condition. People make things that never return to soil, that is garbage. Therefore people are different from things.

Theodore: The idea of developing and making cars comes from our brain—our brain are made of molecules. These ideas come from things. People are things. We can burn all sorts of things in this world. If not things, they cannot burn. People can burn. So people are things.

Maggie: By definition, things exist in space and time. Things can be identified in space and time: for example, chairs, desks... People have brain and molecules, but humans' mind has something not identified in space and time. People can answer own questions, think of future, make effort to realize own goal. They believe god. These are not identified in space and time; they exist in humans' mind. Humans have something not exist in space and time. Things are completely identified in space and time. But people are not completely identified in space and time. People are not things.

General Discussion:

Mary: You said about human and computer as an example. But this is just a point in common between things and humans. We can't say that having a few points in common equals saying that people are things. Of course all things and people came from the same place (it is earth). However, having a few points in common isn't saying something equals something. We learned about the spectrum. Can't you tell the difference between red and violet? They are on the same line but are different from each other. So the relation between humans and things is like on a spectrum (the same spectrum relationship).

Sara: Could you say the difference between red and violet again please?

Mary: We can tell the difference between colors. This is not difficult for us, is it?

Henry: Why did you say the example? The sentence you said before…

Mary: Of course, all things and humans came from the same place, earth, but there is a difference between things and humans in spite of the same place they came from. We have an example about the spectrum. People and things are from the same place, earth.

Sara: Where is the same place?

Mary: Earth.

Sara: Earth?

Henry: Spontaneously?

Mary: Yes.

Sara: So, you said people came from earth spontaneously. Where are things come from, so people are also things.

Mary: Things and people has many things in common, I agree. However, having a few common points is not the same as being the same.

Henry: What I want to say is that humans' body is container, and computer is also container. Humans' brain is computer—is the same as computer's chip—if there are no chip in computer, then computer don't move. If there is no brain in human's body, humans can't move. People and machine are containers—both are things.

Marjorie: If you say so then you are saying that brain and computer is the same as a container, but humans contain contents for the containers. So if you say so, it doesn't make sense. Who contains the contents to the containers? You said chips and brains are containers, so empty containers—who…

Martin: Did you say brain and chips are empty containers? Who said that? Chips and brain are content…

Sara: Brain is content, body is container…

Round Four:

Jezebel: People are things because people are animals. People are things made of earth. If we are not things then only air in us.

Marjorie: You said humans are animals. Well, I don't think so! In English, when you use relative clause, you use "which" or "where"—if you use… when you say about animals using relative clause, use "which." That's for things, but when you say humans you use "who." From this respect, people are not things.

Martin: Imagine seeing the earth from a high place. You see things. You don't realize they are people. They exist the same way as things. Think about the definition of things which we make: this definition exists in time and space. I don't know about the difference you make. People are things—existing in time and space; it means the same as "people are things." Then, think about the world of animals and humans. Animals, we call things. Humans are called things. If you say animals are things, then what's the difference?

           Anyway…

           I think humans' name is just name of a thing—like a container…which…humans are things which have special things…just a thing.

動物 is "moving things" — it means "animals"... forget about it...

You are talking about do things realize special... it doesn't matter to think about people are things: we see people, we know it is thing. It is the way we see things. From high up... the ground, things, ... liquid...molecules, even though flowers grow we can also compare rocks and people. Rocks do not move. Why do we compare these two words? People are things that can think and move.

Can't imagine the definition of humans without things. "Human" is the name of a thing. A category we call — we know that humans are different from other things; we could call these things human as we are human.

We categorize: see shapes... we know it exists... how we categorize as humans is like stones, trees, etc.

People are things.

Zoe: Computers have chips. Humans have brain. They come from molecules. But compare: computers not way of flexible. Generally speaking, computers just deal with problem. The way of flexible means a new solution. Animals just by instinct. Humans develop technique to live more easily, create and invent new things. Humans have each opinion. If all think same thing, behave same way, then they are robots.

General Discussion:

Marjorie: Humans have their own world. Animals do too. People develop techniques, but animals don't develop skills. Animals do not make machines, cannot develop the world, but people can. Give them the idea, we can control give birth (the earth?). If there are animal species, we can try to stop decreasing, and human population, but things and computers cannot do this.

Martin: You say humans have special skills, that's why not things.

Marjorie: Yes, and it is different from computers' action.

Martin: Computer is computer. Human is human. They are different.

Marjorie: Computers have no flexible thinking.

Sara: What is flexible?

Marjorie: A computer just calculates. But people express themselves, using language, but computers cannot express themselves.

Martin: Computers cannot imagine or see, but someday if computers become systematically like brains, we can say it's like humans. Someday they might have dreams. We find it made bones, skins, bodies... and then robots have humans' brain, and it is connected. Then do you say it's human or robot?

            So...

Marjorie: I don't think so. It's still thing.

Martin: Brain's working is not connected to humans.

Marjorie: Using a real human brain?

Martin: Maybe, or you make it. We know it is made of molecules...

            ...never mind...

COMMENTARY

Let us examine the background to this discussion, by way of commentary on these students' views.

Round One:

Henry: People are made of molecules, just as other things, because all things are made of molecules, and humans are made of many kinds of parts, for example bones, skin, etc. So skin and bones are things, because they are made of molecules. In the machine's case, too, machines are made of many of parts—for example, bolts and metal—so they are also made of molecules. So machines are made of molecules. We want to say the relationship of humans and machines is the same: made of molecules.

Comment: The question whether humans are things or not invites an initial position from the obvious point that the human body shares physical properties with other things, such as extension and location in time and space, as well as other physical and chemical properties of inert objects. Fortunately, the "yes" team won the flip of the coin and began with this position clearly stated by an able speaker.

Mary: Our definition is that a thing is an object in time and space. A thing is an object in natural time and natural space. So according to our definition, people are not objects in natural time and space. For example, horses run on land, fish swim in water, and birds fly in the sky. But people run, swim and fly, in ways that are not natural, because people do not fly by themselves—it is not natural for people but we use materials like a plane. Horses can go 60 kilometers per hour, and humans can too, but it is not natural for us. We use materials, like a car. With a car, we save time. People control time and space, but are not limited by natural time and space.

Comment: Mary prepares to make her team's point that a physical description of human life is necessary but not sufficient to understanding the human condition. She points out that human culture is by definition not natural, but also that, paradoxically, humans naturally live in a culture.

Timmy: Humans are things. People are things that have many kinds of skills. Mary's statement is about humans' skills. We don't agree that any skills that human beings have proves that they are not things.

Comment: Timmy is certainly correct about this point. He's not going to be party to any kind of sophist shell-game here.

Judy: We define "things" as objects that exist in natural time and space. People are not limited to natural time and space. Use of a car is itself not natural. We don't have artificial time and space, so we think people exist in something that is not natural time and space. Henry said, "People (are) made (of) molecules." We agree all things are made of molecules—robots are machines and molecules, but humans have a different quality—and so this is not significant.

Comment: The relevant difference is qualitative, so the strategy of materialism probably cannot find the terms within itself to address the core issue, such as Judy has clearly challenged them with.

General Discussion:

Martin: What do you mean by "natural" time and space?

Mary: We define that things are objects in natural time and space. We don't have artificial time and space.

Sara: What is natural time and space?

Mary: Time and space as they were.

Sara: And what is artificial time and space?

Mary: "Artificial" means something made by humans.

Martin: Using a car is *not* natural... what?

Judy: Because it is artificial.

Martin: So you're saying only people do artificial things.

Marjorie: For example, the sky is natural for birds but not for people—so using airplanes gives us skill, but it is not natural for us—not natural time and space.

Martin: Flying skill is to fly. It is a human skill; why is it not natural? Humans have their own human skills, for example, flying skills. Why mention this?

Theodore: Why do you think living things that exist in natural time and space are not things?

Mary: The definition of "things" is: "objects in time and space"—when we strongly think of an object, it is in natural time and natural space.

Sara: You said, "Humans don't have artificial time and artificial space. Humans are not in natural time and natural space," right? So, where are humans?

Marjorie: Humans are in non-natural or artificial time and space.

Sara: But we don't have artificial time and space!!!!

Comment: The "no" team is attempting to point out that we are accustomed to dealing with non-physical objects such as numbers, logic, ideas and values that are not simply located in space and time, but rather in number-space, logical space, idea-space, value-space, etc. It doesn't have to be treated Platonically. Yet, how can this possibly be addressed materialistically? However, Sara on the "yes" team senses the inadequacy of the opposition's expression of this matter and, picking up on infelicitous remarks they have made, drives home her objections, sending a shiver of fear through her opponents' hearts.

Henry: If we're not doing things, what are we? So "things" means we exist in a certain place so we can see each other, and we speak, listen, move... if we are not things, we never exist on earth in the world, so instead of... What do you want to say that we are instead of "things"?

Marjorie: What you said is not the subject of this debate—we're just discussing, "Are people things?"

Henry: If people are not things, what is...

Judy: Humans are humans... can't name them.

Comment: The opening position, that human beings have their physical bodies that are obviously things, was simply too obvious to attract further attention. The discussants attempt to understand the more challenging question of whether human beings are their bodies, or more exactly, whether they are only bodies. The "no" team establishes various senses in which human life is more than the physical body; human life is more than the natural, physical basis but instead is open and creative. The real question, of course, is to what does one attribute the qualitative difference. Henry already senses the necessity of a functional reading of the difference, but cannot express it clearly.

Round Two:

Sara: Your idea is very paradoxical. (You say): "It is not the same as natural time and space. We don't have artificial time and space." Answer this question: "Where are people"? Which time and space are people in?

My opinion is that people are ordinary things. Humans can be humans after learning various things. Do you know of a girl who was raised by wolves? Finally, she could not learn about various things humans should learn.

Humans are containers; like a computer, humans can't work without a brain, or a chip—they are the container for content. Chip is molecules; content is molecules. People and computers are things.

Ann: Animals just act by instinct. Animals' purpose is to give birth. Humans keep trying to develop their techniques (such as technology).

Rune: Ann said that animals have instincts, but humans are the same, acting just by instinct. Acting just by instinct is what the brain does. Animals act just by instinct: it is the same as people. Humans think about something.

Sally: People create new things because people want to live more easily. People can make a lot of inventions. For example, cars, trains, planes, etc. including computers. Things are necessary for human life to live easily. So people can create new things.

General Discussion:

Sara: Do you think animals are things?

Judy: Just people are not things.

Sara: Animals' purpose is to give birth?

Judy: Basic...

Sara: That is humans' purpose too!

Judy: Not only that! Humans want to make more. They keep trying to develop techniques. Animals are not are this way.

Sara: Can you prove it?

Judy: Humans make better and better cell phones. Animals don't have them.

Henry: A long time ago, humans couldn't make them, like animals. Do you know chimpanzees can use tools? But the tools are very simple—in the past, humans also used simple tools but their brains developed. They got the ability from which they made new developments of things like tools. And do you know the difference of chimpanzees and humans? The capacity of the brain is different. Human brain capacity is too small, like lemurs.

Brains have many functions—thinking more deeply—discovering new things—the more capacity things have, the more they discover or make new things. What I want to say is: you say only humans develop techniques, only humans are not things, and animals are not things; but the system of their body is similar to humans. I think the difference of humans and mammals is the capacity of the brain.

Judy: So you want to say, humans' brains are different?

Henry: No difference, only capacity.

Sara: Things around us are made by humans. If humans are not things where do humans come from?

Comment: Here the discussion is trapped in the paradoxical distinction of nature and culture. Henry wants to push it towards a functionalist expression, as he correctly senses this as a possible solution to the difficulty, and he sees that the problem of nature and culture his classmates have opened is also not capable of clear resolution in these terms alone, but hints at a functional interpretation. The difference is one of "capacity," function or organization. Then the question of "are people things or not?" would not be particularly pertinent to further discussion.

Round Three:

Ray: I think people are things. Humans are human because of our brain. The brain is like a micro-chip.

Fay: People can control earth. People improve the earth's condition. People make things that never return to soil, that is garbage. Therefore people are different from things.

Theodore: The idea of developing and making cars comes from our brain—our brains are made of molecules. These ideas come from things. People are things. We can burn all sorts of things in this world. If they are not things, they cannot burn. People can burn. So people are things.

Maggie: By definition, things exist in space and time. Things can be identified in space and time: for example, chairs, desks... People have brains and molecules, but humans' mind has something not identified in space and time. People can answer their own questions, think of the future, make efforts to realize their own goals. They believe in god. These are not identified in space and time; they exist in humans' minds. Humans have something that does not exist in space and time. Things are completely identified in space and time. But people are not completely identified in space and time. People are not things.

General Discussion:

Mary: You said about humans and computers as an example. But this is just a point in common between things and humans. We can't say that having a few points in common equals saying that people are things. Of course all things and people came from the same place (it is earth). However, having a few points in common isn't saying something equals something. We learned about the spectrum. Can't you tell the difference between red and violet? They are on the same line but are different from each other. So the relation between humans and things is like on a spectrum (the same spectrum relationship).

Comment: Finally, Mary states clearly and forcefully that being a thing is a necessary but not sufficient condition of human life. Having a body is part of but not all of human experience. Mary attempts a sophisticated metaphor whereby human existence extends from its natural base so that culture can be placed on a continuum with natural phenomena.

Sara: Could you say the difference between red and violet again please?

Mary: We can tell the difference between colors. This is not difficult for us, is it?

Henry: Why did you say the example? The sentence you said before...

Mary: Of course, all things and humans came from the same place, earth, but there is a difference between things and humans in spite of the same place they came from. We have an example about the spectrum. People and things are from the same place, earth.

Sara: Where is the same place?

Mary: Earth.

Sara: Earth?

Henry   Spontaneously?

Mary: Yes.

Sara: So, you said people came from earth spontaneously. Where do things come from? So people are also things.

Comment: *Sara goes, unsuccessfully, for the reductio ad absurdum. But Mary's point has already blocked this argument.*

Mary: Things and people have many things in common, I agree. However, having a few common points is not the same as being the same.

Henry: What I want to say is that the human body is a container, and the computer is also a container. The human brain is a computer—is the same as a computer chip—if there

are no chips in the computer, then the computer won't move. If there is no brain in a human's body, humans can't move. People and machines are containers—both are things.

Comment: Henry continues to hammer away at the functional analysis that would rid the discussion of what he considers a useless ontological distinction between things and non-things. However, he cannot articulate this clearly enough within the limiting context of the debate topic, and falls back on talk of "things."

> Marjorie: If you say so then you are saying that brains and computers are the same as a container, but humans contain contents for the containers. So if you say so, it doesn't make sense. Who contains the contents to the containers? You said chips and brains are containers, so empty containers—who...

> Martin: Did you say brain and micro-chips are empty containers? Who said that? Chips and brains are content...

> Sara: Brain is content, body is container...

Round Four:

> Jezebel: People are things because people are animals. People are things made of earth. If we were not things then there would be only air in us.

> Marjorie: You said humans are animals. Well, I don't think so! In English, when you use a relative clause, you use "which" or "where"—if you use... when you talk about animals using relative clauses, use "which." That's for things, but when you say humans you use "who." In this respect, people are not things.

> Martin: Imagine seeing the earth from a high place. You see things. You don't realize they are people. They exist the same way as things. Think about the definition of things which we make: this definition exists in time and space. I don't know about the difference you make. People are things—existing in time and space; it means the same as "people are things." Then, think about the world of animals and humans. Animals, we call things. Humans are called things. If you say animals are things, then what's the difference?

> Anyway...

> I think humans' names are just the names of things—like a container...which... humans are things which have special things...just a thing.

> 動物 is "moving things"—it means "animals"... forget about it...

> You are talking about do things realize special... it doesn't matter to think about "people are things": we see people, we know they are things. It is the way we see things. From high up... the ground, things, ... liquid...molecules, even though flowers grow we can also compare rocks and people. Rocks do not move. Why do we compare these two words? People are things that can think and move.

> Can't imagine the definition of humans without things. "Human" is the name of a thing. A category we call—we know that humans are different from other things; we could call these things human as we are human.

> We categorize: see shapes... we know it exists... how we categorize as humans is like stones, trees, etc.

> People are things.

Comment: Marjorie having made the linguistic turn, drawing on the linguistic universal distinguishing animate from inanimate, and citing evidence from English, Martin is prompted to respond with a Japanese example purporting to show that "butsu" means things—this, however, is none too clear: although it is in fact the word used in "physics" in East Asia, on the

other hand this concept has a very long history from ancient China meaning "symbol" or "emblem." It is not so easy to make a flat assertion in this form. Martin is attempting an interesting, though probably ultimately not defensible, "nominalist" reading of the problem. He is just stating the obvious, though, since the fact that people are things in the sense of his argument is not at issue. However, we can see that Martin is, in this way, just getting warmed up. In his reply, during the general discussion below, he conducts a radical thought experiment to challenge his opponents to state their own convictions in very strong terms. Had this part of the debate continued, the participants would be right at home in the current state of research on mind, brain and consciousness.

> Zoe: Computers have chips. Humans have brains. They come from molecules. But compare: the way that computers act is not flexible. Generally speaking, computers just deal with problems. A flexible way means finding a new solution. Animals just act by instinct. Humans develop techniques to live more easily, create and invent new things. Humans have individual opinions. If all think the same thing, behave the same way, then they are robots.

Comment: Here the otherwise silent Zoe hits upon the critical point that even with a functional reading of the question, the human situation is unique. But by avoiding the ontological framework, one can express the human situation more realistically.

General Discussion:

Marjorie: Humans have their own world. Animals do too. People develop techniques, but animals don't develop skills. Animals do not make machines, cannot develop the world, but people can. Give them the idea, we can control the earth. If there are endangered animal species, we can try to stop them decreasing, and control human population, but things and computers cannot do this.

Martin: You say humans have special skills, that's why they are not things.

Marjorie: Yes, and it is different from computers' action.

Martin: A computer is a computer. A human is a human. They are different.

Marjorie: Computers have no flexible thinking.

Sara: What is flexible?

Marjorie: A computer just calculates. But people express themselves, using language: but computers cannot express themselves.

Martin: Computers cannot imagine or see, but someday if computers become systematically like brains, we can say it's like humans. Someday they might have dreams. We find them made of bones, skins, bodies... and then robots have human brains, and it is connected. Then do you say it's human or robot?

So...

Marjorie: I don't think so. It's still a thing.

Martin: Brain's working is not connected to humans.

Marjorie: Using a real human brain?

Martin: Maybe, or you make it. We know it is made of molecules...

...oh...never mind...

Comment: Is it a pun? is it the discussion speaking of itself through the discussants? is it super-mind? We may never know. No matter! In this argument, however, clearly everybody was a winner.

U.S.-Japan Security Relations, 1945 – 1991: Asymmetry and Secrecy

Yukinori Komine

本稿は冷戦期の日米関係における変化と発展をその構造的「非対称性」と機能面の「秘密性」を中心に分析する。具体的には、１）米国の日本における軍事的駐在と日本の防衛能力強化のための自助努力との非対称性の回復、２）日本の防衛と東アジアの安定の維持という、日米安保条約の二つの役割の関連性、そして、３）安保条約とそれに関連する秘密文書に具体化された二国間の安全保障関係の機能面、の三側面を考察する。

This paper examines the major changes and developments in the U.S.-Japan security relations during the Cold War era in terms of their structural "asymmetry" and functional "secrecy" as follows: 1) the restoration of asymmetry between the U.S.'s military presence in Japan and Japan's self-help to build up its defense capabilities; 2) the inter-relationship between the two major roles of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, namely the defense of Japan and the maintenance of stability in East Asia; and 3) the operational aspects of the bilateral security arrangements, embodied in the security treaty and also in its related confidential minutes.

Why has Japan's strategic role in East Asia been so controversial for the last five decades? Is Japan truly a passive power in international security? Or will Japan re-emerge as a key geo-strategic power in the foreseeable future? The origins of these questions can be traced back to the evolution and coordination of U.S.-Japan security arrangements during the Cold War era in which the U.S. pressured Japan to increase its defense capabilities, but simultaneously restrained its autonomous defense policy. This study is based on the three major characteristics of U.S.-Japan relations:

- For the U.S.-Japan relations in the immediate post-World War II period, the "victor-loser" and "conqueror-conquered" structural and psychological asymmetry was central. The development of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system, therefore, played a vital role as the "cork in the bottle" to contain the re-emergence of Japanese military expansionism. Thereafter, the two sides continued to face difficulty in developing a sense of equilibrium.

- Because of the wartime experiences and memories of Japanese military aggression, the question of Japan's rearmament remained highly sensitive to Japanese citizens as well as their Asian neighbors. Thus, so-called "anti-militarism" developed within Japan. The combination of the post-war culture of anti-militarism and Article 9 of the Constitution had been a key device to restrain Japan's rearmament strictly within its self-defense capabilities.

- Since the late 1960s, the U.S. increased its demand for Japan's further "burden-sharing" for its own defense as well as for the maintenance of regional security in East Asia, which escalated into the U.S.'s criticisms of Japan being a "free-rider" on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Hence, U.S. and Japanese officials continuously discussed the strengthening of Japan's defense capabilities within the U.S.-Japan security arrangements.

In essence, the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War evolved as asymmetrical security arrangements between the United States as a military superpower which assessed merits of the alliance in terms of its international strategic deployment and Japan as a re-

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emerging great economic power which perceived changes and developments in the alliance system principally in terms of its own national security.

This paper examines major changes and developments in U.S.-Japan security relations during the Cold War era in terms of their structural "asymmetry" and functional "secrecy" as follows: 1) the restoration of asymmetry between the U.S.'s military presence in Japan and Japan's self-help to build up its defense capabilities; 2) the inter-relationship between the two major roles of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, namely the defense of Japan and the maintenance of stability in East Asia; and 3) the operational aspects of the bilateral security arrangements, embodied in the security treaty and also in its related confidential discussion minutes.

Japan's Postwar Anti-Militarism

After the end of the World War II, U.S. vital interests in East Asia were to terminate the influence of Japanese militarism and to restore regional stability. During the occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces, thus sought to promote Japan's de-militarization and disarmament. On the other hand, many Japanese citizens felt victimized not only by the U.S.'s dropping of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which caused "nuclear allergy," but also by the wartime militarism, where there was no effective check-and-balance system of their own military. The vital issue in the post-war Japan, therefore, was how to prevent the military from becoming a grave danger again. Henceforth, there was a wide-spread powerful sentiment of pacifism among the general public in Japan. Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution declared the renouncement of war as the sovereign right of the nation and prohibited "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential." The constitution thus became the essential legal constraint for Japan in military-security terms. It was against these conditions that the psychological boundary of the so-called "anti-militarism" developed among Japanese.[1] In particular, there were three major factors in Japan's post-war culture of anti-militarism: fear of the revival of wartime militarism leading to fully-fledged rearmament; fear of possible entrapment in Asian regional conflicts because of the U.S.'s military commitment; and unwillingness to play a larger role in military-security terms in parallel with its economic development. Equally important, the remaining deep fear and suspicion among Japan's neighboring states toward the potential danger of the revival of Japanese militarism and aggression played a critical role as a political and psychological brake to restrain Japan from pursuing any active course of rearmament.

The Evolution of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty System

As the tensions of the Cold War increased during the late 1940s because of the division of Europe by the problem of Berlin and the escalation of the Chinese civil war between Nationalists and Communists, U.S. officials re-assessed the occupation policy in Japan, as a power vacuum which the Soviets' influence might flow into. On October 8, 1948, the Truman administration approved the National Security Council 13-2 (NSC 13-2) regarding the overall U.S. strategy toward Japan. George F. Kennan, then the head of the newly established Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in the State Department, suggested the five great industrial areas in the post-war world, consisted of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Rhine region (Germany-France), and Japan.[2] Within this broader geopolitical framework, Kennan and PPS

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[1] See Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword To Chrysanthemum," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring 1993), pp.119-150.

[2] National Security Council directive13/2 (NSC 13-2), October 7, 1948, and Policy Planning Staff 28 (PPS/28), "Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan," March 25, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia* (hereafter

officials recommended the ending of the occupation as a sanction against Japan, and the promotion of Japanese "economic recovery." [3] Their recommendation emphasized the importance of encouraging Japanese independent initiative. Kennan and his colleagues took a view that Japan could be rehabilitated as the cornerstone for the maintenance of stability in Far Eastern Asia. Accordingly, the Truman administration ordered General MacArthur to carry out the NSC 13-2 directive, which signaled the beginning of a "reverse course" for Japan's national security planning.

It was the outbreak of the Korean War between South Korea, supported by the U.S. led UN forces and North Korea, backed by the Sino-Soviet alliance in June 1950 that fundamentally shifted the U.S. occupation policy toward Japan.[4] MacArthur ordered the development of Japanese rearmament, but the Japanese were still very reluctant because of the remaining devastation of the war. In July 1950, pressured by the occupation authorities, the Japanese government finally authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve (consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light weapons). Among senior U.S. officials in Washington, John Foster Dulles emphasized the significance of Japan's future role as a major ally in Asia. On September 8, 1951, as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan regained its independence. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida signed the Peace Treaty as well as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In particular, however, the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had two major structural problems: the lack of a reference to the U.S.'s obligation to the defense of Japan; and the inclusion of the provision which allowed the U.S. forces to intervene to resolve Japan's domestic disturbances, at the request of the Japanese government.[5] Thus, many Japanese felt that the security treaty compromised Japan's independence. Moreover, because of Article 9 of its Constitution, Japan was unable to take any overseas military operations for the defense of the United States. On the other hand, the United States benefited from the security treaty by obtaining the rights to dispose its land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan, which could be "utilized to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East."[6]

Yoshida set the post-war fundamental framework of Japanese national security policy, the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine," namely the dependence on U.S. military protection under its nuclear umbrella and the concentration on economic reconstruction.[7] On the basis of this

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referred to as *FRUS*) (Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 1974), pp.691-719. See also George F. Kennan. *Memoirs 1925-1950*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1968), p.359.

[3] In February 1948, the Truman administration dispatched George F. Kennan to Japan. Kennan saw the weakness of Japanese economy as fertile soil for the growth of communism and felt that U.S. occupation policies had made Japanese society vulnerable to communist political pressures and may pave the way for the communist takeover of Japan. See Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, pp.376-396.

[4] The Korean War began on June 25, 1950 and ended with a ceasefire on July 27, 1953 without any permanent peace treaty. It started as a civil war between two provisional governments, North Korea and South Korea, competing for the control of the entire peninsula. Once the North launched a massive invasion of the South, it escalated into a multinational conflict between North Korea, supported by Soviet military advisers, aircraft pilots, and weapons, and later by the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) of the newly established People's Republic of China; and South Korea, supported by the United Nations, mainly consisting of the United States, Britain, Canada, Turkey, the Philippines and Colombia, together with detachments from many other states. See, for example, Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 2.

[5] *FRUS, 1951, Volume VI, vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part II.* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp.857-858.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp.1226-1227, and pp.1256-1261.

[7] See, for example, Masataka Kosaka, *Saisyo Yoshida Shigeru* (Tokyo: Chuoukouronsya, 1968); Narahiko Toyoshita, *The Conclusion of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: Yoshida Diplomacy and Emperor Diplomacy* (Tokyo: Iwanamishinsyo, 1996); and Hara Yoshihisa, *Yoshida Shigeru* (Tokyo: Iwanamibunko, 2005).

doctrine, the Japanese government interpreted that Article 9 of the Constitution did not necessarily deny the right of self-defense inherent in any sovereign state.[8] In August 1952, the National Safety Force under the National Policy Agency (the former National Police Reserve) was established for the maintenance of domestic social stability. Finally, in July 1954, the Japanese Defense Agency, along with the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF), was created strictly for the purposes of self-defense under civilian control.[9] Importantly, however, the Japanese government never clearly clarified the operational linkage between Japan's defense policy and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. For example, the May 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense described only the development of effective defense capabilities and Japan-US. security arrangements as the "basis" of Japan's defense policy and established a principle to develop "incrementally" the effective defense capabilities within the limitations necessary for self-defense.[10]

During the 1950s, there was increasing rivalry between the political right and left in Japanese domestic politics over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the continued presence of American soldiers in Japan. In the middle, the moderate conservatives of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who represented the business, rural and bureaucratic sectors, supported the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japan security relations. Without the revision of the postwar Constitution and with a minimum level of self-defense capability, they decided to depend on the United States for national security, which would enable Japan to focus on its economic recovery, a policy represented by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946-1947, 1948-1954). On the right, the nationalists supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, but sought to pursue Japan's stronger and autonomous military posture and greater independence from the United States. These assertive groups thus advocated the revision of the Japanese Constitution, which, they felt, was imposed upon Japan under the occupation in order to renounce Japan's sovereign right to wage war, a position represented by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960). On the left, the Socialist and Communist Parties and the labor unions opposed the moderate conservatives and the right wing nationalists and criticized the Self-Defense Forces and the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan for being unconstitutional. These progressive groups warned that because of the alliance with the United States, Japan might become drawn into a conflict peripheral to its national interests. Therefore, for example, the Socialists advocated that peace could only be ensured by Japan's complete neutrality in foreign affairs and that Japan should abrogate the Security Treaty with the United States. The United States supported pro-America moderate conservative politicians in the LDP to ensure the continuation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, especially the maintenance of its military bases throughout Japan.[11]

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[8] See, for example, "Constitution and Right of Self-Defense," Defense Agency of Japan (http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm)

[9] The Japanese government defined the three fundamental conditions for the execution of Japan's right of self-defense: the existence of an imminent and unrighteous armed attack against Japan; the lack of other relevant means to dispel it; and the minimum use of its defense forces. Defense Agency of Japan, "Basic Policy for National Defense" and "Other Basic Policies" (http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm)

[10] Ibid; and *FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII: Part I. Japan.* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp.328.

[11] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secretly sent millions of dollars to the LDP in the 1950s and 1960s in order to help stabilize the LDP-led government and prevent a leftist government from emerging in Japanese politics. More particularly, before the May 1958 House of Representative elections, the Eisenhower administration authorized the CIA to provide limited covert financial support and electoral advice to a few key conservative politicians. Moreover, in 1959, the CIA sought to institute a covert program to split off the moderate wing of the leftist opposition with the anticipation that a more pro-America opposition party would subsequently emerge. See, for example, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol.*

The Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

From August 1958 to January 1960, the Japanese government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi initiated a series of official and private negotiations with the Eisenhower administration to revise the 1951 Security Treaty. In essence, Kishi sought to restore political, military and psychological asymmetry in U.S.-Japan power relations and pursued Japan's autonomy and its equal status in the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. The origins of Kishi's initiative could be traced back to the 1955 Dulles-Shigemitsu talks in which Kishi, as the Secretary General of the Democratic Party of Japan, accompanied the Hatoyama Cabinet's Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu to meet with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. During the talks (August 29 – September 1, 1955), Shigemitsu suggested revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.[12] However, Dulles refused the revision pointing out that the timing was still premature because of Japan's limited military capabilities and insufficient responsibility for its national security and U.S.-Japan security relations. In particular, Dulles questioned Shigemitsu whether Japan would be able to send its troops to the defense of the U.S. in the case of an attack against Guam. This statement convinced Kishi that Japan needed to build up its own military capabilities further in order to overcome the remaining inequality in U.S.-Japan security relations and Japan's unilateral dependency on the United States.

The newly revised "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security" (signed on January 19, 1960), however, still remained problematic. On the one hand, the treaty provided an explicit assurance of the U.S.'s obligation to the "security of Japan."[13] Its preface also declared the promotion of a much closer mutual economic cooperation, by which American and Japanese officials sought to neutralize the military aspect of the new treaty. On the other hand, the 1960 Security Treaty had included secret understandings between the two governments. Under the 1951 security accord, the U.S. had effective control over the use of its forces based in Japan without any need to obtain the permission of the Japanese government or even to consult with it. During the official negotiations from 1958 to 1960, the U.S. military sought to retain as much operational freedom as possible. In particular, the Defense Department had a strong interest in securing the deployment of nuclear weapons in Japan to support U.S. strategic deployment in Asia. Under the new security treaty, the U.S. government would have to consult with the Japanese government to obtain its permission for the use of U.S. forces based in Japan or major changes in their armament, such as the introduction of nuclear weapons. However, through confidential understandings of the consultation provisions, the new treaty also provided significant exceptions to that requirement. It was agreed that in the event of an attack against UN forces in South Korea, the United States could use its forces in Japan to meet this aggression without prior consultation with the Japanese government.[14] There was also the "transit" understanding which allowed the U.S. to move nuclear weapons in and out of Japan without prior consultation. The two governments agreed that prior consultation was required only if the U.S. government proposed to "introduce" or permanently "deploy" nuclear

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XXIX: Part II. Japan. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), p.1; and "U.S. admits CIA gave LDP money in 1950s, 1960s," *The Japan Times,* July 20, 2006.

[12] *FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII: Part I. Japan.* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), pp.90-118.

[13] "The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html). See also Yoshihisa Hara, *Japan in the Post War Era and International Politics* (Tokyo: Cyuoukouronsya, 1988); Idem, *The Structure of the U.S.-Japan Relations: To Examine the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty* (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1991); and Kazuya Sakamoto, *The Ties of Japan-U.S. Alliance: Security Treaty and the Search for Symmetry* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000).

[14] "U.S. Policy Toward Japan (Approved 11 June 1960)," Reversion Issues, 1959-1972, 0000036536, Freimuth Collection, Okinawa Prefectural Archives. See also *Asahi Shimbun,* August 30, 2000.

weapons in Japan. The confidential agreement carefully differentiated between the "introduction" of nuclear weapons and the "transits" of U.S. aircraft or naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons through U.S. bases in Japan and Japanese ports. Finally, in geopolitical terms, there was no clear definition of the term "Far East" as the principal geographical area of the application of the new treaty.

Within Japan's domestic political context, when the new security treaty was signed in January 1960, there was an outbreak of violent public demonstrations in Tokyo against the reactivation of Japan's security role. The main focus of the protects was on the fears that the new security treaty would further entangle Japan in America's Cold War conflicts in Asia and leave the Japanese government with little or no voice in crucial decisions affecting its own national security. The leftist and pacifist political groups, such as the Socialist and Communist parties, called for the abrogation of the Japan-US security treaty. Instead, they advocated that Japan maintain strict neutrality in international relations and pursue a just commitment to its Peace Constitution, which renounced war and prohibited all armaments, including the Self-Defense Forces. The general pacifist military allergy reached its peak against Kishi himself who was the former minister of the wartime Tojo cabinet.[15] Finally, Kishi was forced to resign as a result of his decision to push ratification through the Diet against vigorous political opposition by the left wing parties and widespread public demonstrations.

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, Kishi's successor, adopted a low-profile defense-foreign policy and put his priority on economic development. As a student of the Yoshida school, he advocated a policy of "doubling workers' incomes" within a decade. Behind the scene, however, the Kennedy administration and the Ikeda cabinet continued to exchange views on secret understandings of the consultation provisions of the new security treaty. On April 4, 1963, American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer met the Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and discussed the meaning of the "introduction" of nuclear weapons into Japan as used by the U.S. government.[16] The two sides reached an agreement on a confidential interpretation of "introduce" which would not include "transits" by warships and aircraft with nuclear weapons. Since the Reischauer-Ohira meeting, when senior Japanese officials have needed to use the term "introduce," they have used a Japanese translation, "mochikomu," which is more ambiguous and even includes the implication of "transit." Accordingly, a series of LDP governments have repeated the official line: "there have never been nuclear weapons introduced into Japan, including transits, when the U.S. did not offer a prior consultation." The Japanese leaders have thus sought to counter-argue the opposition's criticisms that U.S. carriers and submarines carry nuclear weapons into Japanese ports as well as to defuse their nation's anti-nuclear allergy. The United States had stated publicly that it would never act against the treaty's obligation for prior consultation or contrary to Japan's wishes, however it still moved its nuclear weapons confidentially.

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[15] Nobusuke Kishi was one of the top officials who was involved in the industrial development of Manchukuo (created by Imperial Japan in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, 1932-1945). In October 1941, Kishi became the Minister of Commerce and Industry in Hideki Tojo's Cabinet (and held the position until October 1943). Kishi was imprisoned as a Class A War Criminal until 1948, however, he was never tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. When the Allied occupation's purge of members of the old regime was fully rescinded in 1952, Kishi resumed his political career. See Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke* (Tokyo: Iwanamibunko, 1995); and Idem (ed.), *Kishi Nobusuke Syougenroku* (Tokyo: Mainichishimbunsya, 2003).

[16] *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 2000. A five-page telegram on this meeting (Document 374, Telegram 2335, From American Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, April 4, 1963, *FRUS, 1961-63, Volume, XXII: Northeast Asia*) is not declassified.

The Nixon Doctrine and the Emergence of Multipolar World

During the latter half of the 1960s, the United States came to face the limitation of its open-ended military commitment as a result of the increasing stalemate in the Vietnam War. In the meantime, Japan re-emerged as a great world economic power. In January 1965 and November 1967, the Johnson administration held summit meetings with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Kishi's younger brother, pressing for Japan's further commitments to assist U.S.'s efforts in Indochina. However, the two governments faced a dilemma, as the Indochina operation made the U.S.'s use of its military bases on Okinawa of greater importance in order to continue the B-52 bombing missions. The highly publicized extensive U.S. use of its Okinawan bases only escalated Japanese political and public demands for the return of the islands, which U.S. officials perceived as "a growing source of potentially serious friction" in U.S.-Japan relations.[17]

In the meantime, the United States attempted to re-define its open-ended containment of the monolithic threat from the Communist bloc and promote "Vietnamization" of its military operations in Indochina.[18] On July 25, 1969, in Guam, President Richard M. Nixon announced major changes in U.S. policy in Asia, in what came to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine":

- The United States will keep its treaty commitments.

- We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

- In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required and as appropriate, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[19]

Nixon's announcement, however, brought about anxiety among U.S. allies that the United States might withdraw from Asia.[20] The real strategic implications of the doctrine were that while continuing to provide nuclear umbrella, the U.S. would encourage its regional allies for further self-help to enhance their own national security.[21] In particular, the U.S. increased pressure on Japan to make a more active contribution to the maintenance of regional stability in East Asia for the post-Vietnam era.

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[17] "Japan: Okinawa Reversion," p.1, attached to Memo from Sneider to Bundy and Brown, "Trip Report: Okinawa Reversion on the Front Burner" December 24, 1968, "Revelations In Newly Released Documents About U.S. Nuclear Weapons And Okinawa Fuel NHK Documentary," The National Security Archive (hereafter referred to as NSA), George Washington University. Under Article 3 of the September 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan, the U.S. had full administrative powers in the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), including its military freedom of action from its large base structure, especially for "nuclear storage and delivery, and for the launching of military combat operation without consulting Japan." On the other hand, the U.S. government had also recognized that Japan retained "residual sovereignty" over the islands and was "publicly committed to return them at a time and under conditions as yet unspecified." During the Vietnam War, Okinawa had been used extensively in U.S. military activities, including training, logistics, and staging operations. As for the development of the Okinawa issue in U.S.-Japan relations, see Robert Eldridge, *Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations: The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York: Garland Science, 2001).

[18] See, for example, Jeffrey Kimball. *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1998).

[19] Richard M. Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A Strategy for Peace," February 18, 1970, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp.40-41.

[20] "Nixon Plans Cut in Military Roles for U.S. in Asia," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1969.

[21] See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chapter 9.

The Okinawa Reversion

From 1969 to 1972, the Nixon administration and the Sato cabinet held a series of official and private negotiations on the reversion of the administrative right of Okinawa.[22] Among the major conflicting issues, the most complex were the U.S.'s conventional combat operations from its bases on Okinawa to continue the Vietnam operation and the treatment of nuclear weapons stored on the island. The Defense Department had a strong interest in retaining maximum free-use of the Okinawan bases for conventional military operations even after the reversion and also in securing the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa. However, the State Department estimated that since the Sato cabinet declared the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (the principles of not manufacturing nuclear weapons, not possessing them, and not allowing their introduction into Japan), it would be essential for Japan to materialize a nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa.[23] Hence, U.S. and Japanese officials negotiated public statements as well as private agreements to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

At the November 1969 summit talks, President Nixon expressed to Prime Minister Sato his expectation for Japan to "develop a significant military capability" and "assume a greater responsibility for the defense of that area" in the future.[24] In particular, Nixon and Sato agreed that the United States and Japan shared interests in Korea and Taiwan. In the joint communiqué, Sato stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was "essential" to Japan's own security; and the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was "a most important factor" for the security of Japan.[25] The U.S. also obtained Japan's political support for the continuation of its military operation in Indochina "in bringing about stability." Finally, the two leaders confirmed together that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty would be extended for a considerably long period "beyond 1970."[26]

Behind the scene, moreover, Nixon sought to reach a secret agreement with Sato, through the "strictly confidential" backchannel negotiations between National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Sato's secret emissary Kei Wakaizumi, that "in time of great emergency" in the Far East, including Japan, the U.S. would be allowed the "re-entry of its nuclear weapons, and transit rights" into Okinawa.[27] Since the November 1969 summit,

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[22] The two sides made major decisions on the timing of reversion during the minister-level negotiations for the November 1969 summit, followed by bureaucratic negotiations on technical and administrative aspects. On May 15, 1972, Okinawa was officially returned to Japan. See, for example, Fumihiko Togo, *Thirty Years of Japan-U.S. Diplomacy: Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Afterward* (Tokyo: Cyuukoubunko, 1989); and Masaki, Gabe, *What was the Reversion of Okinawa? : In the History of Japan-U.S. Negotiations in the Post War Era* (Tokyo: NHK Books, 2000).

[23] Priscilla Clapp. "Okinawa Reversion: Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington, 1966-1969," pp.34-35, *Kokusaiseiji*, 1974. On December 11, 1967, Prime Minister Sato declared the principles in a speech to the House of Representatives. In private, however, Sato understood the impracticality of the three principles within the harsh reality of the Cold War. On January 14, 1969, in his talks with U.S. Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson, Sato criticized the Japanese defense authority for their lacking of "sophistication" in military matters and called the three principles "nonsense." State Department Cable from Johnson to Rusk, January 14, 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-69, Box 2249, Record Group 59, National Archives.

[24] Memorandum of conversation (Memcon), November 19, 1969, 10:30a.m., p.8, Visit of Prime Minister Sato November 19-21, 1969 Vol. I (3 of 3), Box 924, VIP Visits, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Archives (NA).

[25] *The New York Times*, November 21, 1969. Sato's speech at the National Press Club confirmed further that if the U.S. should need its bases in Japan to meet an armed attack on Korea or Taiwan, the Japanese government "would decide its position positively and promptly."

[26] *Ibid*. The 1960 Security Treaty included a clause which allowed either side to abrogate the treaty after 1970 with one year's notice.

[27] Kei Wakaizumi, *I would like to believe that there was no other policy option* (Tokyo: Bungeisyunjyu, 1994), chapters 13-15.

however, it has been publicly debated whether Japan secretly allowed the U.S. to re-introduce its nuclear-armed planes and ships. On the one hand, the Japanese government has repeatedly denied that the U.S. stored nuclear weapons in and transported them through Okinawa. On the other hand, as a "basic principle," the U.S. government has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of any nuclear weapons on its warships.[28]

The Evolution of US-Japan-China Strategic Triangle

The U.S.-Japan security relations in the early 1970s saw a major strategic realignment. On July 6, 1971, at his speech in Kansas City, President Nixon introduced the concept of the five great powers' world consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, China, and Japan.[29] Within this multipolar framework, the U.S. sought to coordinate its relations with the two communist giants, namely the promotion of détente, an easing of tensions, with the Soviet Union by U.S.-USSR arms control talks and the ending of twenty years of Sino-US. hostility by rapprochement with China.[30]

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that as a result of Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing, he would accept an invitation to visit China in 1972 to hold summit talks with Chinese leaders. For Japanese officials, however, it had been a "nightmare" for many years to imagine that one day, Tokyo, which followed Washington in refusing to recognize Beijing as an official representative of China, would find itself by-passed by America's sudden reversal of its position.[31] Hence, the so-called "Nixon Shock (pronounced *shokku* in Japanese)" seriously damaged not only the trust and confidence between the two governments, but also the political credibility of Prime Minister Sato, who received the notice of the upcoming announcement only minutes in advance from U.S. Ambassador Meyer.[32]

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[28] In October 1974, the *Asahi Shimbun* reported that Admiral Gene La Rocque, retired Navy commander of several nuclear-capable warships, testified before the U.S. Congress' Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy [on September 10] that nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan: "My experience...has been that any ship that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, carries nuclear weapons. They do not offload them when they go into foreign ports such as Japan or other countries. If they are capable of carrying them, they normally keep them aboard ship at all times except when the ship is in overhaul or in for major repair." *Asahi Shimbun*, October 7, 1974. In May 1981, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer also admitted that a verbal agreement had been made during U.S.-Japan negotiations over the January 1960 Security Treaty that Japan would allow U.S. warships with nuclear weapons access to Japanese ports and territorial waters. Several former U.S. and Japanese officials, such as former Japanese ambassador to the U.S., Takezo Shimoda, confirmed Reischauer's interpretation that the question of temporary docking or transit through Japanese waters was outside the matter for prior consultation. In public, however, neither U.S. nor Japanese governments made clear their positions. *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 18, 1981; and *New York Times*, May 20, 1981.

[29] *The New York Times*, July 6, 1971. Critics argued that Western Europe and Japan were not yet able to defend themselves without U.S. help and that China still lacked substantial military and economic power resources. See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1972; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," *Foreign Policy*, No.7 Summer 1972.

[30] In January 1950, the Soviet Union and China became allies. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the so-called Sino-Soviet rift emerged as a result of Beijing's challenge to Moscow's leadership within the communist bloc. The U.S. thus sought to maximize its leverage to exploit Sino-Soviet rivalry. See, for example, Robert. S. Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China 1969-1989* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), chapter 2.

[31] U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp553-554.

[32] Armin H. Meyer, *Assignment: Tokyo An Ambassador's Journal* (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974) p.111-114. It was Nixon's political retaliation to Sato regarding U.S.-Japan trade friction. Nixon was provoked by Sato's unfulfilled commitment

From February 21 to 28, 1972, President Nixon visited China, held talks with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, and ended two decades of mutual hostility. In particular, the two sides agreed to include the so-called "anti-hegemony" clause, namely the code-name for an anti-Soviet tacit alliance, in the joint communiqué. The U.S. opening to China consequently pushed Japan to pursue its own more independent policy toward China. On September 29, 1972, new Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing, ended the state of war between the two old Asian rivals and negotiated Sino-Japanese normalization.[33] In the joint communiqué, Tanaka and Zhou declared their opposition to hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. In consequence, the combination of the U.S. opening to China and Japanese opening to China brought about the Washington-Tokyo-Beijing strategic triangle against Moscow.[34]

In private, moreover, Nixon and Kissinger held talks with Mao and Zhou regarding the inter-relationship between Japan's future role in Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Together, U.S. and Chinese officials came to perceive that as a result of Japan's re-emergence as a great economic power, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements would play a restricting role to prevent any possible revival of Japanese expansive aspirations in Asia.[35] For example, during the July 1971 secret meeting with Zhou, Kissinger explained that: "our defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies."[36] Kissinger thus warned Zhou that if Japan felt "forsaken" by the U.S., the emergence of a "strong" Japan would raise a question of "expansionism."[37] Finally, Kissinger sought to assure Zhou that the U.S. was not "using" Japan against China, as that would be "too dangerous."[38] During the February 1972 meeting with Mao, Nixon raised a vital question: "[I]s it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States?"[39] By emphasizing the danger of U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, Nixon sought to justify the continuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and simultaneously calm Chinese leaders' long-term concern about the revival of Japanese militarism: "the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan

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(which was made in the November 1969 summit) to achieve Japan's self-reduction of its textile exports to the United States.

[33] James Babb, *Tanaka: The Making of Postwar Japan* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pp.77-78.

[34] See, for example, Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China 1969-1989*; and Sadako Ogata (Yoshihide Soeya translator), *Normalization With China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992).

[35] The question of Japan's acquirement of nuclear weapons has been controversial for a long period of time. Hersh reports that during the November 1969 summit, Nixon and Kissinger "broadly hinted" to Sato that the U.S. would "understand" if Japan made a decision to "go nuclear," which made Japanese officials "confused." Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p.381. There have also been arguments among scholars of the so-called "neo-realism" that because of "structural pressures" from the shift of balance of power among the great powers in the international system, a great economic power like Japan will re-militarize and even possess nuclear weapons. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), p.55.

[36] Kissinger and Zhou, Memorandum of conversation (Memcon), July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening (4:35p.m.-11:20p.m.), p.42, China-HAK memcons July 1971, Box 1033, Foreign Policy Files (FPF), NSCF, NPMS, NA.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] *Ibid.*, p.3, POLO I.

[39] Nixon and Mao, Memorandum of conversation, February 21, 1972, 2:50-3:55 p.m., p.6, CHINA – President's Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, Box 91, Country Files (CF)-Far East, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF), NSCF, NPMS, NA. See also Richard M. Nixon, *RN* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp.560-564; and Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp.1057-1066.

moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned."[40] These statements were the foundation of the so-called "cork in the bottle" argument which would emerge widely in America during the 1980s. While increasing pressure on Tokyo for further "burden-sharing," Washington sought to continue to "contain" Japan as an independent military player in regional and international security. Finally, the United States thus attempted to enhance Japan's contribution to East Asian regional security only under its political control.

Toward the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: "Burden-sharing" or "Free-riding"?

In the late 1970s, the Japanese government took a series of initiatives to respond to the 1969 Nixon Doctrine's pressure on Japan to take more responsibilities for its own defense policy as well as East Asian regional security.[41] In October 1976, the Miki cabinet introduced the National Defense Program Outline. It claimed that the "equilibrium" between the three great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and the presence of the Japan-US. security relationship played a major role in maintaining stability in Asia, and in "preventing full-scale aggression" against Japan. In particular, the outline stressed the importance of maintaining the credibility of Japan-US. security arrangements and ensuring the effective functioning of the system, including Japan's continuing dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrence. Finally, the outline focused on Japan's basic defense concept against "limited and small-scale aggression." Accordingly, in November 1976, the Japanese government set the limit of its defense budget under 1% of GNP.[42]

In parallel with the drafting of the 1976 outline, the U.S. and Japan sought to institutionalize U.S.-Japan security relations. While U.S. officials sought to focus on contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula along the lines of the November 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué, Japanese officials attempted to limit the final agreement to the defense of Japan against direct attack. In November 1978, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were announced as the first official approval of the joint military planning for the case of armed attack against Japan and situations in the Far East.[43] The guidelines defined broad responsibilities for the respective sides calling for joint exercises and training as well as cooperation in intelligence activities.

With regard to the decline of U.S. economic power in the post-Vietnam era, the Ohira cabinet introduced the concept of "Comprehensive Security" in terms of the maintenance of the Japan-US. security treaty supplemented by such factors as economic cooperation and cultural diplomacy. In July 1980, the study group under Ohira's authorization issued the Comprehensive Security Strategy Report which stressed the increased importance of military-security issues for Japan.[44] The report argued further that for the first time in the postwar era,

[40] Memorandum of conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10-6:00p.m., p.12, CHINA – President's Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, CF-Far East, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

[41] See, for example, Hidetoshi Sotooka, Masaru Honda and Toshiaki Miura, *Japan-U.S. Alliance Half Century: Security Treaty and Secret Agreement* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsya, 2002), chapters 5 and 6.

[42] See Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Japan and two theories of military doctrine formation: civilian policymakers, policy preference, and the 1976 National Defense Program Outline," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,* Volume 1, Number 1, 2001.

[43] Defense Agency of Japan, "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," November 27, 1978. (http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/sisin1e.htm)

[44] Comprehensive Security Study Group, "Comprehensive Security Strategy," cited in Hand M. Kristensen, "Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," Japan FOIA Documents, Nuclear Strategy Project, The Nautilus Institute. (http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/foia /japanindex.html)

Japan had to consider seriously its self-help for defense and prepare for the effective function of Japan-US. military relations.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the end of détente and brought about the so-called "Second Cold War" in which U.S. President Ronald Regan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." The Sino-Japanese of Peace and Friendship Treaty of September 1978 and the Sino-US. full diplomatic normalization of January 1979 reinforced the Washington-Tokyo-Beijing strategic triangle against Moscow.[45] While Japan became the second largest economic power in the world, the United States increased its pressure on Japan to make further efforts to strengthen its defense policy. During the May 1981 summit, Prime Minister Susuki expressed willingness to promote the "division of roles" in the Japan-US. "alliance" for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and stability in the Far East.[46] In particular, Susuki agreed to make efforts in the defense of the "sea lanes" 1,000 nautical miles west of Guam and north of the Philippines.

On the basis of his personal friendship with President Reagan as symbolized by their "Ron and Yasu" relationship, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone sought to expand the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance beyond the existing bilateral framework in order to enhance Japan's national prestige in international security.[47] In the January 1983 summit, Nakasone described U.S.-Japan relations as a "community of common fate" and illustrated Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Pacific Ocean.[48] In particular, the Nakasone Cabinet made a decision to supply arms technology to the United States as an exception to the Japanese governmental ban on arms exports. The Japanese government also increased its defense budget to over 1% of GNP during the early 1980s. In response to the Soviet military build-up, including a new ballistic missile submarine fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk, Japan regularly monitored the activities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and aircraft in the waters and air space around Japan, and the Japanese defense budget increased by an average of 6%. Overall, Japan under Nakasone's leadership attempted to strengthen its self-help for defense policy in accordance with the development of its economic power.

During the late 1980s, however, the United States repeatedly claimed that there was an increasing gap between Japan's global economic influence and its contribution to regional and international security. Accordingly, tension on trade, including Japan's "high tech-competitive challenge," had become a major issue of conflict in U.S.-Japan relations.[49] Because of increasing frustration in U.S. Congress and business community, so-called "Japan bashing" emerged: the United States had criticized the Japanese market for being closed unfairly and even resorted to protectionism against Japan's greatly increasing exports to the American market. In essence, realizing the relative decline of its economic power, the United States had been increasingly irritated by Japan's economic and technological advancement in contrast to its limited commitment to regional and international security. Therefore, the U.S. government continuously demanded that Japan have greater burden sharing in military-security terms, and criticized Japan for being a "free-rider" in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system.

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[45] See, for example, Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China 1969-1989*; and Ogata., *Normalization With China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes*.

[46] Sotooka, Honda and Miura, *Japan-U.S. Alliance Half Century: Security Treaty and Secret Agreement*, pp.361-362.

[47] Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs?* (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), chapter 12.

[48] *The Washington Post*, January 19, 1983.

[49] Memorandum from Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan, Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, April 29 – May 2," April 21, 1987, p.1, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1977–1992*, NSA.(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB175/index.htm)

Finally, the outbreak of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis and War was a major turning point in re-defining the U.S.-Japan security relations and defense and security issues. On the one hand, U.S. officials hoped that Japan would find its own way to shoulder substantial "burden-sharing" in terms of "the risks as well as the costs."[50] In reality, however, Washington criticized the delay of Tokyo's financial assistance (13 billion U.S. dollars) to the U.S. led UN forces and its decision to deploy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1991 following the liberation of Kuwait for being "too little, too late." In private, moreover, U.S. leaders felt that the Gulf Conflicts provided a crucial opportunity to assess the major "obstacles" in order for Japan to transform its "essentially passive approach" to "a mature foreign policy." These obstacles included the "enduring pacifist sentiment and distrust of the Japanese military," and the "gap between the desire for recognition as a great power and willingness to bear the associated risks and responsibilities."[51] On the other hand, the Japanese government sought to make more active manpower contributions to international security, a policy embodied by the June 1992 passage of the Peace-Keeping Operations Cooperation bill which, for the first time, legalized the Self Defense Forces" participation in UN peacekeeping activities.[52] The Gulf Conflicts and Washington's criticisms of Tokyo's slow response in the early 1990s became a long-term trauma for Japanese leaders regarding their thinking on Japanese foreign and defense policy for the rest of the decade, forcing them to question Japan's role in the post-Cold War world and re-define its roles in U.S.-Japan security relations.

Conclusion

During the Cold War era, the asymmetry in U.S.-Japan relations was never overcome. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements not only restrained, but also simultaneously enhanced Japan's defense capabilities as well as its roles in East Asian regional security.

On the one hand, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty played a significant role in containing the revival of Japan's expansionism, symbolized by the term "cork in the bottle." Equally important, Japan's defense policy was restrained by such major factors as the Article 9 of its Constitution, the postwar culture of anti-militarism and nuclear allergy, strict civilian control of the Self-Defense Forces, and the remaining fear and suspicion among its Asian neighbors for the revival of its wartime militarism and aggressions. On the other hand, the U.S. pushed Japan to take further responsibility in "burden-sharing" the costs as well as risks, which was reflected in Washington's criticism of Tokyo "free-riding" on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The preservation of operational and functional secrecy in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by the exchange of confidential minutes played a crucial role for the United States in securing the continuing effective use of its military bases in Japan and the right to re-introduce and transfer nuclear weapons in cases of great emergency in East Asia. For Washington, its alliance with Japan was, perhaps, the most economical military security arrangement in its global strategic deployment because the U.S. could not maintain its effective physical presence and nuclear deterrence in East Asia without its bases in Japan. Finally, it was the maintenance of the U.S.'s centrality based on its worldwide military deployment and nuclear deterrent capabilities that provided essential credibility for the U.S.-Japan security relations.

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[50] Ambassador Armacost to Secretary Baker, "GOJ Contributions and Gulf Crisis," January 16, 1991, p.3, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1977–1992*, NSA.

[51] Ambassador Armacost to Secretary Baker, "The Gulf War: Impact on Japan and U.S.-Japan Relations," *ibid.*, March 14, 1991, p.1.

[52] Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan* (Tokyo, New York, London: Kodansha International, 1994), pp.114-115.

Japan attempted to pursue a more autonomous defense policy as well as equality in U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Thus, despite the constitutional, political, and cultural restraints over fully-pledged rearmament, Japan continued to institutionalize its defense policy and upgrade the military equipment of the Self-Defense Forces without substantially enlarging its scale in the eyes of the general public and the international community. In reality, however, there still remained a perception gap between Japan and its Asian neighbors in their respective views. Any initiative from Tokyo to increase its contributions to the maintenance of East Asian regional security could be perceived by the other Asian states as a sign of the revival of its expansionism.

Japan's re-emergence as a great economic power also caused tension within U.S.-Japan relations. There was a danger that the escalation of the U.S.'s continuing criticisms of Japan for being the "free rider" on the U.S.-Japan alliance could push Japan toward isolationism or unilateralism. In consequence, Washington's pressure might bring about the rise of a new nationalism within Japan leading Tokyo to a more active pursuit of an autonomous defense policy. Moreover, Japan's economic development during the 1980s brought about imbalance in U.S.-Japan trade relations. Thus, Japanese economic success became the cause of annoyance, suspicion and even jealousy in U.S.-Japan relations. In the end, Japan continued to face a dilemma between its increasing willingness to be recognized as a great power in world politics and its remaining reluctance to play a major role in military-security terms.

Finally, there remained a geopolitical and strategic perception gap between the United States and Japan: while Washington, as a military superpower, perceived its security arrangement with Japan within the broader framework of regional and global security, Tokyo, as a great economic power, saw the security treaty system with the U.S. as the fundamental framework of its defense policy. For Washington, its alliance system with Japan played "a major" role in its strategic alignment in Asia along with NATO in Europe. For Tokyo, the Security Treaty was "the most important" bilateral military security arrangement. Therefore, the remaining ambiguous balance between pressures and restraints often caused irritation in the management of the alliance system, importantly, however, this never led to a major crisis in U.S.-Japan relations as a whole. While pressuring Japan for further self-help to strengthen its own defense capabilities and increase its contributions to regional security, the U.S. never intended to allow Japan to go it alone in the pursuit of an independent and autonomous defense policy. In essence, the U.S. wanted Japan to be neither too weak nor too strong, and wanted any possibility for its autonomous defense policy contained within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. On the other hand, despite continuing U.S.'s pressure, Japan never intended to break the alliance system and thus sought to find a balance between its intentions and capabilities to restore asymmetry in the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. In the end, both enhancing and restricting factors over Japan's security role were under the political control of the United States. Hence, the two sides sought to preserve the alliance system despite its remaining structural and psychological asymmetry.

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Justification for a Qualitative Educational Research Project on Distributed Cognition

Jeffrey Chi Hoe Mok

本論文は、研究者の研究目的及び範例（パラダイム）配置・処理、現存の情報収集・分析方法、そして、正当性と確実性に関する近年の議論を検討する。次に、定量分析あるいは定性的（質的）分析のどちらが分散認知により適しているかを説明する。結論として、範例と研究方法の弁明を行う。

This paper discusses a research project in the light of current debate on the purpose of research, paradigm dispositions of researchers, existing methods of data collection and analysis, and discussions on validity and reliability. The paper will attempt to explain and justify which research method, quantitative or qualitative, is suitable for research on distributed cognition. This paper will conclude with the justification of the paradigm and research methods.

Picture this: A group of students are discussing a problem, seeking to resolve it. They are exchanging information, challenging ideas, constructing and synthesizing meaning, with some making notes or drawing visuals. Simultaneously, some consult their hand-held electronic gadgets: personal digital assistants, dictionaries, hand-phones and computer laptops. This may be a typical learning scene in a small group. Cognition has hitherto been understood as a private and individualised activity, but in the situation described above, could cognition be seen not as something private or implicit? Under the broad educational psychological framework of learning, this research seeks to question the *what*'s and *how*'s of cognition that is shared and distributed across the participants in a group.

Classical cognitive science examines how information is represented in the cognitive system, and how these representations are transformed, combined, propagated through the system in goal oriented behaviour (Simon, 1981). Thus far, the individual and what goes on in his mind has been the main focus, until the notion of distributed cognition emerged arguing for the equal emphasis (in some cases, more) on the external artefacts as well as the social and cultural elements. The artefacts refer to any item or visual that engages the cognitive development of the participants in the group. The classical idea of cognition was started with the mind and considered what went on inside that constitutes learning, such as memory and motivation. Only in the recent ten years has cognition slowly been considered outside the individual, distributed across the individuals in a system. Several researchers such as Hutchins, Salomon and Resnick began discussing socially shared cognition and the cognition processes in the 1990s and now serious attention has been given to the study of distributed cognition.

Essentially, distributed cognition is the cognitive process that is distributed across members of a social group (Salomon, 1993). These non-neurological considerations of cognition are the social and cultural interactions amongst the individuals accomplishing a task or resolving a problem. In his classical seminal book on distributed cognition, "Cognition in the wild", Hutchins (1995) studied the interactions of a captain piloting his boat at the control helm and his interactions with his instruments (artefacts) and his crew members (participants). He argued for cognition being distributed outside the individual mind and that these external participants and artefacts are significant in the development of the cognitive activity necessary to perform the task at hand: to navigate the boat to a destination. Distributed cognition is the study of the interactions between the participants and the artefacts in the environment.

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The problem

Much of the research into distributed cognition has been centred on the fields of anthropology, cognitive psychology, cultural psychology, and sociology. However, there has been limited research in education where learning and thinking are the main businesses of schools and colleges. Brown et al's (1993) study into classroom practices was one of the early reported instances of research into formal learning institution distributed cognition. Distributed cognition has primarily been analysed in working environments such as airplane's cockpit, engineering workplace, etc. but little in the area of educational settings. Hence there is a need to study distributed cognition in a learning environment.

Distributed cognition has been used successfully in understanding some working environments but its applications were deemed limited to small, focused and "closed" systems (Perry & Macredie, 1999, p.2) such as the pilot in his cockpit and the captain on his bridge. Perry & Macredie felt that the study of distributed cognition has been confined to a "constrained set of problem solving activities, restricted resources and event durations" (p.2). A study of distributed cognition in less constrained and open environments may yield different insights and reveal more understanding of cognition.

This research seeks an understanding into the nature of distributed cognition in a classroom: amongst the learners and learning artefacts in an open and natural environment. This involves examining ways participants negotiate socially, conduct discourses and interactions. Owing to the nature of different individuals acting independently and interdependently, the participants will exhibit multiple variables and emergent behaviour. This research will contribute to the design of future classroom learning environments fostering the development of a community where knowledge is distributed in ways that provide the seeding ground for learning.

The problem statement can be seen as the study of distributed cognition and how it is distributed across a group of late adolescent male and female college students in single sessions of a problem solving activity. Relationships between the participants and artefacts will be studied and their cognitive representations will be analysed.

The purpose

What is the purpose of this research project? Perhaps the definition of research provided by Bassey (1999) is a good starting point: research is a "systematic critical and self–critical enquiry which aims to contribute towards the advancement of knowledge and wisdom" (Bassey, 1999, p.38). It seems that most research, if not all, should aim towards the progression of knowledge. Michael Bassey further defines educational research as "critical enquiry aimed at informing educational judgments and decisions in order to improve educational action" and makes a distinction from "discipline research" where it seeks to inform the understanding of phenomena (Bassey, 2005, pp.108-109). Johnson (1994) sees the purpose similarly as "to assist the development of effective school and college management....is meant to lead to professional reflection and...a commitment to change." For educational research, it appears that research should improve educational practice on top of attaining new illuminations to new phenomena in educational settings.

Setting noble aims aside, some may feel that the purpose of research in professional practice may be a "rule-driven" means of finding out information (Morrison, 2005, p.4) and done as a matter-of-factly, sacrificing the important questions of *"Why?"* in any research project. Similarly, some may feel that research is a means to be belonged to the elitism of academic profession. Such attitudes and practice may have pushed the whole notion of research as being irrelevant in some cases, leading to many managers and teachers feeling exasperated about research (Clipson-Boyles, 2000). Some writers even considered educational research as "disinterested inquiry" (Morrison, 2005, p.9).

An interesting aspect to educational research is that many researchers use a hybrid approach where problems are derived primarily from other disciplines such as psychology or sociology and their constructs are applied to an educational setting (Morrison, 2005). The research purpose seems to fall into this description: using a theory or concept derived from cognitive science and trying to understand it in an educational learning activity. The purpose for this research is certainly to enhance the body of educational research at large following Bassey's definition, hoping that it will impact both policymakers as well as practitioners in their design of learning environment for cognitive development.

The purpose is therefore to examine the meaning of a phenomenon: distributed cognition in a classroom setting. It is interest driven not rule-driven and is done neither for the sake of research nor on the grounds of academic "elitism".

Research Questions

Qualitative studies revolve around a central question and associated sub questions (Creswell, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Borg & Gall, 1989). Quantitative studies, on the other hand, state specific objectives or hypotheses. Miles and Huberman (1994) set a limit of one to two central questions and not more than twelve sub questions. Creswell (2003) feels that five to seven is good enough. These questions serve as guidelines to the research compared to hypotheses to be tested in quantitative research. Essentially, qualitative research asks open-ended and exploratory questions, seeking to explain and describe phenomenon. It is emerging and employs non-directional language (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Quantitative research, on the other hand, asks close-ended questions and seeks to test, resulting in either null or alternative hypotheses.

Matching of research questions to the purpose of the research is crucial (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Qualitative questions that seek to explore are: investigate phenomena, discover categories of meaning, explain patterns in phenomenon, and identify relationships; to describe are: document and describe the phenomenon; and to emancipate are: opportunity for social action, employing the "what's" and "how's" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

If the purpose of research is to explore and understand a phenomenon by investigating, identifying patterns and discovering relationships, then the questions would be asking about those effects. The general research questions are: what happens when cognition is distributed in a group? What is "distributed" in distributed cognition? What is the cognition between the participants themselves, and with the artefacts? The sub-questions are: What are, if any, the representations of distributed cognition between and amongst the participants, and with the artefacts? If so, how are these representations generated, communicated and shared? Is there joint cognition and if so, how are they distributed? These sub questions seek to understand the phenomenon better.

Paradigmatic Quandary

Let's consider some underlying issues first. Researchers draw on their understanding of reality and knowledge in their investigation and creation of new knowledge. Currently, there are three to four paradigms to understand reality and knowledge: what they are (ontology) and their relationship with us (epistemology). In traditional scientific research approach, positivism or objectivism is the widely used and acclaimed system of philosophy (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Borg & Gall, 1989). Sometimes also known as "logical positivism" (Borg & Gall, 1989, p.16), it asserts that something is meaningful only if it can be observed objectively by human senses. There are universal principles and laws "out there" that can be known by testing them from observing and collecting data objectively. Owing to criticisms that there is no such thing as "theory free" and "value-free", and that not all phenomena are observable, this paradigm was modified to post positivism, which accepted the possibility that knowledge and reality may not

be imperfectly understood (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). However, it was further criticised as resulting in relativism (Borg & Gall, 1989).

Consequently, the third paradigm emerged: interpretism. This paradigm is also known as discovery-oriented, artistic research, subjectivist, constructivist (Mertens, 1998), and naturalistic (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Its key thrust is that knowledge is understood through interactions between the individual and the world. There is thus no objective reality but rather, knowledge and understanding of reality are constructed, interpreted, and modified by people and the meaning they place on them (Easterby-Smith et al. 1994). Instead of seeking to explain, it seeks to understand; instead of testing hypotheses, it builds theories; instead of being an independent observer, it acknowledges that it is part of what is being observed; instead of deconstructing the phenomenon, it looks at it holistically; instead of being value free, it is driven by human interests; instead of a single method of measuring the constructs, multiple methods are used to view the phenomena from different angles and instead of focusing on facts and figures, it focuses on meaning.

These bipolar and diametrically opposite philosophies on reality and knowledge have been the main debate for both scientists and social scientists (Borg & Gall, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 2000) in modern times. Here is the crux of the dilemma: while in physical sciences, one can strongly argue for the objective realities of physical world but in social and human sciences, this cannot be said to be the same. And yet, it is irresistible to posit generalisations of human behaviour which is the basis of psychology, sociology and to some extent, anthropology. After all, after observing and testing hypotheses, patterns do emerge amongst several groups and one may be led to generalize its universality. A discerning person will qualify generalizations, but if everything has to be qualified, then in reality there is really no reasonable generalisation to be made. If so, why generalise in the first place, and why do any research at all?

Critiquing both positivism and interpretism, feminist and critical theory became the next alternative paradigm that spawned the neo-Marxist, praxis-oriented, ethnic studies, cultural studies and action research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Marshall & Rossman, 1999) that sought to transform, emancipate and empower research according to their particular and individual agenda. It purports that truth responds to power, all knowledge is "interested" and power-oriented and that researchers are implicated in political relationships. This paradigm seeks to liberate people from "false consciousness" (Eagleton, 1991). There is therefore no objective knowledge and reality as they are influenced by social interests and political associations.

The research began with a theoretical concept about cognition. So, it will certainly not be done "theory free" or "value free". And even if distributed cognition is unobservable socially, it does not mean that it does not exist. In positivist research, the use of control groups, experimentations and standardised testing of participants is unreal from the social sciences point of view. Arguably, the test participants will respond differently under different contexts no matter how identical the constructs and environments are set up. Variables, other than those determined by the researchers, come into play because one cannot account completely for all the variables. Because it is difficult to pre-determine and stipulate all the constructs to be analysed, would it not be better to examine the phenomena in its natural and real setting rather than in a controlled environment. It appears that taking a positivist position for this research would be erroneous.

This research paradigm does not belong to the school of feminist and critical theory either. It has no emancipatory aspirations because the research does not seek to change any current situations in the college nor the community at large. I have problems reconciling this position's rejection of positivism while claiming to correct the "false consciousness" of groups of people. If we see groups of people having "false consciousness", then who is to judge and by which objective value or criteria do we levy that judgment (unless they draw from some objective criteria!)? While feminist and critical theory is based on rationalisation, so will this research be, in understanding these free autonomous agents (students), creating and managing

their own time in a setting without political and capital constraints (college). However, it will not be seeking to empower the individuals (students). Neither is the research speaking on their behalf in order to make a political or social change to the college or community.

Having examined the various paradigmatic positions, it appears that the research problem (on distributed cognition in a natural environment), research purpose (of examining this phenomenon), and research questions sit well in the interpretist or constructivist paradigm. However, I do confess having an eye cast on the possibility of building theories, which pictures this research sitting as an interpretist looking at post-positivism.

Justifying the Naturalistic Way

Traditional scientific research has been using the quantitative method and is seen by many as the only valid and credible way of research (Borg & Gall, 1989; Burns, 2000; Creswell, 2003). Perhaps because statistics do not lie, the quantitative method of churning out figures and computed analysis appears more credible. Quantitative research sees the researcher as separate from the participants, maintaining a neutral position while observing and obtaining the objective knowledge that is "out there" (Creswell, 2003). It employs standardised testing and uses instruments to gather data. The purpose is to test hypotheses that are pre-formulated by the researcher. This is done by deducing observable consequences of the hypotheses and with the data collected, usually from large and cross-sectional represented samples, they are analysed and presented in facts and figures to prove or disprove the theories (Borg & Gall, 1989; Creswell, 2003). As you can see, the focus on facts and figures, deconstruction, measurable constructs and variables to explain the phenomena via large research samples can be very scientifically appealing.

However, the emergence of social sciences and their significance to human society has seen this way challenged in the late last century as the positivistic paradigm has been challenged on both ontological and epistemological grounds. Lincoln & Guba (1985) were at odds with positivism and offered the alternative naturalistic way, which is now known as the qualitative method. The characteristics of qualitative research are well documented by Lincoln & Guba (1985), Burgess (1989b), Borg & Gall (1989) and many others. It is a method for research that goes in-depth into complexities and processes; examines little-known phenomena; explores discrepancies between theory and practice; observes informal and unstructured linkages and processes; and studies variables that are unknown (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Borg & Gall (1989) consider research with a focus on individuals" lived experience, on society and culture or language and communication as part of the qualitative inquiry genre. Qualitative research genres involve the constructivism, interpretivism, critical theory, feminism, ethnic studies and cultural studies paradigms (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).

Some researchers take the extreme irreconcilable position between quantitative and qualitative research methods while others such as Borg and Gall (1989) posit that different philosophies support different types of research. Some feel that a combination of both (mixed methods) is superior to either one, such as Miles and Huberman (1994), Wolcott (2001) and Creswell (2003), who also rejected the claims of incompatibility suggested that using both methods is legitimate, pragmatic, and not mutually exclusive. Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.31) saw them as more than complementary: as an "interplay" that allows the qualitative to inform the quantitative and vice versa, in order to build a grounded theory.

Human actions and behaviour in a real life classroom group activity are the main investigation interests of this research. As such, the social dimension and physical setting, cultural norms, traditions, roles and values of the participants will become important variables in this collection of data and analysis. These research variables make this research setting highly complex and multi-layered. Borg and Gall (1989), Creswell (2003), Marshall and Rossman (1999) and Mertens (1998) consider that research into human behaviour and complex situations requires the qualitative approach to harness the richness of information and data for analysis.

This research is about individuals' lived experience in a discussion group: uncovering the meaning and reasons behind the participants' actions—their feelings, beliefs, values, thoughts, assumptions and perspectives. This is best done via face-to-face interviews or focus group interviews (Creswell, 2003). The quantitative research method operates by coding variables and imposing pre-determined constructs. Doing this will ignore and miss valuable information.

As a social science researcher, I am aware that my actions and observations as an observer will have an influence (Burgess, 1985b) on the setting. The fact that the participants are aware of my presence and that they are being observed or researched is an influence that will directly affect their behaviour and actions in the group. They may speak less or be careful with what they say, or choose to be more focused on their tasks than in other unobserved occasions. Another issue with my personal involvement is power. They will act differently if this research was arranged by a fellow student (i.e. they may be more casual) or by the dean of the college (they may be more serious) compared to being arranged by myself, as a teacher. However, even with these considerations, it is believed that the overall integrity of the phenomena that is to be investigated is still largely valid and representative of such a setting. The reason is that it represents a typical case of the behaviour of participants in the process being observed.

As the primary source of data collection, personal observation is used because the nature of the phenomena is complex and dynamic. The discussions are fluid and multiple variables may emerge unexpectedly. Personal observations are adaptive enough to capture what the researcher is looking for and minimise any biasness that may result from the interactions and value differences between the researcher and participants (Borg & Gall, 1989). Video and audio recordings of the sessions and interviews with the participants will be made in order to supplement data collection. Open-ended questions will be used to ask for their perceptions during interviews. Observations and open-ended questions are characteristics of qualitative inquiry (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

The dynamic and unanticipated events in the observation will affect the methods design of the research. Adjustments and changes will be made as needs and influences emerge: additional data collection, even with different methods and modifications to the constructs that are being analysed. The reason is the recognised unpredictability of the phenomena and the unfeasibility of ascertaining all possible constructs and influences ahead of time. Such emerging and unpredictable scenario in a research setting can only be qualitatively researched (Creswell, 2003).

Because of my personal involvement, my inevitable contamination of the research setting must be considered. As a primary instrument in collecting the data, my feelings, impressions, interpretations and invariably my judgments will come into play in my understanding of the phenomena. And because I believe that knowledge is created through the individual's interaction with the world, the students will have their own realities and meaning in the discussion activity. Each student socially constructs their own understanding of the world (Easterby-Smith et al., 1994) and the class with his or her peer, teachers, family, community and nation. Each student is culturally, historically and socially bound in their understanding of the meaning of being in a discussion group. Additionally, a student in a different part of the neighbourhood, city or country will perceive and understand their reality of class slightly different from the other. This will be true even of the next student in the same class.

The research is about the social processes, specifically students' learning processes in a group setting: how they think together and how they distribute cognition through their interaction with each other. This research will look at how people act according to what they make of the situation and how they respond and react to the multi-faceted stimuli present. And since all human action is meaningful and personal from the participants' point of view, the research will seek to understand and interpret their actions within their contexts. Each individual's contribution to the distribution of cognition, their action as well as non-action, and what they jointly or collectively as a group create over time in the discussion will be looked into.

The group dynamics and hegemony struggle will also be examined, together with the learning from the teacher and co-learner relationships.

The research will also attempt to look at the phenomena as a whole, considering as many cognitive constructs as well as social, cultural and historical variables. In other words, there will be no pre-determined constructs but rather they are recognised as they emerge in the observations. The phenomena in its natural setting will be examined. The students will be in their regular classes, engaging in small group discussions revolving around a problem solving scenario. Whatever learning artefacts that can be possibly identified in the natural physical environment will be considered.

The sampling will be selectively chosen rather than random. Purposeful sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994), looking at a particular phenomenon and choosing the most typical case, will be used. Apart from the nature of the discussion being a problem solving type, the groups chosen will be mixed gender and mixed ability groups. Another key consideration will be the timing of the observation of these discussions: whether it is at the beginning or middle or towards the end of the semester. This has bearing on the group dynamics and the individuals' other academic demands.

One purpose of this research is also to see if it is possible to induce some qualified generalisations from the understanding of the distributed cognition in educational settings. While I may not begin with a hypothesis, the possibility to develop some grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1999) is enticing. I am opened to the "interplay between qualitative and quantitative in theorising" my research (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.31).

There are several traditional qualitative research methods which an interpretivist or a constructivist researcher may use: ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, life history, action research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000), focus group (Mertens, 1998), ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis (Burgess, 1985b). Although Tesch (1990) described 26 different strategies, she considers ethnography as the most common. Guided by theory, ethnography seeks to understand the phenomena in their natural socio-historical and cultural setting (Jacobson, 1991). Hutchins (1995) considers ethnography as the common research method in distributed cognition studies. In fact, he developed the term and method, "cognitive ethnography" to study cognition in a natural environment (Hutchins, 1995, p. 371).

Ethnography will therefore be the main strategy supported by conversation analysis and phenomenology. There will be thick description from several viewpoints in order to understand the behaviour of a social or cultural group using participant observation. Focus group interviews will be conducted in order to reveal the participants' inner thoughts and understand reasons for their actions and behaviour (phenomenology). Analysis of the conversations will be done to see how the speakers jointly construct meaning and shared cognition in the discussion (conversation analysis). Microanalysis of discourse and behavioural descriptions will be attempted: a detailed line-by-line analysis to "generate categories" and suggest relationships between them in a combination of "open and axial coding" (Strauss & Corbin, 1988, pp. 57-58). Different qualitative methods of data collection will allow me to have "multiple realities" (Borg & Gall, 1989, p.385) to further understand the complex phenomena.

Validity and Reliability

All research must have rigour and be tested against reliability and credibility (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). "Trustworthiness" is a common term used for validating qualitative research, although this is debatable (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). This will ensure that the results are believable. Creswell (2003) suggested that reliability and generalization play a small part in qualitative research due to different starting points and goals.

Qualitative research has been questioned in the area of population validity (Borg and Gall, 1989): that purposeful sampling is not representative of the larger population. In this light, LeCompte and Goetz (1982) suggested that qualitative researchers need to be cautious when

making generalisation. The other concern is the experimenter effect (Borg and Gall, 1989) where the biases and expectations of the researcher may distort data. A tedious and rigorous process called "analytic induction" (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, pp. 736-787), a process of reformulating hypotheses to apply to all cases under analysis, may validate generalization. This is also ethnography's way of validation (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). To some extent for case studies in qualitative research, Creswell (2003) believes that we can generalise some facets of the results to other cases. Yin (1994) believes that multiple cases can strengthen this.

The internal validity is also considered weak in qualitative inquiry (Borg & Gall, 1989). This is the degree of distortion by unrelated variables getting more pronounced over long periods of observation. These changes stem from shifting perception and subjectivity of the researcher over time. Much of the criticism on the reliability and validity of qualitative research comes from the quantitative inquiry camp. However, Creswell (2003) believed that the internal and external validity problems faced by either research method are different and to compare them using the quantitative research criteria is not equitable.

There are several methods that will be used to ensure validity in my research project. The first of which is at the onset of data collection, the purposeful sampling from a typical case will add weight to the internal reliability (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A small scale quantitative survey of the most typical learning and cognitive activity of the students can be done to determine which cases. Secondly, employing multiple strategies to collect data as mentioned under the section "justifying the naturalistic way" will also enhance credibility (Mertens, 1998). Thirdly, the triangulation method is the classic strategy to increase validity (Burns, 2000). Besides observation descriptions of the sessions, there will be in-depth interviews with each member of the group, transcriptions of the discourses, and subsequent observation descriptions from the video recording. Although this is accepted as a traditional way of making one's research valid, it falls prey to finding consistency when one looks for it (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). However, when done properly this method can support verifying of facts. Fourthly, checking via a third party to verify the findings and checking for accuracy with the participants will be conducted. Guba and Lincoln (1994), Mertens (1998) and Creswell (2003) consider member checking as an excellent way to enhance credibility.

Fifthly, rich and thick descriptions of findings, furnished as close to an authentic picture of the phenomena facilitates a degree of validity (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This will be descriptions of the discourses, actions, behaviour and body language of the participants. Creswell (2003) opined that such richness and thickness of description supports authenticity to the observation.

Sixthly, personal biasness and subjectivity will be reported. This will qualify and hedge any results and findings from over generalisations and assumptions. Seventhly, any contradictions and apparent antithetical observations or conclusions will not be omitted in the discussion. When possible, the research process and data gathering will be peer reviewed to minimise any oversight. Such steps are measures to justify qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Finally, the period of data collection will be confined to the same semester where the fear of distortion by unrelated variables such as history, maturation, experimental mortality, and instrumentation will be allayed (Borg & Gall, 1989).

LeCompte and Goetz (1982) pointed out that in a highly social situations such as a classroom, the amount of interaction is too complex and too subtle for the participant observer, whether complete or pure observer, to record everything that happens. Their contention is that while the researcher may record what is relevant to the topic being researched, what is being excluded should be recorded. This will be true in this case, and to compensate this inherent problem, the entire participant observation sessions will be video-taped and audio-taped. This, no doubt, will even capture unobtrusive cues that participants may have exhibited but eluded the observation. Such modern day technologies that support ethnographic research are one of the

major changes in qualitative research in the last two decades (Preissle, 1999) and includes verification of the claims made.

The validity and credibility of qualitative research rest on dispelling the subjective nature of the collection, analysis of data and deriving conclusions from the findings. Hopefully, the steps to be taken above will minimise the experimental effect and if necessary and time permits, the number of case studies may increased for more credibility. Any good qualitative work should not be denied its accuracy and trustworthiness when adequate steps are taken.

Conclusion

Concerned for human actions and behaviour in a natural and open environment of a classroom group activity, balancing its social and cognitive process with looking at it as a whole, and seeking to induce some qualified generalisation of distributed cognition in an educational setting, this research exhibits the "soft side" of research (Burgess, 1985b, p.1). The collection of data, adoption of ethnography, conversation analysis, and phenomenology strategies using observations, face-to-face focus group interviews, discourse recording, and purposeful sampling are typical of the fluid nature of data collection. The analysis of data, rich in thick descriptive information, and from different sources of information: interviews and discourse analysis, provides the "multiple realities" (Borg and Gall, 1989, p.385) of the same phenomena in question. My involvement as an observer—being aware of my presence as a "contamination" and myself as the primary source of data collection—undoubtedly makes this research unmistakably subjective. My research setting and forces that affect the cognitive activity are dynamic, unpredictable and emerging making it uncontrollable and unfixed. With all these classic symptoms of the qualitative inquiry of the interpretist paradigm, this research project seems destined for a tedious and arduous journey of data gathering, processing and analysis.

While I may be largely persuaded that the qualitative method is best suited for this research interest, I recognise and am somewhat unsettled with the fact that I started off with a claim made by distributed cognition: that cognition is distributed across a social group. While seeking to understand and describing it in an educational context, am I not, to some extent, trying to prove that distribution cognition exists, which qualitative work sometimes does? Unless of course, I accept the theory at face value and seek to further the understanding of this theory, in particular, in my own setting and context. Unabashedly, I cannot deny my "sneaky" intention (and at the back of my mind) that a little of my research endeavour is to attest to this cognitive claim. However, at present, I am leaning towards the approach that distributed cognition is an assumption and am exploring it in order to develop it further.

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Japanese Literature as "Other": Women Poets and the Search for a Uniquely Japanese Aesthetic

Bern Mulvey

日本の女流詩人の発想による「美学論」について検討する。例えば「陰翳」や「遠回し」というのが日本人作家の文の特徴だと多くの研究者によく指摘されているが、実は与謝野晶子氏の詩を始め、茨木のり子氏、伊藤比呂美氏や青山みゆき氏の詩もそれとは反対の特徴をみせていると思われる。英訳した作品を通して示しているように、国文学において、「美学論」の単称命題では無く、批判的なテーマや、明確で力強い言葉の利用及び役割も目立っていると言える。

This study looks at poetry by Japanese women in an attempt to determine the accuracy of traditional characterizations of the so-called "Japanese aesthetic." For instance, numerous commentators have described Japanese literary writing as indirect, discrete and non-confrontational. However, these characterizations seem contradicted by the language and themes seen in the work of such writers as Yosano Akiko, Ibaragi Noriko, Ito Hiromi and Aoyama Miyuki. Indeed, as the translated poems discussed suggest, the narrow institutional focus on a single aesthetic ignores the powerful--even confrontational--themes and dynamic, forceful language that have been a mark of poetry by Japanese women for much of the last century.

> The word I see most often in connection with contemporary Japanese women's poetry is *yureteiru*, shaking. The poetry is not unstable and certainly not indifferent, just shaking--in flux and reaching for a landing point, however impermanent.
>
> Malinda Markham, <u>Antioch Review</u>, 2004

One peculiarity of the Japanese language is the clear demarcation between active and passive, transitive and intransitive. In English, for example, a house can *shake* from an earthquake and a person's actions or words can *shake* the very foundations of a society – i.e., though the relationships denoted between *actor* and *acted upon* in these sentences are different, the verb (including spelling) is the same. In Japanese, however, only *yusuburu* can suggest the latter usage, making Markham's choice (in the quoted text above) of the term *yureteiru* particularly suggestive. *Yureteiru* is always without an object, always at least implies the acted upon, the influenced, the recipient of another's actions or words.

Markham's observations about Japanese poetry–particularly the poetry written by women--partake in a long critical tradition. For a variety of reasons, researchers (both Western and Eastern) have consistently sought to characterize the Japanese in general, and Japanese women in particular, as anything but "active," anything but aggressive, dynamic, confrontational, or forceful. On the contrary, Matsumoto, Reischauer, Sakaiya, Smith, among many others, have almost invariably described the Japanese as indirect, discrete, consensus-building and non-confrontational. As seen in critical essays by Henderson, Jackson, Miner, Nishida, Okakura, Rimer, and Tanizaki, this depiction extends to literary studies as well, for Japan has long served as a kind of anti-West, the antithesis of a society ostensibly too logic- and profit-driven for its own good. Sometimes, the results of this stereotyping have been unintentionally amusing, such as when Johnson & Dillon go so far as to advise Western job-

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seekers not to make "eye contact" during job interviews to avoid appearing "aggressive" (28). However, as Ma also notes, academic commentary in this vein too often serves but to "reinforce various ongoing and destructive stereotypes, such as the Western idea that Japanese women are still little more than compliant, doll-like objects of fantasy" (17).

In this essay, then, I hope to offer a "Japanese" challenge to the critical othering of its literature, discussing as well the historical context which necessitated the invention of a Japan-specific artistic vision. As the translated poems discussed below suggest, the narrow institutional focus on a single aesthetic ignores the powerful--indeed confrontational--themes and dynamic, forceful language that have been a mark of poetry by Japanese women for much of the last century.

Before introducing the poems, it is perhaps best to explain the "Japanese aesthetic" they work against. Indirectness and understatement, the idea that complete revelation in art is equivalent to sterility and must be avoided, have long dominated the discussion of Japanese aesthetics. Tanizaki, for instance, argues that shadows—i.e., the absence of revelation—have traditionally played an important role in Japanese art and architecture, in the same way that pauses--i.e., the absence of conversation--continue to be a crucial element in inter-Japanese communication. Nishida equates the aesthetic experience with achieving a state of "muga" (無我) or "selflessness," writing further that "この真理は吾人が己を離れ能く物と一致して得たる所のもの" [For true art is that place where we can attain separation from ourselves] (2).[1] According to Nishida, art is an "absolute background," a place of "nothingness" wherein one's consciousness, divested of self, can expand infinitely. Rimer echoes Nishida's ideas regarding the nature and usage of this "place," observing further that "The intent of Japanese literature is to provide the reader with a means to develop himself" (14). Finally, Okakura argues that the mark of the true artist is knowing how to create this place, especially where to stop, when and where to leave a work incomplete. For artists must avoid at all times both "completion" and "repetition," seeking through intentional ambiguity of thought and/or incompleteness of action to allow "each guest in imagination to complete the total effect in relation to himself" (61). Hence, so-called flaws (by Western standards, at least) are not only allowed but encouraged because of the emotional responses they can trigger. Such imperfections, Okakura writes, are what trigger the imaginative responses so crucial to aesthetic appreciation, for they allow participants the freedom to fancy, to elevate in their imaginations the artist's efforts to the level of art.

This latter idea, placing as it does so much of the responsibility for artistic appreciation on the viewer, is seen as a defining characteristic of the aesthetic—i.e., it is only with the active participation of his or her imagination that true beauty becomes possible. In discussing specifically the appreciation of haiku poetry, Henderson writes:

> Of course, cooperation is required. The reader must consciously try to put himself in the poet's place--see what he sees, hear what he hears, etc., and so feel what he feels. This is one of the reasons why haiku-reading has been called an art in itself. (23)

Indirectness and imperfection, Okakura adds, allow for the imaginative responses so crucial to aesthetic appreciation. The viewer must then complete the picture, for "true beauty can be discovered only by one who mentally completed the incomplete" (60).

Standing in direct contrast to the Japanese aesthetic delineated above, however, are the following poems, themselves but a sampling of the large number of similar poems written and published by Japanese women over the last 100 years. My first example is from Noriko Ibaragi,

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[1] Iwaki and Marra make this observation as well.

who until her death in March was considered Japan's preeminent living female poet. (Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.)

Girls" March

I like bullying boys.
I really like making them whine.
Just today, I knocked Jirou about the head in school.
He said *Ouch* and ran away, tail between his legs.

> A hard-headed boy, Jirou
> put a dent in my lunch box....

Pa says   I mean Father the Doctor says
girls shouldn't race about, act wild.
Inside each of our bodies is a special room,
so we must go quietly, softly.

> Where's my room, do you think?
> Tonight, I'll look for it....

Grandma's pissed   Ms. Dried Plum
tells me girls who don't eat all their fish get kicked out,
they don't last three days as brides before they're returned.
Eat everything but the head and the tail, she says.

> Well, I'm not marrying
> so you can keep your damn fish bones!

The old baker started yelling,
Women and socks have gotten tough! Women and socks!
The women behind the counter were laughing at him.
Of course women have become strong -- there's a reason for it.

> I, too, am going to be a strong woman.
> Tomorrow, who should I make cry?

This poem deviates from the Japanese aesthetic in a number of important ways. Lines such as "I like bullying boys/I really like making them whine" and "Well, I'm not marrying/so you can keep your damn fish bones!" are certainly difficult to reconcile with Tanizaki's assertion that Japanese "prefer the soft voice, the understatement," not to mention seem to be devoid of the kind of ambiguity of meaning advocated by Okakura. The revelation implicit in the ending declaration--"I, too, am going to be a strong woman"--is another apparent violation, both in its directness and completeness. Indeed, the assertion's outspokenness would appear to negate its ability to serve as the proper backdrop for the reader's imagination, at least as delineated by Nishida, Okakura, and Tanizaki. However, even more than these apparent violations, the most interesting thing about this poem is its initial date of publication: 1958. (It first appeared in a poetry collection entitled *Mienai Haitatsufu* [The Invisible Delivery Husband]). This would, of course, place the poem after the appearance of the Tanizaki article (1933-4), and before Henderson (1967)and Miner (1966), again seemingly belying their claims to describing a current, uniform Japanese aesthetic.

Women writers have traditionally been some of the harshest, most confrontational opponents of Japanese domestic and foreign policy. The following are two representative poems by Akiko Yosano. The first, written at the height of Japan's 1904-5 war with Russia,

appeared two years prior to Okakura's famous treatise on the Japanese aesthetic; it remains perhaps the mostly widely anthologized poem in Japan today.

Love, You Must Not Go To Your Death

Ah, younger brother, I cry for you,
do not go to your death.
Born the youngest though you were,
you can still surpass our father in mercy,
though he makes you grab the sword,
though he teaches you to kill,
as if you had been raised 24 years
only to kill and to die.

Even among the shopkeepers of Sakai
our old shop is one of honor,
and so you, love, born to carry on our father's name,
you must not go to your death.
Whether Port Arthur's fortress is razed
or not   what does it matter?
You must see this   we are shopkeepers
it is not our way.

Love, you must not go to your death.
The emperor, he does not
cross the sea to fight,
to spill the blood of others,
to die like a beast on a trail.
All die for an emperor's praise
who if truly worthy
would not force death on others.

Ah, younger brother, you must not go
to war and to your own death.
Autumn passes, will our father outlive
the season's change? And our mother,
who saw you off in grief,
in agony, calling to you,
can she protect our house? In the midst
of the emperor's so-called peace,
your mother's hair turns white.

In the shadow of store curtains, she bends down and cries,
your new wife, so frail and young,
do not forget her, think about her.
Think about this young girl,
torn from your side after only 10 months.
In this world, she has only you,
who else is she to rely on?
My love, you must not go to your death.

The contraventions here of the Japanese aesthetic should be readily apparent. Certainly, there is no "intentional ambiguity of thought;" Yosano's poem, written during the Russo-Japan war, is unabashedly clear in its message: a poignant attack against both this war and the impulse to war. Repetition serves as an important rhetorical conceit. The refrain "My love, you must not go to your death" both opens and closes this poem, serving as both a structuring device and as a sort

of moral chorus, a direct appeal to her brother not to participate. The symmetrical structure, combined with the unambiguous revelation of the poem's intent, obviously limits the spectrum of plausible reader interpretations, seemingly negating the poem's ability to satisfy Nishida's requirement that art stand as a "place of nothingness." However, the clearest violation of the aesthetic appears in stanza three, with its overt criticism of the emperor. There is nothing of Tanizaki's ideas of "silence" or "shadow" here; in lines such as "The emperor, he does not/cross the sea to fight," Yosano baldly accuses the emperor of the twin crimes of hypocrisy and insincerity. (Indeed, this particular stanza helped result in Yoshano's 6-year semi-exile.) Her criticism continues in the fourth stanza with the ironic reference to "the Emperor's peace"; in a stratagem used by certain countries even today, the Japanese government had justified its invasion of Russia as necessary to "preserving peace"--an idea Yosano strongly rejects. That this poem appeared before the appearance of Okakura's influential treatise demonstrates the presence of alternative voices and styles in Japan even at that time, ones which did not fit comfortably under his definition of a single, so-called "Japanese," aesthetic. Given as well this poem's enduring popularity, it seems clear that a large Japanese reading audience existed--and exists--for work at odds with this aesthetic.

Almost as forthright and confrontational is this second poem by Yosano, composed in about 1910 yet eerily prophetic of the horrible war that would begin less than thirty years later:

A Certain Country

A country that takes joy only in rigidity,
in ritual, yet how rash,
how enslaved by whim.
Like impatient China
a self-absorbed and short-sighted country,
a country lacking the resources of America
yet obsessed with becoming America.
A country incapable of questioning,
its men too stooped by fatalism.
A country which congratulates itself,
which repeats without thought,
Ban-Banzai!

Again, both images and theme are transparently critical, though Yosano's target this time is not limited to government policy. Here, she disparages the "fatalistic" Japanese national ethos, and especially the acquiescence of its citizens--without whose support no government could long stay in power.

Best-selling poet "Tawara Machi" (her pen name) also habitually violates the Japanese aesthetic. In her influential 1989 book *Sarada Kinnenbi* [The Anniversary of Salad], for instance, she uses the haiku form to narrate the course of a failed romantic relationship, with each haiku depicting a particular stage (e.g., her realization of love, doubt, and finally loss) in that relationship. Here is a small sampling:

Suddenly, I'm aware that all
the clothes I'm trying on have
your favorite flower pattern. (15)

The falling rain
and just like that I want
your lips. (18)

Believing no promises, you play
in sand where waves cannot reach,
building nothing. (33)

I try James Dean poses
outside in a jacket
musky with you. (83)
I realized I'd given up on you
while wearing a hemp skirt, drinking
the first "ice coffee" of summer. (122)

It was there we said
goodbye. Like an exit interview,
that evening. (180)

While devoid of the biting political/social commentary that characterizes the work of Ibaragi and Yosano, Tawara Machi's poems share with these authors a similar stylistic virtuosity. These are not the haiku of Basho, Buson, or even Issa; seasonal references are blurred or omitted, and Nature itself is a mere backdrop for an intensely personal, very human drama. Indeed, the directness of the images, not to mention the coherent narrative of a failed relationship depicted in the collection, mark a clear departure from the Japanese aesthetic discussed above. From the bold declaration of "and just like that I want/your lips" to the audacity of her referring to a final discussion with her lover as an "exit interview," Tawara Machi is forthright, unabashedly assertive, and even confrontational; the success of the book (over two million copies sold--by far the most successful poetry collection in modern Japanese history) again demonstrates the extensive market in Japan for work with such qualities.

Other Side River, a 1995 anthology of women's poetry, contains further examples of poems by Japanese women that appear similarly to violate the conventions of the Japanese aesthetic. Here, for instance, are the ending stanzas (the full poem is quite long) from "Harakiri," Hiromi Ito's devastating indictment of "bushido," the so-called Japanese "way of the warrior"-mentality that had played (and continues to play in some political circles) such a tragic role in modern Japanese history.

"I know it's kind of sick," he said.
He thinks *bushido* should have cherry blossoms
He thinks samurai are always
looking for a place to die.
I failed to hear
If his ancestors were samurai.
He thinks pain will become pleasure
If he trains himself
"That's why I'm training myself now," he says,
(masturbating)
I'm sure it's extremely exciting
To commit harakiri facing a woman
Mr. O says,
(masturbating)
samurai
(masturbating)
ha ha
(masturbating)
cherry blossoms
(masturbating)
falling
(masturbating)
It's really kind of kinky.

Translation taken from Lowitz, et. al. (86-9)

As with the poems described earlier, the contraventions here of the Japanese aesthetic are readily apparent. There are no "silences" in this poem--even masturbation is conducted through a stream of dialogue. From the mocking "I failed to hear/If his ancestors were samurai" to the conceit of having the would-be "samurai" masturbate in his excitement, Ito's sarcasm is neither subtle nor opaque. On the contrary, her poem seems to represent a direct and extremely lucid criticism of those who would continue to espouse the virtues of an anachronistic "warrior mentality" in a modern industrial society. Furthermore, the ending line appears to violate the aesthetic as well in both the overtness and completeness of its revelation; indeed, "It's really kind of kinky" deftly skewers her target, suggesting as it does that "bushido" is ultimately just another deviant sexual obsession.

Still, there are a number of poems written by Japanese women which seem "Japanese"--in the sense that they are indirect, understated, non-narrative driven and open to various interpretations. However, this brings up an important salient point--is this not equally true of some Western poetry in English as well? Ashbery—who once said that in his poems he "attempts to use words abstractly, as an abstract painter uses paint"—comes to mind immediately. St. John's "Acadian Lane," Plath's "Watercolor of Grantchester Meadows," Scheele's "The Gap in the Cedar"--there appear to be a large number of poems in the English language as well where image enjoys precedent over meaning, where the ending revelation is either muted or left seemingly incomplete, stimulating the imagination and inviting a variety of interpretations. Do not these poems also partake of a similar, so-called "Japanese" aesthetic?

Which leads me to this final question: with so many exceptions existing in the Japanese language, not to mention so many Western poems seeming to conform to the aesthetic ideal delineated above, why has an argument been made for there being a uniquely "Japanese" aesthetic? One explanation that has been offered is racism, i.e., that the West's "imperialist tradition" has resulted in an obsession with "essentializing" or "othering" the Orient. Ma, Said, and Susser, among others, have argued that Western researchers frequently minimalize (or omit entirely) the historical and cultural complexities of their Oriental subject matter, emphasizing instead areas of perceived differences vis-à-vis the Western societies. Worse, this assumption of, and fascination with, "difference" ostensibly leads many Western researchers to "create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe" (Said, p. 3), exaggerating (or even inventing) the exotic in an attempt to "polarize the distinction--the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner becomes more Western." According to these critics, the end result is too often a false dichotomy where the Orient is reduced to an artificial construct, an "Other" which has less to do with the actual reality than with the "identity of the subject who is gazing at the "Other"" (Susser, 1998, p. 52).

However, this line of reasoning belies the fact that, at least in the case of Japan, many of the most egregious offenders in this myth-building process are Japanese. For instance, in asserting the importance of incompleteness and indirectness in Japanese art, Okakura supports his argument with references to both the semantic origin and modern usage of the Japanese word for "tea ceremony house" (数寄屋 [sukiya]). These oft-cited assertions:

(1) The Chinese characters, taken together, originally translated to mean "abode of fancy."

(2) The Chinese characters used to express this term have changed repeatedly over the years.

(3) Currently, depending on the characters used, the term "sukiya" can be translated to mean "abode of vacancy" or "abode of the unsymmetrical."

However, as even Okakura himself must have been aware when he wrote this article, all three of the above assertions are false. Here are the original characters and their former (and present) meanings:[2]

数   chant while holding sticks ["shamaness" in Chinese] (now: "count" or "number")
寄   seeking protection in a stranger's house (now: "draw near," "visit" or "send")
屋   a room where, having arrived, one can relax (now: "house," "shop," or "shopkeeper")

As can be seen, except for a slight difference in the shape of the first Chinese character, the standard characters used to represent "sukiya" (数寄屋) have remained almost unchanged for over 400 years. Also, it is difficult to imagine how this term, whether the characters are taken separately or together, could be construed to mean "abode of fancy," "abode of vacancy," or "abode of the unsymmetrical." Indeed, I would argue that the best literal translation of the modern Japanese would be simply "a house where people can gather together." Now, some scholars have also noted how "sukiya" has in the distant past sometimes been shortened to just "suki" (数寄), a term which had an additional connotation of "like." Hence, the term "sukiya" can also be translated as "a gathering place for people who like tea"--i.e., a concept certainly intelligible to most Western readers as well.

The oversights in the Tanizaki article, while more subtle, are nonetheless equally intriguing. A key concept in his article is the idea of there being an "Oriental" aesthetic, one broad enough ostensibly to encompass both the Chinese and Korean aesthetic traditions, yet distinct from (and threatened by) the so-called "Western" aesthetic. Indeed, this latter idea of Western aesthetic encroachment is a central concern for Tanizaki, who writes poignantly at the end of his long defense of the Oriental aesthetic:

> No matter what complaints we may have, Japan has chosen to follow the West, and there is nothing for her to do but move bravely ahead and leave us old ones behind. But we must be resigned to the fact that as long as our skin is the color it is the loss we have suffered cannot be remedied. I have written all this because I have thought that there might still be somewhere, possibly in literature or the arts, where something could be saved. (65)

However, when this article is viewed in its historical context, the above passage, not to mention Tanizaki's argument as a whole, appears to raise more questions than it answers. Published as it was in December/January of 1933/1934, this article appeared three years after the military had begun its takeover of the Japanese government.[3] It appeared after the beginning of active media censorship, and after foreign books, movies--even loan words borrowed from other languages-- had begun to be banned. It also appeared after Japan's systemic destruction of the fine arts in Korea, and after the Japanese had begun a similar destruction in occupied China.

All this raises questions about the Tanizaki piece, the most important being why it was written. Was it meant as just another example (only comparatively highbrow)of the jingoistic propaganda so common to the era? Any article written in such a climate (Japanese historians refer to this period by the term 狂気の時代 or "the years of insanity"), especially one attacking the nature and prevalence of Western influence, would seem suspect to this charge. The inclusive reference to an "Oriental" aesthetics certainly mirrors much of the government brochures of the time, ironic given that it was Japanese policy (with some public support) to repress non-Japanese forms of the aesthetic in the occupied areas, to the point that Chinese and

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[2] See Henshall, Shinmura, Nelson, etc.

[3] The following history is condensed from Beasley, Irie, Schirokauer, Storry, and Watanabe.

Koreans were forced to study Japanese language and literature at school and to use Japanese for most business and government transactions.

Whatever his intentions, the veracity of a number of Tanizaki's statements seem open to debate. For example, his assertion that the Japanese literature of his time was imitating the West is difficult to support. While some of the fine arts (especially painting) were strongly influenced by the West, and while it is true that many major writers had flirted with Western forms during the early- to mid-Meiji period (1868-1900), by the time of Tanizaki's article, most of the major novelists in Japan--Mori Ogai, Natsume Soseki, and even Tanizaki himself—had moved beyond the Western literary tradition. Certainly it is difficult to see how the classic novels of the period—Mori's Gan, Soseki's Kokoro, and Tanizaki's Makioka Shimai—could be argued to be merely Western imitations.

Okakura, too, may have been motivated by similarly complex, and at times contradictory, desires in articulating his views of a unified, Japan-specific, aesthetic. While symbolism, not to mention an artistic consciousness (see, for instance, Kyorai's "Conversations with Basho"), certainly did exist in Japanese literature prior to encountering the West, no systemic Japanese attempt had been made to codify these often contradictory arguments into a single, coherent aesthetic theory. (Jackson and Marra, among others, have noted that before contact with the West, "aesthetics"—now translated as "bigaku" 美学—and "symbol"—now translated as shouchou 象徴—did not have Japanese language equivalents.) Accordingly, some scholars have argued that many of the seminal articles written on the Japanese aesthetic in the latter half of the Meiji period (1890-1912) were motivated at least partly by a perceived need to define a "national essence" (Schirokauer, 436), to demonstrate artistic and cultural independence (later, superiority) from the West. In an exhaustive study of Okakura's life and work, for instance, Notehelfer demonstrates convincingly how his aesthetic arguments were but a part of a much larger agenda: both to promote popular acceptance of an idealized past and to justify the military expansion that had already begun to dominate Japan's present. According to Okakura, Japan's artistic sensibilities were the result of a "remarkable synthesis" of the best of Asian thought, made possible only by the "particular genius of the Japanese race" (qtd. in Notehelfer, 331). Okakura argued further that these superior sensibilities (i.e., the unique aesthetic he had described) justified Japan's "mission" to "revive the dormant life of the old Asiatic unity" (qtd. in Notehelfer, 335), observing as well that "The Chinese War, which revealed our supremacy in Eastern waters, and which has yet drawn us closer than ever in mutual friendship [with China], was a natural outgrowth" of this mission (qtd. in Notehelfer, 341-2).[4] As Notehelfer himself concludes:

> Here the ambiguity of his upbringing and education, his peculiar need to defend Japan among foreigners, and his romantic adherence to "what should be" instead of "what was" all worked to inhibit a clear expression of the reality in which late Meiji Japan found itself. (354)

In other words, there is reason to question the motivations behind, not to mention some of the substance of, Okakura's foundational work in Japanese aesthetics as well.

Is there a uniquely Japanese aesthetic? While the possibilities are intriguing, I would argue that there is not. At least no clear articulation of one has been offered that can encompass the myriad of voices and forms existent in Japanese literature today, let alone one which can delineate a clear and consistent contrast with Western ideals of the aesthetic. Moreover, considering the pace and the extent of the changes occurring just in the area of women's letters,

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[4] To this, Notehelfer drily responds: "One wonders how any Chinese or Korean, even of the deepest idealistic convictions, could have agreed with Okakura's evaluation of Japanese foreign policy...."

the task of describing such an aesthetic would appear more impossible with each day. Indeed, instead of attempting to delineate a race-specific idea of beauty, it would seem that Western (and Japanese) scholarship would be better served by learning to recognize, and to celebrate, the variety of styles and themes in the Japanese literary arts, not to mention those areas of their overlap with Western styles and themes. For it is not only in contrast that intercultural understanding is advanced; comparison should (and must) play its part as well.

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The Impact of Service-Learning on Japanese College Students: Involvement with Children with Disabilities

Amy A. Szarkowski

本論文は、奉仕活動計画への関与が日本人大学生にもたらす影響について論じる。奉仕活動及びボランティアの日本文化の文脈内における概念化が考察される。 学生ボランティア達は地域における障害をもつ子供達の養護学校におけるスポーツの日の催し物を援助した。日本においては、教育の経験の過程において、「典 型的な優れた生徒」は障害を持つ子供達とはしばしば別の環境で教えられる。この結果、大学生達は、障害を持つ子供達とは何の接触や関与の経験もない場合が 多い。本論文は、奉仕活動の経験に関する、少数のグループにおける熟考及び個々の参加者の文章による感想を分析する。分析結果は、このような奉仕活動への 関与が大学生達の障害を持つ子供達に対する理解を深め、また、「我々と彼ら」というような従来の簡略化された視点に変化をもたらしたことを示している。こ うして、障害者に対する社会的な対応が批判的に分析される。この奉仕活動は「公共に従事する」、そして、より大きな共同体へのさらなる参加をもたらし、行 動を起こすことへ意識を高めたという諸側面から成功をもたらしたといえる。

This paper explores the impact of involvement in a service-learning project on Japanese college students. The conceptualization of service-learning and volunteerism in this cultural context is considered. The student volunteers assisted with a Sports Day event at a local school for children with disabilities. In Japan, "typically developing students" are often separated from children with disabilities throughout their educational experiences. As a result, these college students had no prior contact or involvement with children with disabilities. A small group reflective activity and individual written reactions to the experience were analyzed for emergent themes. Results revealed that involvement in this activity led to greater understanding of the experience of individuals with disabilities and changes in perceptions of "us versus them." The societal treatment of individuals with disabilities was also critiqued. This project was successful in "engaging the civic" and fostering greater involvement in the larger community and a sense of agency in taking action.

In this paper, the impact of participating in a service project on Japanese students is examined. The concepts of volunteerism, service-learning and civic engagement, among other terms often utilized in this field of study, will be explored as well. Essential benefits and limitations of service-learning will be discussed, as will the perception of service-learning in the Japanese context. This paper is a conceptual effort to explore the meaning of service to the community, based on experience in Japan.

Definitions

A number of definitions exist, attempting to differentiate such constructs as volunteerism, service-learning and civic engagement (APA, 2005). Other concepts such as charitable acts, civic education, service for social justice and community-based research have also been proposed (Boyle-Baise et al., 2006). Here, an examination of these definitions is warranted, in order to place the present project within the correct theoretical frame.

Furco (1996, as cited in APA, 2006) created a continuum depicting the distinctions among service programs. This continuum indicated a shift from *volunteerism* to *community service*, then *service-learning*, followed by *field education* and finally *internship*. Using this distinction, service-learning overlapped with both community service and field education. Bringle and Hatcher defined service learning as, "course-based, credit-bearing educational

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experience that allows students to (a) participate in organized service activity that meets identified community needs and (b) reflect on the service activity in such a way as to gain further understanding of course content, a broader appreciation of the discipline, and an enhanced sense of civic responsibility." (1995, p.112).

The American Association of Higher Education (APA, 2006) stated, "Service-learning means a method under which students learn and develop through thoughtfully organized service that is conducted in and meets the needs of a community and is coordinated with an institution of higher education and with the community; helps foster civic responsibility; is integrated into and enhances the academic curriculum of the students enrolled; and includes structured time for students to reflect on the service experience."

A broader definition of service-learning is offered by Campus Compact, a national center focused on community service and service-learning, based in the United States. Campus Compact (2006) states, "1) Service-learning constitutes activity that is focused on meeting a human need in the community where that need has to do with the well-being of individuals and/or of the environment in which they live. 2) Key academic and/or civic objectives to be achieved through combining service with learning have been identified prior to the activity. 3) Opportunities for students to reflect on their experience and its connection to specific academic/civic objectives are incorporated into the activity."

Henry and Breyfogle (2006) distinguish between volunteerism and service-learning based on the inclusion of "reciprocity," typically described as mutuality between the needs and outcomes of the "provider" and the "recipient" in a service-learning relationship. They state that service learning is differentiated from volunteerism based on the inclusion of both reflection and reciprocity.

Many teachers who incorporate community-based service activities state that they do so in order to engage their students in the "real world" and to foster a sense of community and individual responsibility, referred to by Boyle-Baise, et al. (2006) as *enabling the civic*. Many definitions of civic engagement abound. It has been identified as "individual and collective actions designed to identify issues of public concern" and "efforts to directly address an issue, work with others to solve a problem, or interact with institutions of representative democracy" (APA, 2006).

Even within the accepted definition of service-learning there are numerous facets, from *charitable acts* that provide immediate assistance to others, to *civic education*, meaning helping clients to help themselves (Boyle-Baise, et al., 2006). *Service for social justice* allows students to understand inequities and tends to foster activism, while *community-based research* teaches students to investigate social programs, affording them opportunities to improve those programs if they so desire. Boytle (2003) argues that there are two types of service-learning, the "thin" version that focuses on service, which he argues is oriented toward maintaining the status quo, while the "thick" version of service-learning includes organization, an aspect Boytle described as being necessary for social change. Recent literature in the area of service-learning argues that traditional views of service-learning omit the evolutionary change that results as an outcome of a service-learning project, in which both the "participants" and the "recipients" will be changed in the process (Henry & Breyfogle, 2006).

Importance of Reflection

Although the definitions above represent various viewpoints regarding the meaning of service-learning, there is one commonality seen among all of them, namely the inclusion of reflection as an integral aspect of a service-learning project. A number of studies in service-learning have focused on the importance of reflection. The theory behind reflection has been examined, as have strategies for fostering reflection in students (Connors & Seifer, 2005). Templates and learning style inventories have been created to explore the best means of encouraging reflection in students. Reflection has widely been cited as the essential element in

facilitating students in making connections between the activity in which they participate and the learning or change that results from that participation.

The theory behind reflection was first adapted from the work of John Dewey and later, David Kolb (Connors & Seifer, 2005). Based on those early works, the most well-known researcher in service-learning, Eyler, developed The Experiential Learning Cycle. This cycle involves experiencing (the activity phase), sharing (exchanging reactions and observations), processing (discussing patterns and dynamics), generalizing (developing real-world principles), and applying (planning effective use of learning). Reflection is the tool by which movement through these stages is thought to be achieved.

The four core elements of reflection, were established by Eyler and Giles (1999). These researchers found that for reflection to be most beneficial, it ought to be continuous, connected, challenging, and contextualized. Reflection should begin prior to the service-learning activity and should be maintained throughout the experience. The service activity should be related to either course objectives, or learning objectives for a particular group. Student volunteers should be challenged in this thinking, through critical reflection. Instructors can elicit good information from students when they provide thought provoking questions for the students to answer. Lastly, reflections that correspond to course content, or to the topics being discussed, allow students to experience the service-learning in a meaningful way. Additionally, when reflection is done with fellow students or with community partners, the impact on students is believed to be greater than when students are requested to undertake individual reflection alone (Connors & Seifer, 2005).

Current Project in Context

It could be argued that the present study, because its student volunteers were not enrolled in a particular course, does not constitute a service-learning project. Such would be true if utilizing the definition proposed by Bringle and Hatcher (1995) or Furco (2006), which mandate that a service-learning experience be situated within a credit-bearing course. However, this study included reflection and reciprocity, thereby not following the definition of simple volunteerism, either (Henry & Breyfogle, 2006).

Given the involvement of learning about the civic and social issue prior to the activity, the reciprocal agreement with the agency in assisting the student volunteers in understanding important concerns relevant to those "being served," and the use of reflection, the current study will be analyzed in terms of a service-learning project. An additional consideration in placing this project within the scope of service-learning is the definition of service-learning most commonly used in Japan (Feinberg, 2002).

In the Japanese context, service-learning need not be directly related to a course and in fact, it is rarely related to a specific course. Rather, service-learning is in "free time" in Japanese schools, in which students are asked to create projects that will assist them in understanding their society and will lead to increased "moral character." Given the present conceptualization of service-learning in Japan, the benefits of this study will be compared with other service-learning projects identified in the literature.

Service-Learning

Benefits of Service-Learning

As a field of study, service-learning began in the early to mid-1990s (Bingle & Hatcher, 1996). Early studies considered whether involvement with community-based activities could enhance learning or other outcomes in students. Indeed, involvement in service-learning projects has been shown to have a positive impact in a number of studies. Service-learning can promote self-esteem, thinking skills and the use of multiple abilities (Kahne & Westheimer, 1996). It also provides the opportunity for authentic learning and altruism, which students can experience,

rather than consider as an abstraction. Bingle and Hatcher (1996) found that involvement in service-learning increases understanding of course content, teaches students to consider broader applications of what they have learned in the classroom, and increases students' sense of civic responsibility.

Recent research has looked not only at the short-term changes that result in the classroom and in the students who participate in service-learning projects. A look at the long-term academic benefits of involvement with service-learning suggest that students do attain long-term benefits, both academically in terms of grade point average, but also in their approach to learning (Strage, 2004). Students who participated in service-learning projects demonstrated a greater appreciation of their discipline, and achieved better grades within that discipline than students in courses that did not involve service-learning (Strage, 2004). Students in a randomized, controlled study that participated in service-learning in their first year as an undergraduate scored higher than students in the same major who had not taken the service-learning based courses, though the classes themselves were the same. The service-learning students' GPA was 4.8% higher, even after four years of college. The college seniors who had been involved with service-learning in their first year reported that the experience of using reflection in their work had stayed with them, even when it was not a requirement for other courses.

Benefits of involvement in service-learning can be found in the classroom as well as in the individual students. In the classroom, research has found increased student interest, increased problem-solving skills, and increased performance on multiple measures of learning (Bingle & Hatcher, 1996). Qualitatively, students and teachers both reported more enjoyment in the class when activities are linked to the "outside world."

In examining the personal impact of involvement with service-learning, students report greater compassion and empathy, as well as heightened awareness of their community and the world around them when they participate in service-learning projects (Feinberg, 2002). This involvement has been shown to have a significant positive impact on personal, attitudinal, moral, social and cognitive outcomes (Bingle & Hatcher, 1996). Students who participate in service-learning are more likely to be involved in future civic engagement and report positive character development (Aronson, 2006). In working with others, the students not only develop a greater understanding of the problems faced by others in their community, they also demonstrate increased social-emotional understanding of problems. Service-learning impacts personal qualities such as increased interpersonal skills and reduced stereotyping (Eyler, 2000).

Service-learning in higher education leads to subsequent involvement in the community (Eyler, 2000). It appears that the mediating factor in future community involvement is the development of the *civic identity*. Here, civic identity was described as a sense of personal efficacy combined with social responsibility. Eyler and Giles (1999) found that service-learning was linked to better problem-solving skills by increasing the level of complexity in students' problem analysis and identification of the locus of the problem. Problem-solving was also enhanced with the use of supportive arguments and critical thinking skills, creation of novel strategies for community action, and increased cognitive moral development.

Limitations of Knowledge about Service-Learning

There are limitations to what is known about the impact of service-learning. Several scholars have addressed the problems inherent in the majority of the published manuscripts on the topic and have raised questions about the methodology employed to understand its impact.

The first question asked by teachers considering including service-learning as a component to enhance or compliment classroom learning is often, "What is the impact of service-learning on academic performance?" Although research has begun to look at this issue (Strage, 2004), the results are not highly generalizable. Whether problem-solving strategies utilized in the context of a service-learning project are utilized by students in other contexts has

largely been unexplored. The transfer of learning that is sought with service-learning highlights the ability to systematically explore new problems, considering all of the stakeholders that may be impacted by changes in a community (Eyler, 2000). In order to measure this "preparation for future learning," it is necessary to determine whether students have attained greater understanding and ability to apply their knowledge and problem-solving skills. However, since most service-learning studies consider the impact of involvement in a particular service-learning project, this type of information is difficult to obtain.

Will some students "feel sorry" for the marginalized groups, thereby creating a greater divide of "us versus them," although the intention is to create greater understanding (Dahlquist, White & Humphers-Ginther, 2003)? This type of *noblesse oblige* has been noted in some service projects in which the students perceived of their work as "charity" rather than "involvement in their own community" (Boyle-Baise, 2006). The danger noted with *noblesse oblige* is that students can develop a paternalistic attitude toward those less fortunate.

How can the impacts of service-learning best be measured? Self-report has been the most common means of gathering information, yet other data that could substantiate the reports of increases in civic engagement, for example, would be useful (Eyler, 2000). Self-report measures can confuse satisfaction with learning. As a result, the data obtained often reflect students' feeling about involvement in a project, rather than directly measuring complex cognitive outcomes. While understanding students' feeling regarding their involvement in service-learning projects is relevant and important, that alone does not answer the questions raised about the impact of service-learning involvement.

What is the best way to increase students' ability to learn from the real world? (Eyler, 2000). John Dewey, often cited as the "founder of the service-learning ethic" (1938, as cited by Eyler, 2000) wrote that the strength of service-learning is that it creates *educative experiences*, engaging students in worthwhile activities while stimulating intellectual curiosity. Dewey believed that this would lead to increased motivation and a sense of agency, or individual power to make a different. Yet, not all service-learning projects result in the same degree of impact for students. Scholars are not yet well-informed of the variables that constitute a sound educative experience in service-learning from those that will have a smaller impact on the student participants.

Service-Learning in Japan

The Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, known as MEXT, instituted a plan in 2002, known as the "Rainbow Plan" (MEXT, 2002). This plan emphasizes as one of its seven priorities the teaching of children to become caring citizens through participation in community service programs. The MEXT plan promotes two weeks of "community service," loosely defined, for both elementary and junior high school students. High school students are recommended to participate in community service for a total of one month each academic year. Individual schools are to determine the best way to implement this program into their curriculum.

Feinberg (2002) examined a case study of service learning in Japan in Kamakura Junior High School, affiliated with Yokohama National University, which served as a pilot project for the implementation of the Rainbow Plan. The students in Kamakura Junior High School met for one session a week, with a total of 25 periods, for a total of 50 hours per semester. The class was not teacher-directed, the students established their own projects and goals.

The pilot class chose to visit nursing homes, as a means of addressing the problem of the aging population in Japan (Feinberg, 2002). Since the students created the activities without linking them to learning about the issues and concerns of elderly persons, some of the activities that they created were not immediately successful. For example, one group of students created a "ring toss" activity, meant to increase the activity level of the individuals at the nursing home.

However, when one elderly person fell over in her wheelchair during this activity, the students were reportedly quite surprised and decided to reevaluate their plans for community service.

In evaluating the Japanese MEXT "Rainbow Plan," Feinberg (2002) argues that, although Japan has recently included community service as an essential element in "character building" of Japanese children, the program could benefit from more structure. If the curriculum better supported the activities (such as learning about the particular concerns of the elderly before visiting them) and was organized by teachers (who could contact the nursing home, for example, and ask for feedback about what might be most beneficial to the residents), the program would have a much greater chance of succeeding. Feinberg argues that clear connections between service projects, the curriculum, and learning outcomes, would allow the goals of the service component to be met. Namely, students would develop a stronger sense of civic engagement and they would learn more about specific issues of concern in their respective communities.

Current Project

This project involved 14 students from a small liberal arts college in Japan. These students volunteered to participate in Sports Day at a local school for children with disabilities. The volunteers were not a part of any particular class; any student who expressed interest in the program could volunteer. There were no selection criteria other than the desire to be involved and the availability to participate in the program. The volunteers ranged in age from 18 to 22, with a mean age of 21.

At the Sports Day event, the student volunteers participated in a number of activities to assist the program, including holding the "finish line" for the races, moving wheelchairs from the beginning to the end of the race for the participants, lifting the participants and helping them move their limbs. The volunteers were "on hand" to help with situations as they arose, including helping a child who was having a seizure, moving equipment, and helping with the transition between the Sports Day activities. For three hours, the student volunteers assisted in numerous ways to ensure that the Sports Day was a success.

Hypotheses

It was hypothesized that the students involved in this activity would report increased awareness about children with disabilities, since most of the volunteers have had very little exposure to these children. Since these college-age students have largely been unaffected by the Rainbow Plan, sponsored by the Japanese government (MEXT), (which went into effect during their final years of high school), it was hypothesized that they would not have had much prior experience in community service activities. It was anticipated that involvement in this project would lead to reported changes in thinking about the status of children with disabilities in Japan.

Methods

Educational Component.

The students met with the organizer prior to the Sports Day event. They were informed about the school, given information about the level of education the children with disabilities receive, and participated in a discussion about the perceptions of disability in Japan.

Debriefing session

Following the event, the students were allowed a "debriefing session" with two of the special education teachers. One teacher was the organizer of the event and provided the students with direct information about the activity. The other, a master teacher with many years

experience as a teacher for children with disabilities, encouraged the student volunteers to ask questions and provided them with straightforward and honest answers. Although the students initially asked few questions, the master teacher's willingness to be frank with them allowed them to probe further and to critically question the position of these students in society, the parents' reaction to their children, and the level of separation the children with disabilities felt from society.

Small group reflection

Following the debriefing session, the students were broken up into small groups to reflect about the activity with the researcher and notes were taken regarding the volunteer's statements. The small groups were decided based on the comfort level of the student volunteers. As suggested by Eyler and Giles (1999), the "challenging" phase of reflection was done in peer groups, in which each student volunteer could voice his/her thoughts and opinions freely. The volunteers first gave their "initial impressions," followed by a series of questions. Although the questions utilized were the same for each student, they were administered in a semi-structured interview format, so the order was determined based on the content of the discussion. In some cases, the questions were not asked, as they had already been answered by the students in their discourse. The questions were as follows:

1. What surprised you about today's event?
2. What stands out for you as something that you will probably remember from today?
3. In Japanese society, people with disabilities are often not visible to the public. Why do you believe that is the case?
4. (added after hearing the initial responses of the student volunteers) What do you believe should be done in Japanese society to improve people's understanding of individuals with disabilities?

Individual reflection

In the week that followed the Sports Day activity, the student volunteers were given a list of questions and asked to think about their experience with the children with disabilities and to provide the researcher with a written reflection, using the following questions as the basis for their discussion.

1. How have your perceptions or ideas about people with disabilities changed as a result of visiting the School for Children with Disabilities?
2. How have you changed or grown personally by having volunteered at the School for Children with Disabilities?
3. How have you changed or grown personally by having been involved in other volunteering activities?
4. Did this experience make you want to do more volunteer work in the future?
5. What were your thoughts, feelings, or concerns when you first arrived at the School for Children with Disabilities for Sports Day?
6. Please describe any reactions you had about going to the School for Children with Disabilities. What were your thoughts, feelings or concerns at the end of the event?

Qualitative methodology was utilized to analyze the impact on the students of having participated in the project with children with disabilities. The pre-event questions, the small group discussion notes, as well as the reflective journals were included in the analysis. These multiple sources were coded and analyzed for emergent themes. When the researcher was unclear about the meaning of comments written by a student, follow-up questions were asked in order to clarify.

Results

There were a number of common themes that emerged from the information gathered about the impact of being involved with children with disabilities by assisting with their school's Sports Day event.

Same as me

Every student reported surprise at learning that, "they were just like me." Volunteers focused on the emotional expressions of the children, on their daily struggles, and on the fact that they have families and friends.

> *I realized they are the same as us. While I was watching the event, they showed their feelings through their eyes, I think. They can't talk to others, but they can communicate with their teachers or family. It is the same as us. I was surprised that I didn't really think of that before I did the volunteering.*

Although reluctantly, each volunteer also admitted that he/she had not expected to feel this way, and most were unaware of their stereotypes about individuals with disabilities before actually encountering them.

> *I thought that people with disabilities were living in a different world than me. I felt sympathy toward them, but it wasn't empathy. I felt unconsciously that they were different from me, so I believed we live in different worlds and had different goals. However, by doing this activity, I noticed that my thinking was wrong. They are just the same as me. They want to be happy in their lives, with their families, just like us.*

> *Before I joined the event, I thought that they were different and I wanted to take care of them out of pity. But, I realized that view was not right. I think that are not different and they just have strong (physical) characteristics. So, we don't need to feel sorry for them or have pity. I also have different characteristics from everyone else, their handicap [sic] is just one characteristic of them.*

Moving experience

In possible contrast to college students in other countries, those in Japan have generally had few experiences with individuals with disabilities. This is likely caused by the separation of children with disabilities from their peers prior to the beginning of the school years. Children with disabilities in Japan often attend a special school and are not integrated with typically developing children. Of the 14 students in the present study, none had previously had contact with children with disabilities. One student had a grandfather who was in a wheelchair, although this was a result of a disease that occurred in his later years. This relative lack of exposure to individuals with disabilities likely increased the impact on these student volunteers of interacting with these children.

> *This experience made me think about myself. I could feel something was moving in my heart. The memory in here will not be forgotten in all of my life. With this moment, I changed the way that I saw the disabled.*

Other students, in believing that expressing their emotion would be disrespectful to the children, attempted to hold back their emotions, those all but one student wrote about being "moved."

> *I was moved in my heart through seeing them aim for their goals. I was also moved to tears, but I didn't want to cry. I thought it was disrespectful for them, because what they were doing what was natural for them. I thought that, and held back my tears. However, when I saw a father standing at the finish line, calling his son's name, I couldn't stop my tears. I was encouraged by the children throughout the day.*

Learning from them

The student volunteers expressed a surprise at learning from the children with disabilities. They acknowledged the reciprocal nature of service-learning, and noted that, although they had "volunteered to help," the process of being involved in service changed them as well.

> *Actually, I went there to help them, but they helped me to know more about life. I learned what "happy" is, and gratitude. I thought, "I want to help them more, as much as I can." At the same time, I wanted them to teach me more.*

Students acknowledged that the "learning" that had occurred on their end was largely a result of a change in their attitude.

> *The experience at (school name) changed my perception toward disabilities. This means that I realized that I could not do the things that I had expected for children with disabilities. I thought I would be able to help them enjoy the day by communicating with them. However, I had no idea of how to communicate with the children because many of them could not speak. One girl grabbed my hand, and showed me how to help her with her walker. I realized I could learn a lot from them, and I didn't have just be "the helper." I learned a lot about the world by watching and interacting with those children.*

Reflections on society

The students reflected about the role of society in developing their own view of children with disabilities. While this was an emergent theme in general, most of the comments made by the students were unique, ranging from an exploration of society's laws that help people with disabilities to personal experiences of having a family in one student's neighborhood "send a child away" who had been born with a physical disability. Students pondered the role of schools in Japan in educating students about "others" and explored the need to "be like everyone else" in Japanese society.

One common theme related to society was the appreciation of the teachers at the school for children with disabilities. The college student volunteers were uniformly impressed with the level of dedication the teachers had toward the students, and the "power" that they displayed in working with the children.

> *I was overwhelmed by the teachers' power and their desire to help the children have fun. The teachers tried to put the students in the central position, to do whatever was needed to help them succeed. While looking at the teachers and the students doing the sports activities, I thought, "I wish I could be able to have that kind of strong power and desire to help other people."*

Engaging the civic

One of the primary goals of service-learning is to encourage civic engagement, to foster students in their involvement in the community, and to provide them with projects that instill in them a sense of agency and a desire to continue to be involved in the community after the commencement of the given project (Boyle-Baise et al, 2006; Aronson, 2006). The students involved in this project all indicated a desire to learn more about the issues surrounding individuals with disabilities.

> *I found out various ways to be involved with volunteer work as a result of going there. So, I have come to want to do more volunteer work in order to know more about people with various disabilities. I want to better understand about their lives.*

Students in this study also expressed an overall desire to be greater involved in their community. They indicated a change in paradigm, from "thinking about helping" to taking action.

Just thinking of helping others will not change something. I used to think about helping others who need help and support. However, I couldn't put it into action. Through working on this project, I feel I can help disabled people and I feel I can help them in different places as well. I know they are in the community and I would like to be more involved with them.

Limitations of the Present Study

This study involved 14 students who volunteered to participate in Sports Day with the local School for Children with Disabilities. It was limited in scope in terms of number of participants and involvement of participant volunteers. It is possible that students who would volunteer for such a project might have a higher level of civic engagement than students who did not volunteer. Although efforts were made to educate students about issues related to children with disabilities in Japan prior the Sports Day event, the "educational aspect" was not directly linked to a credit-bearing course.

Students enrolled in this small liberal arts college complete their coursework in English. The researcher is a native English speaker and teaches in English to Japanese students. The student volunteers were asked to write their written reflections in English, a second language for most of the students. This complication may have limited the extent or the breadth of the information shared by students in their reflective journals. As an attempt to deal with this confounding factor, the researcher met with the students and reviewed what they had written, and allowed the students to add or clarify meanings if what they had written did not fully capture what they had intended to express. Yet, the limitation of completing written reflections in a non-native language cannot be dismissed.

Conclusions

Cross-cultural Conceptualization of Service-Learning

The field of service-learning is a rapidly growing area of academic study. Eyler, Giles, Stenson & Gray (2001) produced "At a Glance," an 80 page annotated bibliography of what has been learned in the field thus far. Yet, the majority of the research has been conducted with a Western audience. The implications of the benefits of service-learning may be far-reaching. Yet, the conceptualization of service-learning in higher education, community partnerships and community-based action research are not as well recognized by institutions in other parts of the world.

In the case of Japan, service-learning is largely understood to mean the involvement of students in activities that will promote "moral character" (MEXT, 2002). Incorporating service-learning, as defined in the West (see Bingle and Hatcher, 1995) in credit-bearing courses is quite uncommon. Of the materials available regarding service-learning in Japan, much of it focuses on learning English as a Second Language (Edwards, 2001). ESL teachers, often native speakers of English and commonly from the West, seem to be more likely to incorporate service-learning strategies than their Japanese counterparts. The curriculum in Japanese primary and secondary schools is mandated by the national government (MEXT, 2002), with little room for individual teacher innovations or incorporation of additional projects in the classroom. At the tertiary educational level, few service-learning programs are in existence. This paper argues for the conceptualization of the present project as a service-learning project, despite it being separate from a formal class. Given the cultural context in which this project took place, the

author argues that implementation of out-of-class but still learning-linked service activities be evaluated for their impact on students" perceptions and development of a civic identity.

Impact on Students

Students in the present study reported greater recognition of the challenges faced by children with disabilities and their families. They acknowledged changed perceptions of others well as themselves and expressed an understanding of the similarities among people, despite outward appearances. Involvement in the Sports Day activity was moving for the students and provided a unique opportunity for them to interact with individuals with disabilities. They realized that they were not solely in the role of "helper" or "teacher," but could also learn from those they were attempting to assist. Involvement in this activity prompted the students to ask questions about society and its treatment of individuals with disabilities. Since the completion of this project, several of the students have sought additional opportunities to be involved with the community to a greater extent. One student has just declared her senior thesis topic will be "What we can learn from volunteering." These are suggestive of some long-term impacts of involvement with the project.

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Modernization, Anti-Modernism, and Modernity: The Failure of Catholicism in Japan 1865-1925

Míchéal Thompson

パリの海外布教協会のフランスカトリック教の宣教師は、ひじょうに大きな期待を抱いて1860年代に日本における宣教活動を始めた。しかしながら、1920年代にはこれらの期待は幻想であって、宣教活動は相対的に失敗であったことが明らかになった。この論文は、フランスと日本におけるこれらの失敗の理由を検討する。教会は、日本政府にとっても十分魅力を持ちうる、近代化と近代性の分離に関する明らかなモデルを提示した。しかしながら、そのモデルは、最終的には、適用に失敗したフランスそのものに近すぎたことと、日本における土着性の弱さという欠点をもっていた。

The French Catholic missionaries from the Société des missions étrangères de Paris (MEP) began their mission in Japan in the 1860s with high hopes which appeared to be justified. By the 1920s it was obvious that these hopes were illusory and that the mission was a relative failure. This article looks at the reasons why this was the case finding reasons both in France and in Japan. Though the MEP presented a clear model of the separation between modernization and Modernism, which could have been attractive to a Japanese government wanting to do the same, it was in the end flawed by its being too closely tied to France (where it had not succeeded) and by its non-indigenous nature in Japan.

In December 1864, Pope Pius IX solemnly issued the "Syllabus of Errors" composed of a list of eighty widespread errors which were to be condemned by all right thinking Catholics. Many of these are of relevance to the MEP[1] mission in Japan, but perhaps the last one summarizes many of them: (it is an error to say that) "The Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile and adapt himself to progress, liberalism, and the modern civilization".[2] Just a few months after this (in March 1865) a group of poor Japanese approached Father Petitjean in his newly built church in Nagasaki. Their words astonished him: "The hearts of all of us here are the same as yours".[3] It was on the dual basis of these two events that the MEP mission set out to promote Catholicism in the newly "opened" Japan. The purpose of this paper is to analyze what this meant and why the mission failed.

The Missionaries

The MEP missionaries were, like the Society of Jesus, explicitly linked in direct obedience to the papacy. Unlike the Society of Jesus however, they were also very much of a national society not an international one. Their personnel were exclusively French (except for a very small number of other European francophones) and they were very much tied to the French Catholic Church, in fact to the Ultramontane party of this church.[4] Their origins lay in the combined enthusiasms of Tridentine Catholicism to expand the faith and of the French

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[1] Société des missions étrangères de Paris.

[2] Henricus Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 35th edition. (Freiburg: Herder, 1973), 258.

[3] Francisque Marnas, *La "Religion de Jésus" Ressuscitée au Japon* 2 vols. (Paris: Seminaire des missions étrangères, 1931), 530.

[4] Austin Gough, *Paris and Rome: The Gallican Church and the Ultramontane Campaign 1848-1853* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

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monarchy to expand its areas of influence overseas, in this case in Asia.[5] Under the Bourbons this partnership had been a relatively easy one. Though the Catholic Church in France remained largely Gallican in outlook and practice, the papally oriented MEP was a suitable and willing partner in promoting these dual enthusiasms. Though not a numerically large society its work in China and Southeast Asia was appreciated by both Paris and Rome, especially after the problems of the Society of Jesus with the "Chinese Rites" issue.[6] The MEP enjoyed the easy relations of church and crown in France in the eighteenth century, though the weakness of this easiness is perhaps revealed in the small size of the society reflecting a certain lack of enthusiasm in the contemporary French church. Of course, alongside the party of the "dévots" of which the MEP were a part, the very tendencies denounced by Pius IX (Deism, Naturalism, Rationalism, etc) were growing at a far greater rate. The relatively cozy existence enjoyed by the French Church and the MEP was dramatically terminated by the French Revolution.

The impact of the Revolution on the French Church is a well-studied subject. For the MEP, the importance of this impact was largely two-fold: one on the MEP directly and two on the French Church as a whole which then in turn shaped the MEP in both attitudes and actions. In terms of the MEP alone, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 1791 was rejected by them (as it was by the Pope) and they refused to preach the required sermon supporting the state. The priests of the MEP left their seminary in Paris in 1792 to shelter with their families or in exile from France. The seminary became the property of the state and was used as a barracks until it was bought in 1796 by an ex-nun who held it in trust for the MEP. The rise of Napoleon brought better times. The chapel was re-opened in 1802 and the seminary itself was reestablished by Imperial Decree in 1805.[7] Both of these actions reflected Napoleon's dawning realization of the importance of French missionaries overseas and the new climate created by the Concordat between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII in 1801.[8] The reestablishment of the seminary remained largely theoretical in these troubled times as did its second closure in 1809. In 1815 however, with the return of the Bourbon monarchy, the seminary and the MEP were once again firmly established as if nothing had happened. But a great deal had happened to the church in France that would shape the MEP and its missionaries in the years to come.

The church in France had been violently exposed to assault not only in terms of property, personnel, and its relationship to state and society but also to a fundamental challenge to its ideas and the very basis of its existence. Property could, in some measure, be reclaimed or replaced. New personnel could be recruited and at least some of the losses could be transformed into martyr-role models. A viable relationship between church and state could also be re-achieved, though the Concordat remained a source of dissatisfaction for many Catholics. What was not possible was an acceptance of philosophies and resultant practices that clearly appeared to question the Catholic faith itself. The Catholic Church in France had been rudely awakened to the power of these new ideas and was resolved to confront them.[9] In doing so, the trajectory of the revolution itself gave cause for some confidence. Not only had the revolution appeared to burn itself out in bloodshed and self-destruction, but it had also been directed and propagated by only a small group defined clearly along social and even geographic lines. For these individuals, the revolution and its ideologies represented an irreversible break from the past. The gulf between present and past could never be re-crossed. This realization is a good definition of what it means to be modern. Arguably, a large portion of France had never truly experienced this feeling of an irreversible break and therefore was not (yet) modern. Certainly this was the

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[5] Jean Guenno, *Missions étrangères de Paris* (Paris: Fayard, 1986).

[6] George Minamiki, *The Chinese Rites Controversy* (Chicago: Loyola University, 1985).

[7] Guenno, 235.

[8] Bernard Ardura, *Le Concordat entre Pie VII et Bonaparte* (Paris: Cerf, 2001).

[9] John McManners, *Church and State in France 1870-1914* (London: SPCK, 1972).

case for much of rural France (which means most of France in 1815) and for the people who lived there.[10] The ideas of the French Revolution were truly modern in this sense, but it was a modernity which was not a product of the majority of French society. Neither was it a product of modernization, which can be defined as a change in material things which may (or may not) lead to modernity as exemplified by the ideas of the French Revolution.

The Catholic Church in France, along with Pope Pius IX, rejected the package of ideas associated with the revolution, the basis of which would subsequently be condemned by his successor as "Modernism".[11] As yet it had little or no experience of modernization. In France, modernism was the precursor of modernization but in other places the sequence could be reversed. The MEP following the restoration of the Bourbons was recruited from those very areas of rural France in which modernization had not happened and in which Modernism was seen as an alien and disruptive set of ideas. It would be a mistake, however, to consider them as merely reactionaries or conservatives. The point was not the rejection of "merely" material change or modernization but the rejection of Modernism, the MEP were not Amish in soutanes. They could not accept the existence of an uncrossable gulf between the past and the "modern" because it was not truly possible. If history represented (as they believed) the story of the unfolding of man's relationship with God, then such a gulf was both morally unthinkable and theoretically impossible. They basically believed in separating Modernism from modernization (and maintaining the separation) and in rejecting the former while accepting (or taming) the latter. In post-revolutionary France, this seemed far from an impossible ideal. With the advent of the regime of Napoleon III it gained additional credence.

The Concordat Church was divided between those who truly expected a return to the "status quo ante" and those who wanted something new, between Gallicans and Ultramontanes. The MEP was clearly on the Ultramontane side, as its constitutional allegiance to the Pope would dictate. The two sides contested for control of the Catholic Church in France from 1815 onwards, but it was a fundamentally lost cause for the Gallicans. In 1822, the Society for the Propagation of the Faith was founded in France, which united the Ultramontane party to the missionary effort. With the restoration of the Empire in 1852, this became a more and more fruitful union for the church in general and for the MEP in particular. The new emperor was concerned both with maintaining a good relationship with the papacy and with furthering French overseas interests. These in turn meant favoring an increasingly Ultramontane church and hierarchy and encouraging the MEP. The results of all of these factors can be seen in the significant increase in recruitment to the MEP reliant, as always, on specific geographic and social milieus.[12] MEP missionaries were trained in a fervently Ultramontane environment that was also fervently French as were most Catholic priests in France.[13] While strongly rejecting what would later be labeled as Modernism, they were lacking in experience of modernization. However, their rejection of Modernism was based on the principles of the Ultramontane Catholicism in which they had been schooled while their hesitancy about modernization was based on the social conservatism of the geographic and social groups from which they were recruited. Their rejection of an idea of progress that represented an irreversible rupture with the past made them favor as much continuity as was possible. Their rejection of "traditional" Gallicanism made them favor ordered and hierarchic change and modernization. The experiences of the revolution had molded the MEP as a society and its individual members. It was this group of men who arrived in Japan in 1859 to commence their mission.

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[10] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976).

[11] Henricus Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 35th edition. (Freiburg: Herder, 1973), 668, 675, 688.

[12] Mícheál Thompson, "The Geography of Recruitment to the Missions étrangères de Paris 1891-1941" *Comparative Culture* 7 (2001): 1-22.

[13] Marcel Launay, *Les séminaires français aux XIXe et Xxe siècles* (Paris: Cerf, 2003).

The Beginnings of the Mission to Japan[14]

For most Europeans and Americans, Japan in 1859 and for years afterwards was an exotic and unknown country.[15] To the extent that some elements of Japanese society seemed familiar, it was because they seemed like Europe in the Middle Ages. In the age of Walter Scott this could only add to their exoticism and romantic appeal. Japan was not only culturally and geographically distant, but possibly existed on a different chronological plane as well. Alongside this sense of the otherness of Japan went some hard-nosed calculations by some hard-nosed men. Japan was "opened" as part of the ongoing creation of a global and imperialist system and no amount of feudal mystique should be allowed to stand in the way of "progress". Walter Scott's Highlanders were romantic because they were imaginary creatures from the past and they were expected to remain there. A large proportion of the real Highlanders were economic migrants on their way out of Scotland as the new elite of Scotland dressed themselves in tartan to celebrate the progressive nature of the United Kingdom and its burgeoning empire.[16] Neither the Highlanders nor the Japanese could oppose the inexorable laws of development and both would have to pay the price of modernity.

For the MEP, on the other hand, Japan was perhaps exotic (they too shared in some of the cultural enthusiasms of their age) but it was not a truly alien place. They were not bent solely on claiming Japan for the Catholic Church but on reclaiming it. The MEP priests had been trained in the history of the Catholic missions among which the mission to Japan stood out. The earlier mission in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been an outstanding numerical and they believed spiritual success.[17] The mission had only been terminated by the violence of hostile rulers and the machinations of Protestants. All priests and missionaries had been banned as had Christianity itself. The remaining Christians were subjected to violent punishment and execution and the Catholic communities established by the missionaries faded from sight.[18] But not from mind, they had left a legacy or at least a memory in the seminaries of Europe of spiritual fervor and even martyrdom for the Catholic faith. Japan was thus a subject of great interest and great hope for the Ultramontane and missionary movements and the MEP considered itself fortunate to have been chosen to be the sole missionary society for Japan. This interest was widespread in the Catholic Church and the MEP took considerable strength from Pope Pius IX's own support of the mission. This was most obvious in his decision to canonize the "Twenty Six Martyrs" of Japan in June 1862, the first canonizations of his papacy. The church in which Father Petitjean was approached by his potential converts in Nagasaki was consecrated to the "Twenty Six Martyrs".

The initial intentions of the MEP were then to find the inheritors of the first mission, could any be found, and to replicate its successes. What had been done before could be done again[19]. However, the terms of operation of the MEP mission at its beginnings were not favorable to either venture. The French government (in the person of Baron Gros) had signed a Treaty with the governing Tokugawa Bakufu (徳川家幕府) in October 1858 which was the

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[14] Marnas, 1:359-380.

[15] Patrick Beillevaire, *Le voyage au Japon: Anthologie de textes français 1858-1908* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2001).

[16] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland" in *The Invention of Tradition,* ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-42.

[17] Neil S. Fujita, *Japan's Encounter with Christianity* (New York: Paulist Press, 1991).

[18] George Elison, *Deus Destroyed* (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[19] Mícheál Thompson, "Father Jules Renaut and the French Catholic Mission to Meiji Japan" *Comparative Culture* 6 (2000): 1-18.

basis for the MEP presence in Nagasaki.[20] It followed earlier treaties with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and contained basically the same provisions. Despite Baron Gros' personal wishes and those of the Emperor Napoleon III, this treaty with France contained no permission for missionary activity in Japan. Such priests as were allowed on Japanese soil could not move beyond the treaty ports and were restricted solely to serving the spiritual needs of the Europeans. The prohibition against Christianity was still firmly in place. If the treaty was a source of dissatisfaction for the MEP, because it didn't go very far towards allowing them to fulfill their goals, it was a source of far more than dissatisfaction for many Japanese. The Tokugawa Bakufu had come into existence as a result of an overwhelming show of strength on the part of the Tokugawas who had ended a period of civil wars by defeating their enemies and then ruthlessly removing any subsequent dissent (including Christianity and most foreign influence). After more than 250 years the treaties seemed to demonstrate that this strength was now gone. This gave heart to their long term opponents, largely in the "Han" (藩) of western Japan, but also seemed to augur a return to foreign "interference" in Japanese affairs. Small but politically significant numbers of younger men from these western "Han" were familiar with Europe and North America and with their roles in the world.[21] They were also aware of modernization as a process and of some of the ideas of Modernism with which it was frequently linked. While they were accepting of the need for modernization, in some cases reluctantly but in most cases not, their attitude to Modernism was far more varied. Some believed that modernity necessitated Modernism and favored democracy and the cult of the autonomous individual that underlay both. Others clearly viewed Modernism with distaste and wished to conserve tradition at the same time as accepting and "taming" modernization.[22] In this they were not dissimilar in their outlook it would appear from the MEP.

In the twilight years of the Tokugawa Bakufu these issues were discussed and fought out through a number of proposals. The Tokugawas were caught in an impossible situation: to concede to the westerners showed weakness, to concede to the rebellious "Han" showed weakness; to accept change showed weakness and to try to stop it showed the same. In the end they tried to concede to all sides and pleased none of them. The Bakufu collapsed under the weight of internal criticism backed up by external support especially that of the United Kingdom and the United States. As internal support for the Bakufu evaporated, the only external support came from France. No doubt there were elements of "Big Power" competition involved as France did not wish to cede still further influence to the "Anglo-Saxons" in Asia, but the Tokugawas attempt to conservatively manage change and to accept modernization with Modernism had undoubted resonance not only for the MEP and the milieus from which they sprung but also for the increasingly beleaguered Napoleon III.[23]

In hindsight, the results may seem inevitable but, in overthrowing the Tokugawa, the western "Han" had adopted an important tactic symbolized by their slogan "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians" (尊皇王攘夷). The way chosen to remove the Tokugawas was to advocate not a break with the past, but a return to the essence of a more distant past before the Tokugawas, the world of the Emperors. Of course the partisans of the new government realized that a simple return to the past was neither possible nor desirable, they had read their Romantic novels too, what was possible was to use (or reinvent) the past to manage change in the present.

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[20] Alain Cornaille, *Le premier traité Franco-Japonais* (Paris: Publications Orientalistes de France, 1994).

[21] Hirakawa Sukehiro, "Japan's turn to the West" in *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Japan*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 435-498.

[22] Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure* (New York: Noonday Press, 1975), 217-275.

[23] Richard Sims, *French Policy Towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-1895* (London: Japan Library, 1998).

The same applied to the second half of the slogan. They realized, at least most of them did, that "expelling the Barbarians" wasn't realistic or desirable either. What was realistic and indeed necessary was taking on board foreign "things" while not accepting (expelling) foreign ideas. In other words modernization without Modernism. If a traditional Catholic could operate a factory lathe and fire a machine gun (as the MEP believed) then so could a traditional Japanese.

For the MEP the changes were something that happened to them rather than something they were directly involved in. The stance of Napoleon III with respect to the Tokugawas would no doubt have met with their approval but their concerns were much more immediate. If the Tokugawas had reiterated the condemnation of Christianity then they must be persuaded otherwise and the same would apply to any other subsequent regime. The western "Han" (all around them in Nagasaki) seemed to offer little hope of being easily persuaded if you took their slogan at face value. However, the problem was a very immediate one because, as we have seen, in 1865 survivors of the earlier mission were indeed found. The MEP appeared to be on the brink of the successful mission for which they had been prepared but whose reality must have seen at times illusory. The group of Japanese who approached Father Petitjean were seen by him as, in spiritual terms, the sign of God's providence but also, in practical terms, as the tip of a possible missionary iceberg. Who were they? How many were they? Where were they? Were their hearts (and beliefs) really the same as his? What should be done next?

The answer to the last question was the easiest and in some ways answered all the other: they had to be sought out and attached to the MEP mission. This putative attachment would inevitably (at least eventually) mean going beyond the stipulations of the Treaty of 1858. Gingerly the missionaries of the MEP started to do so. Following the revelatory visit of 1865, the MEP missionaries discovered a considerable number of descendants of the original mission (called "Hidden Christians" or just kirishitan (隠れキリシタン) who still considered themselves to be Christians in the Urakami district of Nagasaki. They were also led to the discovery of similar groups in the Goto Islands off the coast of Nagasaki.[24] Within three years, three small chapels had been established in Urakami for these Christians and a strong start had been made on regularizing their religious lives, i.e. bringing them into conformity with the Catholic faith as taught and practiced by the MEP. A start had also been on contacting the Christians on the Goto Islands and establishing a regular community there. In July 1867, the Shogunate officials in Nagasaki enforced the Treaty and existing Tokugawa legislation and pillaged and closed the chapels in Urakami leaving the Nagasaki church (allegedly reserved for Europeans) untouched. By 1868 the persecution had spread to the Goto Islands and there were some deportations of Christians from Urakami to prisons in other parts of Japan. With the Meiji Restoration (明治維新) and the overthrow of the Tokugawas the local administration paused but then, in 1870, deportations resumed with allegedly "all" the Christians being deported. Following remonstrations from the foreign consuls (especially the American and British consuls) and the adoption of a more positive approach to the new government of Japan by the government of France (reinforced by the overthrow of Napoleon III) these deportations were reversed. Despite a high mortality rate, the remaining Christians were back in Nagasaki and Urakami by 1873.[25] Though the reproaches of foreign consuls were important, of more importance was the realization of the new Japanese government that its actions were seen as being retrograde and "anti-modern" from outside of Japan. They wished to create a good impression of Japan in the outside world and had accepted the need for modernization. What the controversy had underlined (in the person of Napoleon III) was the weakness of a position that tried to manage modernization but exclude Modernism when it was confronted by strong external forces. To achieve this goal the new Japanese government had to minimize the impact of such forces and

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[24] Ann M. Harrington, *Japan's Hidden Christians* (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1993).

[25] Marnas, 2:169-275.

one way to do so was to deny them the semblance of a right to intervene in Japanese affairs. The other, and more important, way was to construct a policy which would allow them to foster modernization without Modernism in their own right. The MEP shared this goal but they were to learn that theirs was not the only way.

The Changing Environment of the Mission

Managing change of any magnitude is never easy and accepting a rapid, full-blown process of modernization represents a considerable magnitude of change. The Meiji Oligarchs or Genro (元老) were clear about their long-term goals from the beginning, to modernize in such a way as to limit the destructive political and social elements and ideas (Modernism) which they had encountered in the West and which modernization could so easily bring in its train. The primary mechanism they used to do this was contained in the first part of their slogan, the Emperor was to be firmly placed at the center of the Japanese polity and the people were to be firmly attached to him and to the imperial house. The legitimacy of the emperor's right to rule was largely unquestioned; the Oligarchs wanted to make sure that it was unquestionable. On the success of this policy rested the success of managing the process of modernization. The emperor's centrality both insured that modernization would be accepted as a manifestation of the imperial will and that Modernism, which was antithetical to the maintenance of the imperial institution, would be rejected. These goals were implemented in two principal ways: creating a modern emperor centered state in which the people were trained to feel part of a national polity or kokutai (国家) linked organically to the emperor; and a range of policies instituting concrete changes and the process of modernization. These two were inextricably linked however, how they were accomplished and especially which policies would be implemented could and did change over time.

For centuries, the Emperor had never left the imperial capital and had never been seen by most Japanese people. The Meiji Oligarchs changed this in two important ways, first by moving the emperor to the old Shogunate capital of Edo now renamed Tokyo or "Eastern Capital" (東京) while retaining the imperial residences in Kyoto. This gave the Emperor two capitals, one in the west and one in the east and linked it with all aspects of Japan's past and its future. The second way was to start a series of "Great Imperial Tours" (大巡幸). There were six of these from 1872 to 1885 taking the Emperor from Hokkaido to Hiroshima.[26] In each of them the Emperor could see his people but, more importantly, they could see him and thus the feelings of reverence and solidarity which the policy of the Oligarchs was designed to create were cemented. As part of the overall policy goal of creating a modernized nation which at the same time was firmly linked to a pre-modern past, or perhaps more correctly an "anti-Modernist" present and future the imperial tours were an undoubted success. However, they also raised the possibility of misinterpretation and of seeing the Emperor as cast in the role of a modern or modernizing monarch along the lines of the British monarchy. This they were determined to prevent and they believed, at least initially, that the primary way in which this could be achieved was the creation of State Shinto (惟神の道) which would bind the nation together around the Emperor in a religious or at least quasi-religious way.

State Shinto was a new formation of the Meiji Oligarchs, though founded on an assemblage of traditional texts and various cultic and local practices dating far back into Japanese history.[27] The Tokugawas had established Buddhism as the state religion, though permitting choices within Buddhism for personal and familial practices. This official role for Buddhism had been enforced even in those western "Han" which were relatively

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[26] T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998).

[27] Kuroda Toshio, "Shinto in the History of Japanese Religion" in *Religion & Society in Modern Japan*, ed. Mark R. Mullins et al (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1993), 7-30.

unsympathetic towards it. The Meiji Restoration had abruptly severed links between Buddhism and the state. However, many of the oligarchs were aware of the potential of religion to act as a binding force in society especially in times of change. What they wanted was an Emperor centered cult which went along with their other policies. As one of the Genro (Ito Hirobumi then Private Counselor to the Emperor Meiji) noted in 1888: "The Constitution needs an axle to turn on. For the western nations this is given by religion. In Japan, Buddhism and (popular) Shinto can't provide it. The only axle for this nation is the imperial house".[28] Protestant Christianity, then considered as perhaps a force to be reckoned with in Meiji Japan, was of course unacceptable not only because of its foreign support from the Anglo-Saxon nations but also because it was widely perceived as favoring not only modernization but Modernism as well.[29]

State Shinto was thus founded as a cult for political purposes to manage modernization and to provide an alternative ideology to Modernism which was both manifestly autochthonous and seemingly rooted in the past and yet was experienced as being "modern" by Japanese at the time. The centrality of the Emperor was, in practical terms, modern and a response to modernization. So too was the cult that accompanied it and gave it a spiritual dimension. This applies whether State Shinto is viewed as truly a religion or as a set of cultural practices as many of its exponents argued. State Shinto was actively propagated by the government from 1868 until the 1880's and again, with renewed force, from 1905. Even in the "slump years" of the middle Meiji period (1880-1905), the national and prefectural governments continued to sponsor the building of new State Shinto shrines spreading the cult throughout Japan and even overseas into the new Japanese Empire.[30]

It took a long while for many people to realize the nature of the modernization project envisioned by the government and the role of State Shinto within it. Many people rejected elements of State Shinto for some time, which accounts in part for its "slump years" in the 1880's and 1890's. While the explicit fostering of modernization by successive Japanese governments met with diminishing opposition from more conservative elements in Japanese society, its rejection of Modernism was opposed by other more "progressive" elements especially those associated with Socialism and many groups of Protestants. The position of the MEP in the beginning was, in a sense, more nuanced and more hopeful for an accommodation. As State Shinto built up its strength and its compulsory character this changed and the Protestant groups largely accepted the "non-religious" nature of State Shinto ceremonies and thus reached an accommodation with the state. The Catholic Church in Japan however became one of the principle opponents of State Shinto.[31]

Two versions of "Modernization without Modernism" collide.

The MEP's main missionary strength was from the beginning its stronghold in Nagasaki Prefecture especially in the Urakami district of the city of Nagasaki and in some of the islands off the coast, especially the Goto Islands. Following the initial contact, the MEP had succeeded in finding and reconciling a significant number of descendants of the first Catholic missions. However, by 1880, it was becoming apparent that there was no longer a pool of such potential church members waiting for reconciliation. Though unreconciled descendants remained, they had every intention of remaining unreconciled. The phenomenal growth in the MEP mission in Nagasaki slowed to be largely reliant on natural increase. The early converts were mainly from the rural and semi-rural proletariat, as were the MEP missionaries themselves. Work with them was still culturally challenging in many ways, but of all the populations of

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[28] Pino Cazzaniga, "Il tempio Yasukuni e lo Shintoisme di Stato" *Sette Religioni* 31 (2002), 122.

[29] Yamaji Aizan, *Essays on the Modern Japanese Church*, trans. Graham Squires (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999).

[30] Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State 1868-1988* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1989).

[31] Minamaki, 121-158.

Japan they were obviously most reminiscent of the missionaries own origins. Though this conversion activity had happened at the same time as the government had started to foster State Shinto, it had happened far from the Japanese mainstream and the campaigns of State Shinto were considerably muted by the time that they reached northwest Kyushu. The MEP had concentrated much of their efforts, understandably, on this promising mission field and had been far less successful in the major urban areas. Additionally, the restrictions on missionary work and travel were far more daunting in these areas.

Beginning in the late 1870s, with substantial augmentation in the 1880s, missionaries were granted freedom of movement and action. This presented the MEP with the challenge of deciding on a new mission strategy. Obviously, they would continue to nurture the Nagasaki mission including the training of Japanese priests for the mission. However, equally obviously, Nagasaki was a mission that involved deepening and consolidation but not expansion. There were basically two choices: to attempt to missionize the major population centers of Japan (especially Osaka and Tokyo) and/or to find new and more promising mission fields. The first represented a major set of challenges to the MEP at a wide variety of levels. In the 1880's the two metropolitan areas, already on their way to being major conurbations, had already been the site of extensive missionary activity by various Protestant groups funded and staffed from the "Anglo-Saxon" countries. By 1880 there were 26 such groups operating in Japan, by 1900 the number was 45,[32] the focus of their efforts was the major cities. The social groups attracted to these missions varied widely but included the mercantile and ruling classes who were most directly involved in implementing the processes of modernization in Japan. For them, as for most Japanese with an understanding of the modern world system, America and Britain were the principal engines and exemplars of modernization. Acceptance of Protestant Christianity meant emulating the religious aspects of these cultures alongside developing a way to interpret and cope with the changes of modernization. Catholicism had naturally little appeal to these groups with its rejection of Modernism and reliance on conservatism. The equivocal role of France in terms both of modernization and of its attitude to Japan underlined this. Perceived as a weak power after the fall of Napoleon III and its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France was not the economic giant that the other two powers were and, if that was not enough, the support of France for the Tokugawas was still remembered. To establish themselves in these areas, the MEP would have to contest the ground with the Protestant missions and it would be a very unequal contest.

Protestantism was not the only challenge to be faced; two more major opponents for the MEP could be identified. The first, which was all too familiar to the MEP, were those people who had wholeheartedly embraced modernization and Modernism as well. The whole panoply of Modernism (Liberalism, Agnosticism, Atheism, etc), much of which ironically had French origins, could be found in these areas and in other industrializing areas of Japan as well. Socialist societies, associations of "Free Thinkers" and many others had become popular with different social groups in Meiji Japan.[33] While the MEP was as willing to do battle with them in Japan as the Catholic Church was in France, it was obvious that the MEP lacked both numerical strength and the support base it enjoyed in France. The crucial years in which the MEP had concentrated on Nagasaki and had, in any case, had to face serious restrictions in the major cities were also the years in which these Modernist associations had begun to flourish. The only viable possibility was to convince the government, which was already convinced of the evils of Modernism, that Catholicism offered a viable way of combating Modernism while assisting the process of modernization. The equivocal role of France, the sole patron of the Catholic missions, made this unlikely in any case. So too did the attitudes of the Protestants. What made it impossible was the rise of State Shinto which offered everything that the government needed, an anti-Modernist movement which could still accommodate or even foster modernization. More

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[32] Mark R. Mullins, *Christianity Made in Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1998), 14.

[33] Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985).

importantly, it was a movement without foreign ties. Even in the "slump years" the major urban areas (especially Tokyo) were at the center of the creation of State Shinto. The prospects looked increasingly bleak for the MEP. While the MEP would valiantly attempt to further the cause of Catholicism (and France) in the metropolitan districts, they also started to look for other potentially more viable mission fields in Japan. Though they could not expect to find any more communities descending from the first mission, they did look, they could hope for some success in other areas which "fitted the profile"—that is, areas which were little (or perhaps) negatively affected by modernization and which were conservative enough to reject Modernism. On the other hand, such an area also had to be at least moderately open to limited contact with the "modern" (i.e. foreign) culture that the MEP represented. In the 1860s there were potentially many such areas, by the 1890s this was no longer the case.

Initially the MEP had high hopes for the major island of Yezo (蝦夷) now called Hokkaido. Their hopes were not unreasonable, but the negative resolution of these hopes is contained in the name change itself. While Hakodate was one of the "Treaty Ports" in which the MEP were allowed from the beginning of the treaty regime, the mission was not well staffed compared with Nagasaki. Very soon after the Meiji Restoration, Hokkaido was the object of extensive population migration from other parts of Japan. It was also the subject of a great deal of government interest. In effect, it was the Japanese equivalent of the American West. As such the early MEP initiatives to the Japanese population of Hakodate, which capitalized on their feelings of isolation, was rapidly superceded. The other focus of the mission, the native Ainu (アイヌ) became irrelevant with even greater rapidity. In 1896, the MEP had encouraged the Reformed Cistercians (Trappists) from France to establish a monastery outside of Hakodate with an attached Ainu settlement and school. By the time that the monastery (the Abbaye de la Phare) was in place, there were no longer any Ainu to settle in the region. Migration of Japanese from other parts of the state had pushed most of them out and numerically swamped the residual population. The pace of change had proved too rapid for the Ainu as it had for the MEP. Hokkaido was rapidly moved from the periphery to the center of government managed modernization and the MEP were confronted with the same challenges there as they were in Tokyo.

If Hokkaido had proved the costs of delay, the MEP had other possibilities which were both closer to "home" (i.e. Nagasaki) and more commensurate with both their goals and their means. In the 1890s, one of the veteran MEP missionaries (Father Emile Raguet) was given permission to explore other areas of the island of Kyushu (the same island as Nagasaki) for prospective mission sites. Father Raguet, unusually for the MEP, was not French but Belgian but he fully shared the approach of the MEP to both modernization and Modernism. He had been a missionary in Japan for some years and believed that, with the implosion of state supported Buddhism; there was a vacuum that Catholicism could fill. He also believed that Shinto was largely moribund and therefore could not expand to fill the "gap" that Buddhism had left. He was certainly aware of the challenge of the rival Protestant missions but, especially in southern Kyushu, he believed that their efforts would be minimal. Rather than confront their superior numbers and finances in the major metropolitan areas, it made some sense to create missions where the Protestants were largely absent. In addition, in southern Kyushu, which had been dominated by the Shimazu family of Satsuma Han throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, Buddhism had been restricted and so had little popular support.[34] So, it was southern Kyushu that was to be the new focus of Father Raguet and his supporters in the MEP. The story of this mission underlines, to some extent, the accuracy of his judgement but it also underlines its fundamental weakness.

Southern Kyushu during the Tokugawa Shogunate had its center in Kagoshima, the capital of the Shimazu family domains. Father Raguet eventually settled there but, following in the footsteps of the traditional Satsuma policy of exclusion, it was not a receptive city to

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[34] Torao Haraguchi, *The Status System and Social Organization of Satsuma* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1975).

foreigners whatever their attitude to things modern. It was decided in 1892 that the focus of the mission would be on the fringes of the old Shimazu lands in the city of Miyazaki that lies in southeast Kyushu midway between Kagoshima to the south and Oita to the north. However, in the same year, another MEP missionary (Father Joseph Ferrié) was invited to visit the island of Amami Oshima by a Catholic craftsman who had recently moved to the island. Amami Oshima is the northernmost island in the Ryukyu chain but it had been separated from the Kingdom of the Ryukyus in 1609 and had been ruled directly by the Shimazu. As such, Buddhism was virtually non-existent on the island, its only practitioners were the small group of merchants and their families from Osaka who arrived in the 1890s and were not well liked by the local population.[35] In addition, it was even more outside the Japanese mainstream than Miyazaki. In both places the population were interested in modernization but wary, desirous of change but basically conservative. In other words, both places seemed to be potentially receptive to the MEP's brand of modernization without Modernism. Sadly for the MEP, they were to be only half-right in the short term and completely wrong in the longer term.

The first disappointment for Father Raguet (and his successor Father Joly) in Miyazaki was the fact that the Protestant groups were very far from neglectful of the area. In fact they were sufficiently active for Father Joly to consider them as his main rivals for the spiritual allegiance of the populace.[36] Their better access to funds and their reliance on lay (Japanese) leadership assisted their growth and provided an attractive access route to modernity for some. Though he doubted the strength of their conversions, it was disconcerting to realize that Miyazaki was perhaps more like a provincial version of Tokyo than had been anticipated. However, worse was yet to come for the MEP. As part of the political consolidation of Meiji Japan, Miyazaki City had been made the capital of a new prefecture, which attracted and trained bureaucrats who were in tune with the government and so less than open to Catholicism. This was dramatically heightened in 1906 with the decision to (re)create a major Shinto Shrine in Miyazaki dedicated to the Emperor Jimmu the putative founder of the Japanese Imperial line. Virtually overnight Miyazaki had moved from the fringes to the center of the movement to promote State Shinto.[37] The population was mobilized emotionally and financially to support the project and, in turn, it attracted more people to Miyazaki. All of these newcomers and visitors were caught up in the fervor of State Shinto. The MEP mission faltered and its small numbers went into permanent stagnation.

If Miyazaki was not able to live up to the hopes of the MEP for a thriving mission; the same was definitely not true for Amami Oshima. In stark contrast to Miyazaki, the MEP mission in the even more remote area of Amami-Oshima had started, as an historian of the Catholic Church in Japan has noted, "a movement of conversions that has had no equal in the modern apostolate of Japan."[38] The initial MEP mission met with noticeable success. By 1893 there were 914 Catholics on the island and within ten years this number had nearly doubled to 1767.[39] It was a rate of conversions that compared favorably with that of Nagasaki and without having a base in existing Kirishitan families to explain it. The pace continued after this too. By 1915, when Miyazaki had 162 Catholics (many originating outside of the prefecture), Amami Oshima had 3,659 most of whom were from the local community.[40] The sole mention of non-Amami natives converting to Catholicism is a reference to a family of merchants from Nagasaki

[35] *Missionary Correspondence* [Hereafter *MC*] 571 (1900)

[36] MC 571 (1893) and (1895)

[37] *MC* 571a (1906).

[38] Joseph Van Hecken *The Catholic Church in Japan Since 1859* (Herder: Tokyo, 1963), 53.

[39] *MC* 571 (1893) and (1903).

[40] *MC* 571a (1915).

who had formerly been Methodists who joined the Catholic Church in Nazé.[41] Such a spectacular growth in membership was reflected in buildings as well. By 1915 the MEP had 8 mission stations/churches on the island built with local subscriptions. One of these, Chinazé, had become something of a local tourist attraction and a source of considerable pride to the residents of the town whether Catholic or not.[42] This local pride goes some way to explaining some of the success of the mission, it also helps in understanding the problems they experienced later which were perhaps not so obvious in the first heady days of the mission.

The initial response to the MEP mission did indeed involve strong elements of local pride in Oshima as opposed to the mainland. Clearly, many in Oshima felt that in accepting Catholicism they were embracing a form of modern life that put them ahead of the Osaka merchants in this area. However, it was also clear that much of the interest in Catholicism stemmed from a desire to put one community on the island ahead of others for reasons not so much of religious conviction as of hoped for personal and community advancement. Even in Chinazé, despite their pride in the church building itself, religious indifference was paramount.[43] While in others, such as Kuji, the missionaries were invited because of material interest (they hoped to get money) rather than any interest in the religion itself.[44] As time moved on, a more dangerous enemy for the MEP that either apathy or greed was to begin to appear. By the early years of the Twentieth Century, a reaction in favor of conservatism had started. Initially a movement to "save the traditions of Oshima" it had gained in strength by its links with what the MEP report calls "the dissipated youth element".[45] It seems apparent, by the popular support they obviously found on the island, that this movement went beyond a mere combination of insular reaction and youthful rebelliousness. Amami-Oshima, though still distanced from the Japanese mainstream in many ways, was increasingly coming to know of and incorporate the ideas of the Japanese State. The people were in contact with events on the mainland and in the world in a way that they had not been before. As a missionary noted during the First World War, "the people seem to be waiting to find out how the war in Europe will finish" and what that would mean for both Japan and France and, by extension, Catholicism.[46]

One thing that did follow the end of the war was the grudging acceptance that, in the new spirit of nationalism that animated the growth of State Shinto, the Diocese of Nagasaki would have to be consigned to the indigenous clergy. While some of the missionaries were unhappy with this and saw it as a concession to nationalism, it was clearly a concession that the Pope himself wished to make.[47] Following protracted negotiations and direct papal involvement, a number of decisions were made in 1924 and 1925 to be implemented quickly. In 1927, the MEP lost control of Nagasaki and the first Japanese bishop was consecrated. The MEP also realized that they no longer had the manpower to sustain a number of their other missions as well. In the same year, Amami Oshima was reassigned to the Canadian Franciscans. In the following year, Miyazaki was handed over to the Italian Salesian Fathers. The only foothold left for the MEP in Kyushu was the unpromising new diocese of Fukuoka, which only had 7,000 Catholics when it was erected.[48] The MEP experiment in promoting modernization without Modernism had failed.

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[41] *MC* 571a (1908).

[42] *MC* 571 (1899).

[43] *MC* 571 (1899).

[44] *MC* 571 (1897).

[45] *MC* 571a (1909).

[46] *MC* 571z (1916).

[47] *MC* 571a (1921).

Conclusion: Anatomy of Failure

One reason for this failure was simple, a lack of personnel to put it into practice. But there were other reasons that were more crucial. Perhaps, in the case of Miyazaki, the MEP had missed their opportunity by waiting until the 1890s to establish themselves there. However, such an argument clearly could not apply to Amami Oshima. What finally accounted for the failure of the MEP mission was the unacceptability of the MEP program to most Japanese people and especially to the Japanese government. The attractiveness and utility of the State Shinto model of modernization without Modernism (or without westernization) was far stronger than that of the MEP even though it had many parallels to it. The MEP were clearly westerners even if they were very far from being westernizers. State Shinto suffered no such burden. State Shinto provided an effective (and indigenous) answer to the problem of how to separate modernization from Modernism. The government had no need of another. The program of the MEP was not only non-indigenous but was intimately linked to France. As the Japanese government was well aware however, the program of the Catholic Church was rejected by substantial segments of French society. It had failed to prevent the spread of Modernism in France or anywhere else in Europe. The military defeats of Napoleon III both in the Franco-Prussian War and in his futile efforts to protect the Papacy from Italian nationalism was hardly a role model that the increasingly militaristic Japanese governments wished to emulate. The body of thought represented by the MEP in Japan was seen as a failed attempt to hinder the advance of Modernism. If the Japanese government shared this goal, they did not believe that Catholicism was an effective way to achieve it. State Shinto was effective in this regard and rapidly came to dominate Japanese society until Japan's defeat in 1945.

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[48] *MC* 571a (1928).

Critical Thinking in Higher Education

Peter Verbeek

本論文は、一般教養教育および専門化された高等教育において、クリティカル・シンキング
(批評的思考、分析・判断力)がどのようにして概念化され検査されているかを議論する。
まず、学生のクリティカル・シンキングの技術と性質を奨励する方法を議論し、そして、心
理学の講座におけるクリティカル・シンキングを学ぶための能動的・主体的学習計画の例を
紹介する。最後に、単なる教授技術としてではなく、世の中に参加・従事するための首尾一
貫した方法としてのクリティカル・シンキングを奨励する必要性を強調する。

This paper discusses how critical thinking is conceptualized and tested in liberal arts and
specialized higher education. Methods to cultivate students' critical thinking skills and
dispositions are discussed, and an example of an active learning project on critical thinking in a
psychology course is presented. The need to cultivate critical thinking as part of a coherent way
of engaging the world, rather than treating it as a simple set of teachable skills, is emphasized.

Critical thinking is a stated outcome goal of liberal arts education. A disposition to use critical thinking and ability to do so is seen as a prerequisite for responsible citizenship and a successful life (ten Dam & Volman, 2004). Liberal arts educated academicians at times speak glowingly about the value of liberal arts education in nurturing critical thinking in students. A recent expert panel on the assessment and instruction of critical thinking, for example, proposed that: "One cannot overemphasize the value of a solid liberal education to supplement the honing of one's critical thinking skills and the cultivating of one's critical thinking dispositions" (Facione, 1990). In this paper I take a brief personal look at definitions and measures of critical thinking in higher education. As a teacher in a liberal arts program in Japan and graduate of liberal arts education in the USA, I am particularly interested in critical thinking in the context of liberal arts education, and will focus on that. The first part of the paper introduces common definitions of critical thinking and reviews standardized testing of critical thinking skills and dispositions. The second part of the paper discusses methods of cultivating students' critical thinking and discusses them in the larger context of liberal arts education.

Critical Thinking Defined

How can we define critical thinking? Definitions abound in the burgeoning literature on critical thinking and most focus on the notion of self-regulation: a critical thinker systematically and consistently manages his or her own thought processes. Experts convened by the American Philosophical Association (APA) reached consensus on the following definition of an ideal critical thinker: "The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit" (Facione, 1990). This conceptualization includes two complementary dimensions of critical thinking: cognitive skills and affective dispositions (*ibid.*). In past research students have been tested on both of these dimensions, primarily through standardized tests, with a greater emphasis on affective dispositions.

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Cognitive Skills

The notion of cognitive *skills* in critical thinking implies learning. As such, scores on a standardized test of cognitive skills in critical thinking are not to be equated with scores on standardized measures of intelligence. True to their origin, contemporary measures of intelligence, such as IQ tests, purport to measure mental ability through scholastic aptitude, while standardized tests of critical thinking skills purport to measure mental cultivation through scholastic achievement. Indeed, if critical thinking is a key aspect of "mental cultivation," then it is, to paraphrase Whitehead (1929, pp. 26; cited in Walsh, & Seldomridge, 2006), "nothing else than the satisfactory way in which the mind will function when it is poked into activity." From this perspective, critical thinking skills can be cultivated in any person with basic abilities, although few of us may become fully adept at the full range of skills and sub-skills that are considered central to critical thinking (Facione, 1990; Table 1).

Table 1. Skills and Sub-skills of Critical Thinking

Skills	Sub-skills
Interpretation	Categorization Decoding significance Clarifying meaning
Analysis	Examining ideas Identifying arguments Analyzing arguments
Evaluation	Assessing claims Assessing arguments
Inference	Querying evidence Conjecturing alternatives Drawing conclusions
Explanation	Stating results Justifying procedures Presenting arguments
Self-regulation	Self-examination Self-correction

Adapted from Facione (1990).

The APA panel mentioned earlier proposed the basic critical skills listed in Table 1 and several standardized tests have been designed with this basic set of skills in mind. The tests most commonly used in higher education include the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA; Watson & Glaser, 1994), and the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST). The WGCTA measures the underlying constructs of classical logic embedded in critical thinking skills, including inference, recognition of assumptions, deduction, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments (Walsh, & Seldomridge, 2006). The CCTST is based on similar constructs and includes five scales: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, analysis, inference, and evaluation. Ironically, the CCTST was recently criticized for including 9 (out of 34) defective questions that make errors in critical thinking (Fawkes, O'Meara, Weber, & Flage, 2005). These authors also warn that standardized testing using instruments such as the CCTST can only be understood as a measure of minimal competency for the skills tested, but not as an adequate measure of critical thinking (*ibid.*).

Table 2. Affective Dispositions of Critical Thinking

Approaches to life and living:

Inquisitiveness with regard to a wide range of issues.

Concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Alertness to the use of critical thinking.

Trust in the process of reasoned inquiry.

Self-confidence in one's own ability to reason.

Open-mindedness regarding divergent world views.

Flexibility in considering alternatives and opinions.

Understanding of the opinions of other people.

Fair-mindedness in appraising reasoning.

Honesty in facing one's own biases, prejudices, stereotypes, egocentric or sociocentric tendencies.

Prudence in suspending, making or altering judgments.

Willingness to reconsider and revise views where honest reflection suggests that change is warranted.

Approaches to specific issues, questions or problems:

Clarity in stating the question or concern.

Orderliness in working with complexity.

Diligence in seeking relevant information.

Reasonableness in selecting and applying criteria.

Care in focusing attention on the concern at hand.

Persistence though difficulties are encountered.

Precision to the degree permitted by the subject and the circumstance.

Adapted from Facione (1990).

Affective Dispositions

What motivates learners and teachers to allocate mental energy to critical thinking and how is that mental energy distributed? According to the APA panel of experts, the way a person learns to approach life is closely connected to his or her actual application of critical thought. From this perspective, people who have developed the affective dispositions listed in Table 2 are much more likely to apply their critical thinking skills appropriately in both their personal and civic life than those who have mastered the skills but are not disposed to use them. Students' acquisition of this basic set of dispositions has also been measured through standardized testing, in particular through the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI; Facione & Facione, 1992). The CCTDI consists of 75 items on a six-point Likert scale that measure seven sub-scales: truth seeking, open-mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, self-confidence, inquisitiveness, and maturity (*ibid.*).

Standardized Testing

What have the first decades of systematic standardized testing of critical thinking taught us thus far? Surprisingly little systematic research has been done to test the claim that liberal arts education is particularly successful in cultivating critical thinking in students. A recent longitudinal study in the USA that compared 49 liberal arts colleges and public and private universities in 13 states is among the first of its kind. The study found that liberal arts graduates

excelled on measures of personal growth and responsible citizenship but did not demonstrate superior critical thinking skills compared to graduates from private and public universities (Pascarella, Wolniak, Seifert, Cruce, & Blaich, 2005).

Data from comprehensive institutions are often difficult to interpret as the following example illustrates. In preparation for an accreditation visit, a mid-size comprehensive public university in the USA began measuring both critical thinking skills and dispositions, using the CCTDI and WGCTA (Walsh & Seldomridge, 2006). Data on critical thinking dispositions collected from 1997 to 2002 showed no consistency of pattern. While some cohorts saw gains, others saw losses, and several years had essentially no change. Throughout this period, the usual academic indicators (e.g., SAT/ACT data, cumulative grade point average, science grades) remained the same. The data on critical thinking skills were likewise inconclusive and difficult to explain (*ibid.*).

In Western countries medical and allied health care education has been at the forefront of standardized testing of critical thinking skills and dispositions. In clinical settings critical thinking can literally mean the difference between life and death, and health educators are particularly concerned with devising and testing curricula that require the practice of critical thinking. In the USA problem-based learning has been fundamental to this approach since the 1960s, when medical schools abandoned traditional lecture-based education in favor of active learning (Kowalczyk & Leggett, 2005). Allied health education in the USA followed suit in the 1980s (*ibid.*). Of all fields in allied health education, nursing education has been among the most active in testing critical thinking. One of the main objectives of nursing education is to produce nurses with the ability to think critically and thus be able to provide safe nursing care (Suliman, 2006). The philosophy of this approach is to encourage student self-directed learning and take a problem-solving approach (McAllister, 2001). Similar to critical thinking assessment in liberal arts and comprehensive universities, nursing education has primarily relied on standardized testing.

Walsh and Seldomridge (2006) reviewed the extensive literature on standardized tests of critical thinking in nursing education and concluded that "years of measuring critical thinking using standardized instruments and evaluating the effectiveness of various interventions to enhance critical thinking have yielded results that do not inform pedagogical practice." Walsh and Seldomridge suggest that in nursing education the use of standardized instruments to measure critical thinking is not particularly useful because such tools assess the skills of classical logic, as opposed to the critical thinking skills of clinical practice.

Comparative data obtained in various countries provide some insight into cultural factors associated with the cultivation and assessment of critical thinking in nursing education. Some of these comparative data were obtained with local translations of English-language instruments, while other data were collected with the English language originals. One study compared nursing students from universities in Hong Kong and Australia on the CCTDI. In contrast to the Australian students, the Chinese nursing students failed to show a positive disposition toward critical thinking on the CCTDI total mean score (Tiwari, Avery, & Lai, 2003). In an earlier study Chinese nursing students at a Hong Kong university were also shown to have a negative disposition toward critical thinking in the majority of CCTDI sub-scales. Similar as in Western studies, the students in this study scored lowest on the truth-seeking sub-scale and highest on inquisitiveness (Ip et al., 2000).

The development of critical thinking skills is a current focus in nursing education and care in Japan. However, the Japanese Nursing Association does not require students to be assessed on critical thinking as a curriculum outcome (Kawashima & Petrini, 2004). A recent study based on a Japanese translation of the CCTDI compared freshmen and junior nursing students and transfer students with registered nurses on their dispositions to critical thinking (Kawashima & Petrini, 2004). The students who transferred to the nursing program showed an overall positive disposition toward critical thinking as measured by the CCTDI total mean score.

The data for the regular students and registered nurses suggested an overall ambivalence toward critical thinking. All three groups scored in the positive range on three sub-scales: open-mindedness, inquisitiveness and maturity. When compared to aggregate findings from Western studies of nursing students (Facione, 1997), the Japanese nursing students and registered nurses scored lower on both total score and all sub-scale scores.

In discussing these results Kawashima and Petrini comment that the traditional Japanese education system continues to hinder the development of nursing students. Learning skills that require students to formulate their own questions or interests in academia or social events are not encouraged, and neither are autonomy and independent learning, all of which have been associated with the cultivation of critical thinking skills and dispositions (Ibid; cf. Fancione, 1990).

Kawashima and Petrini's findings and comments about the effect of traditional education on Japanese nursing students resonate with similar observations of Japanese medical education. In a rather frank invited assessment of medical education at a major Japanese medical school, R. Harsha Rao, an accomplished US-based teacher-practitioner laments: "It constantly drove me crazy to see these incredibly brilliant and knowledgeable young minds go into limbo because they were taught not to ask any questions. I came to realize that it was the Japanese way when I was told by them, in fact, that to ask a question was a sign of disrespect for their teacher! So much so that a couple of students even implied that they were afraid to ask because they would be ridiculed for being too dumb to figure it out for themselves!" (Rao, 2006a). Rao (2006b) comments that only if teachers are willing to be challenged will students feel free to challenge them. The primary onus is thus on teachers to foster a climate of active learning.

None of the studies discussed so far directly tested the link between students' learning style and their dispositions to use critical thinking. A study on Saudi Arabian students used the CCTDI and the Learning-style Inventory (LSI; Kolb, 1985) to investigate this link. The LSI measures the participants' relative emphasis on four learning abilities: concrete experiencing (CE); reflective observation (RO); abstract conceptualization (AC); and active experimentation (AE). All students took the tests in English and two groups were compared. The first group consisted of students enrolled in a 4-year BS program in Nursing. The second group consisted of university graduates with a degree in physics, chemistry, mathematics or biology, enrolled in a 2-year accelerated program in nursing.

Overall, the students in the second group were significantly more disposed to critical thinking, inquisitive and self-confident. Across both groups, inquisitiveness was positively correlated with active experimentation (AE) and negatively with concrete experience (CE). Abstract conceptualization (AC) was positively related to truth seeking, analyticity, systematicity, self-confidence, and maturity. Finally, reflective observation (RO) was negatively correlated with truth seeking and systematicity (Suliman, 2006).

Testing: Quo Vadis?

Based on this limited review of the first decades of research on critical thinking outcomes in higher education it seems reasonable to suggest that both skill and disposition are difficult to capture with standardized tests. Standardized testing of critical thinking may face similar constraints and shortcomings as standardized testing of intelligence (Cernovsky, 2002). Walsh and Seldomridge (2006) explain that the inconsistent findings and limitations of available standardized instruments have led programs to consider qualitative measurements of · critical thinking, such as portfolios, narratives, and reflective assignments. However, issues of interrater reliability, validity, and inability to compare findings across programs, have limited the usefulness of such approaches. For example, faculty who identified themselves as more abstract thinkers rated students' reflective writing higher on critical thinking than faculty who described themselves as concrete thinkers (*ibid.*).

Members of the APA panel on critical thinking commented that it was easier for them to reach consensus on the definition of critical thinking than on recommendations for the most effective ways of testing it. The panel did suggest that assessment should occur frequently and should be used diagnostically as well as summatively (Fancione, 1990). The panel also recommended that different instruments should be used, depending on which aspect of critical thinking is targeted and where students are in their learning—the introductory stage, the practice stage, the integration stage or the generalized stage. Finally, and importantly in view of some of the cross-cultural findings discussed earlier, the panel emphasised that critical thinking instruction should not be deferred until college, "since it is not likely to be effective if it were" (*ibid.*).

Cognitive Development and Critical Thinking

Traditional students at colleges and universities are in the late adolescence and early adulthood stages of psychological development. According to Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget's influential developmental theory, around this age young people enter the formal operations stage of cognitive development. This final stage in Piaget's theory is characterized by the ability to systematically think about all the logical relations in a problem. Keating (1980) reviewed research on adolescent thought and elaborated on Piaget's ideas by proposing five specific characteristics that distinguish adolescent thinking processes from those associated with middle childhood: (1) thinking about possibilities, (2) thinking ahead, (3) thinking through hypotheses, (4) thinking about thought, and (5) thinking beyond conventional limits.

We can map these five characteristics of adolescent thought onto the skills and sub-skills of critical thinking identified by the APA panel of experts (Table 2). For example, the ability to think about possibilities (1), to think ahead (2), and to think beyond conventional limits (5) map onto *inference*, while the ability to think through hypotheses (3) maps onto *evaluation*. Finally, second-order cognition, that is, the ability to think about one's own thoughts (4) maps onto *explanation, self-regulation, interpretation* as well as *analysis*. In sum, theory and research in developmental psychology suggest that the average adolescent mind is developmentally ready to be "poked into critical thinking action," considering that it is capable of performing the mental operations associated with critical thinking skills.

Cultivating Critical Thinking

How can college and university teachers poke the minds of students into critical thinking action? Most experts agree that lecture-based, teacher-centered classroom activities are least likely to cultivate critical thinking in students, especially when combined with multiple-choice examinations and similar tests that reward recognition and recall rather than encourage critical thinking (Walsh & Seldomridge, 2006). Providing meaningful active learning opportunities, especially in the form of problem-based or integrated learning activities, is the pedagogy of choice for cultivating critical thinking skills and for nurturing critical thinking dispositions. Much can be done to scaffold active learning without having the teacher take center stage. For example, targeted and timely questioning can help move students into a higher level of functioning. Research reviewed by Walsh and Seldomridge (2006) showed that teacher questions at a higher level (i.e., application, analysis, evaluation, synthesis) yield more sophisticated student responses. Research has also shown that faculty questions are commonly at a low level (i.e., information, knowledge, comprehension), so work in this area remains to be done.

In the following section I briefly describe a recent project on critical thinking in one of my upper-level psychology courses. Our work on critical thinking in the course stretched over several class sessions and included in-class readings and discussions, problem-based homework assignments, and in-class presentation of these assignments, and it culminated in a reflective writing assignment. We started with defining critical thinking and a discussion of

hindrances to critical thinking. For this purpose the students were given a set of tables listing hindrances to critical thinking due to use of language, faulty logic or perception, or psychological and sociological pitfalls (Carroll, 2000; 2003). We worked with these tables in class and tried to come up with everyday examples of hindrances to critical thinking. Next, we read (in class and as homework) a critical piece on the use and misuse of intelligence testing in psychology. After reading and discussing the main content we tried to determine whether or not the critical message of this piece was constrained due to use of language or faulty logic. This exercise was difficult for the students considering that language use hindrances to critical thinking, such as the use of jargon or doublespeak, are difficult to spot in a language other than one's own. The students most often commented on the emotive content of the piece and how in their view it distracted from the main message. Finally, the students wrote a reflective paper offering their opinion on how critical thinking applies to the study of psychology. One student wrote: "Thinking critically is that we can understand what truth is, " while another commented that: "I felt that critical thinking is very related to morals and ethics." Yet another student cited some of the specific examples of hindrances to critical thinking discussed in class and wrote: "... communal reinforcement,[1] ad hominem fallacy, and poisoning the well are psychological and sociological pitfalls that the Japanese tend to fall in. It might happen because of cultural background. Japanese are not individualists and tend to follow authority and numbers." Several students mentioned in their papers that they were well familiar with critical thinking because it had been emphasized in their classes since their freshman year. The insights the students demonstrated through their reflective writing can thus be seen as a cumulative function of the consistent emphasis on critical thinking throughout their liberal arts college career.

It is unlikely that the kind of insights these students showed can be adequately captured through standardized testing. Teachers as well as researchers should think creatively and critically about how to design and implement multiple methods of measuring critical skills and dispositions throughout the entire 4-year curriculum. As teachers we should also critically reflect on *how* content could be taught to foster critical thinking and not only on *what* should be taught. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if we approach critical thinking as a simple set of teachable skills our efforts are likely to fail (Keating, 1996). Rather, as cogently stated by Keating (1996), educators should strive to enhance students' critical thinking by considering it part of "a coherent way of engaging the world that requires such skills, plus content knowledge, personal dispositions, emotional commitments, and productive patterns of social interaction." Perhaps, then, this is what a liberal arts education, with its clear focus on developing students ability to "shed details in favor of principles" (Whitehead, 1929) and proven track record of fostering personal growth (Pascarella et al., 2005), is particularly well positioned to accomplish.

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[1] In the case of communal reinforcement a claim whether valid or invalid becomes a widespread belief through repeated assertion by community members. The ad hominem fallacy involves criticizing the person not the argument that s/he makes. Poisoning the well involves reinforcing prejudice about the opposition, making it difficult for opponents to be viewed fairly.

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Review: *Beautiful Evidence*, by Edward Tufte, Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press LLC. July 2006. 213 pages. ISBN-10: 0961392177.

Edward Tufte's books, workshops, and moderated online forum on the visual display of information have won him a cult following among designers and IT professionals. In *Beautiful Evidence*, Tufte elaborates principles introduced in *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information* (1983), *Envisioning Information* (1990), and *Visual Explanations* (1997). Tufte believes that information displays can and should more fully utilize the human capacity to visually process information. Illustrations should meet cartographic standards as high data-density, scaled and multi-layered color images representing large sets of multivariate contextualized data arranged adjacent in space within a single field of vision to facilitate comparison.

However, for the reader unfamiliar with Tufte's books, the above introduction is less than informative - a parade of abstract concepts in multisyllable. Verbal summaries of Tufte's ideas do not do them justice. Like its predecessors, *Beautiful Evidence* demonstrates rather than explains, taking the reader through a series of excellent, mediocre, and poor designs. Tufte explains the good and bad in these examples and how to improve them, going back and forth between art and science in testament to his belief in the "one deep communality of science and art: to show the results of intense seeing" (105). For Tufte, the content is the design; the data, not the layout, should be the focus of attention in the information display. From simple principles like designing tables with unobtrusive, thin gray lines to his controversial contempt for PowerPoint, his ideas on design and visual communication can be traced back to this insistence on clean, sparse, data-dense displays.

The first five chapters serve as a catalog of new and revised presentation techniques. Tufte begins with mapped pictures, which he defines as "representational images with scales, diagrams, overlays, numbers, words, [and] images" (13). Though designers have been overlaying photos with annotations for a long time, Tufte presents detailed guidelines for when and how to use them. Similarly, Tufte demonstrates how labeling and graphical differentiation can endow links and causal arrows with more explicit meanings, enhancing the presentation of causation and relationships. Tufte revises and codifies these common design elements to require creators to use them more consciously and purposefully.

Tufte also introduces a new technique called sparklines - word-like, inline, and high-resolution graphics representing quantitative information in context. Because sparklines are "adjacent in space rather than stacked in time" (63), the reader can easily compare large bodies of data by focusing on the shape of the sparkline in the context of a verbal explanation or of other sparklines.

Tufte then follows with the chapter "Words, Numbers, and Images - Together," in which he explains his own strict standards for mixing different modes of information. Tables and figures should not be segregated to the back of the book or even the next page, if possible. Explanatory numbers and images are integral components of the text to which they refer, necessitating that the entire explanation, regardless of the mode of the elements, be printed together in a single field of view. Throughout the book, Tufte follows his own advice, putting all images and illustrations inline and even printing references and notes in the right margin, directly beside the text to which they pertain. At no time does the reader have to flip pages back and forth to follow an argument.

The fifth chapter then summarizes Tufte's principles of analytical design, drawing on the preceding four chapters to outline a set of best practices of information design. While Tufte uses the Charles Joseph Minard illustration of French army losses during the 1812 invasion of Russia to explain each principle, this chapter is still more abstract and general than his usual style of breaking down example after example. However, Tufte's compelling portrayal of Minard's motives says as much about Tufte as it does about Minard. According to Tufte, the

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veteran Minard created this famous illustration to show empirically the human losses of war, making it an information display as anti-war poster. Tufte believes that the accurate and efficient display of complex information can affect decisions which affects lives, as can be seen in his analyses of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and the 1854 London Cholera epidemic in *Visual Explanations* (27). For Tufte, good design contributes to the greater good by enabling better-informed decisions, and his mission as a scholar is to improve the quality of information displays.

The next chapter, "Corruption in Evidence Presentations," ends with an elaboration on ideas expressed in *The Visual Display of Information* and a transition to the following chapter. Tufte offers graphic design, linguistic, and statistical critiques of how presentations meant to support a particular viewpoint ultimately corrupt the data and the research endeavor itself. This chapter stands out because some of the analyses focus on how non-visual aspects of design, like language and statistics, can obscure rather than clarify the data.

"The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint: Pitching Out Corrupts Within" is the second edition of a booklet originally published in May of 2003. Tufte's opinion of PowerPoint is that the built-in graph templates are "broken beyond repair" (153), and he goes on to make the case that "PowerPoint, compared to other common presentation tools, reduces the analytical quality of serious presentations of evidence" (157). Tufte's extremely negative assessment of PowerPoint has been a point of debate on the Internet, in blogs, and in reviews of his books since the booklet's first publication in 2003, a key event in the controversy over PowerPoint in schools. Some have accused the first booklet of being a vague, elitist attack with no concrete guidelines, but Tufte's revision adds practical advice for improvement. Other authors, inspired by Tufte's design philosophy, have undertaken the task of improving the use of presentation software; examples include Garr Reynolds' blog Presentation Zen (http://www.presentationzen .blogs.com) and the books Multimedia Learning by Richard E. Meyer and Beyond Bullet Points by Cliff Atkinson.

According to Tufte, the low resolution of PP slides minimizes the amount of information that can be presented on each screen, requiring a long series of slides to present content of any considerable complexity. "Information stacked in time makes it difficult to understand context and evaluate relationships. Visual reasoning usually works more effectively when the relevant evidence is shown adjacent in space within our eye span" (159). Though Tufte does admit that PowerPoint's "quick chunks of thin data may be useful [for] (flash-card memorizing)" (160) and "full-screen projected images and videos" (168), he considers PowerPoint unsuitable for portraying causality and relationships, which are necessary to build a well-structured argument.

Tufte's opposition to PowerPoint in schools begins with his belief that the tool resembles the toolmaker. PowerPoint's metaphor for presentations is that of the organization that created it - a large, hierarchical commercial bureaucracy of computer programmers and marketers. He suggests that a better metaphor for presentations would be teaching, because "the core ideas of teaching - explanation, reasoning, finding things out, questioning, content, evidence, credible authority not patronizing authoritarianism - are contrary to the cognitive style of PowerPoint." (161). According to Tufte, the philosophy of marketing, on which PowerPoint was designed, is incompatible with teaching, making the introduction of PowerPoint in schools "especially disturbing," because "[i]nstead of writing a report using sentences, children learn how to decorate client pitches and infomercials" (161).

Tufte's solution to PowerPoint is the printed handout. Rather than giving a marketing slideshow and one-sided talk followed by questions, Tufte suggests that presentations begin with "a concise briefing paper or technical report," for which he recommends a single sheet of A3 paper folded in half to make four double-sided pages. "Following the reading period, the presenter might provide a guided analysis of the briefing paper and then encourage and perhaps lead a discussion of the material at hand" (184). Tufte's position is that the higher data density

afforded by printed materials and the ability to mark up and then review the paper handout makes it a better communication tool than a linear progression of projected images.

The last two chapters relate loosely to the rest of the book in that they concern presentation, but the focus is on sculpture, not data. One chapter concerns pedestals in artistic and political statues; the other, Tufte's own landscape sculptures. The photos and design of both chapters meet the standards of the rest of the book, but some readers might at this point accuse Tufte of self-indulgence.

Tufte writes, designs, and publishes these books himself. As founder and head of Graphics Press, he has chosen skilled people who share his philosophy. The quality of the printing - from design and layout to choice of pigments and paper - reveals a painstaking attention to detail, which has produced visually compelling scholarly books suitable for both graduate syllabi and glass-top coffee tables.

Beautiful Evidence itself is an example of Tufte's high standards. Each topic within each chapter begins on a left and ends on a right page, making the two-page spread the basic unit of Tufte's arguments, thus giving the reader a single visual field of information at a time. All elements of the argument, regardless of the mode of expression, are kept adjacent in space to allow the reader to review and compare elements. The power of this layout shines in the first two pages of "Punning, Overreaching, and Economisting" (148-149), where he delivers a critique of David Galenson's *Painting Outside the Lines: Patterns of Creativity in Modern Art.* Instead of breaking the target text into quotations scattered throughout the argument, Tufte divides the two-page spread into three equal-width columns; he then prints the complete four-paragraph excerpt in the middle, framed by detailed analyses on the left and right. Yellow highlighting separates the excerpt into passages, and fine gray lines connect the passages to Tufte's commentary. Though one could argue that only an author with his own publishing house could pull this off, the layout allows the audience to read the passage in full, keeping the cited quotations in context and the entire linguistic analysis on one two-page spread. Allowing Galenson's text to stand on its own reassures the reader that Tufte is not quoting him out of context. Faithfully representing the object of the critique makes for a more elegant and more condemning argument, testimony to a principle that Tufte summarizes in a quotation from Eric Gill - "If you look after truth and goodness, beauty looks after herself" (2).

Upon finishing the book, *Beautiful Evidence* seems more like a collection of essays than a cohesive whole, probably because one chapter was previously published as a booklet and many more were developed through dialogues with readers on Tufte's moderated web forum "Ask ET" (http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/).

Regardless, *Beautiful Evidence*, like the three books before it, makes an informative and enjoyable read for any serious communicator. Also recommended is Tufte's web forum, where the reader can monitor and contribute to discussions that will probably become topics in future Tufte books.

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【書評】松尾寿子『国際離婚』
　　　（集英社新書　2005年6月22日発行　230頁　本体680円）　ISBN4—08—720298—4

　本書は自身が国際離婚の経験があってフリーライターであり、自ら「国際離婚を語りあう会」をネットに立ち上げその「ホームページにアクセスしてきた人たちに話をきいた」（26頁）ことを主体として国際離婚の持つ厳しい側面を伝え、また日本人に結婚とは何かを問いかけた貴重なものである。新書版であって簡潔で読みやすく、また参照文献などは学術書と同じスタイルで明記され、一般の読者はもとよりこの分野の研究者にとってもありがたい１冊だといえる。離婚に至るには結婚が前提であるが、国際結婚（英語でいうIntermarriage）にはいろいろな結婚形態がある。本書においては、日本人の女性が外国人男性と結婚し離婚に至るケースを念頭に置いて書かれている。

　全体はプロローグ、エピローグの他、９章で構成される。著者は第一章（29～48頁）で日本の国際結婚の歴史を簡単に紹介する。「1980年には、7261件だったが、2003年には3万6039件」（30頁）と報告する。その理由として海外旅行者の増加に伴う日本人女性の海外留学の増加で現地の男性と出会う例、それに日本に入国する外国人男性労働者の増加をあげている。さらに「一方で国際離婚者数が増えている事実はあまり知られていない」（34頁）と前置きし「1992年には、7716件だったが、2003年には 1万5256件」（35頁）と最近の増加傾向を指摘し、本書の問題提起をする。

　第二章（49～59頁）では「国際結婚が特殊なわけ」と題し日本人同士の結婚と違う３点、（1）結婚に伴う書類などの手配に時間を取られ「相手の人柄を見抜けない」（2）相手が外国人であるがために価値観などの「理想と現実の格差」（3）相手が外国人であるがために相手の家族や相手国の社会情勢などを含めた「相手の育ってきた背景が見えない」ことを指摘する。そして「相手の人物像をもう少し掘り下げて観察したり、知的関心の持ち方にも注意を払うべき」（58頁）と警告する。

　第三章（61～78頁）は国際結婚が国際離婚に至る大きな要因の一つであるDV（ドメスティック・バイオレンス）について考察する。著者は「国籍や人種はまったく関係ない」「職業や学歴も関係」なく（62頁）DVが起こると前置きし、特に外国に移住した場合日本人妻がDVの原因になると論じる。日本人妻は「経済力が消滅する」「言葉に慣れず」「社会システムがわからなければ、土地勘もない。周囲に家族や友人がいないため、孤立」（63頁）するという妻の弱い立場が、暴力性を内包している夫はDV夫に変貌すると分析する。少々短絡的ではあるが、『Women on the Verge』（2001）のKaren Kelskyを参照して国際結婚は「弱者の輪」であり日本人女性との結婚は外国人男性が「自分の弱さをカモフラージュするため」（76頁）という一般化はおもしろい。大半のDVは夫が起こすのであるが、女性がDVの加害者になる可能性があること、また外国では日本と違い「女性側からのささいな暴力を『カットなってのことだから・・・』で見逃す社会ではない」（77頁）ことを強く認識するようアドバイスしている。

　第四章（79～101頁）は国際離婚に伴う大きな問題のひとつである、夫婦間に子供がいた場合の親権問題を扱う。ここでは事例として、配偶者が一方の配偶者に無断で子供を国外に連れ去ることを扱う。日本が1980年に採択された、"Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Abduction"（国際的な子の略奪の民事面に関する条約）を批准していない事実を指摘

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し、日本の裁判所や外務省、日本大使館が何の助けもしてくれないことで残された配偶者は途方にくれると報告する。またアメリカで日本人妻が夫から誘拐罪で訴えられたケースと、さらにイスラーム社会では、離婚後の子供の養育は基本的には父親が受け持つ、ということを紹介している。しかしながら日本の警察や司法がまったく無力でないことを2000年オランダ人男性と日本人女性の判例などを説明し強調している。いずれにしても、著者も言及するように「最大の悲惨さは子供の権利がオヤのエゴによって略奪される点」（81頁）ではないだろうか。

　第五章（104～119頁）では開業医である野口力さんという日本人男性（50歳）とフランス人妻との25年前の出会いから離婚調停裁判で離婚が成立しその後の家族の生活を「限られたケース」（105頁）として紹介している。そして、「過去にどんな苦しい出来事があったとしても、私達は失敗と成功の両面を丸ごと受け入れながら、前を向いて生きていくしかない」（129頁）とエールを送る。

　第六章（121～146頁）は「“移民”という身分への覚悟」と題して、幾例かの国際結婚を紹介しながら、夫の国で暮らすことのむずかしさを読者に訴える。海外で外国人の夫を持ち生活するというのは「ワクワクする異文化体験」（122頁）や「外国暮らしを楽しむような軽いものではないこと」（122頁）を強調してくれる。そして、結婚する日本人が外国で生きていくだけの覚悟があるのかを問いかけてくれる。最後に、「海外生活を選んだのも自分の責任」（145頁）で「夫婦関係が終末を迎えてしまったなら、その決着をつけるのは無論、『本人』以外の何者でもない」（146頁）と強い言葉を送る。

　第七章（147～159頁）では具体的に「国際結婚をする前と、した後の心がけておくべき」（148頁）ことを記述している。それらは、相手の家族のことを知り、相手の国の社会事情を勉強し、多くの友人を作り、健康保険を確保し、相手国の一般的な経済感覚を調べ、金銭の管理を書面で残したり、また自分の財産を自己管理すること、就業する機会を持つこと、語学学習やボランティアを積極的にすることなど、多岐にわたっている。また、最後に「海外生活の最終目標は自分の『収入』を自分の力で得ること」（159頁）と記し、国際結婚・離婚の経験者として非常に強い言葉ではあるが、まったく共感する。

　第八章（161～194頁）は、「国際結婚が破綻したとき」と題して、日本人女性と外国人男性の国際離婚を主に考えてアドバイスが書かれている。例えば、当たり前のようなのだが、なかなかわからない法律上の離婚手続きが違うことをよく知ること。「日本での離婚手続きは、世界に類を見ないほど、お手軽」（176頁）と書いてあると外国の法律上のむずかしを察しできる。また「文化の違いが引き起こす深刻な問題」（188頁）として幼児と日本人の母親が一緒にバスタブにつかっている写真を法廷でみせられ性的虐待だと訴えられたケースもあるとして紹介している。いずれにしても著者は、孤独に陥らないで、離婚を考えている女性たちのグループなどに参加するよう勧めている。

　第九章（195～211頁）では、21世紀を迎えて日本人女性の国際結婚に対する意識が変わってきたとし、「法律婚」をしないで「事実婚」をしている人たちが増えていると報告する。このことを著者は多様化する女性の生き方が今後ますます結婚形態を変えていくと感じ、多くの国際結婚・離婚にかかわる人たちの結婚に対するイメージが画一化されていて、保守的であったと指摘する。

　本書は簡潔な4文字タイトルで「国際離婚」としているが「国際離婚」だけを扱ったものではない。また国際離婚の法律のアドバイスや、国際離婚のカウンセリングを目的としたものではない。さらに、複雑な質問票を利用して離婚者の経験を数量化したものでない。かといって、事例を一つ一つ紹介して、ただ興味本位に国際離婚をした人たちの悲劇を紹介したものでもない。本書は、多くの事例を通して、また著者自身の経験を通して、国際結婚への個人的な見解が的確に語られ、さらに結婚することの意義、特にこれからますます増えると考えられる国際結婚を考える上でとても貴重なものであるといえる。著者は、決してただ「単なる憧れや見栄で国際結婚をするな！」というメッセージを送っているわけでもない。結婚とは自分というものに他人を受け入れ、お互いを成長させるものだと考える。

　残念ながら本書では、国際離婚における子供たちへの影響がほとんど語られなかった。第四章で著者は子供の親権について言及するし、第五章でも野口さん夫妻の子供のことが少し語られたのだが。多くの国際離婚では実際に二つの文化，社会，国家をはさんで子供の生活や将来に何らかの影響（物理的・心理的）を与えているに違いないと私は感じる。今後、この点について報告していただける機会があるといい。

　著者の意見が読みやすく的確に語られた本書を、外国人と親密なお付き合いをされている方はいうまでもなく、多文化共生や異文化コミュニケーションなどを学ぶ大学生などにも是非一読していただきたいとお勧めする。

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